

CIRCLE publication 14

METROPOLISES
METROPOLISES OF EUROPE
DIVERSITY IN URBAN CULTURAL LIFE

Editors:
Dorota Ilczuk and Yudhishtir Raj Isar

Production co-ordination: Magdalena Kulikowska

Warszawa 2006

CIRCLE
Pro Cultura

COLOPHON

CIRCLE publication 14

@ Carla Bodo, Simona Bodo, Lluís Bonet, Yudhishthir Raj Isar, Christopher Gordon, Dorota Ilczuk, Sofia Joons, Krisztina Keresztély, Kira Kosnick, Kazimierz Krzysztofek, Mikko Lagerspetz, Rafał Pankowski, Kirill Razlogov, János Zoltán Szabó, Nada Švob-Đokić, Jan Stanisław Wojciechowski

CIRCLE

PKPP - Polish Confederation of Private Employers
Brussels Office (temporary address)
49, Rue de Treves, Bte 7
1040 Brussels
www.circle-network.org

Editors: Dorota Ilczuk, CIRCLE/Pro Cultura/
Jagiellonian University/SWPS

Yudhishthir Raj Isar, Jean Monnet Professor
The American University of Paris

Proofreader: Anna Minczewska-Przeczek

Production co-ordination: Magdalena Kulikowska,

Production: Pro Cultura Foundation

Design cover and lay out: Agata Ilczuk,
Melania Łuczak

Printed by: AG Poligrafia

All rights reserved

No part of the material protected by this copyright may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owners.

ISBN 83-923359-0-2

This publication was made possible thanks to the financial help of the European Commission, Warsaw City Hall, CIRCLE, City of Rome and Province of Rome, Council of Europe



CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	8
Introduction by Dorota Ilczuk and Yudhishthir Raj Isar	10
Diversity in urban cultural life: some general observations, and particular trends exemplified in the city studies by Christopher Gordon	28
CITY REPORTS	
Cultural diversity and intercultural policies in Barcelona by Lluís Bonet	42
Budapest: regaining multiculturalism? by Krisztina Keresztély and János Zoltán Szabó	
Cultural diversity and cultural policies in the metropolitan area of Rome by Carla Bodo and Simona Bodo	64
Tallinn as multicultural city: structures, initiatives, debate by Mikko Lagerspetz and Sofia Joons	82
Warsaw: a city of reviving multiculturalism by Dorota Ilczuk (in co-operation with Kazimierz Krzysztofek, Rafał Pankowski and Jan Stanisław Wojciechowski)	104
ADDITIONAL PAPERS	
Cultural Policy Discourse and Diversity Management in Berlin by Kira Kosnick	128
The Promotion of Cultural Diversity Through Integration Policies in Helsinki by Ritva Mitchell	144
Moscow: The Melting Pot Under Pressure... by Kirill Razlogov	168
Expressions of cultural diversity in Zagreb by Nada Švob-Đokić	224
INFORMATION ABOUT CIRCLE	232
INFORMATION ABOUT THE PRO CULTURA FOUNDATION	238

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This volume is the result of a collaborative effort. There are many individuals and institutions to be acknowledged and thanked.

First the Editors should like to thank the European Commission for the grant which made the project possible. *CIRCLE (Cultural Information and Research Centres Liaison in Europe)*, together with its partners: the Polish *Fundacja Pro Cultura (Pro Cultura Foundation)* and Italian *Associazione per l'Economia della Cultura (Association of Cultural Economics)*, realised the year-long project with great effort and passion.

We are grateful to the City of Rome as well as the Province of Rome authorities for their financial support and to the *Association of Cultural Economics*, especially to its director Carla Bodo, for organising the working meeting held in Rome in February. Thanks are also due to the Warsaw City Hall for co-financing the Round Table Conference held in Warsaw in September 2005, and in particular to Mr. Janusz Pietkiewicz, the director of the City Hall Theatre and Music Office for his understanding and care. We thank the Council of Europe for financing the flights of conference participants from Eastern Europe. We highly appreciate the role played by the *Pro Cultura Foundation*, especially the work of its co-ordinator Magdalena Kulikowska, and the team of volunteers who contributed to the organisation of the Warsaw 2005 Round Table.

The warmest thanks are due to the researchers who provided the city reports and wrote the additional contributions.

We also wish to thank certain individuals for their different contributions: Diane Dodd, Janusz Palikot and János Zoltán Szabó.

INTRODUCTION

by Dorota Ilczuk and Yudhishtir Raj Isar¹

The present volume is the outcome of a CIRCLE research project entitled *Metropolis of Europe – Urban cultural life and inter-city cultural interactions for “cultural diversity” in Europe* which was financed in 2005 under the European Commission’s programme of “Preparatory actions for cooperation on cultural matters”.

The acronym CIRCLE stands for “Cultural Information and Research Centres Liaison in Europe”, an independent pan-European network of researchers that has functioned since 1984 as a think-tank on a wide range of cultural issues. CIRCLE has also cooperated with university departments, arts institutions, research organisations, national ministries, arts councils, documentation centres and cultural networks. In these collaborations, we have acted as an intermediary and have always sought to ensure that our debates as well as our findings reach all those in a position to act upon or benefit from them. We have consistently identified front-edge issues and mapped the existing information and knowledge base, making new knowledge available through on-line resources and databases. For more than two decades, therefore, CIRCLE has occupied a place of influence in European cultural policy debate.

The current project, CIRCLE’s most recent endeavour, emerged from the need to map the rapidly changing landscape of cultural diversity in Europe’s cities. For contemporary migratory flows and diasporas are generating challenging new variants and mixes of cultural difference. Europe has a long tradition of cultural plurality, to be sure, but today’s developments are novel and our societies have no alternative but to address unprecedented patterns of interaction with newcomers and their offspring that did not have to be faced by any earlier society. Cultural diversity, whether it is new or of the traditional variety, is now experienced in contexts and situations that call for new concepts or radical redefinitions of old ones – not least of which is the place of cultural belonging and cultural difference in human, social and political life in general. While many of the issues can be posed at nation-state level, they are experienced most acutely in our metropolitan cities, which have become veritable ‘laboratories’ for new multi- and inter-cultural processes; it is here that the policy-makers, individuals and communities alike face the greatest challenges.

Hence the questions we sought to pose: Have contemporary European societies, in particular cultural leaders and managers in our major cities, developed a clear vision of the policy challenges of cultural diversity? To what extent are they exploiting the potential of our urban spaces in ways that can contribute to better multi- and intercultural cooperation? In what ways are they fostering culturally diverse artistic/cultural expression at the local and international levels? What new elements does globalisation bring to the rhetoric and practice of ‘cultural diversity’? The research

1. Dorota Ilczuk, Professor of Humanities and Cultural Management, Warsaw School of Social Psychology, President of the Pro Cultura Foundation, President of CIRCLE.
Yudhishtir Raj Isar, Jean Monnet Professor of Cultural Policy Studies, The American University of Paris, President of the European Forum for the Arts and Heritage.

was therefore designed to explore recent developments, with a view to eliciting and analysing comparative empirical data and with a focus on different forms of artistic practice and involvement. Which forms have been validated, sustained and developed? As cities have become increasingly plural in the cultural origins and affiliations of their populations, what cultural changes have occurred? In what ways have cities been “laboratories” for new fusions and interactions? Have hybrid forms emerged through the increasing coalescence of artistic grammars and vocabularies?²

The notion of ‘cultural diversity’ is used in many ways and as a phenomenon it is itself highly diverse, but the questions we posed emerged from an understanding that has come to dominate the social and cultural policy landscape across Europe, i.e.

“ethnically marked cultural differences associated with the international movement of peoples, and within national territories, the claims to difference associated with the protracted struggles of indigenous minorities to maintain their identity. These are distinguished from other diversities by the respects in which they challenge the basic grammar of national cultures in emerging from relations between peoples, cultures and territories which cannot be reconciled with nationalist projects; they also involve forms of difference that have been tangled up with the histories of racism and colonialism which have played so crucial a part in the process of nation formation.”³

This citation is from Tony Bennett’s introductory synthesis, in the volume entitled *Differing Diversities*, of the findings of a Council of Europe ‘transversal’ study of diversity policies in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Canada. This volume is emblematic of the way in which the discourses of democracy and inclusion, heretofore largely confined to countering income inequality and the unequal distribution of social and cultural capital within societies that were relatively homogeneous culturally, now emphasise new categories of inclusion and exclusion created by contemporary migratory flows. The latter have introduced new dimensions of ‘difference’, diversifying the composition of all European societies, some to a greater degree than others.

Bennett’s synthesis, which provides an excellent conceptual toolkit for this entire discussion, also sets out five frameworks for policy and practice that cut across all the dimensions of social and cultural diversity, whether economic, social or ethnic. *Civic contexts* concern the ways in which civic rights are distributed across different groups and the kinds of divisions thus established between different sections of the population in terms of their cultural rights and entitlements. *Administrative contexts* and their policy dynamics, whether devolved or centralized, whether direct or at arm’s-length, and the

2. Our original research design also included an inter-city component, hence the notion of “inter-city cultural interactions” in the project title. Our intention was to explore inter-city interactions and co-operation in particular. We wanted to discover what culturally-diverse forms and practices provide the core of exchanges between and among European cities. This objective turned out to be unrealistic. For one thing, there is hardly any inter-city cooperation at this level. More importantly, however, mapping policy frameworks, institutions, budgets and implementation as regards the cultural diversity situation within each urban setting was itself a task of sufficiently broad proportions to entirely absorb the resources at our disposal.

3. Bennett, T. (2001) “Differing Diversities. Cultural policy and cultural diversity”, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.

increasing tendency to conscript communities as agencies of cultural governance are also key areas of concern. *Social contexts* refer to the social objectives that cultural diversity policies are connected to, usually in ways which either qualify or give a particular inflection to those policies. *Economic contexts* are linked to the perception that diversity constitutes a cultural resource that provides economic benefits and the ways it is sought to be managed as a result. Finally, *conceptual contexts* are delineated by how widely the concept of culture is understood, for this in turn can define the scope and directions of cultural diversity policies. In this regard, it is particularly important, as Bennett has observed, to

“revise such conceptions in order to attend to the flows and crossovers between cultures, and the patterns of their intermingling that are produced by the movement of peoples and the restless cultural mixing that now characterises developed cultural markets.”

Four principles enumerated by Bennett also helped frame the research (in which we replaced the term ‘society’ by that of ‘city’) and are worth citing *in extenso* here:

- 1) an entitlement to equal opportunity to participate in the full range of activities that constitute the field of culture in the society in question;
- 2) the entitlement of all members of society to be provided with the cultural means of functioning effectively within that society without being required to change their cultural allegiances, affiliations or identities;
- 3) the obligation of governments and other authorities to nurture the sources of diversity through imaginative mechanisms, arrived at through consultation, for sustaining and developing the different cultures that are active within the populations for which they are responsible;
- 4) the obligation for the promotion of diversity to strive to establish ongoing interactions between differentiated cultures, rather than their development as separated enclaves, as the best means of transforming the ground on which cultural identities are formed in ways that will favour a continuing dynamic for diversity.

Putting it somewhat differently, our point of departure was that cultural difference, in both its old and new forms, has a considerable and positive impact on contemporary popular life. This is particularly true in Western Europe. In the process, both ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ (or ‘immigrant’) cultures are profoundly affected. The latter are exerting an inspiring and vital influence on the culture life of the whole city. The encounter with them is broadening horizons, promoting an understanding of the globally driven and

multicultural world in which we all coexist. Hence the policy challenge of equity for immigrants and minorities far exceeds the requirements of bounded ethnic groups. This reality is somewhat novel though, as regards the new European Union Member States in Central and Eastern Europe. Their experience of 'multiculturalism' and beyond is far more limited. But worlds are on the move everywhere. Processes already familiar in Western (and to some extent Northern) Europe will gradually unfold in the new Member States as well. The cultural leadership in their major cities ought to be able to benefit progressively from the lessons learned elsewhere. For this reason, another objective of the research project was to put the issue on the city cultural policy agenda in this region in order to creatively benefit from one another and help identify the most effective policy solutions.

Six cities were chosen initially for comparative analysis of policy and practice related to contemporary cultural diversity as defined above: Barcelona, Budapest, Paris, Tallinn, Rome and Warsaw. Unfortunately, severe health problems at a relatively late stage of the work prevented the researcher working on Paris to complete his task and it was impossible to find a replacement at this juncture. Hence only five comprehensive city reports are to be found here: Barcelona (by Lluís Bonet), Budapest (by Krisztina Keresztély and János Zoltán Szabó), Tallinn (by Mikko Lagerspetz and Sofia Joons), Rome (by Carla and Simona Bodo) and Warsaw (by Dorota Ilczuk in cooperation with Kazimierz Krzysztofek, Rafał Pankowski and Jan Stanisław Wojciechowski).

The ongoing debate on cultural inclusion and exclusion (which was, for example, the theme of the 2005 "Inclusive Europe? Horizon 2020" conference organised in Budapest last November by the European Forum for the Arts and Heritage – EFAH – and the Hungarian Ministry of Cultural Heritage) as well as the elusive goal of 'integration' provided the backdrop to the questions posed. What kinds of sensitive policy frameworks and actions with regard to both 'minorities' and 'immigrants' will ensure true cultural citizenship for all?

At an early stage of the research, at a workshop held in Rome on 25 – 26th February, 2005 the city researchers recognised that there were considerable differences among the cities that were being studied. Hence a single shared analytical grid would not be feasible. Instead, however, they agreed to structure their approaches and findings into the following four major sections:

I. Portraying the city

General overview and 'culturescape'

II. Expressions of cultural diversity

How is cultural diversity reflected in the city life?

What is the degree of institutionalisation of cultural diversity in cultural life?

What is the multicultural 'offer'?

How institutionalised is the multicultural offer in the public, business and non-profit sectors?

III. Debate - Policies – Actions

IV. Conclusions

The city researchers were accompanied throughout the process by CIRCLE Board Member Christopher Gordon, who has contributed his general observations on the topic and its background (with particular emphasis on the debate in the United Kingdom) and has also grouped and analysed particular trends exemplified in each of the city studies. In so doing, Gordon has made our task as editors easier, for he has brought a synoptic gaze to bear critically on the material. For this reason his text follows this introduction and precedes the five city reports, providing not only a digest but a constructive synthesis. We shall therefore not duplicate its main findings here. Suffice it to say that the key policy questions which emerged from the city reports pertained to the following: cultural institutions, language and territory, citizenship and minorities, lifestyle and social cohesion.

The following general observations and/or policy prescriptions were also identified:

The cultural offer towards culturally-diverse groups (whether 'minorities' or immigrants) is still mainly an additional element of the cultural landscape;

Non-governmental institutions are the chief partners of the latter;

Spontaneous processes such as 'glocalisation' are in some cases filling the gap;

It is critically important to open up cultural institutions and subsidising mechanisms to projects emanating from diverse cultural groups;

Very little cultural policy as regards these culturally-diverse communities exists;

The elaboration of such policies is therefore critically needed;

In so doing, city authorities should learn how to make the best of the hybridizing experiences that already exist in order to strengthen local cultural forms and products as export items and to affirm their distinctiveness;

In short, the current processes of fusion, interaction and hybridization provide the key words for constructing sensitive policy leading to better social and cultural integration.

The following specific recommendations, as three steps, may be addressed to the so-called 'new' European democracies as they forge cultural policies appropriate to the needs of culturally-diverse citizens:

1. formal recognition (and increased legitimacy) of migrant communities' representative bodies;
2. equal opportunities of access to public cultural funding;
3. creation of public meeting spaces for a spectrum of different groups, where cultural exchange and interaction can take place.

Points such as these are made also in four additional short contributions from researchers who were enlisted to provide supplementary insights and/or analyses as the city mapping process progressed and who contributed actively to a Round Table organized in Warsaw on 23-24th September 2005 that was designed to review drafts of all the papers.⁴ Kira Kosnick has tackled some contradictions and unanswered questions as regards cultural policy discourse and diversity management in Berlin, Ritva Mitchell has observed recent developments in Helsinki while Kirill Razlogov reviews new trends in Moscow, characterising these as "the melting pot under pressure". Finally, Nada Švob-Đokić traces the beginnings of heterogeneity in Zagreb's hitherto rather homogeneous cultural cityscape.

We believe that all these contributions shed useful new light on the complexity of culture and identity in Europe's cities today and, correspondingly, on the complexity of the challenge confronting citizens as well as policy-makers as regards cultural integration in the broadest sense across the European continent. They show how Europe's increasingly diverse cities can or could invent new strategies for citizenship as the

"connective tissue of cosmopolitan planning. By this we mean not only equality of opportunity, but also critical respect for other cultures, reflecting the cultural diversity

4. This Round Table was organised by CIRCLE in cooperation with the Pro Cultura Foundation and the Warsaw School of Social Psychology.

of the city fully in public policy, public space and institutions...we do not counterpose recognition of cultural difference to equality but see them as interdependent. This has become more vital since class has become ethnicised, and so many inequalities which derive from low-paid manual labour or service work, poor housing and schooling are seen in terms of ethnic stigma, rather than class."⁵

The contributions that follow reveal success stories, as well as deep-rooted administrative and attitudinal barriers; enlightened attention to the cultural opportunities offered by minorities and migrants, as well as misguided and not always benign indifference. They help us understand why it is so difficult not only to negotiate differences across cultures in the urban setting and uncover some of the political and economic factors that create blockages and ambivalences. They show some of the ways in which city managers are contributing positively to cultural citizenship for the twenty-first century by creating the conditions that give newcomers a sense of cultural worth and belonging. But they also tell us that too many policy-makers have not yet seized such opportunities.

Above all they reveal the potential of a new cultural dynamic at work in our urban neighbourhoods. Seizing this new potential is not simply a matter of combating racism, xenophobia and intolerance – although doing so is indispensable – but as much, also, of giving dignity, voice and recognition in the public sphere to different cultural groups while constructing – negotiating – the shared identity of common citizenship. Above all they teach us, as Bhikhu Parekh has so aptly put it, that

"We cannot integrate *them* as long as *we* remain *we*; *we* must be loosened up to create a new common space in which *they* can be accommodated and become part of a newly constituted *we*".⁶

5. Jude Bloomfield and Franco Bianchini, "Planning for the Cosmopolitan City", COMEDIA, in association with the International Cultural Planning and Policy Unit, De Montfort University, Leicester, January 2002.

6. Parekh, B. (2000) "Rethinking Multiculturalism. Cultural Diversity and Political Theory". London, Macmillan.

DIVERSITY IN URBAN CULTURAL LIFE: SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS, AND PARTICULAR TRENDS EXEMPLIFIED IN THE CITY STUDIES

by Christopher Gordon⁷

"All immigrants and exiles know the peculiar restlessness of an imagination that can never again have faith in its own absoluteness... Because I have learned the relativity of cultural meanings on my skin, I can never take any one set of meanings as final... In my public, group life, I'll probably always find myself in the chinks between cultures and subcultures, between the scenarios of political beliefs and aesthetic credos. It's not the worst place to live; it gives you an Archimedean leverage from which to see the world."

– Eva Hoffmann (Lost in Translation)

Introductory remarks

The underlying question guiding the process and structure of the work commissioned by CIRCLE from five European cities in this survey was "can sensitive policy actions lead to better integration?" There was a reasonable expectation that out of this might emerge some concrete evidence, or at least advice, which could be of benefit to other cities wishing to improve their own engagement with the difficult issues around cultural diversity, in particular:

- enumerating challenges for policy makers, through identifying any significant gaps and/or weaknesses;
- recording observations on methodological challenges to assist policy progress and action.

In the light of differing national, regional and local history and practice, there was always going to be some difficulty in "reading results across", not least because accepted definitions and starting points just happen to be so different. To some extent the cities chosen for study were selected precisely *because* they were believed to have significantly interesting differences. They all have their individual histories underlying their current cultural diversity, which has taken place on different timescales.

We can see evidence of this historical aspect quite clearly from the changing terminology employed over the past fifty years or so, which has moved at different speeds in different locations. The first European countries to provide evidence of attempts to confront and resolve the issues which came to be recognised as significant were those with a recent/current history of immigration arising out of previous colonial power. This is particularly true of Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK, and to a rather lesser degree of Italy and Germany.

7. Christopher Gordon, independent expert in the sector of culture, CIRCLE board member.

At the same time the spotlight was beginning to focus sharply on the impact of migrant workers, often recruited as cheap labour to underpin the burgeoning economies of the industrially developed countries. These immigrant workers originated both from within the European Union (e.g. Italians and Portuguese in Luxembourg) and from elsewhere as large numbers of Turks, Albanians or Moroccans sought to improve their lot. Berlin was perhaps the highest profile individual case. Different again, but just as significant has been the example of countries such as Sweden which have allowed substantial immigration as a liberal response to crises elsewhere - as also happened in the UK in 1968 (Kenya) and 1972 (Uganda) when Asians - many of them fourth generation residents - were expelled from East Africa in their thousands. Since 1989 many of Europe's "new democracies" have had to deal with their own post-Soviet legacy, e.g. the very substantial Russian "minority" which has remained in Latvia and Estonia, while the EU as a whole since the new accessions of 2004 (and with Bulgaria and Romania waiting in the wings) is having to try and square its liberal rhetoric with the reality of "mobility of labour" and open competitive markets.

As a consequence of the post-colonial migrations into Europe from the late 1940s onwards, the tentative first moves within cultural policy and local government practice tended to use well-meaning, but ghettoising, terminology such as:

ethnic minority arts

which subsequently came to be expressed more generically as:

multiculturalism, then

cultural diversity

and now interculturalism

The changes in terminology – whatever national policy may intend regarding assimilation or independent mutual tolerance and respect, a "culture of cultures" – reflect a much greater acceptance that it is not a question of "containing" (or helping "preserve") something imported, but rather of allowing for development and cultural miscegenation. The "progressive dilemma" (see UK digression below) as it is being debated post 9/11 and within Europe particularly since the Paris, Madrid and London bombings is shifting intellectual and political attention onto the compatibility of a liberal cultural diversity with the solidarity necessary to the operation of a "modern" welfare state in the 21st century. In the case of the eight new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe

(exemplified in this study by Warsaw and Tallinn) this dilemma is further complicated by the fragile progress towards market economies.

Defining the context: the Council of Europe, UNESCO and the European Union

As has so often been the case since the end of World War II, the interlinked agendas of cultural development and other policy areas have been furthered by international bodies which are not constrained (at least in policy and research terms) by national political and economic considerations. It is to the credit of the Council of Europe (CoE) that its own research and exemplary projects since the 1970s have always sought to contextualise cultural policy with its human, territorial and economic aspects. Whilst it is an inter-governmental body, the CoE's strong constitutional links with regional and local government, as well as with NGOs, the cultural sector itself and the academic world, have often enabled it to engage at a more "meaningful" level of socio-cultural policy than many national governments have been able to achieve. It was in this spirit that it initiated the "transversal" research project that culminated in the volume *Differing Diversities* edited by Tony Bennett that has been referred to in the co-editors' Introduction.

UNESCO's World Commission on Culture and Development (whose report, *Our Creative Diversity*, appeared in 1996) advocating a fundamental rethinking of cultural policy, particularly in an era of globalisation and international interdependence, with a particular emphasis on the interactions between cultural factors and development processes.

It is also relevant to mention the research study into cultural policy and social exclusion within the EU which was commissioned in 2002. The originator within the European Commission itself was the DG for Employment and Social Policy, which following the Nice Summit at the conclusion of the French Presidency in December 2000 had correctly identified the failure of most EU member states to include any consideration of cultural factors in their ongoing National Action Plans for Social Inclusion (NAPs), and wished to address this failing with evidence. The overwhelming concern of the member states in their NAPs was with the economic and employment issues, with social and educational aspects as a sub-set. The reality of "cultural" factors as a massive "hidden" influence hardly emerged at all as an issue in what the countries had submitted to the Commission. Cultural diversity and immigration were, not surprisingly, constant themes in the eight EU member states studied by the research team.⁸ However, no attempt appears to have been made by the Commission to link the common agendas of the respective DGs for Social Affairs and for Education and Culture (despite the Treaty of Rome's Article 151.4 which enjoins the Community "to take cultural aspects into account in its actions under other provisions of this Treaty").

8. The main countries in the study were Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

A changing context and the contemporary challenge

The diversity, individualism and mobility that characterise developed economies – especially in this era of globalisation – mean that we will spend an increasing proportion of our lives amongst “strangers” with whom we must share. As countries and cities become more diverse, the old (often assumed and undefined) “common culture” is eroding. Sharing only works amicably on the basis of certain fundamental common values and assumptions. This is a central dilemma of political life in developed societies: sharing and solidarity, the key bonds in society, may increasingly conflict with diversity. The logic of solidarity relies on the drawing and acceptance of some fairly arbitrary boundaries. The logic of diversity lies in an ability and willingness to cross them. Simple old-fashioned assertions of group identity would now conflict with both the rule of law and the principle of equal treatment under the law now enshrined in the legal codes of all EU member states, deriving from the European Convention on Human Rights.⁹

The democratic debate and negotiation about mutual obligations and the collective choices on offer at any given time are filtered through the media, much of which has a tendency to be populist, sensational, demagogic and reactionary. This inevitably puts liberals – people who value both solidarity (social cohesion and generous welfare policies) and diversity (equal respect for “different” values and ways of life) – on the defensive. David Goodhart has termed this the “America versus Sweden” dilemma. It is a particularly “European” issue, with the post-war Welfare State under increasing attack from right-wing political movements and their intellectual acolytes and economic gurus, highlighting the systemic link between taxation and universal welfare. Goodhart argued that liberals who desire diversity may thereby be unintentionally helping to undermine the broad post-war moral consensus necessary for a large welfare state to function effectively. Ironically, the political broad Left’s espousal of diversity may be beginning to damage the very people whose values they set out to champion in the first place. We have already seen some aspects of this at work in the results of the French and Dutch referenda on the new EU “constitution”, with a particularly negative focus on the poorer southern and east European states and on Turkey, left on the sidelines. A generous welfare state system may well be incompatible with open borders, as Europe’s mostly high-density populations seem to be saying with their demand for more transparent rules which are seen to work “fairly” – in both directions.

9. This reasoning draws on David Goodhart’s 2004 provocative but thoughtful Prospect article.

A post-7/7 UK digression

The group of “metropolis” cities included in CIRCLE’s study – Barcelona, Budapest, Rome, Tallinn and Warsaw have all produced evidence of trends and practice which is relevant for future policy development more generally. London, which was not included in the study group, has the dubious distinction of having been the only “Western” city targeted by suicide bombers, something so horrific that the UK government was initially quick to deny it (in response to media speculation based on eye-witness survivor reports) even as a possibility. Since the July 2005 suicide bombings in London (7/7) the right wing press and media in Britain have predictably been extremely vocal. In this context, it seems relevant and instructive to consider some of the effects (good and bad) on public and political attitudes in respect of multiculturalism. There is parallel comment in the Italian and Hungarian studies about a tendency of certain politicians to seek to put a negative “spin” on the subject.

In the vanguard has been the veteran Conservative Party politician Lord Tebbit, who has seized the opportunity to revive controversy over his notorious 1990 “cricket test” of immigrant loyalty. Tebbit is now claiming that had his warnings been heeded, the 7/7 bombings would have been “less likely”. He has specifically condemned multiculturalism for undermining “British society”, claiming that a multicultural society is an impossibility – “a society is defined by its culture. It is not defined by its race, it is not a matter of skin colour or ethnicity, it is a matter of culture. If you have two cultures in one society, then you have two societies. If you have two societies in the same place then you are going to have problems, like the kind we saw on 7th July, sooner or later.”¹⁰

But it was clearly *not* an excess of culture that set the bombers off on their deadly mission on 7th July. It is surely primarily a lack of social “connectedness” to others that enables such callous fanaticism to exist, regardless of whether it was “home grown” or externally encouraged and assisted. On the optimistic side, one of the most notable features of Londoners’ reaction to the bombings – at the “average” citizen level – has been the bringing together of disparate communities of people in multicultural solidarity, given that they were *all* indiscriminately targeted. People appear to be confirming that, despite the current media frenzy, they see multiculturalism on balance as a good and positive force in society (confirmed by an unscientific London opinion survey resulting in above 70% agreement).

10. The suggestion was that if UK immigrants or their descendants supported, say, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh or the West Indies (i.e. their family’s country of origin) when playing cricket against England, then they would fail the test as “loyal” British citizens. Despite his strenuous denials of any racist element in his critique, Tebbit never seems to have openly questioned the loyalties of immigrant Australians, New Zealanders, white South Africans or Zimbabweans who have chosen to “return” to the “home” country. It is interesting to note from the UK Office for National Statistics (2004) that their processing of the 2001 National Census shows that 80% of the UK’s black Caribbean community classified themselves nationally as “British, English, Scottish, Welsh or Irish”, with over 75% of the Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi community also identifying themselves in this same way.

Tebbit's brand of thinking ignores the reality of the majority of European citizens in the 21st century living comfortably with multiple identities. In complex societies the capacity to move easily within and between different identities (family, class, locality, profession, religion, interests, race, nationality etc.) is generally regarded as a mark of maturity. In the UK, following political devolution to Scotland and Wales in 2001, nobody has seriously questioned groups' identifying with more than one territory and more than one culture making them any less "British" than Tebbit assumes he is. The second generation Indian comedians who created BBC TV's hugely successful *Goodness Gracious Me* (the title itself being an ironic take on Peter Seller's blacked-up caricature Indian doctor in the 1960 film *The Millionairess*) have a well-observed running gag about two immigrant Indian families trying to outdo each other in their ludicrous attempts to seem more English than the English.

Goodhart's thesis is predicated on the belief that there may now be an inherent conflict between diversity and solidarity, arguing that systems which have to adapt to the shock of rapid change (not least the demographic consequences of immigration) inevitably have trouble in absorbing those influences. After three hundred years of homogenisation through industrialisation, urbanisation, war and politically centralised nation-building (the last of which has all but destroyed any local government justifying the name in England), the British *as individuals* have become freer and more varied. Over half a century of peace, prosperity and mobility have encouraged greater diversity in lifestyles and values, two major waves of immigration having contributed significantly to this. However, Goodhart reminds us that assumptions of kinship and shared interest underpin the everyday decisions governments are obliged to make over the distribution of finite resources. We need to remember that "before the 20th century, today's welfare state would have been considered contrary to human nature."

Multiculturalists would argue that a single "national" story is *never* a reliable basis for a common culture, because that will always be contested from within by class, geography, historical interpretation and religion.¹¹ However, we are more likely here to be thinking in terms of different versions of a shared story, which does not bind anyone to a single narrative or rigidly defined and artificial national identity.

11. The "Anglo-centric" view of UK governments in London is still seen by many as a major continuing problem, despite devolution of much political authority back to Scotland and Wales in 2000. The evidence of many of today's surviving Scottish institutions – legal, religious and educational (as well as a surprising amount of common dialect including slang and gastronomic terms) – betrays their origins in the "Auld Alliance" with France against the English. The French alliance formed the main plank of Scottish foreign - and much commercial - policy from 1295 to 1560, after which Protestantism (in Scotland French/Swiss Calvinist Presbyterianism, not Lutheranism) gave Scotland and England an influential shared agenda, the downside of which is still to be felt in Ireland today.

Common and significant themes to emerge from the research

Because the historical and "cultural" circumstances of each city in the chosen group are so different, it is hard to deduce any meaningful priority list of broad conclusions. Nevertheless, there are many common factors – which may, according to the particular case, pull in rather different directions. With the primary research questions converging on improving the chances of successful integration, it comes as no surprise that some of the minority "cultural" (in a broad sense) factors seem to assume almost equal importance alongside legal considerations in relation to effective policy development and action. The brief however implies that social and (narrowly defined "arts") cultural policy are inextricably linked. Of course they are, but government and civic policy as it has been formulated and expressed does not always reflect this reality. The cultural factors are a massive influence in any ability to integrate.

We have, for example, a fair amount of information about the relative failure of major publicly funded cultural institutions to pay anything more than lip-service to minority issues. This is, one suspects, not a consequence of any deliberately exclusionary policy, but simply evidence of how the prevailing structural and economic constraints operate. One needs to bear in mind here the fundamental difference between how cultural policy has traditionally been formulated in Mediterranean countries (institutions outwards), and at the other extreme in the Nordic countries (people as individual citizens upwards).

Fundamental to any rational analysis and understanding is the issue of definitions. The Rome report is particularly clear and helpful about the confusions here. Whilst on the one hand local authority policy, programmes and actions have tried to engage in supporting "cultural diversity" over at least the past decade, different understandings seem to have hampered progress – with "multiculturalism", "interculturalism" and "cultural integration" often being used as if they were interchangeable. The broadly understood sense of "cultural integration" is being tackled at the level of encouraging meaningful civic participation and political representation of minority and migrant communities (i.e. moving beyond minimum social protection).

The second sense around a much narrower understanding of "cultural policy" is hardly registering – with official bodies content (no doubt partly for economic priority reasons, as they would see it) to relegate the issue to the domain of *animation socio-culturelle* or *soziokultur* which they do not understand to be within their central brief. This confusion at both levels is perhaps illustrated most spectacularly in the Tallinn study which states that "the number of immigrants to Estonia from countries outside the former Soviet Union has until now remained almost insignificant. In fact the need to develop a policy towards new immigrants has become apparent only very recently, partly due to Estonia's

membership of the EU. The discourse on migration-related issues has primarily been concerned with the Soviet-times settlers in the country." That difficult discourse will naturally coalesce around issues of citizenship/naturalisation, language, education and legitimacy, but the "cultural" measures of the city cited seem to come down to "direct and indirect support to activities of NGOs and amateurs." If one were, for the sake of argument, to substitute Narva (Estonia's "third" city with a population of almost 100,000, 96% Russophone)¹² for Tallinn – in the context of a small country with a population of only around 1.4 million – then such "cultural" measures would look even more marginal than they do already.

Agendas for sharing and discussion

What follows is an attempt to highlight nine important issues which emerge from the five studies and other papers, either overtly or else "between the lines". Mostly this is grounded in evidence or observations that seem to strike common chords – but a few "one-off" observations have also struck me as worthy of inclusion since they may reveal a much wider, but suppressed or unacknowledged, significance.

Language and Territory

It comes as no surprise to find that language, whether overtly or covertly, surfaces as a huge issue in the Barcelona, Budapest and Tallinn studies. However, the impact of this is interestingly different. From the **Budapest/Hungary** perspective, a key element of the capital's cultural identity is that it is the main symbol of survival for the substantial number of Hungarian speakers outside the country's present border. To some extent this is down to the immediate post-1956 diaspora, but mostly to the redrawing of lines on the map of Europe after 1918 when Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory. Current estimates show that there may be at least four million Hungarian speakers living outside the borders of the present day state of Hungary – a massive number when you recall that the country's population is just over 10 million. The study comments that there is a post-1989 pattern of net immigration of "Hungarians", although many of these people are in fact temporary residents, using Hungary (Budapest in particular) as a stepping-stone in the process of emigrating permanently elsewhere.

Estonian, like Hungarian, is a difficult language for foreigners, something which happily helped sustain and preserve sufficient live vestiges native culture despite the relatively small population and the severe oppression they underwent. Nevertheless, language is seen as an extremely sensitive issue, as is also the case in neighbouring Latvia, a consequence of the very high proportion of Slavic Russian speaking residents.

12. Sourced from Wikipedia, which currently has it that only about 20% of the Russophone community in Estonia were actually born in the country. The Tallinn study notes that pre-Second World War Estonia was ethnically relatively homogeneous, but that now "ethnic" Russians (both naturalised and "stateless") account for some 26% of the country's total population of around 1.4 million.

In Tallinn itself, the data shows us the Estonians account for 54%, with ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians making up 42%, with native Estonian speakers at 52.5% and Russophones at almost 45.5%. Since the number of Russians who took the trouble to learn to speak/read Estonian pre-1989 was extremely small, it does not require much imagination to understand how in urban areas (and obviously in Narva, like Daugavpils in Latvia, in particular) the most significant "minority" can almost feel like the "majority". Tallinn city's policies, according to the study can be seen as "balancing between official monolingualism and pragmatic bi- or multilingualism."

Poland with a parallel history of Soviet occupation, but with an indigenous (West) Slavic language and population of almost 40 million including only a minor residue of Ukrainians and Byelorussians (under 2% nationally) has no such language "problem" with Russian or East Slavic languages in real terms or symbolically. This is not to say that overt "anti-Russian" feeling is not present or exploited politically from time to time, but that target is not really symbolised linguistically. The Warsaw study makes reference to the political compromise that finally delivered in January 2005 the Parliamentary "Act on National Minorities and Regional Languages" which affords protection and certain rights to "historical national minorities", effectively on a pre-1989 definition which *excludes* more recent immigrants. Consequently those who in Western European countries – particularly those with a history of post-colonial immigration – would be termed "ethnic minorities" do not automatically share the same rights.

The **Rome** study reminds us that there was an abrupt shift in Italy around 1980 from the country habitually suffering net emigration to becoming a significant immigrant destination (although of course, as in Spain, there was major mid-century (and earlier) internal migration - from a poor agrarian south to the industrial cities of the north). The first legal attempt to regulate the growing wave of immigration was a law of 1990, which more or less granted amnesty, regularising the status quo up to 1989 and beginning to put integration measures in place. However, an influx of refugees from the civil war in ex-Yugoslavia across the Adriatic and from Romania, as well as substantial illegal immigration from Africa via Sicily rapidly upset this "balance" leading to stricter regulations and fuelling the xenophobic agendas of the Northern League. The Rome study has interesting data on "foreign" minorities, and their dispersal (mostly avoiding ghettoisation according to ethnicity). Because the origins of these minorities are very varied, language has not been a major stumbling block to the City's and Province's attempts to encourage meaningful civic participation of minorities.

With **Barcelona**, by contrast, both language and territory (which are inseparable) are *massively* influential considerations. As with all "minority" languages, Catalan's fortunes have long been bound up with regional political aspirations and comparatively recent

memories of the language's (unsuccessful) banning by Franco's oppressive centralising fascist state. However the "historical" region of Catalonia is perceived as including French Roussillon as well as the Balearic Islands, and much is still made of the "Euro-region". Given that the language is inside the DNA of Catalonia, it is not surprising that the Barcelona study draws considerable attention to the possible cultural and social effects of waves of migration by Castilian Spanish speakers both from within Spain, and more recently from Latin America, as well as Morocco.

"The Catalan language, identity and culture" the study declares "do not coincide with those of the Spanish state with which Catalonia is integrated." Given almost 200 years of attempts by the central state to eliminate difference, it is understandable that there is an acute sensitivity in Barcelona to staying dynamic through assimilating, adapting and reinventing its own identity. Distinctive elements of recent patterns of substantial immigration from outside the EU, it is suggested, may make this assimilation harder to achieve. The diversity of languages in use in the region is enormous (maybe more than 200), with some of them not even "official" languages in their states of origin – such as Peru, Ecuador, Morocco and Algeria, which can cause problems with consulate staff.

Citizenship and Minorities

Poland as a consequence of the Holocaust lost its rather rich history of multiculturalism, and then under communist further purges, deportations and assimilation policies was treated as an ethnically homogeneous country. Up until 1989 minorities were rigorously excluded from public life, and their cultural autonomy was suppressed. The Polish Jews of today do not see themselves as a "national minority" although they are empowered, under a law of January 2005, to claim this status. As it is, they are unique as a group in Warsaw in claiming legitimate institutional status as a religious community. Other minority groups with historic ties are specified as "ethnic minorities" and have a lesser degree of protection, which is not afforded legally to more recent immigrants.

Greater **Tallinn** which accounts for almost one third of the total population of Estonia is centrally caught up in the national dilemma about how best to regularise an imposed and inherited "minority" situation. The confusion and understandable tentativeness of the approach is highlighted by the fact that although Estonian is the sole official language, which governs employment and practice in all public administration, the state can only continue to function on the basis of pragmatic bi-lingualism.

Catalan integration puts the emphasis on territorial co-existence (though Spain exhibits a range of differing integration patterns). It is as yet unclear whether this rather liberal idea will be able successfully to integrate people with such widely varying economic and educational levels without producing a backlash. It remains to be seen whether large numbers of primarily poor economic migrants who have chosen the region solely for its wealth will be willing and able to adapt to the degree expected of them if the policy is to work.

Since the 1993 **Hungarian** Act on National and Ethnic Minority Rights (with 2005 revisions) legal authority has been given to self-declared members of minorities to set up parallel territorial local government units, which can elect their own representatives. In 1995 a public foundation was established with an annual budget of around 2 million euros to be applied to ethnic minorities. The Budapest study tells us that "In March 2005, the Hungarian Parliament officially declared the responsibility of Hungarian society for the Roma Holocaust. This move is a sign that the Roma population has come to be considered an integral part of Hungarian society, a notion that was completely taboo under state socialism". This is an important step within a system which requires at least one hundred years of continuous settlement within the borders as the benchmark of qualifying as a legally recognised minority. The report notes that with a history of attempts to stamp out nomadism going back at least to the times of Maria Theresa and Josef II in the 18th century, large numbers of Roma have been unwilling to self-define themselves into that identity.

The 1990 Regional legislation in **Lazio** (following the Italian government's model) established a right of non-EU immigrants to basic social services, healthcare and employment training, alongside the "safeguarding of their cultural identity." This is supported by an annual Action Plan to promote integration, but the funding allocated is wholly inadequate for the identified task. Against a background of national policy which the Rome study describes as "lurching from integration to expulsion", and with the openly xenophobic Lega Nord a key partner in the government coalition, it is difficult to predict progress with too much confidence.

Migrants

The studies enumerate and describe various categories of migrant communities or groups which are covered by the term. Some of these are helpfully clear in dispelling any mistaken assumptions about "migrant" status necessarily implying "disadvantage" in any particular way. Descriptive categories include the following:

- Economic migrants – from poor regions of the world

Economic migrants – from within the EU

Economic migrants from Eastern Europe (e.g. Romania)

Migrants from within the same national territory

Voluntary/temporary migrants (e.g. students)

Voluntary migrants from within EU (to work or retire)

The Barcelona study mentions the difficulties encountered in trying not to stigmatise the more “at risk” and non-EU categories. Particular problems seem to be encountered by the accompanying children, especially teenagers, of poor migrants seeking work. These young people find it hard to integrate at school if they do not yet speak the language – although it is pointed out that despite the added complication of a bi-lingual region, the traditional Catalan sympathy for minority languages can add some positive benefit. Students, by contrast will arrive in the city with an open and cosmopolitan frame of mind.

Identity

With a common perception of cultural identity so often being derived (whether consciously or not) from nationalism and the 19th century nation state, and with politicians and the media frequently so ready to regress into old stereotypes, it is not easy to maintain public discourse at any sophisticated level of reality. Since the July 2005 London bombings there has been considerable discussion about the rights of the British police to stop and search citizens on suspicion- fiercely contested since the 1970s. Because “Asian” appearance is likely to be a trigger, does this amount to racism? Or should that unpleasant thought be over-riden by the perfectly legitimate public concerns about security? Cultural diversity is certainly now a security policy issue. Besides, “British Asians” are a far from homogeneous group. We need to differentiate between a very wide range from the religious fundamentalists in Bradford who organised the bonfires of Salman Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses* (and whose families mainly came from remote villages on the Pakistan/Afghan border) to the burgeoning number of millionaire female entrepreneurs in the Midlands, whose parents were evicted from East Africa in 1968 and 1972.

So far as “legal” identity is concerned, the situation is variable and quite complicated. Because of the legislative ramifications, the studies all need to be read and understood on an individual basis. The Polish compromise legislation on the rights of “national minorities”, adopted earlier this year, creates anomalies which will presumably need to be addressed in the future. But it is also made clear that the Polish national census

does not allow for any declaration of “double identity”. Barcelona aims “progressively to define a respectful intercultural model while simultaneously reinforcing and enhancing the local Catalan identity.”

Policy

The studies all provide evidence of the difficulties in addressing any intercultural or integrationist agendas for cities as a direct consequence of their structural administrative arrangements. We have already noted in addition that underlying this there may be a more fundamental problem in how cultural policy is perceived as arising, with the Mediterranean and Nordic contrast. So long as neither social nor cultural policy makers will accept sufficient responsibility, it is likely that it will always be relegated as a task of lesser importance for someone else to deal with. The same thing happens, of course, between levels of government as well as inter-departmentally. In some countries this might be *structurally* true, but if central government doesn’t concern itself enough to understand and provide the redistributive resources to local government to act, then the results are likely to be patchy at best. Inevitably, work in this area is likely to be more overtly “political” than many cultural bureaucrats are used to having to deal with, and may feel it exposes them to risk, or to have to change their mindset.

Jude Bloomfield and Franco Bianchini have recently written wisely on this dilemma.¹³ In a section entitled “Rethinking City Practices” they identify a need to change mentality and practice in order to facilitate more pluralistic organisational ways of conceptualising and working. They also comment that it is often hard for cities to admit to making mistakes, so that they are unable to engage constructively in any open processes of social learning. Specifically they suggest a requirement for city governments to:

Revise administrative mechanisms across old departmental divides to facilitate brainstorming and problem-solving. The conversations it needs to ensure take place must tap the reserves of talent and ideas within the city and the regional authority’s own organisation and with partners throughout the diverse civil society.

Combine funding streams imaginatively so that they can integrate different dimensions of cultural diversity – such as integrating training with culturally sensitive health provision or educational programmes and workshops ... Improving evaluation enhances advocacy which helps to secure more continuity in funding.

The **Barcelona** study is candid about the city’s record in relation to diversity being more about crisis response and management than long-term strategy. However, it is complicated by City Action Plans and decisions which rule that immigrants receive equal

13. In *Planning for the Intercultural City* (2004).

treatment with other citizens (the same rights and duties) which thereby rules out any option of creating special programmes or budgets even in the short-term. The political desire to avoid any kind of well-meaning cultural policy *apartheid* is understandable, given the history of very mixed success elsewhere through the 1970s and 1980s. Still, triggering the support and resources which may be needed in the short-term is a vital step. This is not always easy in the context of a national system which through its decentralisation has only minimal effective coordination.

The **Tallinn** study draws attention to the problem that while *formally* established cultural minority umbrella organisations can offer a potential channel for policy engagement and development, they are likely to be restricted to linguistic, religious or cultural matters, thereby missing out on their social and economic position which is precisely what makes them more vulnerable than the rest of the population. Minor grant-giving to specified cultural NGOs doesn't begin to tackle to real underlying issues.

The **Warsaw** study observes that "minority culture" is still very much predicated on the city believing it is a mono-cultural entity – a concept which seems extremely static and passive to migrants. If the city is to achieve its aim of embracing minority contributions as part of its future cultural development strategy, then it surely must begin to treat these as integral rather than just additional?

Institutions

It follows from what has been reported about policy that the major cultural institutions are not particularly engaged with any minority or intercultural agendas, and still tend to take refuge in a rather traditional view of their own roles and place in society. This was very much borne out by the EU Commission research into cultural policy and social exclusion (2004), and all of the studies make reference to this phenomenon. Access – in a predominantly social and economic sense – is clearly a problem which is not being properly addressed, but that may well be an easier barrier to overcome than radically developing programme content.

The **Warsaw** study comments in general that any interest in minorities is poorly reflected at institutional level (as an afterthought, if at all), while any "actions taken by the central institutions continue the old-fashioned, state-centred cultural exchanges." The city of Warsaw still lacks any real policy context which might begin to address this and to show a proper concern extending beyond "religious rites and trading habits."

From **Rome** we learn that although the institutionalisation of migrants (in a social and political sense) has been taken seriously and is beginning to have something to show

for it, the cultural institutions themselves are lagging far behind. This is in spite of some successful individual initiatives and a positive history dating from Nicolini's period as *Assessore* from 1976-1986. Rome's libraries seem to have made a more positive effort. However, the study offers a telling quote from the city's current Cultural Policy Director that "more could be done... but the main responsibility for cultural integration of migrant communities should lie with the city's Department for Social Affairs." This comment belongs to a tradition of similar excuses since the late 1960s from cultural administrators. All manner of alibis – from what is stated in the Constitution to next year's likely budget – will continue to be adduced. The perpetual dilemma has recently been well expressed by François Matarasso as follows: „The emphasis in arts support has been too "supply side" which is literally insatiable. You need to empower the "demand side" in communities, neighbourhoods and towns with the resources for them to decide what they want."¹⁴

The Media

It may be that a certain concentration on good data-based evidence in the studies has limited somewhat more subjective comment on the role played by the media in relation to immigration and minority issues. What is drawn to our attention is the prevailing lazy and negative stereotypes which surface again and again in the tabloid press and talk shows.

The **Barcelona** study comments on the sensationalist crime angles, and the curious mixture of "morbid news and political correctness." The **Rome** study refers to little effort being made by the media to promote a better understanding of the issues, which always finds it easier to reinforce the negative paradigms of diversity, with particular distortion (which has been corroborated by good surveys) of the image of the Roma and Muslims. The **Warsaw** study specifically comments on limited – but nevertheless extremely damaging and actually criminal – pamphleteering behaviour of right-wing and even neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic groups which poisons the atmosphere. The perceived nature of a "homogeneous Polish society" coupled with the weak social position of many minorities makes it difficult to move to more positive agendas. On the other hand, there are individual civic initiatives which have had some success through publications for young people (associated with rock music, sport and film, for example) and a powerful and very articulate Jewish lobby able to make the most of its "national minority" protected status. It is observed in the Budapest study that in the Hungarian media "the majority of debates adopt the historical and traditional meaning of multiculturalism in Hungary... foreigners and new immigrants are very rarely mentioned in articles concerning multiculturalism."

14. Cited in *Changing Places* by Peter Hewitt (Arts Council England, 2005).

This appears to apply even to the more liberal press which one might expect to be more open-minded.

The key issue here is the usual one of relatively powerless groups of people having little or no real chance to represent themselves. Marginalised through their position at the very edges of society, having no voice, and being stigmatised through “fear of the unknown” they are unable to counter-present any positive images which might do something to shift prejudices. The **Warsaw** document comments on the need for self-representation as nobody else within the privatised burgeoning capitalist and globalising economy is likely to take up the cause, and intellectual and artistic élites have only very limited capacity for positive action. It adds, surely correctly however, that it does not necessarily follow that the market has to be dysfunctional for multiculturalism – as may be demonstrated, I believe, by some of the “lifestyle” developments. Media outlets in the hands of (or at least influenced by) minority migrant communities though do seem to play a vital role in promoting community cohesion and educating people to have a better understanding about the host country/city. Local press and radio (notably the fascinating and growing phenomenon of community radio) as media which are cheap to produce and operate have a vital role here (**Rome** has some success to report here, besides at least 28 dedicated newspapers, published in some 20 languages).

Lifestyle

One of the most common ways through which one can take the pulse of successful “integration” is through observing wider lifestyle changes brought about through the agency of the activities of minorities. This has usually nothing to do with policy as such, has little to do with the issues surrounding status or rights, and moves well beyond minority language newspapers and broad- (or narrow-) casting since it is more easily accessible to a wider community. It is mostly a by-product of cultural and economic activity in major cities. Whilst manifestations of this in food, markets, shops, convenience stores and through music, dance, film, video etc. may start out with a specific and narrow commercial market in mind, they often rapidly spread wider acceptance, interest and usage, together with hybrid new cultural forms.

The **Barcelona** study points out the importance of Internet centres as meeting points for low income immigrant groups, from which networks and solidarity can build. They also tend to be the starting off points for weekend evening entertainment. Bars, squares and beaches also provide socialisation spaces for cosmopolitan young people, with music style as an important defining characteristic. Support for local sports teams can also be an important shared bonding interest, particularly promoting the integration of young people. Library use in some of the poorer areas is high and increasing – largely the result of their offering free internet access. Commercial cinema is less buoyant (forms of cultural

supply in the city are being affected by the mass of tourists and affluent new foreign residents) but film and video clubs and hiring outlets can be important for particular minority groups, also possibly as *genre* specialists bridging into the wider community.

Warsaw is aware it needs to exploit many of the positive benefits of multiculturalism in order to promote the city as a lively contemporary place to visit, there is certainly a heightened sense of the importance of those networks, festivals and celebrations, and the development of a more cosmopolitan food culture. This seems to have been led by the immigrant Vietnamese community, who also ran fast food outlets in the city centre. They have also developed their own football league and music groups. Turkish cuisine is now also a growing phenomenon – though mostly run by Arabs rather than ethnic Turks. The different incoming groups are also beginning to develop their own sales outlets, and there are some excellent Russian bookshops.

Rome as the centre of a former world empire and home to the Roman Catholic Church has, despite its decline in Mediaeval times, never lost its cosmopolitan flavour. Nevertheless, so far as recent immigrants are concerned, it is felt that the considerable potential for sharing and cross-over activity between different cultures is largely untapped. **Budapest** is able to offer a quantity of “minority” cultural activity in their own centres or as part of “alternative” culture. The “official” outlets mostly seem to limit any engagement to cultural imports. The Merlin International Theatre has since 2003 aimed to provide a mixed programme featuring plays in foreign languages. On the streets the large Chinese market and a range of extraneous cuisines are having a visible and important effect on urban living.

Diversity and Social Cohesion

All the study cities to some extent recognise that as integration policy becomes more successful and effective, they will increase their attractiveness to new immigrants.

In the **Warsaw** document we read that a “new culture of borderlands on its territory will complicate the problem of balance between diversity and social cohesion”. As levels of affluence rise, the pattern is for low status immigrants to be permitted or encouraged (at least in the short term) to do the work that “natives” no longer will. The degree to which social problems arise and may begin to have a disproportionate effect on society seems partly to derive from “ghetto” concentrations. Both the **Rome** and **Barcelona** studies provide data and evidence suggesting that limited dispersal policies seem to work. The **Barcelona** paper also reminds us that contemporary metropolitan dynamism and service-based economies also require an influx of professional skilled labour which may have more mainstream preferences in cultural consumption.

In **Tallinn** it appears some of these inner city concentrations have been identified as problematic – particularly since “the districts with the highest percentage of ethnic minorities are also the ones showing the highest unemployment figures”. Furthermore, this is against a background of the labour market position of ethnic minorities having clearly worsened during the 1990s. The existence (or not) of cultural centres accessible to minorities may therefore seem a small issue – although the contribution to be made to social harmony and integration on the purely instrumental level could be important. The 2004 European Commission research confirms that public authorities (particularly at state level) usually underestimate and undervalue the contribution that cultural activity can make to social cohesion and integration of minority and marginal people.

The **Catalan** liberal complexities make assimilation of new immigration flows from outside the EU harder. This refers mainly to Moroccans, Latin Americans, and Asians (with the region’s number of Chinese and Pakistanis much higher than average for Spain as a whole). Location and existing support networks are of major importance. Despite dispersal, there are certain of the poorest districts where an occasionally volatile mixture of Moroccans, Pakistanis, Dominicans and Filipinos live side by side. Generation and gender imbalances within the migration patterns of particular groups is also a significant issue.

The **Warsaw** study observes that while “the issue of multiculturalism in the metropolis is almost a mirror reflection of the situation throughout the whole country” the balance between cultural diversity and social cohesion as major urban areas become more attractive and inviting “melting pots” for immigrants will remain sensitive. It suggests that it may take a generation for the full effects of the extension of rights to (and expectation of obligations to be fulfilled by) the “new Varsovians” to generate legitimacy and fully-integrated civic activism.

The **Rome** study quotes a professor of sociology as commenting that the key role of “cultural rights” in the development of individual and group identity has not yet been fully acknowledged in Italy. In response to so-called neo-liberal economic thinking over the past 20 years, culture (as more traditionally defined and perceived) has increasingly had to justify itself in *instrumental* terms – first economically, and then socially. In the post 9/11 world, the realisation is emerging that governments and public policy makers can no longer ignore “cultural insecurity” as a major national and international issue. At the accessible level of everyday city life, therefore, the issues surrounding identity, belonging, participation and social inclusion need to be high on the agenda.

Some conclusions

Goodhart’s *Prospect* essay has probably been referred to more often in the UK following 7th July 2005 than previously by commentators who now seek to promote a simplistic anti-diversity philosophy. What the author himself says is this:

“In the rhetoric of the modern liberal state, the glue of ethnicity (people who look and talk like us) has been replaced with the glue of values (people who think and behave like us). But British values grow, in part, out of a specific history and even geography. Too rapid a change in the make-up of a community not only changes the present, it also – potentially – changes our link with the past... Is this a problem? Surely Britain in 2004 has become too diverse and complex to give expression to any common culture in the present, let alone the past.”

Nevertheless, the very visibility of *ethnic* difference still means that it overshadows all other forms of diversity. It is the outward reminder that there appear to be, at least initially, “strangers” in our midst if that is how people choose to interpret it. Yet in most EU states the percentage of GDP taken in tax is at historically high levels, and we should note that the Nordic states with the most generous welfare systems have also shown themselves to be the most socially and ethnically homogeneous countries in the western world. (cf. Europe in general as compared with the individualistic, wealth- and ethnically-divided USA, as has been so tragically exposed to the world in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina). Detailed economic analysis by experts shows that welfare policy and reality is rather less redistributive than most people imagine – being rather more influenced by enlightened self-interest than universal or altruistic mutual obligation. But those who value solidarity, the argument goes, should take care to ensure that it is not eroded by a refusal to acknowledge the real constraints upon it or, more dangerously, to take mindless refuge in political correctness as an end in itself. Note Goodhart’s final paragraph:

“Too often the language of liberal universalism that dominates public debate ignores the real affinities of place and people. These affinities are not obstacles to be overcome on the road to the good society; they are its foundation stones. People will always favour their own families and communities; it is the task of a realistic liberalism to strive for a definition of community that is wide enough to include people from many different backgrounds, without being so wide as to become meaningless.”

References

Barber, Benjamin R. (1995) *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalisation and Tribalism are Reshaping the World*, New York, Ballantine Books, ISBN 0-345-38304-4

Bennett, Tony (ed.) (2001) *Differing diversities – cultural policy and cultural diversity*, Strasbourg - Council of Europe Publishing, ISBN 92-871-4649-7

Bloomfield, Jude and Bianchini, Franco (2001) *Cultural Citizenship and Urban Governance in Western Europe* in Stevenson N. (ed.) 'Cultural Citizenship', London, Sage

Bloomfield, Jude and Bianchini, Franco (2004) *Planning for the Intercultural City*, Stroud UK - Comedia Publishing, ISBN 1-87367-97-3

Goodhart, David (2004) *Too Diverse?* in Prospect Magazine, edition February 2004, www.prospect-magazine.co.uk

Ilczuk, Dorota (2001) *Cultural Citizenship: Civil Society and Cultural Policy in Europe* Amsterdam, Boekmanstudies/CIRCLE, ISBN 90-6650-070-0

Woods, Roberta, Gordon Christopher et al. (2004) *Report of thematic study using trans-national comparisons to analyse and identify cultural policies and programmes that contribute to preventing and reducing poverty and social exclusion*, Newcastle upon Tyne, University of Northumbria (commissioned by European Commission DG Employment and Social Affairs)

CITY REPORTS

CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND INTERCULTURAL POLICIES IN BARCELONA

by Lluís Bonet¹⁵

1. Barcelona, metropolis in transition

1.1. Portrait of a city

Meeting point for multifarious cultural expressions

Historically, Barcelona has been a meeting point for both people and commercial activities. The city's port has been a doorway to cultural influences and contact, especially during the medieval commercial expansion of the city in the Mediterranean, and from the second half of the eighteenth century on, with the arrival of the Industrial Revolution and free access to the Spanish colonial markets in the Americas. However, migratory inflows from external regions accelerated in the middle of the twentieth century with the arrival of immigrants from southern and western Spain, doubling the population from 1950 to the time of Franco's death in 1975. In the following years, economic stagnation brought such migratory inflows to a halt and these would not pick up again until the mid 1990s.

Social integration during the last third of the twentieth century was relatively rapid, owing to upward social mobility and also the shared commitment by Catalan leftist and nationalist political forces to overcome linguistic and cultural differences. The pact endorsed by the opposition to Franco's regime allowed for a peaceful and widely supported democratic transition and social coexistence. Since the democratic policies of linguistic normalization were not coercive and were based on a shared will to integrate, they generated hardly any social rejection by the 50% of the population who were of non-Catalan origin and language.

We have to wait until the mid-1990s to see immigration gathering momentum again. Before that, there had been a permanent inflow of political migrants such as Latin-American exiles during the 1970s or professionals coming from Europe and other regions, who easily integrated into the city. Distinctive features of the recently inaugurated immigration flows from outside the EU are both its large numbers and its economic and cultural traits, which make it more difficult to assimilate them. Nevertheless, as a report by the Baruch Spinoza Foundation concludes:

"it is imperative to denounce the falsehood of assuming that an increase in cultural plurality must inexorably lead to an increase in social conflictivity. First of all, since many of the conflicts normally presented as ethnic, religious or intercultural are actually the result of unjust situations or poverty, we can conclude that a general improvement of the population's living conditions - housing, jobs, healthcare, education - will make communication and exchanges among human groups flow easier ... It is obvious that

15. Lluís Bonet, University of Barcelona.

The author wishes to thank the following for their useful advice and suggestions: Judit Agulló, Xavier Aragay, José Arias, Juanjo Arranz, Jordi Baltà, Jordi Caià, Marcel Cano, Esteve Caramés, Diane Dodd, Carles Feixa, Joan Manuel García Jorba, Antoine Leonetti, Yolanda Onghena, Jordi Pascual, Joan Pedregosa and Carles Solà.

cultural integration is impossible without socio-economic integration, i.e. without reducing the asymmetry imposed by the capitalist system, which most frequently tends to go too far in pursuing its objectives.”¹⁶

Thus, it is easier to coexist in peace and integrate into public life in the presence of the appropriate social and economic conditions. However, if the aim is the sharing of a common set of civic values and a joint project of citizenship (which does not necessarily imply a national project), then some willingness to integrate into the life of the city is needed. Such willingness depends on several additional factors: adherence to a body of shared values, certain common expectations and building of shared identities. Cities provide better environments for building shared identities than rural areas, and they do not necessarily impose full assimilation on migrant communities. Yet it can also turn out to be easier to integrate when one lives in a small community than in the anonymous life of the city. Integration is a long process in which the presence of heterogeneous educational and cultural heritages does not help.

It still remains to be seen whether Catalonia's history of cultural contact and the capacity it demonstrated to incorporate previous immigration waves will be now able to cope with the more heterogeneous and culturally multifarious human inflow of the present, framed by the globalisation process and the decline of the European welfare state. The fact that the country's elites are avid travellers and have a cosmopolitan vocation is proving helpful, since many of the organizing initiatives in support of immigrants are promoted by small collectives interested in world cultures.

A dynamic city with a multi-core configuration

Barcelona, one of the most culturally dynamic cities in Europe, has a metropolitan area with a population of 4,673,648 inhabitants - 68.6% of Catalonia's total population- and lies along the sea on a rugged relief of 3,236 km² - comprising 10.2% of the Catalan surface area. Clearly, the city of Barcelona, with its population of 1.6 million concentrated in a small territory of just 101 km², plays the role of a capital city in its metropolitan area, as well as in the rest of Catalonia and in the area of influence of its Euro-region (made up by Aragon and the Balearic Islands in Spain, and the French areas of Midi-Pyrénées and Languedoc-Roussillon). We must bear in mind that for a long time, beyond its administrative boundaries, the actual city has not been restricted to the narrow limits of its municipality, but has extended over a much wider and multi-core metropolitan system of cities.

Barcelona's dynamism and the network of cities surrounding it allowed for the early development of the Catalan economy compared to the rest of Spain, especially from the

Industrial Revolution on - throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. Such development was made possible by a quasi-permanent flow of immigrants who were at first domestic or migrating from the adjacent regions (Aragon and the area of Valencia); however, by the 1920s immigration flowed mostly from the southern and western regions of Spain. These immigrants ended up integrating into the social and cultural system of Catalonia at a swifter or a slower pace as a result of the inflow rate and the current political situation. We must remember that, while the Catalan population rose from 3.2 million in 1950 to 6.8 million in 2004, the natural growth rate by itself for the same period would not have produced any population increase.

Integration of immigration flows has been a key issue because of the distinctive identity and political conditions of the Catalonia. Catalan language, culture and identity do not coincide with those of the Spanish state in which Catalonia is integrated. For most of the past two centuries, the Spanish state has tried to suffocate such differences - if not to suppress them altogether during the long periods of dictatorship - not only by banning its genuine expressions, but also through the use of the educational system, the media, the centralizing pattern of the market and the natural opposition of non-Catalan immigrants to integrate into a system which is alien to them. However, the survival of a sense of belonging and a distinctive identity has had a lot to do with the particular dynamism of the country and its ability to constantly assimilate, adapt and reinvent its own identity. In this sense, Barcelona, situated at the core of many of the contradictions inherent to this process, has played a key role as the backbone of Catalan contemporary social and cultural realities.

Due to geographical, historical and political reasons, the administrative structure of the Barcelona metropolis is quite complex. While we are still waiting for the Catalan Parliament to approve, in the near future, the formation of the Barcelon - Region (which we use as a basis for this study), the area is now structured into 7 administrative demarcations and 164 municipalities (27 of which make up the first ring around the city and share a conglomerate of metropolitan services). In addition, the province of Barcelona has another four inland administrative demarcations.

Due in part to topography, but also to endogenous dynamism and strong municipal autonomy, the Barcelona metropolis displays a multi-core structure to a most interesting degree. Sabadell, one of the most charismatic examples, has not only the fourth largest bank in Spain, but also its own opera season and a powerful local bourgeoisie which dates back to the middle of the nineteenth century. Similarly, cities such as Terrassa, Mataró, Granollers or Vilanova, and more recently L'Hospitalet and Badalona - part of the urban continuum of Barcelona - keep strong idiosyncrasies which have been reinforced over the past 25 years by democratic municipal governance. Without doubt, the fact

16. Fundació Baruch Spinoza, 1996: pp. 89-90.

that the city of Barcelona (34% of the total population of the Metropolis) still carries significant economic, demographic and political weight keeps the dialogue among its component cities alive and supports its international projection of itself.

A metropolis which is economically dynamic and territorially complementary

Also, from the perspective of its economy, the Barcelona Metropolitan Region as a whole is currently a multi-core structure, but one where each core specializes in different economic spheres. Within the complementarity of this whole, the city of Barcelona has increased its importance as a supplier of high-tech services and knowledge (Trullen 2001). On the other hand, according to a mobility survey of the Barcelona Metropolitan Region, between 1996 and 2001 the total amount of internal trips in the area rose by 21%; this increase did not correspond solely to trips between the city's demarcation and the others, but also to trips between any two of the other administrative units included in the region (especially interactions between Baix Llobregat and Vallès Oriental, or between Vallès Oriental and Vallès Occidental).

Between 1991 and 2001, the number of employed increased by 559,696 (24.8%) to reach the sum of 2.8 million people. It is this dynamism that promotes immigration and population growth. However, the distribution of employment growth is quite unequal by large economic sectors. While the number of jobs in the tertiary sector rose by 48.7% and increased in the construction sector by 57%, the agricultural sector shrank by 15.5% and the industrial sector by 12.8%. As has happened in so many other European countries, the Catalan economy has moved over the past 30 years from an industrial-based economy to a service-based one. Industry has gone from accounting for 36.1% of the jobs in 1991 to only 25.2% in 2001, while services rose from 52 to 62%.

In this context, one of the most dynamic sectors has been the tourism sector. Catalonia receives about 18 million visitors every year, mainly from the rest of Europe. The city of Barcelona, however, was not included among the country's tourist attractions until the mid-1990s when, linked to the 1992 Olympic Games, a successful campaign was launched to improve the city's image, raising the number of visitors from 1.7 million in 1990 to 4.5 million in 2004 (Bonet 2004).

Another sector displaying high growth rates throughout the past decade is the building sector, which constitutes a fairly physical activity with relatively low use of technology. Thus, it is not surprising that tourist services and building are precisely the sectors that employ a larger supply of recent immigrant labour.

However, large contemporary cities also concentrate multiple services to companies and individuals who require skilled labour. They promote a different sort of immigration constituted by highly educated professionals who are intensive consumers of cultural services. It is this group of economic activities that makes it possible for the metropolis to keep growing and compensate for the loss of employment in the traditional industrial sectors, which are directly suffering the consequences of industrial relocation to countries with cheaper labour.

Within the service sector, the activities that make up the so-called 'quinary' sector (education, health, social services, art and entertainment, culture, information, professional services and technical-scientific services) generated 205,559 new jobs between 1991 and 2001; this was 36.7% of all employment created in Catalonia in this ten-year period (Baró 2004). Everywhere in the world, 'quinary' services are concentrated for the most part in the downtown area of large metropolis. In contrast with the Catalan average of 18.4% in 2001, 23.8% of people working in the Barcelona demarcation were employed in such activities, but they accounted for 27.1% of all employment in the city of Barcelona, which concentrated 41% of all employment in the information and cultural industries in Catalonia.

1.2. Immigration and demographic change

Strong migration inflow

According to the municipal register, in January 2004¹⁷ there were 469,000 foreigners in the Barcelona province (9.2% of the total population), out of which 188,000 (40%) lived in the city of Barcelona (11.9% of its total population; 14.6% one year later, in January 2005).

The largest national group in the province were Moroccans (20% of the total foreign population), followed by Ecuadorians (16.2%). Europeans account for 19 % of the total; French (2.5%), Romanian (2.3%), German (1.9%) and British (1.4%) nationals are the most numerous among them. Among Latin-Americans, apart from Ecuadorians, also Colombians (5.8%), Argentineans (5%)¹⁸ and Peruvians are well represented. Among Asians, Chinese and Pakistanis are the most outstanding and their relative numbers are much higher in Catalonia than their average rate in Spain as a whole.

Barcelona, the capital city of Catalonia, comprises a wide range of nationalities whose number has dramatically risen in the past ten years (the number of foreigners has grown 7.9 times larger from 1996 to 2005), especially regarding people from Eastern Europe, Central Asia and South America. Compared to the rest of its province, most of the

17. With all the limitations due to geographical data which do not include either the flows in the last one and a half years (especially the legalisation process for illegal foreigners undertaken for the first six months of 2005) or the huge pockets of illegal immigrants that circulate about the country.

18. The actual proportion of people born in Argentina almost doubles the number of Argentinean nationals, as many of them are descendants of Spanish or Italian emigrants and are not registered as Argentineans.

Asian population (58%) is concentrated in the city of Barcelona, while the proportion of Moroccans, Africans in general and Romanians in the city is much smaller than their proportion in the rest of the Barcelona province and Catalonia as a whole.

Table 1. Change in number of foreigners in the City of Barcelona by geographical origins, 1996-2005

	Mar 1996	Jan 2005	%	Δ 05-96
European Union (25)	8,535	37,017	16.0	4.3
Rest of Europe	995	15,818	6.8	15.9
Middle East	672	1,812	0.8	2.7
Central Asia	1,998	26,204	11.3	13.1
East Asia	2,906	8,794	3.8	3.0
Northern Africa & Maghreb	3,510	16,927	7.3	4.8
Africa South of Sahara	451	3,448	1.5	7.6
Central & Southern Africa	83	543	0.2	6.5
North-America	824	3,268	1.4	4.0
Central-America	2,113	15,168	6.6	7.2
South-America	7,276	99,482	43.1	13.7
Oceania	76	282	0.1	3.7
Total foreigners	29,354	230,942	100.0	7.9
% foreigners to total pop.	1.9%	14.6%		

Source: Ajuntament de Barcelona (2005); www.bcn.es. Compiled by the author

As regards nationalities, the most numerous are Ecuadorians, followed by Peruvians, Argentineans and Pakistanis. Among Europeans, Italians (some of them actually camouflaged Argentineans) and the French are the most numerous. However, in the past year (January 2005, as compared to January 2004) Bolivians, Chinese and Italians have increased substantially in absolute numbers, as have people from Paraguay, Bolivia and Bangladesh in terms of relative numbers.

Table 2. Twelve main nationalities in the City of Barcelona, and growth in 2005 over the previous year


12 Main Nationalities		Maximum Δ in absolute value		Maximum Δ in relative value	
Ecuador	31,828	Bolivia	3,504	Paraguay	176.0%
Peru	15,037	China	2,329	Bolivia	72.8%
Morocco	14,508	Italy	2,059	Bangladesh	43.0%
Colombia	13,935	Peru	1,874	Australia	33.5%
Argentina	12,439	Pakistan	1,799	Nepal	33.3%
Pakistan	11,997	Mexico	1,257	China	32.4%
Italy	11,678	Brazil	1,131	Costa Rica	32.3%
China	9,524	France	1,129	Brazil	31.8%
Bolivia	8,314	Argentina	1,002	Mexico	31.7%
France	7,706	Romania	965	Romania	31.3%
Dominican Rep.	7,218	Morocco	914	Hungary	29.6%
Philippines	6,470	Chile	842	Turkey	28.6%

Source: Ajuntament de Barcelona (2005); www.bcn.es. Compiled by the author.

Within the Barcelona Metropolitan Region, Calella, a tourist resort with many European residents as well as an intensive agriculture employing many Africans, is the municipality with the highest rate of foreigners (18.4% of the total population). It is followed by other tourist resorts such as Sitges (17%) or Castelldefels (16.2%), by small agricultural towns in the Alt Penedès with a high proportion of Moroccans, and by a few industrial cities like L'Hospitalet (the second biggest city in Catalonia; 13.4%) and Martorell (where the SEAT car plant is located; 12%).

European residents concentrate mainly in the most cosmopolitan towns on the coast (such as Sitges, Castelldefels, Sta. Susanna or Calella), in some high-income towns near the capital city (St. Just Desvern and St. Cugat del Vallès), and in the best districts within the city. Although there are no substantial differences among Western European residents, the British prefer to settle in the Garraf or Alt Maresme demarcations, while Germans prefer St. Just or Sta. Susanna. On the other hand, Europeans from outside the EU choose not to pay the high rents in the capital city and prefer to settle near their place of work in industrial or vegetable and wine-growing towns.

Map 1.



The African population, mainly Moroccan, is very scattered territorially and tends to be located in industrial and agricultural towns. Latin-Americans are more spread out, although some towns or districts in Barcelona may have a special Ecuadorian, Peruvian, Argentinean or Colombian imprint. As we can see in the case of the city of Barcelona, some communities prefer to settle in certain specific areas. For instance, many Chinese occupy certain areas in the Eixample and, particularly, the area surrounding the Estació del Nord, as well as in Santa Coloma and Badalona. Ecuadorians, Colombians and Peruvians tend to share a common area, as do Argentineans and Italians depending on their income level. On the other hand, a conglomerate of Moroccans, Pakistanis, Dominicans and Filipinos live in the poorest districts, which sometimes gives rise to conflicts among them.

Table 3. Distribution of 15 main foreign national origins by districts in Barcelona City, January 2005

District	% foreigners	Country 1	Country 2	Country 3	Country 4	Country 5
1 Barceloneta	22.5	Morocco	Ecuador	Pakistan	Italy	Argentina
2 Parc	34.1	Morocco	Dom. Rep.	Italy	Argentina	Pakistan
3 Gòtic	22.9	Italy	Pakistan	Argentina	Morocco	Philippines
4 Raval	47.4	Pakistan	Philippines	Morocco	Ecuador	Bangladesh
5 St. Antoni	15.2	Ecuador	Peru	Colombia	Argentina	Italy
6 Esquerra Eixample	15.3	Ecuador	Peru	China	Argentina	Italy
7 Dreta Eixample	15.2	Italy	Argentina	China	France	Ecuador
8 Estació del Nord	15.4	China	Ecuador	Italy	Argentina	Peru
9 Sagrada Família	14.5	Ecuador	Peru	Colombia	China	Argentina
10 Poble Sec-Montjuïc	25.4	Ecuador	Pakistan	Morocco	Dom. Rep.	Colombia
11 Zona Franca	10.5	Ecuador	Peru	Colombia	Morocco	China
12 Font de la Guatlla	15.4	Ecuador	Colombia	Peru	Argentina	Morocco
13 Bordeta-Hostafrancs	14.4	Ecuador	Peru	Morocco	Argentina	Colombia
14 Sants	14.2	Ecuador	Peru	Colombia	Morocco	China
15 Les Corts	9.1	Ecuador	Colombia	Italy	Argentina	Peru
16 Pedralbes	14.2	France	Japan	Italy	Germany	Mexico
17 St. Gervas	10.6	Italy	France	Argentina	Colombia	Peru
Sarrià-Vallvidrera-Les						
18 Planes	11.0	France	Italy	Japan	Germany	USA
19 Gràcia	13.1	Ecuador	Italy	Argentina	Colombia	Peru
20 Vallcarca	12.1	Ecuador	Colombia	Argentina	Peru	Italy
21 Guinardó	10.9	Ecuador	Colombia	Peru	Argentina	Italy
22 Horta	8.0	Ecuador	Colombia	Peru	Morocco	Argentina
23 Vall d'Hebron	11.7	Ecuador	Colombia	Argentina	Peru	Chile
Vilapiscina-Turó						
24 Peira	11.3	Ecuador	Bolivia	Peru	Dom. Rep.	Colombia
25 Roquetes-Verdum	10.3	Ecuador	Peru	Morocco	Colombia	Bolivia
Ciutat Meridiana						
25 Vallbona	20.6	Ecuador	Morocco	Dom. Rep.	Pakistan	Peru
26 Sagrera	10.2	Ecuador	Peru	Colombia	China	Argentina
27 Congrés	9.6	Ecuador	Peru	Argentina	Colombia	Morocco
28 St. Andreu	7.9	Ecuador	Peru	China	Argentina	Colombia
29 Bon Pastor	9.6	Ecuador	Morocco	Colombia	Bolivia	Peru
30 Trinitat Vella	24.8	Morocco	Ecuador	Pakistan	Peru	Colombia
31 Fort Pius	13.4	China	Argentina	Ecuador	Italy	Peru
32 Poble Nou	13.6	Ecuador	Morocco	Argentina	China	Pakistan
33 Besós	14.9	Pakistan	Ecuador	Morocco	Peru	Colombia
34 Clot	12.8	Ecuador	Peru	Colombia	Morocco	China
35 Verneda	7.1	Ecuador	Peru	Colombia	China	Argentina

Source: Ajuntament de Barcelona (2005); www.bcn.es. Compiled by the author.

Examining the map of the foreign population helps us grasp the multicultural reality of the metropolis. First, the larger a municipality, the lower the concentration of citizens of one single origin. Thus the city of Barcelona has the greatest diversity. On the other hand, the 'call-effect' (geographical concentration by nationalities as a result of support networks and information from relatives and friends) is most visible in small towns. We must bear in mind that the arrival of new immigrants is closely linked to the presence of previous immigration from the same area. Following the settlement of the first immigrant, his relatives and friends are quickly drawn in.

The age structure of the foreign population displays distinctive features, not only compared with the indigenous population (people over 65 average 2%, compared to 18% of the Spanish population), but also depending on the nationality. The population of children is fairly significant among Europeans and Ecuadorians, but almost insignificant among Asians or Canadians; teenagers of Central-American and Moroccan origin are abundant. On the opposite end of the age spectrum, the oldest population comes from wealthy countries, while the bulk of residents of working age come from developing countries. The Mexican case is quite odd, as almost half the people coming from that country are young university students.

Table 4. Age structure of foreign population living in the Province of Barcelona, grouped by nationalities, 2004 (%)

	0-9	10-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	≥ 65
Rest of European Union	33	6	16	22	11	8	5
Rest of Europe	7	10	31	27	17	7	1
Africa	6	12	32	31	14	5	1
Monacco	6	13	31	29	13	5	1
Americas	8	11	30	28	14	6	2
Central America	5	15	27	30	14	7	2
Canada	3	9	25	32	22	8	1
United States	9	9	22	27	17	12	4
Mexico	5	5	46	30	9	3	1
Argentina	8	8	31	27	12	9	4
Ecuador	11	13	31	27	13	4	1
Asia	4	8	30	35	17	5	1
Oceania	3	4	22	36	21	10	4
Average foreigners	11	10	29	28	14	6	2

Source: www.ine.es. Compiled by the author.

Gender structure displays significant differences in the case of some nationalities. Two thirds of Africans and Asians are male, while 62.4% of Central-Americans are female (Dominicans and Cuban). There are numerous Ecuadorian, Mexican and Canadian women, although they make up a smaller proportion (around 54%).

The educational level among foreigners above the age of 16 is low for Moroccans, Africans and Asians in general, as many of them have not completed primary school. On the contrary, the average educational level is much higher among Latin-Americans as a result of the double social origins of such immigration agricultural workers, especially from the Andes and the Caribbean, and an elite of young university students and professionals. Lastly, many Europeans from outside the EU and many North Americans possess a university degree.

Table 5. Educational level of foreigners over 16 living in the Province of Barcelona, 2004 (%)

	Primary ed. uncompleted	Primary ed. completed	Secondary ed. completed	Vocational ed.	University ed.	Total
Rest of						
European Union	2.0	13.4	39.0	11.9	33.7	100
Rest of Europe	1.9	14.1	42.1	20.1	21.8	100
Marocco	35.6	30.3	29.1	1.9	3.1	100
Rest of Africa	18.2	32.8	32.8	4.0	12.2	100
Us and Canada	0.0	1.4	25.0	4.2	69.4	100
Latin Amwrica	3.5	19.4	54.7	7.0	15.4	100
Rest of the world	21.0	28.6	27.9	2.7	19.8	100
Average	8.5	19.7	44.3	9.1	18.4	100

Source: www.ine.es. Compiled by the author.

We must be aware, however, that an analysis in terms of national groups may not always be significant in itself for example, among EU nationals, not everyone is rich and properly settled; for example, there are also homeless people in the city centre who have come here in search of charity, good weather and a permissive society.

2. Expressions of cultural diversity

2.1 Experiencing cultural diversity

The daily presence of diversity

One of the phenomena, although it is undoubtedly mixed in its import, that makes multiculturalism more visible in Barcelona today is the growing presence of multi-ethnicity in the streets, especially when compared to the lack of diversity at the beginning of the 1990s. This is apparent in the centre of the city, in public transport, as well as in neighbourhoods with a higher concentration of immigrant population (or tourists). For many citizens, who were only used to distinguishing between native Catalan people, people from other areas in Spain and Gypsies,¹⁹ the differences are now more blatant. Careful observation reveals not only greater ethnic and linguistic diversity, but also the precarious socio-economic conditions of many immigrants. It is this aspect that distinguishes the latter from the millions of tourists who wander about the historic centre of the city, most of them European but also hailing from the Americas and the rich Asian economies.

Language is a first distinctive trait. Although only a few languages are *lingua franca* (Arabic, English or French, plus Spanish as the dominant language and Catalan in the school system), the diversity of linguistic expression is enormous. According to a survey carried out by Prof. Carme Junyent of the Study Group of Languages in Danger at the Barcelona University, speakers of more than 200 different languages are registered in Catalonia. We must be aware that behind a language lies a whole cultural system, and that the language gathers a whole community around it.

Some of the most spoken languages heard in the Barcelona Metropolitan Region such as Quechua (spoken by 10 million people in Peru and Ecuador) or Tamazight (spoken by Berbers in Morocco and Algeria), are not official languages in their own states, a fact that causes some trouble with their consulate staff and among immigrants with shared nationalities. Integrating into a society which is officially bilingual constitutes a surprise or even a nuisance for some (it is one more barrier to employment and social integration), but the traditional interest of Catalan people for minority languages constitutes an unexpected value for many immigrants from marginalized linguistic communities.

For the average man, another sign of growing cultural and ethnic diversity is the increasing number of shops that deal with special goods for migrant groups. While in the 1970s the opening of foreign restaurants was perceived to be an improvement in taste and gastronomic choices for local customers, specialized shops now cater mainly to

immigrant groups. Different products and clientele are mixed in the many convenience stores that stay open late. In other cases, such as butchers that follow religious procedures or video stores specializing in film genres or music from a specific country, long established Catalan people are simply strangers looking in from the outside. Nevertheless, for curious citizens all of these outlets represent an increase in the variety of available products, as has occurred in many other countries with a long-standing history of immigration.

Integration of immigration by stages of adaptation

The process of immigrant adaptation to their new place of residence is shaped by a set of circumstances, which are related to their expectations and situation on leaving their country, as well as to the new conditions in the host country. The combination of both types of factors, as well as the course followed by the adaptation process itself over time, may give rise to widely differing situations, from plain coexistence (with or without conflict), through varying degrees of social integration, to full cultural assimilation. Following Dassetto's categorization, there are three stages in the migration process - or cycle - from the moment someone arrives, settles down and becomes established (Dassetto, 1990). Upon his/her arrival, an immigrant is either a 'guest worker' (with all the connotations that the expression has) or is socially excluded and strives to make a living. In the second stage, such a person settles down in a permanent household, sets up a family and has contact with his/her neighbours. Finally, an immigrant puts down roots and achieves social recognition. This is not a linear process, however, and the final result is not always positive. We can also come across regressions in the process of integration or permanent situations of non-inclusion (or self-exclusion) and social alienation. Thus, it is important to be aware that the initial situation and expectations (social, economic, educational, cultural, as well as those related to family and age group) of the various immigrant groups will influence the success of the process of integration. Connected to this, it is also important to consider whether their wish is to stay on and settle down or just stay temporarily. Nevertheless, even more important than these considerations is the willingness of the host communities and institutions to assimilate the immigrant and their ability to do so. Success or failure depends especially (but not only) on the possibility of achieving better socio-economic standards without feeling left out as a result of ethnic or geographical origin. Peaceful coexistence and integration into public life are easier if social and economic conditions are adequate.

In the Barcelona metropolis, we find domestic Spanish immigrants or Latin American exiles who are fully rooted but not completely mixed with the indigenous Catalan population. There are about 100,000 residents of the Gypsy ethnic community, whose degree of integration ranges widely, from those who have lived in the country for

19. From the fifteenth century on, several Gypsy communities settled down in Catalonia, as they did in many other parts of Europe. Their marginalization decreased during the twentieth century and gave way to some measure of social and cultural integration. It is estimated that 100,000 out of Spain's 700,000 Gypsies live in Catalonia.

centuries or arrived some decades ago from the south of Spain (prominent personalities of musical styles as Catalan as rumba or even flamenco) to the nomadic groups that recently arrived from Portugal and Romania, who enjoy poor social conditions and have serious problems finding work. There is also a growing number of foreign immigrants who are legal, settled, with solid work and family, who follow integration patterns and are not too segregated in terms of territory. Finally, there is an indeterminate number of immigrants who are newly arrived or have not yet managed to legalize their situation in the process undertaken by the Spanish government during the first trimester of 2005. Staying legally or illegally in the country makes a dramatic difference to their standard of living and chances of integration.

As mentioned above, the integration process varies according to cultural and economic factors, as well as according to structural factors linked to different local, social and working contexts. In Spain, there is:

“a wide range of integration patterns, from integration *à la catalane*, which emphasizes territorial coexistence, to the pattern in El Ejido, based on socio-territorial segregation” (De Lucas 2004).

Yet it still remains to be seen whether the widely praised Catalan pattern, only recently implemented, proves itself able to integrate people with such varied income and educational levels, such different experiences of coexistence and such diverse career expectations, and do so without generating conflicts. It is normally easier to integrate small communities rather than larger ones, people who share a territory and interests rather than people whose only motivation is finding a job, people who are willing to integrate rather than people who feel reluctant to make any effort at all to adapt (like so many retired old people from Northern Europe). There is a big difference between those who fall in love with a place (and prepare themselves to stay there) and someone who has no preference for one rich region over another.

Immigration typologies

We may distinguish three broad types among the foreign residents that have settled in the city in the last ten years:

A. Low-education, low-income immigrants from Latin-America, Asia, Northern Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa or Slavic countries, who arrived in the city to try their luck. Logically, their behaviour, expectations, use of socialization spaces and willingness to integrate

vary depending on their countries of origin as well as their position within the migration cycle. This can lead to tensions among different communities. Within this broad group, we may distinguish:

- Young bachelors (many of whom are minors and mostly of Northern or Sub-Saharan African origin);
- Muslims with a family (whole families, mothers with children, or groups of men, sometimes young);
- People from Sub-Saharan Africa (bachelors or with a family);
- Lower social level Latin-Americans (strongly integrated within their families);
- Filipinos and other non-Muslim communities;
- Middle-aged Slavs (displaying higher educational levels than the other groups, but marked by the failure of the model in their countries of origin).

B. Chinese immigrants. Despite obvious similarities with other economic migrants, Chinese immigrants display little interest in integrating or relating with other immigrants or local population. They take refuge in their own family or community. When they arrive, they normally plan to stay for a limited time until they can save enough money. However,

“most of them never really think of making the journey back home; ‘work, save and set up a business’ is their slogan and they have one single response to possible failures: try again”.²⁰

C. Cosmopolitan youth. This group is made up of university students and young professionals, semi-permanent in the city, in various stages of economic standing, coming from well-off societies (or from high-income, high educational level environments in poor countries or countries with non-Western culture). Their average stay in the city ranges from a few months to several years.

There are still other groups of foreign residents to be added to these: senior executives of multinational corporations and retired people or people living off investments and/or properties who come in search of good weather and quality of life and spend most of the year in Catalonia. Their willingness to integrate is often low. However, due to their financial situation they do not fit in with the popular notion of an immigrant.

20. Interview with Shumin Wang, owner of an internet café, available at www.comunitats.info/xina/cat/entrevista.html.

One last factor to be distinguished and that also influences the adaptation process is whether the immigrant arrived of his own free will or came as a result of the policy of family regrouping, began in 1999, that has forced many adult sons and daughters to leave their countries. These teenagers, mostly of Latin American origin, become conscious of their specific cultural identity and identify each other by the way of dressing, the use of certain sign language or the reggaeton dance. Such distinguishing signs of identity may either be important aspects brought in from their original country or reach them through the internet and other media that spread the traits of other youth Latin American diasporas. In Barcelona, according to the latest estimates, 5% of all Latin adolescents (together with others Portuguese and Moroccan youths) belong to gangs, such as the *Netas* or the Latin Kings, that consider themselves cultural communities rather than criminal groups (Feixa 2005).

Diversity at school

One of the places where multicultural presence becomes more visible is at school, mainly because of the enormous inflow of immigrant population assimilating without previous knowledge of local language and culture. The fact that public schools in the poorest neighbourhoods have high concentrations of immigrant students does not make integration any easier. And we also must not forget that many of the children and youngsters who enter the school system every year (contrary to those coming of their own will to find a job or study at the university) have been forced by their parents to change their environment and cultural context. In addition to the natural difficulty of integrating into a different environment and a different curriculum, these immigrant students know neither the local language nor the prevailing social codes and values. The conflict rate is very high among adolescents, and it normally promotes grouping by nationality or interests and, consequently, isolation from the rest of the class group. Instead, in the case of families with small children, school attendance and education ultimately serves as a cultural bridge for adults as well, especially mothers.

Enrolment of foreign students in the pre-university school system is a recent phenomenon resulting directly from the arrival of young migrant labour and the family regrouping policies promoted by the Spanish government. As migrant workers settle in their new environment, they call their family or, if they do not have one, they get married and have children - many more children than the indigenous population. Thus, it is not surprising that the most numerous students are Latin-Americans (47%), followed by Northern Africans from the Maghreb (27%).

In only three years (from school-year 1999-2000 to 2003-2004), the number of foreign students in Catalonia rose by an average of 3.89 times, to reach the sum of 77,017

students. Such inflow maintains its intensity and generates a good many problems in a school system which is not used to dealing with the associated difficulties: student enrolment in the middle of the school-year, lack of knowledge of official languages, unmatching curricula in the countries of origin, among others.

Table 6. Evolution of the number of foreign non-university students in Catalonia, school years 1995/96 – 2003/04

	Pre-School	Primary	Secondary	Special Ed.	Post-Obligatory	Total
1995-96	3,523	10,456	427	48	2,521	16,975
1999-00	3,678	8,002	6,338	144	1,631	19,793
2003-04	17,693	32,761	20,233	536	5,794	77,017
Δ 3 last years	4.81	4.09	3.19	3.72	3.55	3.89

Source: Departament d'Educació, *Estadística de l'ensenyament*, www.gencat.net. Compiled by the author.

Hence, although the influx of foreign students is observed at all educational levels, the need of special education in particular has increased dramatically. While in school year 2003-04 the average proportion of foreign students in the non-university school system was 7.5%, that proportion rises to 39% in the specific case of special education, with an extremely high rate of Northern African students. And on the other hand, the proportion of foreign students in post-obligatory studies (from the age of 16 on) is significantly low, except for European students and students from certain Latin-American Republics.

Table 7. Foreign students in the Catalan non-university school system, school-year 2003/2004 (%)

	Pre-school	Primary	Secondary	Special ed.	Post-obligatory	Total
Rest of EU	7.1	5.6	5.2	3.7	9.8	6.1
Rest of Europe	8.2	8.7	9.5	2.8	12.2	9.0
Maghreb	29.4	26.8	27.7	35.8	16.2	26.9
Rest of Africa	7.2	4.3	2.2	9.7	2.7	4.3
North-America	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.0	0.9	0.5
Central and South America	41.8	48.8	47.7	44.6	54.2	47.3
Asia and Oceania	5.7	5.3	7.3	3.4	4.0	5.8
Total foreigners	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Foreigners/Total	7.0	9.0	7.9	39.1	3.6	7.5

Source: Departament d'Educació, "Estadística de l'ensenyament", www.gencat.net. Compiled by the author.

The phenomenon of cultural diversity at school cannot be measured in quantitative terms alone, it must also be considered in qualitative terms. Thus, not only has the number of foreign students grown substantially, but also the variety of countries of origin. According to the latest data, in Catalan schools there are students from 152 different countries.

The timid attempts both by the Administration and teachers to adjust to this new situation have been overwhelmed by the enormous scale of the heterogeneous inflow of children entering school, often in the middle of the school year. It is increasingly necessary to retrain a teaching community which lacks the tools to deal with students with widely differing cultural and educational backgrounds and has to face unknown values and codes of behaviour. It is essential to develop and disseminate specific teaching materials adapted to the different realities of each area and each educational level. It is also necessary for teachers to share their practice and successes if they are to improve their self-confidence. A number of useful tools have already been produced by some teachers and institutions, including the Department of Education,²¹ but there is still a long way to go, and a significant proportion of teachers feel disconcerted and disheartened.

Places of worship

Several parishes and Christian churches of non-Catholic creed, as well as (in smaller numbers) mosques, synagogues and temples, together with the centres associated with all of them, also constitute important places for socialization and socializing, for maintaining ties with the societies of origin and for remembering religious and cultural values (rites, songs, food, language and beliefs). For families with children, they provide a safe place of reception; and for the elderly and people with difficulties in integrating, they provide a daily place of interaction. A singular phenomenon is the increasing number of Evangelical churches attended by Latin Americans attracted by their more participative approach that promotes solidarity and cohesion more strongly than Catholic churches. In a country where Catholicism has been dominant yet regular religious practice limited, the recent waves of immigration and their religious expressions represent a significant change. Religious practice has not only been diversified but has been made more visible. The proliferation of Evangelical churches and mosques has meant 'culture shock' for local people and has awoken centuries-old fears in a society where there was a state religion until 1975 and alien religious practices had to be performed almost clandestinely. City authorities are now attempting to shift future mosque locations to industrial areas, as a result of public opinion which associates Islam with potential terrorists. Yet mosques are now the most numerous places of worship in Catalonia, since Moroccan immigration is the most widespread. The development of Evangelical churches is quite recent, driven by Latin-American immigration and the recent conversion of Spanish or Gypsy groups into self-protecting communities.

21. See, for example, teaching resources available at www.entrecultures.org/home.htm and www.edualter.org/index.ca.htm, the result of efforts of civil society to promote intercultural education. See also www.xtec.es/escola/index.htm for materials promoted by the Department of Education's Aula Oberta [Open Classroom].

Table 8. Number of places of worship by religions (excluding Catholicism)

	Judaism	Orthodox churches	Evangelical churches	Jehovah's Witnesses	Adventist Church	Church of J. Ch. of the Latter Day Saints	Islam	Bahá'í Creed	Hinduism	Sikhism	Budisme	Taoisme	Total
Alt Penedès			2	2	0	1	4						9
Baix Llobregat			33	19	0	1	15						68
Barcelonès	2	7	123	28	4	4	17	1	11	3	15	5	220
Garraf			5	2	0		1	1			1		10
Maresme			17	9	0	1	11						38
Vallès Occ.			43	17	2	2	7	6	3				80
Vallès Or.			21	8	2	1	9			1	1		43
Metropolitan Region	2	7	244	85	8	10	64	8	14	4	17	5	468
Catalonia	2	8	341	141	12	13	139	12	16	5	28	5	722
Rest of Catalonia	0	1	97	56	4	3	75	4	2	1	11	0	254

Source: Estruch, J. (2004). Compiled by the author.

Socialization places by immigrant typologies

The socialization places of foreign immigration in Barcelona metropolis are clearly different depending on social origin, educational level, job type, family situation, environment (rural-urban) and, in certain cases, nationality. Common meeting places are both open-air (all year round, despite beaches and parks growing more important from spring to autumn) and inside places (bars, specialized shops, calling or internet centres, places of worship, social and cultural clubs, entertainment or dancing halls, among others). These places of socialization and cultural interaction of recent immigration are mostly segregated from each other and from places used by the original Catalan population or previous waves of immigrants.

One of the most popular meeting places is the calling or internet centre²² where low-income immigrants, particularly from Latin America, Asia, Northern Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, often gather. They make connections within their group, share advice and resources and weave ties of solidarity. In the evenings or at weekends they also gather at these centres before going out for entertainment. Latin American and Filipino groups are mixed (men and women), while groups composed of Northern African or Pakistani people are purely masculine.

22. In spite of the growing importance of the Internet, the telephone is still the main channel of communication with many rural areas from which the poorest and lowest-educated immigrants come.

Other socialization places, especially for cosmopolitan youths, include bars, plazas and beaches. Along with the good weather, beginning in April and lasting through October, the city beaches (mostly from Barceloneta to Port Olímpic) become a special meeting point for semi-permanent foreigners in the city. On holidays and in the evenings on workdays, people sunbathe, meet for drinks in bars or play volleyball for fun and social interaction. From seven in the evening into the small hours, meeting places depend on the musical tendencies of the bars that exist on the beach itself or at the Olympic Port-fusion, flamenco, chill-out, Caribbean or Brazilian dance music, pop or techno music make up the prevailing offer.

Western young people, or high-income/high educational level youths of other origins, hang out around the historic centre (Raval, Born, Baix Eixample, Gràcia). Integration among young people of different nationalities is very high, while it is very low with the Barcelona-born (this will take time to develop and only as a result of work interaction or other activities). Café Zurich is a traditional meeting place for locals and foreigners temporarily residing in Barcelona. Plaça Universitat constitutes a more specialized meeting point: skateboarders (also to be found at MACBA), bicycle acrobats and gays (due to its proximity to the Gay-Eixample). In contrast, low-income non-Western Europeans integrate through national affinity channels (which facilitate housing, entertainment and so on). Certain places in the Raval and other districts with high immigration rates are essential as meeting points for these groups. Barcelona is seen (and sold) as a capital of fun and a trend-setter (cultural life, good weather, entertainment venues, cosmopolitanism...). Expectations are so high that there is the risk of being disappointed. The length of stay of Western temporary residents ranges from a few months to one or two years. After their experience, new foreigners take their place.

Thus people have different perspectives on the city, depending on their personal circumstances. As Reuel Castañeda, Catholic priest and president of the Filipino Cultural Centre, puts it:

„the tourist’s eye is very different from the immigrant’s. As a tourist, I saw Barcelona as a lively city, with its beaches, hills, people, humanity and significant cultural wealth, which could be seen in the streets... However, now that I live and work here, I see a very different city ... Being an immigrant is very difficult: you live in a different culture, with a language that is not your own and in a city you don’t know and that often excludes you.”²³

23. Interview available at www.comunitats.info/filipines/cat/entrevista.html.

Spaces for multicultural interaction

Districts with the highest concentration of immigrants have become a space of forced interaction. After a first reaction of bewilderment, communities reach a certain collective knowledge of what the differences are. However, with the massive arrival of immigrants, coexistence is something that original residents experience as an imposition. Not only do skin colours, clothes or types of shops change in the streets, but also the use of public spaces or smells and noises in the patios, which generate inconvenience, lack of understanding and even nuisance (loud music in the small hours, strong smells, a feeling of unsafety...).

School is often the main – sometimes also the only – place of intensive multicultural interaction for children and teenagers of all origins and social position. In private or state schools in rich neighbourhoods, the proportion of immigrant students is small and, as a result, integration is easier. In state schools, especially when the proportion of foreign migrant students exceeds the number of local ones, integration into the culture of the country becomes a complex matter. Problems of understanding the language and the associated system of values develop into self-marginalization.

Television programming is a crucial virtual space of integration into the culture of the country. Open television, the only sort that the low-income population watches, transmits society’s values, likes, language and tastes, simultaneously providing the fodder for conversations with schoolmates, workmates or neighbours. Football, in particular support for Barcelona’s team, becomes a significant shared asset promoting integration. Incorporation into wide political debates is more complicated, as it may be difficult to understand nuances in the domestic political agenda. There are only two issues that have been closely followed: the changing immigration rules, and the mass protests against the Iraq war. The latter has generated some sympathy towards Muslim immigrants. As Javed Ilyas Qureshi, spokesman of the Pakistani Workers Association, puts it:

“the looks from the people that saw us in the demonstrations were very sweet; we got looked at differently. I noticed that; their eyes looked sweet. There were people from our neighbourhood who had never said hi to me before and now greeted me so kindly. But this was only then. Now it’s over.”²⁴

In many districts, civic centres and libraries the essential municipal social installations become places of cultural interaction. Yet there are only certain immigrants that make use of them and feel at home there.

24. Interview available at www.comunitats.info/pakistan/cat/entrevista.html.

Problems with interaction

Interculturality in a rapid demographically growing metropolis such as Barcelona faces great problems such as the lack of infrastructure, experienced professionals and services, as well as clear guidelines for them to act as cultural mediators. There are also very few people who know many of the languages spoken in the city. Their own national communities become a refuge for newly arrived immigrants (but also a system of social control) which is hard to avoid; a refuge that can easily turn into an intercultural exclusion space. The relative degree of integration varies depending on the community, its cultural habits and the kinds of interactions in the working, social and school environments of each of the household members. Obviously, a negative or stereotyped vision of others does not promote integration; nevertheless, there are also objective misunderstandings that can easily turn into conflicts.

Some of them may be caused by clashes among the neighbours' daily timetables, especially when these are accompanied with loud music or noise. For example, Caribbean immigrants cannot live without loud music and dance. In summer, when the windows are wide open or in buildings lacking all basic soundproofing, this can culminate in the intervention of the local police. During Ramadan, families gather for parties that go on into the small hours and combine noises, smells and cultural traditions that are difficult to understand for the neighbours. Thus, it is not surprising that some misunderstandings begin around smells and food. Slaughtering a lamb in the building staircase, cooking with plenty of garlic or boiling pork can give rise to severe conflicts.

Language incomprehension and communication problems are not conducive to reducing misunderstandings. In this context, school children become the first cultural mediators, although they are not always interested in translating in a completely reliable way. In other instances, there is little tradition of dialogue and compromise, which does not help to prevent conflicts either.

All of these interaction problems show up in the use of public spaces. A massive presence of one specific community in one square ends up excluding other communities; this gives rise to a situation of prevalence and segregation which may even vary at different times of the day. A good example of this is Rambla del Raval, where, depending on the time of the day, certain sections are occupied by Muslim women with children, groups of Pakistani or Moroccan men, Ecuadorians, Dominican girls, Filipinos, etc.

Despite all this, we must not forget that the notion of cultural integration or exclusion may be understood in many different and even ambiguous ways both at the city level and inside specific communities. Certain groups are not interested in achieving much

integration; sometimes they even practice clear self-exclusion in different ways for protection sake or simply for lack of interest. In such instances, it is difficult to promote an increase of cultural intercultural social interaction. One of the conditions required for people to be able to experience interculturality is personal and collective commitment and effort. A favourable environment where interculturality is seen as a value can help, but it is also necessary for everyone to become actively involved.

Raval District: a paradigmatic district

The Raval District, located in the heart of the city between the port and the Rambla, has been historically the initial area of reception for multiple waves of immigration. Until not too long ago, before the major redevelopment of the urban fabric, the district's narrow streets and poor housing conditions at affordable prices attracted many newcomers and all sorts of fringe activities (among others, the cheapest prostitution). Nowadays, despite the urbanistic operation just mentioned, about half the district's population (47.6%) are foreigners, which makes it the area with proportionately the highest foreign population.

The principal groups are Pakistanis with 4,651 residents (10% of the total population), followed by the Filipino (3,591), Moroccans (2,230), Ecuadorians (1,897) and people from Bangladesh (988). Despite the difficulties and tensions among the different groups present in the neighbourhood, the Rambla del Raval is a privileged space for intercultural experimentation because none of them predominates. Nevertheless, Javed Ilyas Qureshi, spokesman of the Pakistani Workers Association, describes the Rambla del Raval as the *Rambla of Sadness, Udas Rambla*:

"we call it that way because there're always many Pakistanis without papers, and you can hear them wondering when they'll be able to go back home, or how the people back home will be doing... People speak sadly in the Rambla. As a rule, most Pakistanis spend hours and hours. When they get off work, many rent Indian films at the video-club. Unfortunately, few of them read. There is a library in Hospital St. with many books in Urdu, but we hardly go there. The Rambla is the place where people get more contact with each other. They talk. Sadly, but they talk".²⁵

Other areas in the Old City, such as the Born and Santa Caterina areas, are similar (with a mix of central city installations, people going there for work or entertainment, students or artists living there temporarily and pockets of diverse immigrant communities), but the density of foreigners is lower. Schools, libraries and civic centres in El Raval have

25. Interview available at www.comunitats.info/paquistan/cat/entrevista.html.

become the first test of ability for intercultural coexistence in the city. Many of the problems we have just described revealed themselves first in this district where, unlike in other parts of the city, Ecuadorians are not the prevailing national group.

2.2 Institutionalisation of multiculturality

Impact of immigration on cultural consumption, participation and supply

Cultural supply in a city like Barcelona is not unaffected by the avalanche of tourists and new foreign residents. On one side, up-scale tourists and residents increase the number of museum visitors and concert-goers. On the other side, the more limited purchasing power and the absence of cultural habits of poorer or rural origin immigration reduces attendance rates per resident to theatres, exhibitions and cinemas, but it increases the number of library users (owing to free internet access and the availability of books and periodicals from their countries). Analyses of temporal series for the last few years are hard to understand if we do not take into account this new determinant factor, as well as the aging of the indigenous population.

The city's cultural landscape is not only transforming because the cultural habits are changing, but also because of its ability to generate new forms halfway between its own cultural roots and hybridisation. The opening up of new venues, from restaurants to night spots, the birth of new festivals and cultural programming halfway between the new citizens' demands and the indigenous population's interest in world cultures, as well as the transformation of the programmes offered by conventional spaces, are all proof of the richness of the intercultural phenomenon. Nevertheless, one may wonder whether the present types and amounts of different cultural offers satisfy the needs of the public and are adapted to the needs of the different immigrant communities. The institutional response to all of this cultural change is still relatively weak, as a result of a history and habits which are difficult to change at the same pace as immigration. It will be some time before we can assess this response comprehensively.

Cultural centres and meeting points of foreign communities

Barcelona hosts many foreign cultural centres such as the German, French, British, Italian or North-American institutes, and smaller centres for Brazilian, Chinese or Mexican culture. Although many of these centres finance themselves through the teaching of languages, their role of 'open window' to their respective cultures is highly significant. Both people from those countries or regions and residents interested in visiting the countries or creating links with them use the services offered by the centres. Their activities are not

centred merely on their own premises, but are also connected to different specialized cultural planners so as to promote the presence of artists, scholars and professionals in the city's regular cultural programmes, exhibitions or festivals.

Aside from this set of cultural centres more or less dependent on consular delegations or independent institutions in each country, Barcelona has three public cultural spaces which specialize in Asian, Latin-American and Mediterranean cultures: Casa Asia, Institut Català de Cooperació Iberoamericana, and Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània. The aim of such centres is to bring cultures closer to each other, to promote the creation of all sorts of links and to manage some of the aid programmes of the Spanish and Catalan administrations.

Finally, some foreign cultural spaces have opened up recently in a highly precarious way, lacking the resources of the aforementioned institutes. Although some have been promoted by a consulate (e.g. Mexico), most of them are born out of the efforts made by small associations that survive on the fees paid by their users and small subsidies. Located in apartments or at ground level, they are small spaces for social interaction that support the newly-arrived, teach language to children and organize cultural and entertainment activities. However, most of the cultural events they organize are held in places owned by other entities or by the municipal civic centres, or in restaurants and entertainment venues owned by members of the community or which specialize in their food, music and dances. As regards this last point, apparently the most obvious business opportunity for a newly-arrived immigrant is to serve his own community. This makes it easier for him to integrate into it and quickly gives him a network of relationships and customers. So, as a community grows, new specialized restaurants, bars, grocery shops, call centres or video-clubs come into being. Some of them become meeting points where people interact while others are more suitable for celebrations such as weddings, etc.

2.3 Barcelona: new destination for artists from throughout the world?

Reasons for the city's attraction

Several factors account for Barcelona's attractiveness for many creative young people from throughout the world. To begin with, the brand image generated since the 1992 Olympic Games has linked the notions of Barcelona and culture. This image, created in order to attract tourism into the city, has also brought in many *cosmopolitan young professionals*, as well as a permanent inflow of Erasmus Programme students (as was shown in the French film *L'Auberge Espagnol*). It created an open young foreign community with a high educational level and broad cultural interests which generates new offer, increases demand and forms an ideal breeding ground to perpetuate the

image of culture and entertainment. If we add the mild climate, which makes it possible to live in the streets almost all year round, good communications with the rest of Europe and a city large enough to host all types of services, it is not surprising that Barcelona has become fashionable for a good many creative and cultural professionals.

Furthermore, the growing concentration of the cultural industry in a few world cities has created big labour markets in and around them. Although Barcelona is not a first-rank cultural producer on the world scene, it has a number of small and medium-sized companies in the music, publishing, fashion and audiovisual industries and related services (design, advertising, information and communication technologies, etc.). These constitute a fabric dense enough to generate employment and artistic synergies (it must be said, however, that these industries are quite often dependent on the activities of big public cultural bodies). Unfortunately, we do not have enough evidence to determine the real scope of foreign creative and cultural professionals in the country's cultural life and industries.

Exaggerated expectations?

Catalonia obviously has drawbacks as well, such as an expensive and limited housing market, a professional labour market structured around personal ties and references, a bilingual Catalan-Spanish society with little command of English and inexperienced in interacting with stable foreign communities.

As a result, integration is not as easy as many foreigners may think. To begin with, general labour and police regulations are fairly restrictive for non-EU nationals. Also, in the cultural area, conventional labour contracts are not usual, which generates a sporadic quality of work, jobs centred on single projects, etc, all of which makes it difficult for some foreigners to legalize their situation. Despite all this, the number of foreign professionals has increased substantially over the past 25 years. From the 1980s on, with increased quality requirements by the public and the loss of social acceptance of a gregarious system of job transmission, it became easier to incorporate foreign artists into the large cultural institutions. Thus, early on, symphony orchestras and many theatre and artistic companies became open to foreign artists and professionals, despite some opposition from the locals. This process became widespread during the 1990s, except for publicly managed cultural institutions (museums, libraries, culture departments of the public administrations, etc.), where foreign professionals meet more legal barriers or lack information about the cultural and administrative system. In private companies, in spite of the fluid incorporation of artists and creative professionals, any person wanting to become a manager or an entrepreneur needs to have sound knowledge of the cultural and social realities. In order to fully integrate, then, it is not only necessary to understand

Catalan, but also a whole set of local references. It can be quite frustrating to realize how irrelevant outside experience or job references can be when someone is looking for work. Nevertheless, new enterprises and micro-businesses are starting to emerge as a result of the accumulated experience of foreign professionals recently established in the city. Some of them incorporate people of different origins and one of their main features is that they get to operate quickly in an international network.²⁶

Another professional area with a high demand for foreigners with some knowledge of the country is the area of cultural mediation. Many cultural centres and entities value the services of professional people who know the language and social networks of the different migrant communities. Obviously, the most valued are not mere translators but people who can develop interconnecting spaces and projects and who are themselves active players in the local cultural system.

Yet most foreign artists and creative professionals concentrate in the most precarious areas of cultural work as street musicians and artists, grant holders in artistic heritage institutions, independent artists, etc. Despite expectations, Barcelona is not London or New York. Its relatively weak structure of cultural business produces a labour market that has difficulty absorbing the huge employment demand of newly-arrived residents. Hence the abilities of many foreign creative professionals are under-utilized.

Diversity: resource and motive for creativity in an increasingly cosmopolitan city

The most interesting phenomenon that the presence of these artists from outside generates is the high degree of interaction among creative people. Artists of different origins work together, facilitating the appearance of new, often hybrid forms that are the fruit of the mutual influences that are generated. Fusions like flamenco with hip hop, digital music and multi-media, or the design of fashion or gastronomic culture respond to this process. Although today aesthetic circulation occurs on a world-wide scale, - through magazines, portals, commercial exchange or a frenetic geography of specialised fairs - social habit and the physical space of creation, experimentation and reception continue to be important. Barcelona better and better plays its role as a 'creative' city, with a cosmopolitan atmosphere and real opportunities for interaction; it has thus become less peripheral with respect to the ubiquitous, unidirectional global market.

This process, which initially occurred more or less naturally, by osmosis as it were, is strengthened when projects or resources exist to give it impetus. The Sala Beckett, opened as a gamble by José Sanchis Sinisterra, has for years been a paradigmatic case of a meeting space between Catalan and Latin American playwrights. The Centre de cultura contemporània de Barcelona (CCCB) has hosted entities, festivals and original

26. A good example is Quick Flick World (www.qfworld.tv).

alternative proposals including professionals from all over the world. Festivals such as the *Sónar*, *Artfutura* and *OFFF* in the digital music world; projects like *Hangar* or the open *Tallers* [workshops] in the field of visual arts; ephemeral and stable clubs for musicians and videojockeys; an underground scene that moves artists, programmers and activists; schools and universities that include new disciplines in their programmes, and, as in the case of the musicians' workshop, until they become producers and programmers; and all this close to an ever more discerning public that acts as a sounding and receiving board for all these creative endeavours. Of course, better coordination between diverse interests and strategies is needed, between official culture and the different underground cultures, between artists and isolated collectives in stagnant compartments, between consolidated initiatives that receive most of the subsidies and more alternative proposals, often made by voices with foreign accents...

As a result of these processes, the perception of world cultures tends to become interiorised and the exchange with countries of origin grows. But it is also true that for the latter it can represent a brain drain, and a certain loss of creative capacity. Likewise, the migratory process is not the same as it was decades ago. Today, fluid and fructiferous contact may be maintained with the place of origin, networks and shared fidelities which allow multiple allegiances, what Rainer Bauböck (2002) named 'transnationality'.

Finally, account should also be taken of the impact cultural and ethnic diversity has on native artists to whom the streets and squares of the city, with all their spirit and conflicts, but also with the different flavours, smells and possibilities of exchange, are a source of creativity difficult to imagine a few years ago. As early as at the beginning of the recent migratory phenomenon, filmmakers like Llorenç Soler in *Saïd* (1998) or José Luís Guerin in *En construcció* (2000) were portraying immigration, cultural diversity and the transformation of the city. This was also demonstrated by recent films such as Jordi Torrent's *L'Est de la bruixola* and Silvia Quer's *Maria I Assou*. Similar treatments are to be found in theatre, music, video art, photography and literature, all enriched by foreigners established in the city. The resulting creativity is typically from Barcelona, yet immersed in the acceptance of internal cultural diversity, as was the appearance of the rumba, or more recently Catalan flamenco.

This is the environment that attracts more or less recognised artists to Barcelona: from the great Latin American writers who have made their homes in the city for more than thirty years ago, to young and not-so-young musicians, painters, designers, architects, actors or directors who have established themselves more recently.

3. Debate, policies and programmes

3.1 Public debate concerning the city's intercultural character

Social perception of, and responses to, cultural diversity and immigration

Social debate and negative perceptions of immigration and cultural diversity are centred on three factors. All three stigmatise immigration while presenting it as: unfair competition, a reserve army of criminals, and a threat to Catalan cultural identity.

Immigration is seen first as a danger because of the fragility of an increasingly liberalized and competitive labour market in which industrial relocation to some of the countries where the immigrants come from has brought down salaries and undermines the European model of the welfare state (which, despite everything, immigrants help to support). In such a context, immigrants are seen as competitors for the limited inexpensive housing, which concentrates a good deal of the social benefits previously addressed to nationals.²⁷ Also, they are seen as people who are willing to accept poor working conditions, which has the effect of worsening the labour market.

Secondly, immigration is directly associated with the lack of safety in the streets. Petty crimes, the establishment of mafias and Islamic terrorism are at the core of worries of a population whose fears are growing stronger and that confuses the dark-skinned neighbour for the protagonist of police reports. It must be said that some radio talk shows and the tabloid press promote this kind of association. Moreover, the competition for scant resources and the difficult coexistence amongst minorities do not contribute to dissolve the violent image of foreign immigrants.

Thirdly, immigration is seen as a threat to local cultural identity, to the values, civic references and ways of living and interacting within the community. The immigration avalanche promotes the loss of cultural homogeneity and the loss of certain collective social assets made up by local tradition and held up by the school. When an immigrant community reaches a significant volume, the need to assimilate is not so strong and their cultural, religious and linguistic expressions become more visible. Fear of the unknown adds up to some civic values that clash with the local habits. Thus traditions linked to Ramadan, the smells of strange dishes or the loud Caribbean music cause uneasiness and suspicion. This fact is even more evident with recent immigration that has not gone through the process of local socialization and for which behaviours such as not paying at the underground or dumping papers in the streets are assessed in a different way. In the case of Catalonia, it must be added that the language of communication chosen by immigrants is Spanish, a fact that increases the feeling of loss of local identity. Finally,

27. In spite of the fact that, according to a recent study, immigrants are motivated by cash income rather than by real income, which includes benefits (López Casanovas 2005).

must bear in mind that the latest migration wave has coincided with the degradation of civic behaviour in the centre of Barcelona due to a high concentration of tourists and the use of public spaces for fun and entertainment.

Violent expressions of xenophobia

There are two outstanding events in the media reports of violent expressions of xenophobia. The first one occurred in 1999 in Ca N'Anglada (Terrassa, in the metropolitan area of Barcelona). Then came the much more serious events of El Ejido (an Andalusian village in Almeria) the following year. In both cases, conflicts between the indigenous and the immigrant communities affected poorly-educated populations. In Terrassa, they were both low-income communities coexisting in a degraded neighbourhood. In the Andalusian countryside, the communities are segregated and the only interaction is that between employer and employee.

However, beyond conflicts like these, which have been only sporadic until now, the real xenophobic violence is that staged by organized gangs of skin-heads that attack immigrants, homosexuals and other minority groups that do not fit into their narrow view of life. It is not a widespread phenomenon but, despite growing police surveillance, attacks are frequent in several towns within the Barcelona metropolis. Together with these sorts of groups made up of marginalized indigenous young people, there has been an increase in the number of immigrant adolescent gangs. They organize in the fashion of their original countries and adopt the same imagery and symbols, and they are starting to cause serious trouble and even a few deaths. Fights among groups for territorial control are an obvious danger that can accelerate xenophobia. Apart from violent expressions by right-wing extremists, young criminal gangs or even leftist groups against the system, the message of xenophobic exclusion is also reaching growing numbers of conservative citizens. In the 2003 municipal elections, the xenophobic right-wing party "Plataforma per Catalunya" got 5 to 10% of the votes in the inland towns of Vic, El Vendrell, Manlleu and Cervera and thus gained representation in the town hall in all those cities.

The role of the media

In keeping with the growth of immigration and the consequent internal cultural diversity, the Catalan media has multiplied tenfold the amount of news concerning immigration on the radio, in the press and on television. However from 2000 to 2002 this has tripled. On all television channels in Spain combined, it has gone from some 3% to almost 8% of the total information on news programmes.²⁸ Likewise, as Paco Martín from the Commission for journalistic solidarity of the Journalists College of Catalonia affirms, the treatment of immigration is tendentious and simplistic, explaining immigration from the

28. Information contributed by Manel Mateu, from MigraCom, the debates on immigration, diversity and the media organised by the Jaume Bofill Foundation autumn 2003. See Gonzales, J [coord] (2004), P.16.

point of view of conflict.²⁹ Journalists openly position themselves in a simple debate, fed by news of outstanding events. Behind conflicts of different orders, from the large mafias to petty crime, often the cause and implicit association is obvious: immigration as a synonym of marginalization (in the same way the Gypsy has been treated as the delinquent par excellence). Obviously immigrants are behind many crimes, owing to the sheer precariousness and marginalization in which many of them live, and to the fact that Spain until recently has been a quiet refuge for organised crime. When it comes to using adjectives, it is easier for the press to speak of the Russian mafia, the Maghrebi bag-thief, or the Peruvian gang. So public opinion increasingly associates delinquency with immigration.

The media positions itself between morbid news and political correctness. When news can be treated as an event, its sensationalist dimension is exploited without scruples. On the other hand, the word 'Moor' (traditional term for people from the Maghreb with a negative connotation), in widely extended hypocrisy, is avoided in this area. Logically, the worst role is played by the gutter press (for example, the free newspaper *Olé*), or determined programmes of debate or radio commentators of marked demagogic tone such as Radio Taxi in Barcelona, or Cadena COPE at Spanish level (curiously, owned by the Spanish Catholic episcopate).

Similarly, there also exist multiple positive treatments of cultural diversity. Some public media have in the last few years set up special programmes to divulge the existent cultural diversity, in an effort to generate a positive image, explain reality beyond stereotypes, and to respond to the need for information generated by a new, unknown phenomenon that may generate anxiety and even fear. Thus a number of programmes have been broadcast to this end on both radio and television.

Barcelona Televisió for its part emits a news programme dedicated to immigrant groups resident in the city, *Infos*, with contents going from self-referenced information about their own community and country of origin to social or legal themes, and the presentation of a cultural agenda, local customs and traditions. This programme began in 1998 in four languages, and seven years later it is emitted in a total of twenty, with the philosophy of giving voice to each community and that the communities themselves should be the spokespeople of their own space.³⁰ Until now, these news programmes have been broadcast exclusively in the original language, but from September 2005 they have been subtitled in Catalan, which will permit greater interaction between groups, as well as help integration.

Beyond these positive actions, the logic of the media behind morbid or striking news is characterized by a negative use of adjectives for the migratory phenomenon. To fight

29. Ibidem, p.7.

30. The programme is broadcast each Saturday and Sunday morning, from 10.30 a.m. to 14.00 p.m. and made up of 21 news programmes in the following languages: Japanese, Arabic, Italian, Danish, Finnish, Portuguese, German, Swedish, Norwegian, Amazig, Occitane, Urdu, in Catalan in sign language, French, Chinese, Russian, Tagal, Bubi and Mandingo.

this the College of Journalists had already drawn up a manual of style on the treatment of immigration in the media in 1996, which is complemented by recommendations of the Audiovisual Council of Catalonia on the preferred ways of presenting information on immigration in the audiovisual media (*Quaderns del CAC*, 2002). More recently, the College has begun the multicultural Agenda of Barcelona, a tool that has to enable identifying professionals in the field (with the aim of facilitating the sending of messages to the media by the different communities) and at the same time fixing different existing sources of information. It has to be taken into account that existing sources on diversity and immigration in Catalonia for the most part come from official authorities (demographic statistics, data on delinquency, official reports), from some specialised entities, or from a limited number of representatives of different communities.³¹ Many immigrants do not want to be known because they distrust the media, because attending journalists takes time, because they lack self-confidence in expressing themselves, or simply because they wish to remain anonymous.

As to information on countries of immigrant origin, official sources are more limited, and usually Western news agencies have to be used, once again influenced by that which is considered news or an interesting story in the West. As Isabel Ramos of the *Vanguardia* comments:

“access to the sources is not easy, although it seems to us that access to internet solves everything. Depending on the place of origin of the immigrant or ethnic, linguistic or religious group to which they may belong, it is difficult to find books on the country, ethnic group or religion in question. In Barcelona there are no embassies and, in many cases, non-European Union citizens are represented by honorary consuls that do neither speak their language nor have adequate documentation on the country; that is to say, there are often no sources of official information on the countries of origin.”³²

Lastly, in this brief analysis it is necessary to cite the media of and for different communities. In spite of their still small number, they fulfil an important role as a medium of internal communication. They are often simple bulletins or websites. Given the elevated cost of production and distribution only exceptionally do they take the form of a newspaper or magazine. This obliges them to address wider regional communities, or publish for the whole of the state. Among the most significant publications *Catalonia Today* and *Barcelona Metropolitan* may be cited (weekly and monthly magazine, respectively, in English, addressed both to Catalans who wish to practice their English and the wide cosmopolitan community which uses this language as a vehicle of communication), *El Hispano*, *Catalina* or *Argexpress* (monthly magazines addressed to the Latin American communities, but also the Catalan reader), *Soweto* (bi-monthly

31. The true legitimacy and real correspondence between spokesmen and their communities should be subject to analysis. Normally, the representatives come from the middle classes of their respective countries and they have few experiences in common with the most of the immigrants, who are from more subordinate strata.

32. González, 2004: pp. 9-10.

addressed to the Maghrebi and sub-Saharan community), the *Mirador de los inmigrantes* (Pakistani weekly), *Estación Mir* (addressed to the communities of the ex-Soviet Republic), or *Chinalia Times* and the *Voz de China* (daily distribution addressed to the Chinese community). The distribution of these publications is usually free, in telephone booths, consulates or other meeting places, and their main source of financing is advertising (Sender 2004). Only the strongest economically can be bought in the kiosks with the rest of the periodic publications. Two cases apart are the veteran *Nevipens Romaní*, bi-monthly newspaper of the Gypsy community, or the monthly magazine *Masala*, multicultural product of Ciutat Vella (the Old Town).

Ideological debate on immigration and cultural diversity

Obviously, the intellectual and ideological debate on domestic cultural diversity is not homogeneous. As we have seen, nowadays the issue is inextricably linked to the immigration phenomenon in all large Western cities although cultural diversity can be independent from immigration and free of problems related to integration or national identity.³³ The different positions that exist examine the challenges associated with interculturality by analysing the consequences (and, sometimes, the social causes) of immigration. The debate over the role of government and civil society in immigration drives the assessment of the impact of the policies of different sectors on interculturality: education, social welfare, healthcare, security, culture and so on.

On one side of the intellectual debate we find the apocalyptic analysts. It is not a scholarly powerful group, but it finds support in the most sensationalist media or the media linked to the Spanish Conservative Party (PP), as well as in a good deal of the most frightened institutional and social fabric. Their positions are similar to the notion of the ‘clash of civilisations’ suggested by Huntington. In Spain, such ideas are explicitly defended by some scholars (for example, A. de Miguel and G. Sartori), many press commentators and, privately, a good many higher-level professionals (judges, lawyers, businessmen, etc.). It is a position that presents itself as defending western values of democracy and pluralism but, by stigmatising multiculturalism, breaks up with one of the basic principles of western culture itself. For all of them, the only effective way of integrating culturally non-Western groups is through their complete assimilation to Western principles and values.

On the other side, we find supporters of complete equity of rights and political integration of immigrants as a way of showing respect for their personal character and improving their full social integration and accommodation (De Lucas 2004). This approach emphasizes implementation of immigration policies based on co-development (which allow for real advantages for immigrants themselves, for their country of origin

33. Gypsy or Jewish people established in Catalonia for several generations can keep a cultural identity of their own and be part of the cultural diversity of the country. They can be perfectly integrated and consider themselves completely Catalan, in the same way that gays, music lovers or football fans constitute specific communities with their own types of cultural expressions that are, all of them, part of the country's cultural diversity.

and for the hosting country). The aim is to reach the full incorporation of immigrants to public life and civil society under conditions that respect equity, with all the rights and duties this entails.

Midway between these two, the most common position among the intellectuals surrounding the institutions is that of a certain perplexity at the difficulty of finding an acceptable intercultural model. On the one hand, this position denies the existence of a clash of civilisations while on the other, it considers multiculturalist ideas inefficient. Aiming at cutting down popular pressure for fear of large immigration growth, labour market difficulties (with relocation as an ordinary reality), crime increase and alien phenomena such as Islamic terrorism, the proposal is a charter of rights and duties including the assimilation of immigration to western values. In spite of its rhetorical espousment of cultural diversity, this position places Western individual and collective rights before the cultural rights of immigrant communities. Finally, at an international level, it advocates tighter control of migration flows, cooperation on security issues and heightening 'dialogue among civilisations'. Inspired by this position, Spanish President Zapatero recently put forward at the United Nations General Assembly the idea of working for an 'Alliance of civilizations'.

Other intellectuals like Manuel Castells differ slightly from this line of thought and propose a move towards a model similar to the American one, with a clear system of prevailing values but respectful for the wealth of cultural expressions contributed by different immigration waves. Behind this proposal is the idea that, if European values and culture are to be preserved, it is necessary to impose (in subtle or clearly authoritative ways) the genuine cultural assimilation of non-European immigrants to those values that are considered essential, praising simultaneously the diversity of cultural expressions that are compatible with them. Opposing this view, there are people such as Manel Delgado and Salvador Cardús: the former believes that multiculturalism is just a trick (Delgado 2000); the latter thinks it is simply dead, fortunately (Cardús 2005).

To understand this debate, we must take into account what Rosa Aparicio explains in her study of migration in post-industrial societies : social relativization in the perception of physical space and, consequently, in feelings of belonging to such space. Immigrants never *leave their country completely*, since they keep fluid communication with it and develop trans-national links (family, commercial, cultural, political and so on) beyond the range of the host country and its sovereign institutions. It is difficult to design integration policies in such conditions, as the physical distance between countries becomes relative and the links with the land of origin (and the influence of it) are strengthened by continuous

virtual and personal contacts. From the point of view of the study of interaction and cultural dialogue, this is a very interesting process. However, from the perspective of the classical integration model that requires complete assimilation it is problematic...

A more specific Catalan concern is the preservation of the country's identity and language. In the face of the widespread use of Spanish (and of the Spanish references associated with the language) by the new immigrants, these are seen as a real Trojan Horse for complete assimilation of the Catalan identity to the Spanish one. In the case of Catalonia, this particular concern and other anxieties present in the debate over immigration and cultural diversity throughout Europe confront a tradition of voluntary assimilation. Not having had, in the modern era, an independent nation-state that could defend its own cultural identity has forced Catalan society to preserve itself through a good deal of self-conviction, persuasion and moral and economic power. Nevertheless, in the face of such an intense, diverse and globalized immigration inflow (which, thank to the communication revolution is able to maintain an intensive relationship with their countries of origin), the efficiency of the mechanism of conviction comes into question. In view of this set of challenges, it is no surprise that the academic world has organized many debates, seminars and courses on the subject. In the last few years, the University of Barcelona alone has carried out a variety of post-graduate studies with degrees so closely connected to the subject as Interculturality, International Cooperation and Cultural Management. The philosophy at the core of all these efforts has to do with to publicizing the richness of cultural diversity as an antidote against xenophobia. As we shall see below, a good example of an action taken in this spirit is the exhibition "Languages in Catalonia".

Lastly, we must highlight the conceptual legacy of the *Universal Forum of Cultures* in connection with interculturality and cultural rights. Beyond the immediate results of the Dialogues organized during the summer of 2004, the Forum has provided a legacy of more or less critical reflection, contacts with professionals from throughout the world and many local experts concerned about all of these issues.

3.2 Initiatives of civil society

Pioneer implication of specialized working groups

Catalonia has a good number of small foundations and 'solidarity' entities sensitive to social and cultural issues. Some of them, like Caritas Diocesana, active in the fight for social integration, were the first organisations to detect the relationship among immigration, social alienation and intercultural conflicts. Other organizations with a

long-standing trajectory of support to Third World projects, like Intermón-Oxfam, are realizing that a new action front is opening up at home. More focused on cultural and inter-religious dialogue, there are outstanding entities such as the Unesco Catalonia Centre.

Mention should also be made of the resources invested in the study of the phenomenon by academic centres, e.g. the efforts of the Fundació Jaume Bofill, the CIDOB or the Mediterranean European Institute (IEMed) to create spaces for deliberation and devise schemes focused on the phenomena of interculturality and immigration. With the aim of contributing to the diagnosis of problems, the reflection and development of specific measures and actions within this field, the Fundació Bofill organizes debates, supports research and publishing of specialized works and has become involved in several emblematic projects.³⁴ The CIDOB specializes in reflexion on intercultural dynamics and migration in order to bring the academic debate, the professional and economic world and the institutional representatives closer to each other.³⁵ Finally, from its Observatory, the IEMed offers a comparative perspective, both European and Mediterranean, on the Mediterranean migrations through the organization of conferences and debates and the publishing of several specialized publications.³⁶ Many public and private policies implemented in the past few years, as well as a great deal of the ideological debate that legitimises them, were born out of the work and the reflections carried out by these entities.

Emergence of grassroots initiatives and organizational fabric

There is an emerging organizational fabric made up of both nationals and foreigners interested in promoting the experience of cultural diversity. One of the most visible activities of such groups is the organization of cultural diversity festivals that feature many local and international artists. The most common areas of activity include music, craftwork and gastronomy. These kinds of initiatives have a good reputation among the local public authorities, which subsidise them or pay for the installation expenses (electricity, stalls and so on).

Besides these festive activities, several associations and foundations have carried out campaigns to raise public awareness of and fight against racism and xenophobia. If it seem initially that showing a black child crowning the human towers typical of the country was already enough, many institutions have adopted more proactive measures aimed at fostering genuine interculturality. The main trade unions are also devotedly engaged in eradicating discriminatory attitudes in the workplace and promoting a culture of tolerance and interculturality.

34. See www.fbofill.org. Among the projects promoted by this foundation we must mention Entreculturas [Between Cultures], a programme in support of intercultural education which has contributed to the creation of a large number of teaching resources (www.entrecultures.org) and the television programme Un sol món [One Single World] on the Catalan channel that we examine below.

35. See www.cidob.es/catalan/programas/programas.cfm.

36. See www.iemed.org/tematica/emigracions.php. Among the several activities organized by the Institute, we must highlight the world congress on 'Human Movements and Immigration', held in the context of the Forum 2004.

As far as the rise of entities representing the different communities living in the country is concerned, in the last ten years there has been a remarkable effort to institutionalize such communities. Traditionally, Gypsy ethnic groups have been the most organized, because of their rootedness in the country and since they are so numerous. Gypsies possess many associations and entities,³⁷ a few media of their own and even political representatives in the Parliament.³⁸ One more instance of parliamentary representation is the Socialist member of Parliament Mohamed Chaïb Akhdim, who was born in Tangiers and was the President of the socio-cultural association Ibn Batuta (1994-2003) for the integration of immigrants. The structures of association of other communities are not as strong and they devote themselves primarily to help newcomers, promote their language among the children and young people, publicise their members' interests and defend them before the public administrations.³⁹

Programmes and support from savings banks foundations and friendly societies

Together with the initiatives mentioned above, we must highlight the resources invested by the different foundations set up by the Catalan savings banks. Following a legal obligation to invest part of their profits in cultural and social actions, savings banks have designed programmes to support social and cultural integration (immigrants in turn constitute a growing clientele as senders of money to their home countries). Social programmes, economic subsidies and academic and vocational training are some of the initiatives launched. Fundació Caixa Sabadell, for example, sponsors the TV show *Tot un món* [A Whole World] on Catalan public television (TV3) and organizes the *Programme for the Integration of Immigrant Youths* (www.fcaixasabadell.org). The Foundation Un Sol Món [One Single World], created by the Caixa de Catalunya, has a grant programme for training and placement of teenagers and young people in danger of social exclusion, a group in which there are many immigrants. Similar programmes of financial support, job counselling and training can be found in the social programmes of most of the savings banks.

3.3 Government policy

Is there a Catalan model of intercultural cultural policy?

While it may not be right to speak of a uniform French, British, Dutch or North-American model of coping with multiculturalism, it is even harder to speak of the existence of a clear, explicit and developed Catalan model. To begin with, the immigration phenomenon is fairly new and there has been not enough time to develop definable policies. Moreover,

37. For example, the entities represented at the Municipal Council of the Gypsy People of Barcelona: Gypsy Cultural Association "La Cera", Gypsy Association "Bon Pastor", Gypsy Women Association "Drom Kotar Mestipen", Gypsy Cultural Centre of Hostafrancs, Confederation of Catalan Gypsy Associations, Pere Closa Foundation, Gypsy Cultural Group of Porta, Roma Institute of Social and Cultural Services, Gypsy Union of Gracia and the Roma Union.

38. The President of the Roma Union, Juan de Dios Ramírez Heredia, was a member of the Spanish Parliament. Later, he was a member of the European Parliament. At present, he is the International Commissioner for the Rights of Gypsy People.

39. See table 10.

as Caïs and Garcia Jorba point out, for the moment the general political discourse on the subject in Catalonia consists of a set of programmatic intentions based on political correctness and an admirable theoretical design, but without real and effective implementation. This is partly a result of the arguments on which the Catalan integration policy is founded. Developed in three consecutive plans of action⁴⁰ from 1992 on, after the creation of the Interdepartmental Commission for follow-up and coordination of actions concerning immigration, the Catalan option has chosen to treat the immigrants as any other citizens, with the same rights and duties. In other words it has refused to have specific programmes and budget allocations and, instead, has chosen to increase budget allocations to the general programmes according to their new needs. Consequently, there is a lack of contrasting elements (strategies, programmes and budget with an initial situation and achieved results) that would allow us to assess the efforts and compare a supposed Catalan model with those of other Western countries.

In order to understand the Catalan approach, we must take history into account. Catalan political and social identity has been built during the twentieth century on the basis of language and culture, both expressed underground over long periods of ideological and cultural repression, and in democracy by the consecutive autonomous governments. The twentieth century witnessed massive immigration from other parts of Spain that doubled the population in 25 years. The need to integrate such immigration into the social life of a nation without a state of its own led to the development of a discourse of respectful and voluntary cultural assimilation. Nowadays, this discourse has been adopted by a good part of the population and the Catalan political class (political Catalan nationalism, in its varying degrees, has a parliamentary representation of 85% in the Catalan constituency). Thus, it is not surprising that Catalonia's immigration 'model' is based on promoting the social and cultural integration of immigrants through respecting their own identities yet also strengthening their will to integrate culturally and linguistically.

In the face of the most recent inflows, consisting this time of foreign populations with values and cultures clearly different from each other's and from those in Catalonia, the reference model has been almost the same as that governing domestic Spanish immigration from the 1950s to the 1970s: of generating processes of intercultural dialogue and teaching newcomers the culture and realities of the country, while offering them simultaneously the same basic services enjoyed by the rest of the population (education, health and social welfare) so as to bring them closer to the patterns and the values of the citizens of the host country. We must bear in mind that, while the central state has most of its powers regarding immigration and border surveillance, basic social rights and services are managed by the Catalan and local administrations.

A model marked by these traits requires a lot of education, as well as trying to avoid

40. Two under the CiU Catalan nationalist conservative government (1993-2000 and 2001-2004), and one under the present leftist-nationalist coalition (2005-2008).

tensions or conflicts and generating trust, since it can only succeed if it generates enough agreement and commitment that enables a form of integration based on assimilating the fundamental values of the host society, but also cultural hybridising in aspects not so essential for the survival of a distinctive Catalan identity (music, food or festivals). An example of such policy can be found in the Committee for Audiovisual Diversity, which meets periodically at the request of the Catalan Council of Audiovisual Media (CAC) in order to contrast opinions and initiatives regarding the promotion of diversity and respect for multiculturalism in audiovisual media. Thus, endorsed by Forum 2004, a set of recommendations was compiled regarding the best ways to spread information regarding immigration⁴¹, and a reference material fund was set up, together with the Catalan public television (TV3), on intercultural dialogue and diversity. Mentions should also be made of the numerous TV3 programmes that deal directly with the issue (*A Whole World*, *Karakia and It's Our Voice*), the frequent documentary shows on the subject (*30 Minutes*) and the positive immigrant characters in television series such as *In the Heart of the City* and children's programmes. With all of these programmes, the goal is to create a favourable sentiment towards immigration.

However, as Caïs and Garcia Jorba point out, it is surprising that a model of incorporation of immigration by means of cultural integration has virtually no specific and explicit cultural policies. Neither the Culture Department of the Catalan government nor the Culture Institute of the City Council have an integration plan different from the policy for linguistic normalization, except for occasional projects carried out within a festival or previously existing celebration. Immigration policies are managed by the Education, Social Welfare and Work departments, but do not belong - at least explicitly - to the recognised realm of cultural policy. Thus, when attempting to analyse the government's policies and cultural actions regarding immigration, we find that, beyond well-meaning words, there are no specific programmes or actions to strengthen the integration process. This does not imply a lack of interest on the part of those in charge of the institutions related to culture, as we have seen in the instance of the Committee for Diversity promoted by the CAC, or as we shall see in the case of territorial cultural centres.

Behind the relative lack of initiatives may lie two overlapping reasons. First and, once again, according to Caïs and Garcia Jorba:

"the Catalan model of integration is born out of a political-scholarly speech based on an *impossible balance* between the respect for cultural diversity and the feeling of belonging to one single community as defined by the Catalan language and culture."

Such a model makes it impossible to go beyond the programmatic discourse and develop policies which are both efficient and verifiable. Nevertheless, as Fornés remarks, by

41. www.audiovisualcat.net/forumbcn2004/cat/presentacio.htm.

of cultural policies, it is possible to implement proactive strategies of integration that do not simply promote plain assimilation. An example of this may be the promotion of cultural crossbreeding, which

“has the added value of enriching the indigenous culture with the contributions of the recently arrived ones.”⁴²

Another reason that may explain the lack of greater governmental commitment in this area could be the monopolizing of cultural policy and the resources allocated to it by traditional cultural planners. By defending their legitimate right to obtain the necessary allocation of funds, cultural projects and facilities become lobbies that are not interested in changing the prevailing *status quo* or are only interested in changing it in their own favour (as it is made clear by the debate about the future Council of Culture and the Arts). This attitude is complemented by the scant interest shown by the government and the city administration in widening the criteria for the selection of projects and allocation of subsidies so as to include principles different from those established by the prevailing political and cultural philosophies (for example, by substituting the notion of excellence accepted by the established cultural system for other principles more favourable to multicultural expression and interaction). As a result, despite the increase in the number of applications for subsidies by foreign artists and professionals (mainly Latin Americans), the allocation of resources has remained virtually unchanged, as these applications do not comply with the prevailing criteria (established as a consequence of a particular historical background, specific esthetic and cultural models and pressures by the professional world that did not take into account the recent phenomenon of immigration).

It was not until 2005 that the bases for the allocation of subsidies by the Culture Department included an explicit reference to an intercultural focus. The funds allocated to this are customarily devoted to promote themes that may change from one year to another. This year they were assigned to:

“projects around cultural diversity in order to favor intercultural dialogue, which is indispensable for coexistence and for encouraging the rise of new creative expressions of the different cultures living together in Catalonia.”⁴³

Linguistic Normalization Policy

The only broad policy that is distinctively cultural, has clear plans and budget allocations and is clearly intended for the integration of immigrants is the so-called linguistic normalization policy. Launched by the first autonomous Catalan government in the 1980s, its goal was to favour Catalan language learning both for the Catalan-speaking

population excluded from academic education by the dictatorship and for the Spanish-speaking population. It aimed at normalizing the social use of a language banned during Franco's regime and at favouring the integration of the large immigration waves from the two previous decades. Since the Catalan language had already been introduced into the regular school curriculum by the end of the 1970s, the normalization policies focused on the teaching of adults, on use in the administration and on signage of spaces and services open to the public. After the onset of the new immigration, the Consortium for Linguistic Normalization continues to offer free teaching to adults, based on the idea that language learning is a way to understanding Catalan culture and integrating into it. Given the students' different origins, these classes can also become an interesting place of intercultural conversation. The number of students at the Consortium rose from 36,180 in 2000-2001 to 53,717 in 2003-2004, a 48% increase. Latin American students accounted in the latter year for 30% of the total number of students, followed by Catalan (23%), Spanish (19%), European (5%) and North African (4%). However, the majority of immigrants never enrol for the courses, or leave shortly after beginning, because of more urgent necessities. In Catalonia, since the knowledge of Spanish is not only necessary but also sufficient for employment and social integration, Catalan is left behind for a second stage of full assimilation to the culture and professional responsibility.

Consequently, while the term 'normalization' gives rise to misunderstandings among the most conscientious collectives, which do not understand its historic origin and do not wish to be 'normalized', Catalan people feel disappointed when they realize that the majority of immigrants do not learn Catalan and use Spanish as their chosen language of communication.

Actions by neighbourhood public cultural venues

Many of the government actions within the terrain of interculturality are taken by the professionals who manage the programmes of cultural institutions. Civic centres, cultural houses, youth leisure centres and libraries have recently adapted some of their actions and strategies to the new realities of immigration and the cultural diversity associated with it. Although there are no well-defined general strategies, professionals and political officials are aware that it is necessary to adapt these programmes in order to promote the integration of the new neighbours into the life of the city and the country. In the case of Barcelona, because of the novelty of the present multicultural reality the process is still in a trial and error stage in which strategies, projects and actions by the different administrations and institutions involved follow one another in an unstructured and uncontrolled way. The declared goal of the people responsible for them is to learn from experience in order to implement the successful action in future programmes.

42. Fornés, 2001: p. 7. In the same article, the author tells us about his first-hand experience of integration of the Gypsy community living in Gracia into the neighbourhood festivities, which constitutes a first-rate sample of a cultural policy promoting interculturality.

43. See <http://cultura.gencat.net/subvencions/index.htm#sub2>.

A good example of de-centralization of the decision-making process can be found in the managing of locations for street musicians. In the face of a growing presence of foreign musicians playing in public spaces such as streets, squares and the underground, as well as some conflicts among them and the pressure of neighbours' complaints about noise, the Barcelona City Council has attempted to regulate the situation. It has commissioned the St. Agustí Civic Centre to manage the project "Music in the Streets of the Old City". Some 170 musicians, 70% of whom are legal or illegal foreign residents, enrol in the programme, which allocates weekly timetables at 20 different tourist points within the Old City. According to an internal report, the group that has the biggest trouble adjusting to the regulations is the Bulgarian, but it is not clear whether the problem stems from their deficient understanding of the language or from their more itinerant condition. Bulgarians and Romanians account for 20% of the musicians in the programme; Russians and Ukrainians represent an additional 20%; and Argentineans, Uruguayans and Bolivians constitute 15%. About 60% of them are regular participants in the programme, and 23% participate additionally in a similar project at the metro.

Another interesting case is the Besòs Civic Centre. Situated in a district of traditional Spanish immigration, in recent years it has welcomed new immigrants of a wide range of origins. In response to the latter's needs, the Youth Information Centre has been turned into a reception place, at the initiative of the staff itself.⁴⁴ Every Monday, the Centre organizes a talk to help immigrants orient themselves within the employment, legal, social and cultural context of the city. Immigrants from other districts attend the talks following the recommendations of friends, neighbours and welfare professionals. They are encouraged to participate in workshops and cultural activities organized by the Centre so that they interact with their neighbours. In this line of action, in May 2005, an intensive ten-day programme about Pakistan and its culture was organized. Pakistanis are the largest foreign community in the district, and some of their leaders took part in the organization of the event. The programme included a gastronomic fair, a photo exhibition, and workshops on kites and facial painting. In order to reproduce the ambience of a traditional celebration, there were dances, concerts, reading of traditional poetry, tales and legends. A film and a traditional dress and modern fashion parade provided an occasion for people to admire Pakistani culture and neighbours to interact. However, the whole process is not free of conflict. Some neighbours have trouble accepting the demographic shift experienced by the area and, consequently, they are reluctant to accept the new activities organized by the Civic Centre (which was typically devoted to flamenco). On the other side, the new communities do not always understand the constraints of a municipal facility (the process of appropriation has been so successful that they wanted to organize the end of Ramadan party there).

44. The manager of the network of Youth Information Centres is well aware that the Besòs centre is acting outside the formal action framework; nevertheless, since he is also conscious of the strong needs in this area, he agrees to use the centre for an activity different from the ones it was conceived for.

In the Old City, the district with the most foreigners, Civic Centres such as Drassanes, Pati Llimona or Sant Agustí have witnessed a deep transformation of the users of the services they offer in just a few years. In case of all three centres, depending on the nationalities present in the area as well as on the users that are sent in by the schools, by specialized organizations and by welfare services, they adapt their activities and try to promote a strategy of integration of youths and elderly of different origins and from various communities. For example, at the Child Leisure Centre in Sant Agustí the proportion of foreign users in their workshops has jumped from 18 to 32% between 2001 and 2004, equally distributed between EU and non-EU parents. Distribution by nationalities varies dramatically in relation to age. While young children represent fairly well the different nationalities present in the area, teenagers are basically Moroccans and Ecuadorians.⁴⁵ However, not all the foreign communities use these services. It is quite strange, for example, to find Chinese children there, since they do not interact with the rest of the communities, but only within their community networks and associations.

One more interesting example is the case of district libraries, the most widespread cultural service in terms of territory and also the best equipped. The enormous general growth in the number of library membership cards and loans made in the last ten years, is not homogeneous by nationality: while one in four residents of Spanish nationality has a library card, this figure is doubled in the case of Pakistanis, or increases by 70% among Argentineans. No less important to take into account is that the use of the library differs according to the resources available (documentation in the different languages) and the cultural habits and economic situation of the different social groups making up each community. Thus Pakistani and Indian immigrants attend the library to read newspapers and magazines in Urdu and Hindi, or to connect free to internet, but in exchange they borrow very few books. However Argentineans and Chileans, and to a lesser extent, Italians, Mexicans, Brazilians and Germans use the lending service more than the Spanish.

At the other extreme, and with minimum use of the different library services, we find the Filipino, Dominican or Chinese immigrants followed by Romanian, British, the poorer countries of the Andes (Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru and Columbia) and Moroccans. In general, and not by chance, those who least use the service are the communities with the lowest level of education (see Table 9), or that come from rural environments without library services or reading habits. Hence language (and therefore greater or lesser availability of documentary material in the respective languages) appears to be a less fundamental element than socio-cultural factors. It must also be said that the effort made in recent years to adapt the available resources to the new reality of each neighbourhood is more evident in areas of high immigrant presence, as in the case of the Sant Pau library in the Raval district, than in other neighbourhoods where this phenomenon is more diffuse.

45. Some of them are sent in by social entities. In exchange for helping in the workshops, they get free internet access.

In this sense, the need to have publications available in different languages obliges librarians to find material beyond conventional sources and consult cultural mediators or immigrant entities on the quality and aptness of the material. Equally, for many immigrants the star resource of a library is free access to internet, a fact which has obliged the libraries to incorporate measures of time distribution or in some cases exclude messaging in order to centre on the use of information research. Another phenomenon which in the future may increase the number of users with a Libraries of Barcelona Consortium card is its use as a proof of residence for those immigrants undergoing the spring 2005 immigration regulation process.

Table 9. Library membership cards and lending figures in the city of Barcelona by inhabitant and nationality, 1st quarter 2005

	Residents	Cards	Lending	Cards/Res %	Lending/Res. %
Ecuador	31,828	3,481	3,233	10.9	10.2
Peru	15,037	2,389	2,737	15.9	18.2
Marocco	14,508	2,349	1,900	16.2	13.1
Columbia	13,935	2,242	2,314	16.1	16.6
Argentina	12,439	5,588	8,815	44.9	70.9
Pakistan	11,997	6,142	1,114	51.2	9.3
Italy	11,678	2,842	4,162	24.3	35.6
China	9,524	509	469	5.3	4.9
Bolivia	8,314	918	1,192	11.0	14.3
France	7,706	2,049	3,262	26.6	42.3
Dominican Rep.	7,218	308	182	4.3	2.5
Philippines	6,470	180	167	2.8	2.6
Chile	5,307	1,684	2,692	31.7	50.7
Mexico	5,228	1,322	1,856	25.3	35.5
Germany	4,762	1,396	1,443	29.3	30.3
Brazil	4,688	1,395	1,577	29.8	33.6
United Kingdom	4,056	401	566	9.9	14.0
Romania	4,049	361	595	8.9	14.7
Other nationalities	52,198	13,608	14,135	26.1	27.1
Spain	1,350,853	343,023	295,609	25.4	21.9

Source: Information provided by the Libraries of Barcelona Consortium. Compiled by the author.

Other initiatives for intercultural dialogue

In the last few years, different Catalan town councils have developed mechanisms of citizen participation in order to respond to various challenges. One of the most outstanding aspects refers precisely to the question of co-existence, dialogue and cultural integration of the different communities present in each locality. In the city of Barcelona, for example, of the new existing municipal councils, three aim to promote intercultural dialogue: the Municipal Council for Immigration, the Municipal Council for international Cooperation in Development, and the Barcelona Municipal Council of Gypsy People.

Beyond this institutional response, the most evident and generalised way of promoting intercultural integration on the part of public entities and administrations is the organisation of festivals and shows of music, traditions and gastronomy. These activities, very fashionable today, are seen as an opportunity to make the wealth of expressions known and foster the contacts between neighbours of different origin. This objective is not always achieved, however, since the majority of the audience for an Asian film festival may be made up not of immigrants from these countries but of local fans of the seventh art; the Hindu or Pakistani immigrants go directly to the local Bollywood video clubs run by a compatriot, and occasionally fill a stadium when the star of their world lands in Barcelona. On the other hand, with the organisation of festivals, gastronomic shows or other expressions of the different communities present in our neighbourhoods there exists the danger of converting the difference into a party on the basis of only promoting its exoticism. The best way of avoiding this is not to stigmatise the difference and avoid unnecessary 'ethnicization' in the presentation of the agents intervening as participants in the festival. The 'folkloreisation' of the non-native groups on a stage can achieve the perverse effect of stigmatisation through 'exoticisation'. At the same time, the excessive compartmentalisation by sectors of population in the offer of activities does not favour intercultural integration, but separates and makes dialogue between cultures difficult, both with respect to age, borders and ethnic, cult and other personal options (Fornés 2001). Nevertheless, the best way of avoiding this risk and favouring real cultural integration is to be aware of this, and apply it daily when programming different cultural services and activities in the city.

Beyond the promotion of intercultural integration and behind the programming of the cultural expressions of the new immigrant communities, there may be another, quite worthy objective, that of helping people discover the cultures of the world and thereby generate interest, knowledge and links which can prepare us to interact more effectively in face globalisation. In this sense, it is worth emphasising the work of Casa Àsia, a joint initiative of the Spanish, Catalan and Barcelona governments, to promote culture and strengthen economic and social links with the Asian continent. To a lesser extent, given

the lesser resources and availability of space, the Catalan Institute of Iberian-American Cooperation – Casa d'Amèrica – intends to be an open door to Barcelona for Latin American culture.

We should highlight as well the commitment to interculturality of certain large cultural institutions located in a district with as high migratory pressure as the Raval. The CCCB, perhaps the most visible example of this, has programmed several exhibitions which represent a dialogue with the surrounding interculturality like, for instance, *The West Seen from the East*, which focuses on how the Muslim East has contemplated and contemplates now the Western culture. This and other exhibitions are not isolated events, but are part of a more permanent commitment to and conversation with their imminent surroundings. The large number of other activities organized and the programme *The CCCB and the Raval* including projects like *Moving Culture and Literary Geographies of the Raval* are proof of this. We must mention that such commitment is also shared by a good many other cultural venues in the district, which participate in the organization of such initiatives as the *Raval Cultural Festival* through the Fundació Tot Raval.

Finally, the new Catalonia Museum of the History of Immigration located in Sant Adrià del Besòs should be cited. This museum is centred fundamentally on the internal Spanish migration of the fifties and sixties.⁴⁶ Despite the context and origin of the project, it is surprising that a museum which has just been inaugurated has only 15% of permanent useful exhibiting surface and possesses but a few visual or monographic tokens. None of its exhibitions has presented the new migratory processes. This lacuna is no doubt emblematic of how difficult it is to accept the new reality on the part of the old immigration and its representatives.

Interaction with other social and educational policies

Finally, it should be recognized that a great deal of governmental action in the area of cultural diversity has its origin in other policy areas. The school, health or social services have had to address the reality of immigration, whether it be legal or illegal. In the search for strategies, culture has been fundamental as an element of mediation, mutual understanding and relationship-building.

The school is a great instrument for integrating families through their children. However, in state schools located in neighbourhoods of dense immigration, the situation is not easy and resources are lacking. The social and health services likewise need cultural mediation to render their services to communities whose social behaviour is very different from that of the country. Finally, policies which in principle are unconnected, such as those at the urban level, can have an important impact on cultural integration. The segregation or

not of spaces, the placing of places of prayer or the increase in the price of land effect the development of a sustainable model of intercultural integration. The coordination of all these policies and dialogue with the cultural authorities is an unresolved matter that need urgent attention.

4. Conclusions

If there is one thing that characterizes the present situation of cultural diversity in the Barcelona metropolis, it is the dramatic changes it has experienced in the past few years. Since 1998 on, the amount and diversity of origins of immigration have increased exponentially. Despite the long-standing experience in assimilating immigration cultural exchange of a nineteenth-century manufacturing centre such as Barcelona, the intensity and multi-ethnic origins of the present migration inflow constitute a significant challenge. As we see in other European cities, the problems associated with the daily experience of multiculturalism and the process of assimilation are complex and, sometimes they even constitute a source of conflicts. The search for an interculturality and respectful coexistence model which finds a balance between the country's culture and the new immigrants' cultures has not yet been conclusive. Government intervention has been timid and insufficiently coordinated. The local administration, as well as the different services directly connected with immigration, have attempted to solve urgent issues in an ad hoc manner, more on the basis of the goodwill and imagination of its professionals (teachers, social workers, public health staff, cultural managers...) than on the basis of an explicit model of intervention. There are several reasons that may account for such passivity. To begin with, this is a rather de-centralized country with a limited culture of coordination. While the Spanish government is responsible for the immigration control, autonomous governments are in charge of sectorial policies (education, health and culture) and local governments manage neighbourhood services and infrastructures.

Secondly, Catalonia experienced in the third quarter of the twentieth century a large immigration wave coming from the south and west of Spain that doubled its population. The assimilation of such immigration (of rural Spanish-speaking origin but with fairly similar cultural background) is done on the basis of a legal rights equity system (they are citizens of the same state, where Spanish is the official language) and real possibilities of social and economic ascension. This fairly successful experience has shaped the manner in which recent immigration is addressed, which is simultaneously respectful and politically correct towards the identity of the newcomers. Hence it is not surprising that the explicit and rhetorical model of integration is grounded on universal rights and duties, and an almost absolute lack of explicit policies (with budget allocations and specific actions) to impose a greater degree of assimilation. For the moment, this model

46. See their background and objectives at the museum website: www.mhic.net.

in avoiding serious conflicts, but it is unclear whether it will promote a sufficient degree of integration and a foundation of shared values that prevent social isolation in the medium term, especially if the migration inflow remains at its present pace.

It must be noted that the multicultural reality of Barcelona comprises notably different situations. Firstly, we must distinguish between the bulk of economic immigration from countries in a difficult situation and students and young professionals from everywhere in Europe and America who choose Barcelona because of its popularity as a cultural and cosmopolitan metropolis. The former set up households and community networks that are rather enclosed, simultaneously filling up the classrooms with children and teenagers that display serious integration problems. However, the greater degree of cultural and linguistic assimilation of Latin-American immigrants, led by Ecuadorians, Peruvians, Colombians and Argentinians (making up 49.7% of the number of foreigners in Barcelona), contrasts with the much lower degree of Moroccans, Pakistanis, Chinese or Filipinos, just to mention the main non-EU groups. Alternatively, even though Ecuadorians are the main foreign community and some communities are concentrated in specific districts or towns, there is no excessive territorial polarization. This may give rise to some conflicts among communities deriving from coexistence and common use of public space, but it also involves an experience of interaction that overcomes the segregated pattern present in other cities and countries.

The public institutions are aware that it is necessary to design a cultural policy capable of coping with the new patterns, and, at the same time, take advantage of the creative potential of many professionals and artists attracted by the city. In this direction, it is necessary to really open the cultural institutions and subsidizing mechanisms to integrate creative projects emanating from immigrant circles. They will have to learn how to make the best of the hybridising experiences that already exist (such as the ones appeared around Manu Chao and other people) in order to strengthen a cultural industry with an identity of its own. The challenge is to take advantage of the cultural wealth brought in by immigration (connections, knowledge, creative abilities, etc.) in order to turn Barcelona into a more competitive metropolis in the international arena.

At the same time, by trying different strategies (developed by the entities and public services operating at the neighbourhood level), the aim is to progressively define a respectful intercultural model which generates true dialogue among the expressions of the prevailing cultures (Anglo-American, Spanish and Catalan) and the expressions of the (immigrant or elite) minorities while simultaneously reinforcing and enhancing the local Catalan identity.

However, the main challenge now is to achieve a type of social co-existence and integration that does not stigmatise non-EU immigration (as has happened traditionally with the Gypsy community) and avoids social hypocrisy around the issue. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to go beyond simple co-existence that does not imply any life in common and, even less, any commitment to such a shared existence. It is necessary, in Fornés words, to promote:

“personal contact, getting together, celebrating together, ... all of which are instruments that can prove efficient in order to promote the life together of people that are similar in what is essential to them: their humanity.”⁴⁷

In this sense, some of the challenges that remain are to enhance intercultural dialogue among all sorts of agents, to take advantage of festivities and other popular cultural events as a privileged setting for intercultural dialogue, to change everything that needs to be changed or to facilitate upward social mobility, for example, through the access of young immigrants to university.

The goal is clear: to create a common symbolic and cultural space that is shared by the majority of the population in everything essential that affects our life together and our sharing of a common project as a city and as a country. This entails, on both sides, agreeing to the shift in values and habits involved by such incorporation and exchange, knowing that it is a long process and not everybody can jump into it in the same way. If we wish to move in this direction, then the authorities and the leaders of the main actors involved have to show strong determination and clear leadership. It also entails more applied research on the analysis of cultural diversity and in the search of good practices and local and international solutions to the problems that come along and that will often be the same.

In a more programmatic level, it may be interesting to overcome the present stage of excessively Eurocentric cultural policies that accommodate the general strategy of equal treatment and services, and promote, instead, a more intense implication of cultural actors in proactive strategies and actions favourable to the development of interculturality. Culture can promote a shared citizenship beyond all stereotypes, as well as better understanding and collaboration among different cultural values and expressions. It is not only about reflecting cultural diversity in the activities organized at the different cultural facilities and programmes - obviously, without segregating the audiences by cultural and social origins - but also about integrating different sensitivities through the incorporation of professional and their creative proposals, simultaneously

⁴⁷ Fornés, 2001: p. 12.

encouraging the emergence of multiple syntheses that give expression to the cultural wealth of the metropolis. Our neighbours coming from all of these different cultures are our best ambassadors abroad. Thus, it is essential to stimulate their careers.

However, I do not think that it is beneficial to happily rush into 'multicult' just because it is fashionable or it is politically correct, but because it can contribute to a better integration within the community and can make us more competitive in an increasingly globalized world. As Mingus Formentor puts it:

"Barcelona is hybrid because of its history, it is crossbred because of its geographic situation and it is a little mean by hobby, and all of these qualifying adjectives come from far back in time. It would be wrong, then, to think that we had to wait until French-Galician Manu Chao settled down in the city to describe the genuine Barcelona sounds as a transnational sonic cocktail shaker of 'Latin' pop music".⁴⁸

We must be aware that, in order to survive as a distinct cultural community, we have to develop those inter-dependencies that will allow us to adapt and keep going. The aim is to be a protagonist in this process, to use and recreate our own roots without the complex of being peripheral, to preserve a specific identity open to the world while generating a positive and integrating complicity with newcomers. May this paper contribute to initial reflection that will enable those responsible for cultural projects and policies to design of strategies and programmes that build up a real intercultural character, one that is respectful towards the identity of all, but ultimately ensures that we all build together a common project of culture and citizenship.

48. Formentor, 2005: p. 90.

Case 1

"A Whole World": a TV show for interculturality on Public Catalan Television

"A Whole World" [Tot un món] is a documentary broadcast on Catalan public television devoted to introduce the cultural diversity of recent immigration. The programme, with a duration of just three minutes, has been running every Saturday and Sunday since October 2004 preceding the midday news on the main channel of Catalan public television (TV3) and is re-broadcasted every Tuesday and Thursday on the news channel 3/24. The programme tries to answer the questions that Catalan society asks about the new immigration and its objectives range from breaking apart cultural stereotypes and misunderstandings to providing information about the social reality of the immigrants' cultures and beliefs.

The show uses a news documentary report to set up an issue which is then developed through personal stories of real people aimed at bringing the audience closer to the true life of immigrants from different points of view. In three minutes, the documentary report develops the subject, reflects on some current affairs, provides information on legal aspects and describes daily situations. In order to do so, it relies on the personal experiences of recent immigrants, immigrants from the rest of Spain, Catalan emigrants to other countries, as well as professionals working in the welfare, educational and health services, NGOs and foundations staff, neighbour associations and students of the immigration phenomenon.

In certain instances, the documentary report is made by a TV3 correspondent in any of the countries of origin of the new immigration. At the end of the report, when necessary, it delivers complementary information (telephone numbers, e-mail addresses and so on) for those interested in learning more.

As shown in Table 10, some of the subjects are linked to current affairs, while others deal with more timeless issues that are nevertheless relevant to the present moment.

Average share from October 2004 to March 2005 was 15%. The programme's success has driven the Catalan TV programmers and the show's sponsors (Fundació Caixa Sabadell and Fundació Jaume Bofill) to renew it for next school-year. Broadcasted episodes can be watched at www.3alacarta.com.

Table 10. Titles of programmes broadcasted from October 2004 to July 2005

Where They Come and Why	Constructions Workers	Racism and Xenophobia
First contact	Calling Home	Fujian: the Exodus
Destination: Catalonia	Immigrants in Immigrants'Districts	Sit-ins: immigration Laws
How They Get In: The Pateras	Offspring	Specialized Businesses
Working Without Papers	Cultural Mediators	Mariages of Convenience?
Many people in Little Time	Working in the domestic Service	Paying Tax
Waiters and Cooks	Invisible Immigration	Citizens with Nationality
First Reception	Hispano-Americans in Madrid	Street Children
Diverse Shoosls	Media for Immigrants	Being Parents
The practice of Coexistence	The Chinese	The Leisure Centre and the School
Losing Papers	The municipal Register	Integrating in France
Universal Healthcare	Argentineans	Under Tutelage: A Hard Way Ahaed
Acting as Employers	Self-Employed Immigrants	A Thousand and One in a Flat
Lively Streets	Myths and Rumours	Imams and Mosques
Long-Time Immigrants	The Headscarf	Quotas & Contract at Point of Origin
Ulldecona: 24% Immigrants	British Reception	Example: Generalitat Citizen Plan
University Degrees Shalved	Weaving Networks	Products from There, Made Here
Transfers of Money Home	Law and Punishment	Working for the Tourists
The Celebration	Domestic Problems	Having Fun
World Musicians	Preserving Traditional Jobs	Discriminated Against?
Integration	Halal Food	To Die Far from Home
Moroccans from the Riff	Creed and Coexistence	Labour Market
Immigrants in Catalan	Refugeese	Working as a Peasant
Family Re-Grouping	Foreigners and Immigrants	Immigrants and the EU

Case 2:

Exhibition "Languages in Catalonia"

The exhibition 'Languages in Catalonia' is a good example of an action supportive of cultural diversity. Displayed at the historic building of the University of Barcelona in April-May 2005, the exhibition was the culmination of a long and ambitious project propelled by the Study Group of Languages in Danger at the University of Barcelona, led by Prof. Carme Junyent. This group of researchers has recorded speakers of over 200 different languages ranging from Aymara to Zapotec, Kannada (Indian language), Txol (Mexican) or the Senegalese sign language. For many of those languages, apart from recording

samples of spoken language, the group has created a glossary of basic vocabulary. In addition to the linguistic interest, the materials were designed to be used in schools in order to identify the language of newly arrived students who cannot speak Catalan or Spanish yet. The core philosophy of the project is to publicize cultural diversity as an antidote for xenophobia. As the presentation of the exhibition states:

"Living with the fact that the world can be seen in many different ways is a good antidote against those who claim that the world is just the way they see it; it is also the best education for an enriching coexistence where exchange and cooperation are a natural fact. Diversity, thus, makes us permeable and, at the same time, it is a stimulus to go on being who we are, which is the only possible way for us to contribute in a creative way to the exchange network we constantly weave. For each language comprises distinctive knowledge that can only be passed on by its speakers and would get lost if we all had the same vision. People from throughout the world have found out in Catalonia that this country's language is as valuable as all the others and have recovered a feeling we all deserve: enjoyment of language, a sense that we are heirs to a legacy from our ancestors that ties us to them and leads us to the future, while it allows for us to contribute to the world a certain knowledge that the world would not have without us."

The exhibition, which includes a series of conferences on linguistic diversity as well, is structured around four areas:

- Languages in Catalonia
- A Different Look
- Strategies for Coexistence
- Languages for Universality

For more information, visit www.ub.es/ling/expollengues/continguts.html.

References

Ajuntament de Barcelona (2005), *La població estrangera a Barcelona*, Informes estadístics, Barcelona: Ajuntament de Barcelona. www.bcn.net.

Alvarez Dorronsoro; Fumanal (2000), *Ca N'Anglada. Una reflexió sobre l'emergència de la xenofòbia*, Veus Alternatives, n. 13.

Aparicio, R. (2002), *La inmigración en el siglo XXI: las novedades de las actuales migraciones*, García castaño, J.; Muriel, C. (eds.) *3er Congreso de Inmigración en España*, noviembre. Vol II.

Aramburu, M. (2002), *Los comercios de inmigrantes extranjeros en Barcelona y la recomposición del inmigrante como categoría social*, Scripta Nova. Revista electrónica de geografía y ciencias sociales, n. 108, www.ub.es/geocrit/sn/sn-108.htm.

Baró, E. (2004), *La importància de l'ocupació en les activitats de serveis quinaris a Catalunya: evolució en el període 1991-2001. Pla Estratègic Metropolità de Barcelona*. Unpublished.

Bauböck, R. (2002), *How migration transforms citizenship: international, multinational and transnational perspectives*, Wien: IWE Working papers series n. 24. <http://www.iwe.oeaw.ac.at/downloads/workingpapers/IWE-Papers/WP24.pdf>.

Bonet, L. (2004), *La estrategia cultural de Turisme de Barcelona, un consorcio público-privado de éxito*, Font, J. (Coord.) *Casos de turismo cultural. De la planificación estratégica a la gestión del producto*, Barcelona: Ed. Ariel.

Caïs, J.; Garcia Jorba, J.M. (on press), *Immigration et politique culturelle en catalogne*, Bonet, L.; Negrier, E. (eds.) *Le fin des politiques culturels nationaux*, Paris.

Cardús, S. (2005), *El multiculturalisme ha mort*, Avui, 15 juliol.

Castells, M. (2004), *El repte del multiculturalisme*, *Nou cicle*, www.noucycle.org/arxiu7/mcastells_multi.html.

Chaib, M. (2003), *La diversitat cultural i la integració social dels immigrants*, Aja, E.; Nadal, M. (eds.) *La immigració a Catalunya avui. Anuari 2002*, Barcelona: Mediterrània.

Col·legi de periodistes de catalunya (1996), *Manual d'estil sobre el tractament de les minories ètniques als mitjans de comunicació social*, Barcelona: Col·legi de Periodistes de Catalunya.

Cuadras, A. [dir.] (2004), *Les Condicions de vida de la població d'origen no comunitari a Catalunya*, Barcelona : Institut d'Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona.

Dasseto, F., (1990), *Pour une théorie des cycles migratoires*, Bastenier; Dasseto, F. (eds.) *Inmigrations et nouveaux pluralismes. Une confrontation de sociétés*, Brussels: De Boeck-Wesmael.

Delgado, M. (1998), *Diversitat i integració: lògica i dinàmica de les identitats a Catalunya*, Barcelona: Empúries.

Delgado, M. (2000), *El parany multicultural*, Avui, 5 de novembre, p. 25.

Delgado, M. (2001), *Inmigración, etnicidad y derecho a la indiferencia*, Checa, F.; Checa, J.C.; Arjona, A. [coord.] *Convivencia entre culturas. El fenómeno migratorio en España*, Sevilla: Sintagma.

De Lucas, J. (2002), *30 propuestas de política de inmigración*, Claves de Razón Práctica, n. 121.

De Lucas, J. (2004), *Inmigración y globalización. Acerca de los presupuestos de una política de inmigración*, Cuadernos electrónicos de filosofía del derecho, n. 10 www.uv.es/CEFD/Index_10.htm.

Estruch, J. et al. (2004), *Les altres religions. Minories religioses a Catalunya*, Barcelona: Editorial Mediterrània.

Feixa, C. [dir.] (2005), *Jóvenes latinos: espacio público y cultura urbana*, Barcelona: Ajuntament de Barcelona; Consorci d'Infància i Món Urbà de Barcelona (unpublished).

Formetor, M. (2005), *Per una definició de la flamenquitud del nord*, Nexus, n. 34, p. 86-93.

Fornés, J. (2001), *Multiculturalitat i cohesió social. La cultura popular com a instrument*, Barcelona (unpublished).

Fundació Baruch Spinoza (1996), *La ciutat de la diferència*, Barcelona: Centre de Cultura Contemporània de Barcelona.

Garreta, J; Llevot, N. (2003), *El espejismo intercultural: la escuela de Cataluña ante la diversidad*, Madrid: Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte.

Gonzàlez, J. [coord.] (2004), *La immigració a debat: diversitat i mitjans de comunicació*,

Barcelona: Fundació Jaume Bofill, Col. Debats n. 5.
Kymlicka, (1995), *Multicultural Citizenship*, Oxford: O.U.P.

López Casanovas, G. (2005), *Evolución de los servicios sanitarios en España*, Barcelona: Fundación BBVA; Institut d'Estudis Autònoms.

Moreras, J. (2002), *Les activitats comercials dels estrangers a Ciutat Vella*, Barcelona: Fundació Cidob.

Naïr, S.; De Lucas, J. (1998), *Le Déplacement du monde. Migration et thématiques identitaires*, Paris: Kimé.

Nicolau, A.; Ros, A.; Aubarell, G. [coord.] (2004), *Immigració i qüestió nacional: Minories subestatal i immigració a Europa*, Barcelona: Fundació Jaume Bofill.

Quaderns del CAC (2002), *Mitjans de comunicació i immigració*, n. 12, gener-juny.
www.audiovisualcat.net/box48.html.

Solà Morales, R. [coord.] (2004), *La immigració a debat: diversitat i participació*, Barcelona: Fundació Jaume Bofill, Col. Debats n. 4.

Sartori, G. (2001a), *La sociedad multiétnica. Pluralismo, multiculturalismo y extranjería*, Madrid: Taurus.

Sartori, G. (2001b), *El islam y la inmigración*, Claves de Razón Práctica, n. 117.

Sender, N. (2004), *Què passa al meu país?*, *Comunicació21*, Hivern.
www.comunicacio21.com/paper/15/reportatge.pdf.

Solé, C; Parella, S. (2005), *Negocios étnicos. Los comercios de los inmigrantes no comunitarios en Cataluña*, Barcelona: CIDOB. Col. Interrogar la actualitat.

Trullen, J. (2001), *El Territori de Barcelona cap a l'economia del coneixement*, Barcelona: Diputació de Barcelona. Elements de debat territorial n. 15.

Xarbau, X. (2004), *L'educació intercultural a Catalunya: aproximació a la situació actual*, Barcelona: Fundació CIDOB. Documents CIDOB. Sèrie Dinàmiques interculturals n. 2.

Zapata-Barrero, R. (2004), *Immigración, innovación política y cultura de acomodación en España*, Barcelona: Fundació CIDOB. Col. Interrogar la actualitat.

BUDAPEST: REGAINING MULTICULTURALISM?

by Krisztina Keresztély and János Zoltán Szabó⁴⁹

1. Portraying the city

1.1 General overview

A brief history of urban development and planning in Budapest

Budapest was created on 17 November, 1873 by the unification of Buda, Pest and Óbuda (Old Buda - *Aquincum*). Following this, the city developed rapidly as the national capital of Hungary and, as the second capital city of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, soon became an international metropolis. When the Treaty of Versailles was concluded after World War I, Hungary lost two thirds of its territory. The city of Budapest had been the capital of a leading European country where a significant proportion of the population was composed of ethnic minorities. But now the country (and population) was divided into 6 parts and Hungary became a medium-sized country with a monocultural society. This caused major conflicts between Budapest and the rest of the country, the repercussions of which continue to fuel debate even today. During the next several decades Budapest was often treated as the 'enemy' of the nation, in the sense that it was an unnecessarily overdeveloped and over-modernized city, as compared to other parts of the country. On the other hand, Budapest remained the main centre and the national symbol of Hungary and represented the wonderland and central point for three million Hungarians stranded outside the new borders of the country. The city thus came to be viewed in this twofold manner, and still is today.

Finding the balance between interests is the key to urban development in Budapest today. After 1989, it became the main destination for international capital investment. During the first six to eight years of the transition period, Budapest kept its dominant economic position in Central–Eastern Europe, concentrating 30% of the total investment entering the region. Its attractiveness was bolstered by a liberal and laissez-faire urban policy on the part of the municipality. During the 1990s Budapest went through a deep urban restructuring that was mainly the result of international private investment in property (offices, shopping malls, hotels and residential parks). The state withdrew entirely from urban development and planning, and major new state investment projects only appeared in the capital around 2000. Since the political transition, Budapest's urban development has thus been characterised by the preponderance of private investment and the disintegration of local policies as a result of the decentralisation of public administration. Urban planning practically disappeared for almost the whole of the last decade, and urban development strategies that were implemented during the last few years are now being used to try to fill the gaps that had been left by the complete lack of regulation earlier. Moreover, since 1990 Budapest has been steadily losing its population as a result of a rapid suburbanisation process, which naturally hinders its infrastructural development.

49. Krisztina Keresztély, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
János Zoltán Szabó, The Budapest Observatory.

It has finally become obvious to urban and national policy-makers that Budapest is gradually losing its primary position in the region in comparison to other capitals such as Prague, Warsaw or even Bratislava... and also that the permanent degradation of urban life may be the result of the lack of socially and culturally sensitive policy-making. Both citizens and politicians have begun to realise that sustainable cultural and social development is indispensable to keeping Budapest an attractive city for economic investment and international tourism. National and urban policy-making have to find a balance, on the one hand, within Budapest, between the different parts and social groups of the capital city itself, and on the other hand, between the capital and other parts of the country, especially secondary cities such as Debrecen (population 206,000), Pécs (158,000), and Szeged (163,000).

Some data on Budapest

Recent infrastructure development includes:

- The new metro line 4 and a restructuring of metro line 2;
- A major restructuring of the city's roads;
- New squares, such as Erzsébet Square, a cultural district (Palace of Arts, National Theatre), the Millenáris Park.

In conjunction with this, private investment has increased dramatically in the construction of office buildings and "apartment parks".

Budapest is divided into 23 districts. Each district has an elected local government with a mayor at its head, and in addition there is an elected municipal local government with a principal mayor for the entire city. Every public territory and institution is owned by the capital authority or the district authority, which makes the city structure very complex. Co-operation between the capital and its districts is a very sensitive process.

The socio-demographic characteristics of the city are an ageing population, depopulation, a scaling down of industry in the downtown area, and a fast-developing suburban area. Districts situated on the Buda side are rich, while districts situated in Pest side are rather impoverished except for the Parliament area (5th district). While unemployment stands at only 2-3%, Budapest faces real problems in regard to homelessness and poverty. Budapest and its suburban area with four million inhabitants represent 48% of the EU per capita GDP, which is significantly higher than the Hungarian average (35-40%). Many international companies have established their Central-Eastern European headquarters in Budapest, which explains the economic potency of the city.

In regard to Budapest's multicultural tradition, it can be observed that the structure of the city is rather a mosaic; there are parts where different ethnic groups and minorities are grouped. However, the total number of minorities is less than 5% and it is mostly the Jewish and Roma cultures that represent the multicultural tradition.

1.2 Culturescape

Major cultural trends - elite and grassroots culture

Generally speaking, cultural trends are widely segmented and in continuous flux in Budapest. As far as elite and popular culture is concerned, a fair description would be that major cultural trends are a rising and falling cyclical process. It must be clarified that distinctions made between elite and grassroots culture are sometimes superficial, but in some cases can be deep and discordant as well. We shall focus on the most influential cultural development processes and try to place them in their appropriate place between elite and popular culture.

The radical changes of Hungarian society and culture after 1989 are self-evident and need little elaboration; however recent developments ought to be described, as well as certain processes that are gaining momentum. Indeed, we can mention several fields of cultural life with special regard to their contribution to these processes.

In Budapest there are 4-5 important contemporary fine arts galleries that are utilised as points of sale by agencies for artists, and their turnover is rising by about 10% a year. Oil paintings and mixed materials are usually the most popular, but video and new media art is gaining ground, too. A well-run gallery can manage 10-12 contemporary artists.

Other forms of traditional elite cultural life, such as opera and symphony orchestras, are struggling to retain their position among the array of cultural services. Opera is one of the most expensive high art forms and thus questions are being raised as to the efficiency of funding it. But on the other hand, one of the most up-to-date European concert halls and the home of the National Philharmonic Orchestra, with nearly 2,000 seats, was opened at the Palace of Arts, in Budapest, in 2005. Until now, it has been a constant challenge to fill the 1,000 seats at the Academy of Music, so another 2,000 seats will be an extra challenge for the Orchestra. It is hoped that the reconstruction of the building of the Academy of Music will begin soon, giving box office managers a breathing space before having to fill 3,000 seats a night. To sell the seats is also a key question of opera life. While old and 'heavy' operas are staged at the beautiful historical building of the Opera House, popular opera pieces and musicals are staged in a 70-year old concrete building that also belongs to the opera management. There is a form of audience

segmentation at work here: opera and symphonic music are seen as high culture while musicals and operettas are lower on the scale.

As regards other forms of elite culture the following are apparently growing in popularity: applied art, mixed/media art, architecture, industrial art, design and fashion. Unfortunately however, at the same time the market is being inundated with trashy art. New developments can be observed in the film industry. Huge multiplex centres with 10-20 theatres were built during 1990s, such as the West End, which is the biggest shopping and entertainment centre in Central-Eastern Europe. As a parallel process, the municipality has created an art movie network in order to save smaller cinemas in the city centre. The cinema system was completely restructured in the process. As the next step, new film studios were established through private investments after 2000. Some evaluate this trend as late in coming, but an absolutely necessary process that will build up a new film industrial area around Budapest, on the ruins of the antiquated Hungarian Film Company (MAFILM), which flourished in the 1960s and 1970s.

Various forms of theatre, music and dance occupy a place between elite and popular culture, depending on the performance. Contemporary theatre and dance are mostly for very keen patrons, who are never really satisfied. However, avant-garde and post-modern theatre usually plays to almost full houses. The National Dance Theatre, opened at Buda Castle in 2005, runs as an open house for contemporary companies. Recognised new theatre and dance companies usually run shows without their own building, while traditional theatre companies (providing 92% of yearly shows) tend to have their own building. In general, theatre and dance are flourishing in Budapest, since the numbers of performances, audiences and venues have been growing continuously since 2000. Music is in the forefront as regards popular culture and it is everywhere: in local pubs, music clubs, discotheques with DJ-s that do well year in year out. Yet, pubs with live music are not doing so well at all. Fortunately, new venues and festivals provide some excellent opportunities for music groups.

Institutional and non-institutional based cultural activities

The traditional view among artists and groups of artists is that they should be state-funded or state-employed and this attitude largely persists. However some artists take different approaches, such as selling their music commercially, or by utilising the media or sponsorship. 'Mini matrix' organisational structure (team members with various roles in various projects) has become the standard among cultural managers and artists, as well as among institutions. Recently, the role of institutions has changed, because new forms of institutional co-operation and partnership are emerging and providing opportunities for artistic expression. This question is of major importance for our

research, because institutions support most of the cultural activities. It should be noted, however, that the institutional support is often provided by a group of institutions rather than by individual ones. Many cultural activities require such institutionalised support; it is especially essential for bodies such as galleries, theatres, and museums. Whenever continuity is required, guaranteed long-term support is indispensable yet at the same time many bodies are seeking to find more flexible new formulas in order to survive.

Spatial configuration of culture i.e. centre / neighbourhoods

Each one of the 23 districts has a centre of administration and shopping centre, as well as a cinema and other cultural services. Budapest as a whole also has its city centre, which is the 5th district and the Buda Castle (1st district). There have been many plans to develop areas such as Nagymező Street (a street with six theatres in the 7th district) as a cultural district; however hard financial realities have thwarted these ambitions.

These days cultural consumption takes place mostly between Buda Castle and Heroes' Square. Visitors can follow a path called "Cultural Avenue", which in almost a straight line leads to the most interesting museums, cafés, restaurants, theatres, churches and parks. To identify clusters of cultural consumers, this "Cultural Avenue" is dedicated to tourists; however, in winter most of the institutions are visited by citizens of Budapest as well. In summer the whole city changes, new open-air concert venues are formed, such as St. Stephen Basilica Square (mostly symphonic and opera concerts). Sziget Festival attracts 200,000 people to the old shipyard island. Budapesti Búcsú (the day of the patron saint of Budapest) opens bridges for street walks. Films are screened in the open air all night in front of the Parliament during the Space-Film-Music Festival.


Youth groups are constantly acquiring new venues for entertainment, such as Ráday Street with its many bars and restaurants, the A38 Ship, and the Green Pardon. Popular concert venues where they gather are Petöfi Csarnok, Budapest Arena, Puskás Ferenc Stadium, or smaller places like Gödör and Millenáris Park. Multifunctional places open for contemporary art are the Trafó House of Contemporary Culture, and the Fonó House.

It is worth noting that a tourism boom took place in 2005, with 5-10% more visits, 50-70% more flights and 10-15% more nights booked, although nobody has provided an adequate explanation for this. It was a positive change but quite unexpected. Can cheap flights really have such an impact on tourism?

1.3 Maps


“Cultural Avenue” was a project led by *Turisztikai Kutató* (Tourist Research Kkt.), which identified 55 spots worth visiting, along the red line on the map from Buda Castle (left) to Heroes’ square (right).

Map 2. Cultural Avenue, Budapest Licence from 2q Kkt (Puczkó László)



This red line, running in the East-West direction, leads the visitors to most of the historical cultural buildings and museums of Budapest. As can be seen, this is not an extensive area and can be walked in one day. This is why city leaders recognised the need to plan new cultural centres in the opposite direction (South-North). Map 3 illustrates what Budapest is planning to implement within the framework of its application to become European Capital of Culture 2010.

Map 3. Investment foreseen in the Budapest application for European Capital of Culture 2010



As the Millennium City Centre with the Palace of Arts and the National Theatre started this process, the two key projects will strengthen the whole by creating new cultural spaces in the North and South.

2. Expressions of cultural diversity


2.1 How is cultural diversity reflected in city life?

When focusing on the question of cultural diversity, one has to analyse the level of plurality within a population. By definition, two main groups have to be distinguished in Budapest. Ethnic or what in Central and Eastern Europe are termed 'national' minorities are formed by ethnic or religious groups that have had a stable life and tradition in the country for at least a hundred years. This is the necessary condition to obtain the legal status of minority. The other group that contributes to Budapest's cultural diversity is composed of immigrants. Measuring the numbers of minorities and immigrants, respectively, is one of the main challenges for demographic and social studies. Statistical data are never exact, since their points of view are entirely different, such as in the case of national census data, or data related to working or residence permits. The legal situation of these two groups is constantly changing.

Minorities

The two most important minorities are that of the Roma (Gypsy) and the Jews. According to the 2001 census, Gypsies form 0.79% of the population of Budapest, or 14,000 people. It is quite possible that their number is higher (up to 150,000), as many Gypsies do not live a stable, place-oriented life and also because many of them are most probably unwilling to admit to their ethnic origin. The largest Jewish population of Central-Eastern Europe lives in Budapest and is approximately 100,000, strong. They are usually referred to as 'Hungarian Jewish' or 'Jewish Hungarian'. These expressions describe their identity, which is Hungarian and Jewish at the same time, a point that Imre Kertész, 2004 Literary Nobel Prize winner has made many times. The Jewish population can be considered a religious group, but they have had a stable life and tradition in Budapest for more than a hundred years, so they also count as a minority.

Map 4. Roma population in Budapest's districts



2001 Census

Case study 1.

Cultural integration of Roma community

The Roma first appeared in Hungary in the 14th century, and various Gypsy groups continued to arrive afterwards, until the 19th century. According to historical sources, both local and central political authorities sought the social integration and assimilation of the Gypsies. Thus both Marie Therese and Josef II issued various decrees, the objective of which was to hinder the travelling lifestyle of Gypsy groups. For the 1893 census, because of these decrees, 90% of the Gypsy people declared that they had long been settled down. During the Horthy regency (1920-40) other arrangements were made to

force Gypsies to settle and the majority were employed in agriculture, mostly as day-labourers. By that time, industrial development began to drive out handcrafts, including traditional Gypsy professions. The tragedy of World War II resulted in thousands of Gypsies falling victim to the Roma Holocaust.

During the socialist regime (1948-1989), the Roma remained one of the poorest groups of society. Owing to the extensive industrial development of 1950s many new jobs were created and required new labour. At this point the politicians turned to the Roma, realising that poverty stood in the way of their integration. A party decree issued in 1961 initiated the construction of basic apartments for them (the so called "CS" flats), which usually meant apartments with a shared bathroom in the corridor. The realisation of this plan was made by interest-free long-term loans. At that time, the Gypsy population of the 6th, 7th and mainly 8th districts of Budapest reached its present size with Gypsies occupying old and semi-derelict apartments (built around 1900). At the same time, politicians realised that a high percentage of Roma children were dropping out from obligatory primary school. In order to compel these children to attend school 'temporary Gypsy classes, and schools' were established. The schooling of the Roma is still a huge problem; however, integrated schools and classrooms created since 2003 have become symbols of Roma integration, even though the way of implementing the project of integrated schooling is still a controversial issue..

A softening of the political climate made it possible for István Kemény and his team to carry out a research survey on the Roma in 1970-71. As well as looking into other issues, this survey studied the labour market situation of the Roma such as the employment rate of adult Gypsy men (85,2%) and found that it was almost on the level of non-Gypsy men (87,7). Industry needed the unskilled labour of the Roma and this trend continued until 1989, when many unskilled Gypsies became unemployed. According to a Roma survey (1993) approximately half a million Gypsy people live in Hungary, with about 150,000 in Budapest. The unemployment rate of the Roma is double that of non-Gypsies.

From 1992, many new Roma programmes were started by the Hungarian Labour Fund, the Autonomy Fund, the Soros Foundation, the Public Foundation for Hungarian National and Ethnic Minorities etc. Since 1993, there has been a Roma Parliament (and Cultural Centre) operating in a building situated in the 8th district of Budapest. After Hungary joined the EU, Roma people were targeted by EU structural funds for specific programmes. The Ministry of Cultural Heritage recently started a new programme to help the creation of Roma cultural centres. Today Roma cultural centres (sometimes called 'Roma community centres') – in spite of their financial difficulties – are available in almost every large town. Indeed, some may ask why we need new Roma infrastructure (financed by central government). Would it not duplicate the old cultural centres (cultural

houses) financed by local governments? This does not really fit the notion of integration, but Gypsy people undoubtedly consider Roma cultural centres to be symbols of their autonomy.

Another historically significant minority group in Budapest is that of the *Germans*, known to Hungarians as the Svabish. German was the official language until 1867, when, two decades after the 1848 revolt, in a historic reconciliatory compromise, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was established. Though the population of Budapest has been rapidly assimilated ('magyarized'), the number of people of German origin remains large. Many of them live in the elegant neighbourhoods of Budapest.

Other important minorities are the Greeks, the Slovaks and the Serbs. The Greek minority can trace its origin to the 1950s revolution in Greece, when a huge number of Greek communist activists immigrated to countries of the Soviet block.

Legal and cultural situation of minorities

Since 1993, the Law on National and Ethnic Minority Rights (act LXXVII) stipulates that autonomous local-governments can be organised by minorities as parallel systems of territorial local governments of villages, towns and cities. Representatives of minorities are elected at local elections, parallel to other local representatives. Since June 2005, these minority governments can be elected only by persons who have previously declared themselves as belonging to the given minority group (prior to this, anybody could vote for minorities' local governments, which led to various voting irregularities and abuses).

Government Decree 2187/1995 established the Public Foundation for Hungarian National and Ethnic Minorities with an annual budget of approximately two million euro. Furthermore, the National and Ethnic Minority Office was founded by government decree 125/2001, responsible for national and ethnic issues. This political-administrative structure in Hungary is considered to be a unique democratic approach for minorities in Europe and more specifically in Eastern Europe.

Immigrants or minorities?

The 2001 census used a broad definition of minorities. According to this survey, several groups of immigrants are considered to be minority groups, such as Chinese, Africans or Arabs. These groups are far from forming minority groups in Hungary, as they were certainly not present in Budapest a hundred years ago, which is the legal requirement. Nevertheless, the presence of these groups of immigrants is becoming ever more visible in Budapest. The most numerous are the Chinese, whose estimated number was 4–5,000

in Budapest in 1999 (Keresztély, K. 1998) and who, as in all cities in general, have a strong impact on the urban landscape and on consumption practices in Budapest. Apart from the spread of restaurants, Chinese business people have established the biggest mixed market in Eastern Europe, in the 8th district of the city.

Arabs, Turks and Africans, though less important in their numbers, have a visible effect on the urban landscape as a result of the proliferation of small groceries and kebab bars in the central areas of Budapest. Still, in the case of the latter group, there remains the problem that people coming from the diverse countries of Africa are considered by most Hungarians to have originated from a single i.e. *African* culture (Olomoofe, L. 2000).

The identity and position of certain groups of immigrants is difficult to define: more than half of the immigrants in Hungary are actually *Hungarians* coming from a neighbouring country (see Table 11). Research has shown that for instance Hungarians coming from Erdély (Transylvania, Romania) build their networks by keeping their initial relationships with their compatriots (SÍK, 2000). That means there are strong differences between Hungarians coming from different countries and diverse social groups. Yet, there has been little research in sociology or cultural anthropology concerning these particularities.

Table 11. Persons living in Hungary with an immigrant permit in 2001

Citizenship	Number of persons	%	
Romanian*	37,996	47.7	Citizenship marked with a *: the majority of these are ethnic Hungarians. The phenomenon derives from the Treaty of Versailles after World War I, when two-thirds of Hungary was cut off and annexed to the neighbouring countries. At present, around four million Hungarians are living outside the country. This influences the political rhetoric on the position of immigrants and minorities in Hungary (see above).
Yugoslav*	9,81	12.3	
Former USSR	4,888	6.1	
Ukrainian*	5,859	7.4	
German	3,658	4.5	
Chinese	3,684	4.6	
Czech and Slovak*	1,728	2.2	
Russian*	1,468	1.8	
Others	11,404	14.3	
Total	79,652	100	

Source: Tóth, Pál Péter

Immigrants and expatriates

Since the 1989 transition and subsequent opening of the country, the position of Hungary in terms of international migration has changed. Instead of being an exporting country it has become an importing one, and more people are entering the country than are leaving it. Unfortunately, the increased attraction of Hungary does not mean that it is also successful in keeping its immigrants... According to the demographer P. Tóth, more than 200,000 foreigners entered the country officially between 1990 and 2000, while almost 100,000 left it.

Refugees form an important component of the non-Hungarian immigrants. Though the majority live in refugee camps, some of them reside with friends while waiting to leave the country. Refugees in general do not intend to remain in Hungary for a longer period of time, or at least they do not imagine spending their whole lives in this country. Yet, sometimes they have to stay here for several years, or even permanently. Generally, their living conditions are far from decent, and few of them can be integrated into Hungarian society.

Case study:

Refugee camp failure in Kalocsa

In 2001, the Hungarian government decided to rebuild the unused army barracks left behind in Kalocsa by the occupying Russian Army (Russian troops were pulled out in 2002) and open it as refugee camp for Afghan refugees. On October 30, 2001, a major demonstration was organised to protest against this decision. "Why in Kalocsa?" asked many. On the one hand they disapproved of the decision having being made without asking local people and authorities, and on the other - they developed irrational ideas that justified rejecting strangers in their neighbourhood. In fact, those Afghans were obviously not terrorists, but victims of the totalitarian system in Afghanistan.

The media brought the issue to the public's attention following the political, sociological and physical background of the affair. On October 11th, an article in *Magyar Narancs* (a weekly journal) noted that the socialist heritage was one to be feared and rejected the stigmatisation of any people or group. In the previous day's issue of *Népszabadság* (daily newspaper) Ákos Tóth noted that people were afraid of the repercussions of the US-led invasion on Afghanistan. They thought that a flood of refugees was inevitable and no one would be happy to live in a neighbourhood full of disgruntled Afghans. The article quoted the arguments of local people:

The barracks are in the city centre and it is not the best use of a centrally located building;

500 refugees is too high a number for a town with only 10,000 inhabitants;

The local authority is suffering from a financial deficit;

Afghan customs are simply too different.

It would be fair to say that Ákos Tóth emphasised the emotional side of the affair, disregarding the facts, and did not concentrate on experience or on possible guidelines as to how people should live and deal with the presence of refugees. In *Magyar Hírlap* (a popular daily newspaper), R. Székely Julianna also reflected on the story and asked the question: "what if we could be proud of being Kalocsai not just when those who suffer are far away from us, but when they walk in our streets?" In *Magyar Nemzet* (a popular daily newspaper) Szabolcs Berényi criticized the Hungarian Liberal Democrats' Party, because a liberal party member and mayor was against the refugee camp. Berényi wrote that this was not the first case of the liberal party demonstrating its lack of tolerance, and called for the need to be tolerant in deeds and not just in words.

According to the Home Office, 2,749 Afghans sought asylum in Hungary in 2001. Many of them were granted it, but then 1,358 refugees disappeared! While we were having a debate about foreigners, one-and-a-half thousand Afghans disappeared in our country. Where are they now? Finally the Afghans were put into another refugee camp in Debrecen. There are now some 2-3.000 refugees in a city of 230,000.

The other category of immigrants is a 'happier' one: expatriates (*or new immigrants*). Expatriates are different from traditional migrants because their migration is not prompted by any political, socio-economic or psychological pressures, but probably because they simply wanted to come here for their own special reasons or personal interest. Expatriates can be independent people following intellectual professions or doing studies. Most of them arrived in Budapest for 'adventure'. They are quite flexible and integrated within society; most of them speak Hungarian. They go out to the same places as Hungarians; they follow similar habits in the city. Expatriates can also be employees of multinational companies. Because of their long working hours, however, they do not have time to meet local people, and therefore they live in a strongly international ambiance. How long they stay in Budapest depends largely on their company, so even psychologically they do not invest much in local culture (Ramond, 1998).

2.2 Institutions and cultural offer representing multiculturalism

We may distinguish three components of multicultural offer in Budapest:

cultural institutions and activities of minorities;

cultural institutions and events promoting international cultural offer (invitations to artists, organised events in foreign languages etc.);

institutions and events improving international and inter-city relations and eventually the presentation of Hungarian artists and groups abroad.

Cultural institutions and activities of minorities

All minorities have well-established institutional networks consisting of a political and administrative centre, one or several centres for cultural activities, occasionally their own newspapers, and art groups (in general, groups of music or dance). Several of them organise their own festivals or other cultural events. In Budapest, the following minorities run their own cultural centres: Bulgarian, Greek, Croatian, Polish, German, Armenian, Romanian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian, Ukrainian and the Roma community. Apart from 'traditional' cultural centres, certain minorities organise their own special art venues, such as the Malko Teatro, the Bulgarian ethnic theatre that has been open since 1996, or the ethnic music group of the Greek minority (*Sirtos*), that has been well known in Budapest since the 1980s. Yet in certain cases, these establishments may function as *off*-cultural centres and events; this is so in the case of the Bulgarian theatre. As a result of this phenomenon, in some cases, minorities' cultural events or establishments may become part of the alternative cultural life of Budapest.

Institutions promoting international cultural offer and inter-city cultural relations

In Budapest, most of the cultural institutions and events focusing on international/multicultural offers are largely limited to 'cultural imports'. For financial and organisational reasons, cultural institutions have few opportunities to promote the presentation of Hungarian artists and organised events abroad (Keresztély, 2005). For this latter purpose, 'transfer' institutions and programmes aimed at the development of international relations gain importance in Budapest. Several types of cultural institutions may be distinguished according to the form they use when presenting a multicultural offer.

a) Institutions addressed directly to the international communities living in Budapest

The Merlin Theatre was founded in 1992 and has been a core place for international cultural offer in Budapest since then. The founders believed in a rapid increase of tourism. Though the creation of a theatre for tourists failed, the organisers maintained the idea of running an English Theatre for the benefit of the international communities living in Budapest. In 2003, the Theatre was renamed: the Merlin International Theatre. The main idea of the reorganization was to create a more multicultural theatre, giving performances in several languages, such as English, French, German, etc.

b) Institutions and events promoting special international cultural offer in Budapest

Most of the cultural institutions make efforts towards international networking. That is why it is difficult to limit the circle of cultural institutions that *de facto* determine the international-multicultural art life. Thus our analysis will not cover all the cultural venues of Budapest, but will picture main features and problems of multicultural representation.

The **Trafó House of Contemporary Art** was created by the Budapest Municipality (in a former electric power house in the 9th district) as the successor of the *Club of Young Artists* (Fiatal Muvészek Klubja) that was arguably the most cultic place of alternative art and cultural life during the 1980s. Trafó provides different forms of art: fine art, theatre, music, but mainly dance and other services such as a café, bar-restaurant, and nightclub.

Fonó is a cultural centre that was founded by civil initiative in 1998, and became the main centre of ethnic, world and jazz music; it runs its own record company and plays an important role in the presentation of multicultural music-life, by regularly inviting ethnic and world-music groups, such as Chalaban (Morocco) or Besho-Drom (Serbian, Balkan world music), Ando Drom (Roma music).

Mucsarnok [Kunsthalle] is a museum without a permanent collection that also provides a venue for events of modern and contemporary art, often exhibiting the work of international artists. In 2004 one of the museum's main exhibitions was the "Bisterdo Holocaust" that concentrated on the presentation of the Holocaust of all minorities, and not just that of the Jews, i.e. the Roma, homosexuals or people persecuted for their religion.

The two latest cultural developments in Budapest were created by state investment (or at least through cooperation between the central state and a private investor). The

Millenaris Park was inaugurated in 2001. The cultural theme park was created on the premises of a former machine factory (GANZ) in the prestigious area of Buda. Millenaris has become an important cultural centre in Buda to host international concerts of jazz or world music, several small festivals, exhibitions etc.

The Palace of Arts hosts three institutions owned and managed by the central government: the **Festival Theatre**, the **Ludwig Museum** and the **National Concert Hall**. All three play a major role in the international cultural attraction of Budapest, by regularly inviting world-renowned artists and orchestras. The **Ludwig Museum** especially represents international art-life as part of the Ludwig museums' network (Vienna, Koln, Habanna, headquarters in Aachen) and specialises in modern and contemporary art. The Budapest collection is partly based on international art objects (pop art, German new expressionism, photo realism etc.) and partly on Hungarian and Eastern European pieces acquired systematically during the last decade.

c) Temporary events for international culture: festivals

There are four main festivals with an international reputation. **The Spring Festival** (since 1980) was a state-financed festival until 1989, when the local government of Budapest took on this role. Later many other cities adopted this model and also hold spring festivals, working with a co-ordination centre in Budapest in a sort of "cultural franchise" system. From 1992/1993 Budapest has organised an **Autumn Festival** as a sister festival to the Spring Festival, but the goals of the two festivals are different. The Spring Festival's aim is to put classics on stage (philharmonics, choir, theatre, ballet opera etc.), while the Autumn Festival is for contemporary art (jazz, pop/rock, architecture etc.).

The "**Sziget**" Festival is often heralded as the biggest pop/rock festival in Europe. Based on private initiative they had many teething difficulties, however, is a profit-oriented Limited Company (so-called 'Kft') now. After the first several years of concentrating on pop/rock the Sziget has become a multicultural festival with theatre and cinema performances introducing different cultures.

The **Jewish Summer Festival** is held in Erzsébet Square and around the traditional Jewish area of the 7th district. The event promotes Budapest's Jewish culture, but it has a strong international flavour too.

Other smaller festivals in Budapest such as the **Festivities of Arts and Crafts** at Buda Castle, the **Festival on Space, Film and Music** (Tér Film Zene Fesztivál) in front of the Parliament are designed for tourists. **Budapest Plázs** and **Budapest Parade** attract many different subcultures and minority cultures.

d) Transfer institutions

In the 1990s, the cultural sections of many foreign embassies realised the need for international cultural co-operation and played a very important role in this field as transfer institutions. In 2005, most of them decided to cut their spending on international co-operation. Culture 2000 took over this role partly from embassies.

e) Cultural seasons abroad

After being a guest at Frankfurt Book Fair (1997) and a special guest at *Europalia* (1998) in Brussels, the Hungarian Government evaluated cultural seasons that were very useful and efficient. We have already had French, Italian, English, Dutch and Russian Cultural Seasons. The Chinese Season is expected in 2006. At present, these are the only events that provide an official framework for allocation of public subsidies for cultural events and organisations whose aim is to present Hungarian artists and works in a foreign country.

f) Media

Almost every community has its own publications: the *Budapest Business Journal*, the *Budapest Sun*, *In 24* (embedded in *Libération*), and even the Chinese have their own newspaper. There are two radio stations that focus on minorities and immigrants. The first one is **Radio C**, ("C" is for Gypsy = Cigány in Hungarian) the Roma radio, which is well known at international level. The second one, **Tilos Radio** (*Radio "forbidden"*) is an innovative and alternative cultural radio station that often broadcasts programmes in different languages such as English, German, Serbian, and maybe in the near future, in Arabic. State subsidy is granted every year for various minority programmes at Hungarian National Radio and Television.

Table 12. Minority newspapers and journals supported by the Office of National and Ethnic Minorities

Name of media (weekly/monthly)	State grant in 1997 in '000 forints (HUF)	State grant in 1998 in '000 forints (HUF)	State grant in 1999 in '000 forints (HUF)	State grant in 2000 in '000 forints (HUF)
Ararát (Armenian) (biweekly)	7,130	7,443	8,346	8,992
Hromada (Ukrainian)	3,760	3,925	5,000	5,387
Heamus (Bulgarian) (quarterly)	4,500	4,698	5,272	5,680
Hrvatski Glasnik (Croatian) (weekly)	21,770	22,727	25,557	27,538
Kafeneio (Greek) (quarterly)	4,000	4,176	5,000	5,387
Ludové Noviny (Slovakian) (weekly)	21,770	22,727	24,090	27,538
Magazyn Polonijny and Polonia Węgierska (biweekly)	9,160	9,563	10,277	11,073
Neue Zeitung (German) (weekly)	24,740	25,828	27,377	29,499
Foaia românească (Romanian) (weekly)	15,500	16,208	22,471	24,212
Porabje (Slovenian) (biweekly)	6,450	6,733	7,561	8,147
Ruszinszkij Zsivot and Fővárosi Ryszín Hírlap (Russian) (biweekly)	4,300	4,489	5,003	4,334
Srpske Narodne Novine (Serbian) (biweekly)	22,000	22,968	25,743	27,738
Friendly (on line) (biweekly)	0	0	1,500	2,494
Roma news & journals				
Amaro Drom, (monthly)	9,240	9,646	6,550	7,038
Lungo Drom, (monthly)	10,380	10,836	12,457	11,972
Phralipe, (monthly)	5,300	5,533	4,000	1,000
Világunk, (monthly)	0	0	10,378	13,967
Kethano Drom (quarterly)	0	0	0	1,995
Total	170,000	177,500	206,612	224,000

Table 13. Minority programmes at Hungarian National Radio stations

Minority	Programme time, frequency, Broadcasting	Weekly total time
Bulgarian	Weekly 30 minutes broadcasted nationwide.	30
Gipsy	Weekly 30 minutes on 6 days of the week, nationwide.	180
Greek	Weekly 30 minutes broadcasted nationwide.	30
Croatian	Daily 90 minutes broadcasted regional, daily 30 minutes broadcasted nationwide.	840
Polish	Weekly 30 minutes broadcasted nationwide.	30
German	Daily 90 minutes broadcasted regionally daily 30 minutes country wide.	840
Armenian	Weekly 30 minutes broadcasted nationwide.	30
Romanian	Daily 90 minutes broadcasted regionally daily 30 minutes broadcasted nationwide.	840
Russian (Ruszin)	Weekly 30 minutes broadcasted nationwide.	30
Serbian	Daily 30 minutes and broadcasted regionally, 4 days a week 50 minutes broadcasted regionally, daily 30 minutes broadcasted countrywide.	630
Slovak	Daily 90 minutes plus weekly 30 minutes regionally broadcast Daily 30 minutes broadcasted country wide.	870
Slovenian	Weekly 30 minutes broadcasted regionally, and 30 minutes nationwide.	60
Ukrainian	Weekly 30 minutes broadcast country wide.	30

“In the same home” Multicultural programme, weekly 30 minutes, “Egy hazában” plus quartely 180 minutes broadcast nationwide.


Source: Office of National and Ethnic Minorities

2.3 How institutionalised is the multi-cultural offer in the three sectors?

Public, Private and Civil

Private and civil organizations are becoming increasingly involved in creating cultural institutions these days. Diagram 2 illustrates their place in the structure of cultural institutions and organizations. One dimension of this matrix shows the relations of culture (its organizations, participants and creations) to the economy, or rather it reflects the role of economic factors and the search for profit as objectives. The second dimension illustrates the relations of politics and state to the same cultural organizations. This state influence could well be that of the owners, employers, legal supervision and protection and support.

Diagram 1. Dimensions of non-profit organisations



Source: Szabó Cs., Szabó J.Z. (1996)

Organizations set up by private individuals and characterized by strong motivation for personal gain (I), expect little state regulation. Examples include the Sziget Festival, small institutions such as APA Gallery, and some other galleries in Budapest. They are private enterprises, whose founders risk their own money (circle 1) on business, and their expenses are covered mostly from their own revenues.

The next segment (II) represents for-profit organizations working under strong state influence. It was not possible to find a multicultural organisation where the local authority is the owner, the employer, or the legal supervisor and also seeks to earn profits (circle 2). A special case could arise when the organization's charter does not envisage profit-making but gives its board members the opportunity to gain personal benefits (circle 3). The Spring Festival is an example of this.

The third type (III segment) are state-affiliated non-profit organizations. It means that they carry out certain legal and expected state functions. Public institutions such as the national public television and radio, museums, Millenaris Park, Trafó, Gödör, Merlin, Art cinema-network belong here, but minority news and journals too, since the majority of their income is derived from the state. Maintaining the National Theatre and museums is not a duty but is expected from the state by the citizens (circle 4).

In the fourth segment one can find not-profit organizations that the state influences only as a legal supervisor. This is the segment to which most civil society organizations belong (circle 5), e.g. Kultiplex, Café-bars with cultural-art functions (Szimpla, Spinoza, Godot, Sark (Roma evenings) etc.), C3, Studio of Young Artists, minorities' institutions such as theatres, art groups.

Data on cultural consumption

Table 14. Capacity of cultural institutions

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Theatres in Budapest					
Number of theatres	22	22	23	23	23
Seats	13,400	14,000	15,000	14,800	15,000
Permanent employees	2,461	2,476	2,609	2,749	3,045
Number of performances	6,189	6,072	6,224	6,424	6,272
Number of spectators	2,087,000	2,138,000	2,266,000	2,345,000	2,416,000
Cinemas in Budapest*					
Seats	22,651	22,702	24,551	24,487	n.a.
Number of Rooms	125	124	133	134	132
Number of performances	192,829	209,713	226,580	222,248	222,390
Number of spectators	9,123,000	8,459,000	8,382,000	7,821,000	7,793
Museum in Budapest					
Number of museums	96	98	99	100	100
Number of exhibitions	604	569	586	658	557
Number of visitors	2,604,000	2,342,000	2,737,000	4,042,000	4,033,000
Libraries in Budapest					
Total number of book (thousand)	3,979	4,324	3,857	3,760	3,713
Books borrowed (thousand)	6,165	6,584	6,597	6,357	5,706
Number of registered readers	163,368	195,000	192,688	213,737	215,903

* Data on the art-movie network is quite deficient. There are 27 art-film cinemas in operation in Budapest and these had 720,000 paying spectators in 2004.

3. Debate – Policies – Actions

3.1 Debate

Politicians, community leaders and non-governmental organisations, individual artists and the media often discuss cultural diversity. Politicians sometimes question the importance of the whole issue, while community leaders and non-governmental organisations seek to put it higher on the agenda. Although cultural policy documents have not highlighted the question, several important perspectives can be analysed.

We can cite, for example, the views of two key commentators, who represent diametrically opposed points of view on this topic:

Tamás Derce, the Mayor of the 4th district claims that multiculturalism does not make any sense. It is a blind alley for European development as whole and its realisation is problematic at the EU level; only co-operation between distinct cultures would be able to improve the EU's performance.

György Enyedi, researcher and intellectual often claims that Budapest has to become an international city, a gateway between East and West, in which minorities and subcultures can live together and focus on Europe.

Debates concerning multiculturalism are largely dependent on political and social concerns. With regard to international migration, Hungary and its capital city have only recently become recipients of immigrants. Cultural diversity as a matter of political and social debate has become a subject in continuous flux.

Debate in media about national policies

Debate on multiculturalism in the Hungarian media is rather limited, with newspapers representing the most liberal and open vision with regard to the topic. Two key issues are the social and political situation of the Roma population and the Hungarian minorities living in the neighbouring countries as a result of the 1920 Trianon Treaty. The majority of debates thus adopt the historical and traditional meaning of multiculturalism in Hungary. Debate on foreigners and new immigrants take place very rarely.

One of the main questions posed by politicians and social groups concerns the policy of the government as regards the legal, cultural and economic situation of the Hungarian minority living in neighbouring countries. Should the Hungarian State grant them Hungarian citizenship? This was the main question in the autumn of 2004, preceding

a national referendum held at the end of the same year. The question is emblematic of the traditional cultural debate in Hungary between defenders of the traditional values of Hungarian culture and those who would press forward the European – and global – integration of the country. The people rejected the question asked in the referendum, but they also did not say 'yes' to globalisation – and so it is clear that the problem is not yet solved.

The debate concerning minorities living in Hungary is not more heated almost certainly because Hungary is one of the European countries that developed the most liberal policies towards minorities. Yet, the question is more complex in the case of the most numerous and historically the most problematic group of minorities: the Roma. As has been shown above, their cultural and economic integration is in the forefront of Hungarian social policy in general. The vision and approach of Hungarian society towards the Roma population has been absolutely transformed since the political transition as a result of various programmes for cultural and social development. In March 2005, the Hungarian Parliament officially declared the responsibility of Hungarian society for the Roma Holocaust. This move is a sign that the Roma population has come to be considered an integral part of Hungarian society, a notion that was completely taboo under state socialism.

However, there is continued debate on the ways and means of Roma integration. Partly these stem from the fact that Roma political groups are divided among themselves. In 2001, nine different political parties of Roma were registered by the Hungarian Supreme Court (www.romacentrum.hu); each of them adopts different political principles and approaches different parties of the majority of society.

The civil sector enters the debate on multiculturalism

National and local policies dispute multiculturalism and international migration as political-theoretical issues but have initiated very few practical steps to resolve the everyday problems of immigrants in Hungary, and especially in Budapest. Some recent events in Budapest have shown that the civil sector is actually the most sensitive to the problems of multiculturalism, though its vision of the issue is often limited as well. Since 2004, for example, a controversial debate has developed concerning the future of the famous "Jewish Quarter" in the former ghetto. The debate mainly concentrated on urban development, i.e. whether to renovate the former ghetto's rundown facades or to demolish the old buildings and construct new ones. The local municipality of the district (7th district) intended to sell the mostly derelict buildings to private developers and renew the urban landscape of the whole area in this way. In opposition to this policy, a civil movement called "Protestation" (Óvás) was formed. Led by an architect,

the actions of this association concentrated on the preservation of the buildings that the local municipality wanted to put up for sale. Meanwhile, the movement is often criticised as being composed of 'elite architects' living in the residential areas of Budapest, who only care for the buildings but do not care about social problems of the area. Yet, an indisputable achievement is that the civil association has succeeded in thwarting the project of a legally elected body: the Budapest Municipality suspended the sale and demolition of the buildings.

In 2005, a group of young artists created the first real cultural squat called "Tuzraktar". They organised a complex cultural centre in a former industrial building that they obtained for use from the owner of the building during the summer of 2005. The building and the whole initiative fit well into the neighbourhood located on the edge of the most important rehabilitation area in Budapest that previously had been a severely rundown neighbourhood close to the city centre. The group's cultural activities are entirely non-profit events and concerts, and are offered free just like at every other cultural centre of this kind all over Europe. Since they host international guests and workshops and they are in close contact with the international network of independent cultural centres (*Trans Europe Halles*), their multicultural role in Budapest is incontestable. They provide special occasions for the inhabitants of the neighbourhood to participate in their activities and thus have a possibly important effect on local society as well. In order to finance their activities, they applied for subsidies to both the district and the central municipality, but without success. The local municipality declined because it felt the activities did not fit its objective of creating a serene, middle class area. Again, multiculturalism found itself blocked by a conservative vision of local policy.

Artists as a special group of independent expatriates

A certain number of expatriate professional artists have chosen to live in Budapest for various reasons. Their opinion about the atmosphere and the opportunities for art in Budapest may be an important element when considering different opinions about multiculturalism in the capital city. Interviews were made with some of them, who speak Hungarian, are almost entirely integrated into the local art community, while also take part in international art networks. According to them, the Hungarian ambition of keeping up with Western European trends hinders the development of harmonious and original local forms of art. Western norms are over-estimated. Budapest is a relatively small city that combines the advantages of a multicultural metropolis with those of a smaller city. On the other hand, after a longer stay here one may come to realise that it hosts a very narrow circle of people, with strong personal interests and networks, that makes it difficult for a 'foreigner' to be a successful competitor. In general, as most of artists see it, average people in Budapest are rarely open enough towards multiculturalism – most of them do not speak a foreign language, and are closed to ethnic difference, etc.

These examples show that multiculturalism is still far from being an evident cultural need for the wider public in Budapest. Further policies and moves are required to improve the situation.

3.2 Policies and actions

National policies towards multiculturalism

In 2002, the Minister of Culture established a strategic council chaired by the head of the National Cultural Fund. The council and all its members are responsible for elaborating a Hungarian Cultural Strategy. A first final version of this cultural policy document submitted to Minister István Hiller (2002-2005) in February 2005 analysed the new world situation and emphasised the following points:

- Globalisation is an irreversible process, and while, on the one hand, values can be depreciated by it, on the other hand, isolated national values can become universal.
- People are living longer, the ageing of the population is continuing, and migration is increasing. The formation of fragmented societies can be expected.
- The confrontation of global cultures resulted in the renaissance of national identity issues. The correlation between identity and national symbols is a more and more sensitive issue.

The document did not reflect, however, on 'national' or ethnic minorities or strategic goals or priorities.

In proclamation of 15th June 2005, minister András Bozóki decided to change the priorities to the following:

- Community experience;
- Freedom in culture;
- Inclusive and coloniser culture;
- Create a European Hungary;
- Open culture (put culture on internet, to allow free access to it by everyone).

Although there is relatively little information available, on the basis of recent trends several observations can be made on both cultural policies in general and policies towards minority groups in particular.

First of all, clearly positive processes were initiated in regard the Roma community during the 1990s and especially after Hungary joined the EU. Many Roma programmes and initiatives were launched in the fields of culture and education. Yet, still lacking are well-designed policies and programmes on international cultural relationships and towards immigrants.

The cultural policies of the Budapest municipalities (that is the central municipality and the district ones), although responsible for the same urban spaces, approach the question of minorities quite differently. Municipalities have been co-operating with the local 'governments' of the 'national' minorities. These 'governments' operate as mini-parliaments responsible for minority issues and are financed by the central government according to legislation on National and Ethnic Minority Rights.

In order to finance special minority projects the Hungarian Government established the Public Foundation for Hungarian National and Ethnic Minorities, which coordinates its work with the National and Ethnic Minority Office (2001) and the Helsinki Committee.⁵⁰ The National Cultural Fund created a temporary board responsible for minority cultures in 2004. These two funds have an annual budget of some 2.5 million euro. Since joining the EU, structural funds have started numerous different programmes for the Roma, but until now it is not clear how far the supported projects can be considered as multicultural projects.

The civil sector is relatively wide in the field of minorities. The main players are the Soros Foundation and the Autonomia Foundation while minority groups, mainly Gypsies, run many civil organisations. The annual budget spent on multicultural activities can be estimated at 2-3 million euro.

50. The Helsinki movement began in the Soviet Union following the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The Moscow Helsinki Group was founded with the aim of monitoring compliance by the Soviet government with the human rights provisions of the Final Act. Based on their initiative, in 1978 Helsinki Watch was founded in the United States, which monitored the protection of human rights in all signatory countries. Soon after, Helsinki Committees were created in Western Europe, then in Central and Eastern Europe and in countries of the former Soviet Union. In Hungary, the democratic opposition had been in regular contact with the Helsinki movement, particularly with Helsinki Watch, since the early 80s. The Hungarian Helsinki Committee was established in May 1989. It monitors the enforcement of human rights enshrined in international human rights instruments, provides legal defence to victims of human rights and informs the public about rights violations. It promotes legal education and training in fields relevant to its activities, both in Hungary and abroad. Its main areas of activities are centred on protecting the rights of asylum seekers and foreigners in need of international protection, as well as monitoring the human rights performance of law enforcement agencies and the judicial system. In recent years, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee's activities have been supported among others by the Soros Foundation Hungary, the Open Society Institute and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. (www.helsinki.hu)

Policy of the Budapest Municipality – tackling multiculturalism in urban development strategies

The financing and operation of cultural institutions and programmes are managed by the Department for Culture. Yet policy and strategy making concerning the role of culture in the global functioning of the Municipality appears in the long- and medium-term strategies for urban development as carried in recent years by the Mayor of Budapest. The long-term strategy draws up a vision for the capital's urban development for the next 30 years. The concept and the programmes included in the document focus on the international role and functions of Budapest. One of the main objectives for the coming decades is to define and strengthen the position of Budapest as a regional-international economic hub in Central-Eastern Europe. The medium-term strategy (from 2005 to 2013) places greater emphasis, however, on the 'internal' situation of Budapest, i.e. on the development of closer cooperation between private and civil players, and on better living conditions within the city. There seems to be some doubt as to the international dimension though, as illustrated by the following citation:

"Budapest is a city with excellent geographical conditions, a wonderful natural setting, architectural treasures and distinguished potentials but it would be difficult to say that Budapest is the cultural hub, the economic transfer-point, the financial and tourism centre or the ecological model-city of Central Europe" (p. 3.)

Cultural development and multiculturalism appear in divergent forms in the two documents as well. The long-term strategy stresses the international cultural attractiveness of the capital. Its main components are to develop Budapest as an international music hub; to develop a knowledge-based city with points of IT communication and to ameliorate the position and participation of minorities in Budapest cultural life. In this latter point, the document formulates an important idea. The Budapest municipality should initiate the renewal of certain run-down industrial and other types of buildings in order to install cultural centres for ethnic, religious and other minorities living in Budapest. Unfortunately, this long-term document does not include any practical steps to carry out the proposed programmes, and as a result no concrete method has been defined for the amelioration of the institutional conditions for multicultural life in Budapest.

It seems that the 2005 medium-term strategy has put these goals to one side. Its cultural programme stresses the need to broaden the social conditions of cultural consumption. Multiculturalism and international cultural attraction do not even appear as priorities. On the other hand, the strategy formulates several concrete development projects that support cultural and also multicultural development. Two projects are emphasised as

core elements of the cultural-urban development; both focus on the renewal of former industrial buildings on the two banks of the Danube in order to create two new cultural centres in the city.

Besides urban development strategies, the Budapest Municipality offers very weak cultural policies, and its activities are limited to funding. Much of the policy framework is devoted to the maintenance of institutional networks such as theatres, museums, cultural centres etc. Supporting multicultural initiatives is always linked with supporting a certain programme (for instance, that of the Sziget Festival, of the Autumn Festival or the Jewish Festival) or certain institutions (such as the Trafó Theatre, and the Merlin Theatre, etc.) The Budapest Municipality does not follow a cultural policy based on strong initiatives, but rather the one that is based mostly on 'laissez-faire' policies.

Policy of district municipalities

The role of district municipalities is a special problem in Budapest. According to the 1990 Act on Local Governments, the 23 Budapest district municipalities obtained the same degree of autonomy as other local governments in Hungary. Each has its own budget and the right to define its own regulations, especially in matters of urban planning. Their local autonomy is based on their own revenues and properties. At the same time, they have obligations similar to smaller cities (like Debrecen) – provision of elementary education and health services, public lighting, maintenance of local roads and public spaces, and monitoring ethnic and religious equality in the area. In regard to culture, there is a cultural department in every district municipality that has to follow the decisions of the Cultural Committee of the district. The central Municipality of Budapest functions mostly as a regional authority, with restricted competences on the local level, but with several obligatory duties at the level of the capital city or with respect to issues that concern the territory of more than one district.

In spite of the difficulties, there is a cultural success story from the 9th district, the first area where an urban rehabilitation programme was launched at the end of the 1980s. This programme, implemented in cooperation with the French *Caisse de Depots et de Consignations*, has continued ever since the transition. As a result, the former blue-collar district has become an increasingly middle-class area. This change has been accelerated by the biggest urban development project in Budapest, which was conceived in the same district: the Millennium City Centre. This project involves important cultural elements, such as the National Theatre (completed in 2002) and the Palace of Arts (2005).

Districts represent individual strategies and practices of cultural development, but there are some common features, namely in regard to obligatory duties related to

multiculturalism. Yet an institutional structure for multiculturalism is still far from being achieved. Districts are responsible for elementary public services – and this duty clearly concerns every social, ethnic, and national group living in the territory of one district. Some case studies have shown that few districts respond to the needs of immigrants living in Budapest – although they do fulfil their obligatory duties, but the tendency to initiate special services, such as teaching Hungarian, or translating services, is an extremely slow procedure. (Keresztély, 1998)

4. Conclusions

Can sensitive policy actions lead to better integration?'

Budapest is a city with an important multicultural tradition which, however, was twice reduced: first, after World War I, and then again under the socialist system. After the 1989 transition, the opening of policies, culture and the economy to international relations began to bring this tradition back. The number of immigrants increased rapidly. However, after fifteen years of transition it is now clear that the return of multiculturalism is limited.

The tradition has been almost entirely destroyed during the last hundred years or so. After World War I, Budapest lost its multicultural background as most of the country's mixed ethnic regions were detached from Hungary. In the 1940s, the remaining minorities, ethnic and religious groups were decimated by the Holocaust; and under communism - by deportation and voluntary emigration. As a result, by the time Hungary opened up in 1989, it was a quasi-monocultural country. After the transition, it changed from being a country exporting people to an importing country and, as such, a new target for international migration. A major proportion of the new immigrants is composed of ethnic Hungarians who have left neighbouring countries for political and/or economic reasons. This main source of international migration is people of Hungarian origin. Currently, urban diversity is largely based on a population with common cultural origins; this does not strengthen the cultural diversity of Budapest.

However, like other post-socialist countries after 1990, Hungary also became an important destination for refugees and other migrants, who rarely consider Hungary and Budapest as the terminus of their migration; on the contrary, they use the country as the interchange station that most of them want to leave after a few years. This, actually, characterises a relatively high percentage of migrants of Hungarian origin as well.

Minorities do have their own cultural institutions and productions, but their effect on urban culture is limited. There are a few cases, e.g. Greek dance, or Roma music groups, in which a minority's production becomes part of the majority cultural offer, and even then usually that of alternative culture. Other cultural institutions that typically represent the international and multicultural offer in Budapest have restricted opportunities to develop inter-city and international cultural relations, largely as a result of financial limitations. Though politicians and intellectuals like to imagine Budapest as a gateway city connecting East and West, the international cultural relations of the capital have always been asymmetric: while they are strong with the West they are much weaker with the South-Eastern Europe.

Multiculturalism remains vague in public debate. It could even be claimed that a true debate on multiculturalism does not exist. Articles and opinions remain within the framework of the traditional meanings of 'multiculturalism' and 'migration', in other words the situation of Hungarians living outside the country, and the minority groups – especially the Roma - living in Hungary. Migration as a recent phenomenon is only discussed in regard to specific issues, such as the choice of location for a refugee camp or the usefulness of migration for the demographic development of the country. But considering immigrants as potential or real contributors to the cultural offer of the city is rather unusual.

Multiculturalism appears in a very ambivalent way in local and national policies as well. In other words, there is a strong contradiction between strategy-making and its implementation. The importance of developing a multicultural city is expressed in almost every strategy document. Yet, relatively few special subsidies or programmes exist to sustain multicultural offers and inter-city cultural relations on the state as well as on the municipal level. The municipality follows a conservative urban cultural policy that is mainly based on maintaining existing infrastructure and public institutions. As far as the everyday problems of immigrants are concerned, such as language, or a lack of other basic knowledge, no strategic political solution is proposed at the city level. The fragmented administrative structure of Budapest hinders the functioning of a balanced policy concerning relations between local services and immigrants.

The inefficiency of local policies also reflects the relatively weak position of the civil sphere in Hungary. One of the most important civil society bodies has clearly been the Soros Foundation, which is actually planning to entirely withdraw from Hungary and Central Europe. Individuals and associations who represent any form of multiculturalism have very few opportunities to lobby local and municipal policy-makers. Recent debates and tensions in Budapest have shown that a man in the street is still suspicious of multiculturalism. Local policy-making does not act to change these misconceptions. On

the contrary, as local politicians do everything to gain or retain votes, most of the local municipalities impede initiatives that would otherwise reinforce the multicultural offer in Budapest.

The case of the Roma population shows that a sensitive policy making can ameliorate this situation. During the last decade, the Roma have been foregrounded at all levels: state, municipal and civil. Socio-political programmes dealing with the Roma population extend to a large array of activities, such as education, cultural heritage, arts, etc. As a result of strong and voluntaristic policies to strengthen the rights and opportunities of the Roma population, the extremely strong preconceptions that before had determined the behaviour of the majority of society seems now to have declined somewhat. This is a very good example concerning the role of sensitive and strategic policy-making in the integration of minority groups.

After the 1990 political transition, Hungary developed a democratic political and administrative structure for the political, social and cultural representation of traditional minorities – but these groups are no longer the only ones to determine multiculturalism. International migration in its actual form is certainly a new phenomenon in Hungary that is difficult to deal with. In the end Hungarian society and policy-making will have to accept this phenomenon and work out its own strategies. At a time when the cultural sector has an increasing role in all fields of economic and social development, cultural development will also obtain a role in policies fostering the integration and the democratic rights of new immigrants. Cultural institutions, inter-city cultural relations, special subsidies of cultural productions etc. should thus become important tools for dealing with the new problems related to international migration and new forms of multiculturalism.

References

Enyedi, Gy - Keresztely, K. (eds.) (2005): *A magyar városok kulturális gazdasága* (Cultural Economy in Hungarian Cities), 'Hungary at the turn of the Millennium' Strategic Research, Centre for Social Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest

Juhász, V. (2000): *Amerikaiak Budapesten az 1990-es évek végén* (Americans in Budapest at the end of the 1990s), in: SÍK, E.- TÓTH, J. (eds): *Diskurzusok a vándorlásról* (Discussions on migration), Political Sciences Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, pp. 60-82.

Keresztély, K. (1998): *A kínai közösség Budapesten* (Chinese community in Budapest), In: Glatz F. (ed): *Budapest, nemzetközi város* (Budapest, international city), Hungary at the turn of the Millennium, Strategic Research, Centre for Social Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest

Keresztély, K (2005), *Budapest, ville-pont culturelle?* in: *Revue d'Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest*, vol. 36, no 2, pp. 39-69.

Olomoofe, L. (2000): *Egy fekete közösség létrejötte Budapesten?* (Formation of a black community in Budapest?) in: SÍK, E.- TÓTH, J. (eds): *Diskurzusok a vándorlásról* (Discussions on migration), Political Sciences Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, pp. 50-60.

Kemény, I. (ed), (1999): *Cigányok Magyarországon* (Gipsies in Hungary), 'Hungary at the turn of the Millennium' Strategic Research, Centre for Social Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest

Ramond, I. (1998) *A Nyugatiak Budapesten* (Migrants from the West in Budapest) In: Glatz F. (ed): *Budapest, nemzetközi város* (Budapest, international city), 'Hungary at the turn of the Millennium' Strategic Research, Centre for Social Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest

Sík, E. (2000): *Kezdetleges gondolatok a diaszpóra fogalmáról és hevenyészett megfigyelések a diaszpórakoncepció magyar nézőpontból való alkalmazhatóságáról* (Rudimentary reflections on the notion of diaspora and some observations on its adaptability for the Hungarian case), in: SÍK, E.- TÓTH, J. (eds): *Diskurzusok a vándorlásról* (Discussions on migration), Political Sciences Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, pp. 157-185.

Szabo Cs., Szabó J.Z. (1996) *Tradition and Invention in the Revival of Non-Profit Sphere in Hungarian Culture*, in: *European Culture III*. Ed. Enrique Banús, Pamplona, Spain

Websites:

<http://kisebbseg.bmknet.hu/index.html> (a site containing the websites of minority organisations)

<http://www.romacentrum.hu> (website containing information and links concerning the Roma minority in Hungary)

<http://www.soros.org> (Soros Foundation)

<http://www.errc.org> (European Roma Rights Centre)

<http://www.radioc.hu> (Hungarian Roman Radio)

<http://www.c3.hu> (Cultural Centre and Website of Soros Foundation)

<http://www.nka.hu> (National Cultural Fund)

Media:

<http://www.nol.hu>

<http://www.es.hu>

<http://www.mno.hu>

<http://www.hvg.hu>

Strategy documents:

Medium-term Strategy of the Budapest Municipality

Budapest 2010, programme for the title of European City of Culture

Hungarian Cultural Strategy (February 16, 2005)

Hungarian T.E.A.- New Cultural Policy in 21st century (*Transparency, Equality and Alternatives*), June 15, 2005

Budget of the Budapest Municipality

List of interviewees

David Yengibarjan – musician, Armenian

Mamikon Yengibarjan – sculptor, Armenian

Eike – video artist, German

Laurent Prebos – artist, French

Mathieu Bardiaux – attaché for culture, French Cultural Institute

Brigitte Kaiser-Derenthal – director of Goethe Institute

László Magács – director of Merlin Theatre

Szabó György – director of Trafó

CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND CULTURAL POLICIES IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF ROME

by Carla Bodo and Simona Bodo⁵¹

1. The metropolitan area of Rome: a portrait

1.1. Territorial, socio-demographic and economic features

The territorial dimensions of the City of Rome, capital of Italy located at the core of the Lazio Region, are unusually vast. With its 1,285 sq. km. (about the equivalent of the whole province of Milan), it is the country's biggest municipality, extending from the Albani Hills to the sea, and including a large part of the rural areas of the Pontino Plain. And yet, no far-reaching socio-demographic and economic analysis of the present and future situation of Rome can ignore the strong interconnections between trends within the municipality and those in its metropolitan area, which covers a large part of the Province of Rome as well. Our research therefore covered the whole province of Rome.

A brief summary of the main *territorial and socio-demographic features* of the City and the Province of Rome follows.

City of Rome:

square km: 1,285

population (2004): 2,557,724

administrative districts (Municipi): 20

per capita GNP: 29,400 euro

Province of Rome:

square km: 5,352

population (2004): 3,805,939

number of municipalities: 121

per capita GNP: 27,900 euro

As regards *demographic trends*, between 1991 and 2001 (when the last two censuses were taken) Rome's population has fallen by 6.8%, while, in the same decade, neighbouring municipalities have undergone a significant demographic growth, and the province's overall population has increased by 11.8%. One of the main factors determining the flight from the city has been the steep rise of property prices in the second half of the 1990s, which has in turn led to a significant growth in the commuting population – notably the poorer and most disadvantaged groups, including immigrant communities. It should be noted that, while Italy's overall population is ageing, Rome's birth-rate has slightly increased between 1991 and 2001 (from 7.1 to 8.1 babies for every 1,000 inhabitants). According to a recent survey on the metropolitan area of Rome, the national trend is mainly "counterbalanced by the demographic behaviour of immigrant couples"; demographic forecasts for the next decade point to a slight

⁵¹ Carla Bodo, Associazione per l'Economia della Cultura, honorary CIRCLE board member.
Simona Bodo, Associazione per l'Economia della Cultura, CIRCLE board member.

The authors would like to thank Thomas Bednarek and Nicola Didonna for their contribution.

increase in Rome's population (+2%), mostly because of the predicted growth of foreign residents, which by 2015 will be a cautiously estimated 12% of the overall population (CENSIS-CLES 2005)⁵².

In the second half of the 1990s, *employment* in Rome's metropolitan area grew more than the national average, also because of increased access of women to the labour market. In 2001, the unemployment rate in the province of Rome was therefore slightly lower than the national average (8% vs. 8.7%). The manufacturing industry's decline in the last decade, partly to be ascribed to the privatisation of several state-owned companies, has been counterbalanced by a significant growth in the service sector, which in 2001 accounted for 64% of the employed population in the province of Rome (as against 15% in the manufacturing industry, and 21% in civil service) (CENSIS-CLES 2005). The highest employment rates in the service sector were found in film production and distribution, press agencies, telecommunications, air transport, insurance, software services and research.

According to the above-mentioned survey, the software industry, ICT, tourism, and culture are going to be the most promising sectors in Rome's economy in the next decade. As for the cultural sector (museums, libraries, performing arts, cinema and the audiovisuals, publishing, sport), it employed in 2001 nearly 73,000 labour units, with a yearly average growth rate of 1.3% in the previous decade, which can be partly ascribed to the huge investments in capital projects made by the State and the City of Rome for the 2000 Jubilee.

1.2 The cultural landscape

Cultural supply and demand in the City and Province of Rome

Because of its multilayered historic and artistic heritage – extending from the eighth century BC to present times – the city's cultural supply is exceptionally rich, so much so that Rome's historic centre may be considered an open-air museum in itself (besides the city's many fine museums). Monuments and archaeological parks with important Roman and Etruscan remains (Tivoli, Tarquinia, Cerveteri, etc.) are also scattered in the Province's territory, and the whole metropolitan area draws a constant flow of cultural tourists. Music and theatre, where attendance is growing at a faster pace than the average national level (SIAE-City of Rome, 2005), are thriving, also because of a significant effort by municipal authorities in the opening and restructuring of performing arts venues and in the organisation of cultural events, some of which (such as Paul McCartney and Elton John's concerts) have been provided free. On the other hand, whilst cinema attendance is also increasing, the serious crisis affecting the once flourishing cinema industry and the

CINECITTA studios since the 1990s has not yet been overcome.

Unfortunately, available data do not allow us to paint a detailed and satisfactory picture of the current situation of cultural supply and demand either in the City of Rome, or in its Province. However, when we compare the few available sets of cultural indicators referring to the City with those pertaining to the rest of the Province of Rome, as well as figures on Italy as a whole (which is possible in some cases), we sometimes observe a huge gap between the capital city and its surroundings, not to speak of the entire country.

Table 15 shows the number of museums and libraries and their percentage rate for every 100,000 inhabitants within the province of Rome. The situation appears to be quite balanced in the case of museums, where the less densely populated Province of Rome, with its rational network of museums (see The role of cultural policies), has a slightly better museums/inhabitants ratio than the City does. On the other hand, the City of Rome is far ahead if compared with the remaining provincial area as far as libraries are concerned.

Table 15. Libraries and museums.

Number and % for 100.000 inhabitants in the City of Rome, in the other Municipalities of the Province of Rome and in the Province of Rome as a whole – 2004

	City of Rome		Other Municipalities of the Province of Rome		Province of Rome	
	Number	% for 100,000 inhabitants	Number	% for 100,000 inhabitants	Number	% for 100,000 inhabitants
Libraries	855	33	127	10	982	26
Museums	147	6	91	7	238	6

Sources: AEC elaboration on data by ISTAT, City of Rome, Province of Rome, ECCOM.

As for the performing arts, while data on theatre and cinema venues in the City and in the Province of Rome are not available, Table 16 shows the percentage rate of performances and of sold tickets for every 100,000 inhabitants. In this case, the advantage of the City of Rome, when compared with Italy as a whole and, even more so, with the remaining part of Rome's Province, is overwhelming.

52. The survey Roma 2015 was commissioned in 2004 by the City of Rome to identify the medium-term development trends of the city.

Table 16. Cinema and the performing arts

Performances and sold tickets/100.000 inhabitants in the City of Rome, in the Province of Rome and throughout Italy – 2004

	City of Rome		Other Municipalities of the Province of Rome		Italy	
	Performances /100,000 inhabitants	Tickets /100,000 inhabitants	Performances /100,000 inhabitants	Tickets /100,000 inhabitants	Performances /100,000 inhabitants	Tickets /100,000 inhabitants
Classical music concerts	57	11,280	8	892	26	3,122
Other concerts	85	52,412	22	3,346	39	12,644
Theatre	654	67,878	954	8,935	154	20,204
Dance	24	4,502	76	607	11	2,304
Opera	19	5,958	1	341	5	2,285
Cinema	3,772	474,837	350	18,895	1,964	193,653

Source: AEC elaboration on data by SIAE

The role of cultural policies

In the past thirty years, Rome's overall cultural landscape, as well as the level of cultural supply and demand, have been strongly influenced and shaped by particularly innovative policies. This is the reason why this report will also focus on the role of cultural policies in general, notably those developed by local administrations as a key vehicle of Rome's metropolitan area development.

At the *national level*, in its twofold role as the capital of Italy and the largest and most outstanding historic centre of our country, Rome has understandably been the focus of the Ministry of Culture's attention in recent years, leading to huge investments for the preservation, enhancement and promotion of its heritage: in preparation of the 2000 Jubilee, 290 million euro were spent for culture by different government levels in the province of Rome (63% of which in the City of Rome), mostly earmarked for capital investments (Cabasino, Trimarchi 2005). The Ministry also actively supports national cultural institutions as well as a high level music and theatre supply. Among the most innovative projects promoted to enhance Rome's standing on the national and international contemporary arts scene is the creation (currently in progress) of MAXXI – Museum of Contemporary Art of the Twenty-first Century.

As far as our specific issue is concerned, the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also worth mentioning. Responsible for international cultural co-operation and the network of 88 Italian Cultural Institutes abroad, the Ministry also supports such Rome-based

national organisations as *ISAO – Istituto per l'Africa e l'Oriente* (former ISMEO) and the *Istituto Latino Americano*, both actively engaged in promoting intercultural dialogue between Italy and the countries of the geographical areas respectively concerned.

The *Regione Lazio* plays quite an important role in supporting the city's cultural supply, notably in the libraries sector.

In this report, however, our attention will focus on the main trends of the City and the Province of Rome's cultural policies, as they are more dynamic and innovative, as well as closer to the needs of citizens.

Cultural policies of the City of Rome

As far as cultural policy is concerned, the City of Rome has undoubtedly been a forerunner. The term *cultural policy* was virtually unknown in Italy until the 1970s: the heritage and performing arts were then under the responsibility of separate ministries, and a comprehensive vision of public intervention in the cultural sector was still missing. Renato Niccolini, Cabinet Member for Culture of the City of Rome in the centre left government between 1976 and 1986, was the first Italian policy maker to closely connect the heritage and performing arts through an innovative cultural policy, devoting long-overdue attention to the democratisation of culture, and 'opening' the historic city centre to citizens with very different social and cultural backgrounds, including young people from the suburbs. His most outstanding innovation, the *Estate Romana (Roman Summer)*, offered for free or at very low prices – as it still does today – a rich programme of cinema, music, dance, street theatre, literature and poetry events. From June to September, it enlivened the most beautiful monuments and squares of the city centre, transforming them into places of social interaction and blending of different publics – therefore with a high potential of intercultural exchange (see **DG for Cultural Policies**). Since then, the *Estate Romana* has been imitated by virtually all Italian (and some foreign) cities as a highly successful model. But it has also been criticised for concentrating on *ephemeral* events, while neglecting the development of Rome's permanent cultural infrastructure (far more challenging for the public finances of that time).

After a period of stagnation and limited resources for culture, the 1990s have led to another significant shift in cultural policy, with a programme that weds the *ephemeral* with the *permanent*. On the first front, alongside further developments in the *Estate Romana*, it is worth mentioning the *Notte Bianca (White Night)*, an event drawing inspiration from Paris, the 'twin city' of Rome. During these 'white nights' (started in 2003), the city offers free access to museums, monuments, theatres and other venues, where *ad hoc* events take place. Two million people, including foreign residents,

attended the event of September 18th in 2004. But the most significant innovations have occurred on the front of the *permanent* in the years revolving around the Jubilee, with an unprecedented policy of investments in cultural infrastructure concerning both the restructuring of ancient monuments and the promotion of bold contemporary architecture projects. To name but a few examples, the *Mercati Traianei* in the Roman Forum and the Quirinale Stables have been restored and turned into exhibition venues; a new City Gallery of Modern and Contemporary Art has been created in the former Peroni brewery; and, most notably, a brand-new Music Park has been planned by Renzo Piano to house an auditorium composed of three big halls connected by an open air *cavea*. As it has already happened with La Villette in Paris, the Music Park is gradually becoming one of the key city venues for the gathering and interaction of new public (see DG for Cultural Policies).

Investments in capital project, however, did not cease after the Jubilee celebrations, with the restructuring of the *Palazzo delle Esposizioni* and with the innovative policy of the *Casa (Houses)*, mono-thematic cultural venues housed in historic parks. Alongside the first-born House of Literatures, the House of Cinema, the House of Theatre and the House of Jazz have recently been opened to the public.

The next step – following an explicit recommendation of the Mayor of Rome, Walter Veltroni, who is deeply convinced that the development of cultural demand and creativity can be best achieved by giving children and young people of all social and cultural backgrounds the chance to approach the arts during school and after-school programmes – will be the policy of *houses for children and young people*: among other things, a toy museum, an archaeological park for children, a puppet museum and a children's house to be created in some historic parks of Rome. Considering the growing percentage of foreign pupils in Roman schools (in 2005, an estimated 10% of the overall school population)⁵³, these new venues may turn out to be an interesting seedbed of interculturalism in the medium to long term.

Cultural policies of the Province of Rome

Of the four levels of government in charge of cultural policies in Italy – the State, the regions, the provinces and the municipalities – the provinces are by far the least active, so much so that they account for only 3% of total public cultural expenditure in our country, as against a rate of 30% for municipalities (C. Bodo, C. Spada 2004). Their key responsibilities lie with the safeguard of the heritage and with the planning and support of museums and libraries systems. In fact, rather than directly operating public institutions, as is still the case for municipalities, their main mission is to act as an intermediary body in charge of planning, promotion and co-ordination.

53. Estimate of the City's Department for Education and School Policies.

These *governance functions* are in fact highlighted by Vincenzo Vita, Cabinet Member for Culture and Communication of the Province of Rome since 2003, as his Department's priority: "Our main goal is to evolve from a situation in which cultural activities in the Province's 120 municipalities are extemporaneously assembled, to an organic cultural policy revolving around two key priorities: *systems and cultural clusters*". As far as the former are concerned, the Province is currently developing the existing library and museum systems, and creating a new *theatre system* (also through the construction of new theatre buildings in the Province's areas which still needed them). In 2005, a pilot project was also started to create a *provincial network of music workshops* aimed at training youngsters in music languages and professions, as well as at "using the high potential of this artistic medium for social integration's sake"⁵⁴.

However, the most ambitious project of the Province's Department for Culture and Communication concerns cultural clusters, i.e. a number of territorial integrated systems promoting the interaction between heritage sites, cultural activities, training and research institutions on the one side, and the business sector and tourist services and infrastructure on the other. A pilot study is currently being carried out to explore the potential of a *cultural cluster in the "Castelli Romani" area*. Closely connected with the cultural cluster model is the Department's plan to create an *Audiovisual Cluster of the Province of Rome*⁵⁵, reflecting the importance of ICTs, audiovisuals and software services in the local economy as well as in fostering employment opportunities (see: Territorial, socio-demographic and economic features); special attention will be devoted to professional training and development in the audiovisual sector.

2. Rome, multicultural metropolis

2.1 Historical overview

Multiculturalism has its roots in the most ancient history of Rome. Situated as it is at the heart of the Mediterranean, and having been for centuries the capital of an empire extending from Western and Northern Europe to vast areas of Africa and Asia, the city has always been a crossroads of different peoples and cultures. It is worth noting that the integration of the different ethnic groups within the Roman Empire reached such a level as to suggest to the Emperor Caracalla to proclaim an act officially conferring upon all (free) inhabitants of the Roman Empire the condition of *Civis Romanus*, a status that guaranteed equal rights as citizens (212 AD). The subsequent role of Rome as the seat of papacy and Christianity has helped preserve its cosmopolitan character throughout the dark ages of urban and demographic decay following the fall of the empire. Not to speak of the variegated international artistic community which, for centuries, has revolved around the Academies, and of the many writers, painters and sculptors for

54. Province of Rome, Linee di indirizzo di politica culturale per l'anno 2005.

55. The Department for Culture of the Province of Rome is in fact also responsible for Communication – which is quite rare in Italy.

whom studying Rome's past glorious heritage has been imperative, the highlight of their *Grand Tour*, of their *Italienische Reise* (Goethe).

Capital of the recently unified Italian State since 1870, Rome has undergone a significant, ongoing expansion – physical, economic, demographic, welcoming and integrating different waves of migration from all areas of Italy (notably the southern regions), each with its own distinctive culture and level of development. As regards foreign residents, alongside religious orders and diplomatic representatives at the Holy See, the newly established capital started to attract embassies and, after World War II, international bodies such as FAO.

In the last three decades, however, Rome has known yet another radical shift in its multicultural and diverse nature (as much as 194 ethnic groups are now cohabiting in its metropolitan area), by attracting a consistent share of the constant flow of migration towards the northern shores of the Mediterranean from the less developed areas of the world or areas of crisis and conflict. This recent phenomenon has turned Italy quite abruptly from a country of emigration into a country of immigration: which means that it was far less prepared than others to face the new, substantial migratory wave (see: The State). In fact, the painful diaspora experienced by Italians between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – estimated today at around 60 million people scattered on five continents⁵⁶ – often tends to be overlooked.

2.2. What cultural diversity?

Taking the cue from Tony Bennett's definitions, the forms of cultural diversity focussed on in Rome's report will mainly be 'diasporic' – i.e. "cultures produced in association with the histories of displaced peoples, involving the development of mobile international cultural networks operating across, and offering an alternative to, the territorial logic of national cultures" (Bennett 2001). 'Autochthonous' minorities (understood by Bennett as "ethnically-marked minority communities that are the result of earlier movements of peoples – or of national boundaries – within Europe"), in fact, are not a major issue for the metropolitan area of Rome, whereas they are significantly present – and well integrated – in some regions of the North-East and North-West of Italy, bordering France, Austria and ex-Yugoslavia⁵⁷. The same can be said of Rome's so called 'traditional minorities' (that is, autochthonous religious minorities): the Jews and the Waldenses. The Jewish community in particular is highly integrated both from a socio-economic and a cultural point of view, besides being Italy's biggest such community and by far the most ancient in our country, dating back to the 1st century BC. On the other hand, the Roma community is almost by definition the most segregated, although it has long established in Rome's metropolitan area (and in Italy at large), and many of its members are by now

56. This figure comprises second, third and fourth generation immigrants.

57. The rights of officially recognised autochthonous minorities (French in Val d'Aosta, Germans and Ladins in Bolzano, Slovenians in Friuli Venezia Giulia) have been fairly well safeguarded through national and regional legislation from the post-war period, and guaranteed by the Constitution (Article 6).

Italian citizens. More recently, this community has known a sharp increase in number (according to Opera Nomadi, rising from 10,000 in 2001 to 15,000 in 2005) following new migrations from Rumania and the Balkans – which explains why Roma may today be considered as a partly 'autochthonous' and partly 'eterochthonous' minority⁵⁸.

Also among 'diasporic communities', a line needs to be drawn between refugees and immigrants from less developed areas of the world on the one side, and on the other the large communities of foreigners – diplomats, representatives of religious orders and international organisations, businessmen etc. – coming from Western Europe, the United States, and other continents as well (see Table 17), who evidently don't experience the same problems of integration.

One compelling reason for us to focus our attention on the above described, less privileged diasporic communities is that they pose not only very different, but generally more urgent, policy implications: all the more so in a country like Italy, where debate and action concerning the role and responsibilities of cultural policy makers and institutions in promoting the integration of these 'new citizens' is still inadequate.

2.3 Dimension, features and trends of immigration in Rome

Because of its fluid nature, and the non-comparability of the different available information sources, it is difficult to measure immigration in statistical terms. According to the Roman Observatory on Immigration set up by *Caritas* (a Catholic non profit organisation, see Associations, charities and NGOs), foreigners living in the province of Rome with a regular residence permit issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs were 291,000 in 2004. If we then consider the unknown number of illegal residents – *Caritas* estimates them between 30,000 and 40,000 – the *actual* number of foreigners living in the province of Rome could be as high as 325,000-335,000, thus already accounting for about 8,5% of the overall population.

58. In fact, there seems to be quite a high level of conflict between the long established and the newly arrived, most of whom, always according to Opera Nomadi, are beggars.

Their *division by country of origin* is extremely varied and constantly changing:

Table 17. Province of Rome: Foreigners by country of origin – 2003

Countries	Numbers	%	Countries	Numbers	%
Romania	59,657	20.5	Egypt	6,454	2.2
Philippines	22,892	7.9	Ecuador	6,132	2.1
Poland	17,300	5.9	France	5,769	2.0
Ukraine	12,300	4.2	United Kingdom	5,501	1.9
Albania	9,812	3.3	Sri Lanka	5,338	1.8
Peru	9,546	3.3	Moldova	5,229	1.8
Bangladesh	8,984	3.1	Germany	5,069	1.7
United States	8,174	2.8	Brazil	4,826	1.7
Spain	8,053	2.8	Morocco	4,392	1.5
India	7,832	2.7	Other Countries	93,336	26.1
China	7,349	2.5	Total	291,012	100.0

Source: AEC elaboration on data by Osservatorio Romano sulle Migrazioni, based on resident permits issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs

While the first migratory waves in the late 1970s came mainly from the Philippines, in more recent years immigration from Eastern Europe has grown exponentially, accounting for 40% of foreign residents in 2004; in particular, the 60,000 Rumanians today living in Rome are by far the biggest immigrant community (followed by the Poles and Ukrainians). Immigrants from Asian countries (alongside the Philippines, Bangladesh, India and China) rank at the second place, followed by Latin America (particularly Peru and Ecuador), and Africa (Morocco). The high percentage of foreigners coming from other Western European countries and the United States is largely due to the presence of several embassies, religious orders, etc. (see above).

Division by gender shows a slight prevalence of women residents in 2004 (53.7%). This figure, if considered also in the light of the foreign population's *classification by employment sectors* – 31% of foreign residents (three quarters of them women) are household workers, as against 19% employed in the commercial sector and 15% in the building industry – is quite revealing of the prevailing employment trends of immigrant communities. Firstly, the nature of immigration in Rome is *post-industrial*: most of the labour demand comes from the service sector.⁵⁹ Secondly, the high percentage of household workers – most of them women, employed as maids and, more and more, as care providers for sick and elderly people – can be largely ascribed to the ageing population and the severe deficiencies still affecting the Italian welfare system. Immigrants are thus mostly confined to lower grade jobs, also because of the lack of a well organised social and professional mobility system.

59. See E. Pugliese and M. Vitiello, "L'inserimento lavorativo", in Osservatorio Provinciale sull'Immigrazione 2005.


Alongside this well known and long lasting phenomenon, however, a more recent, less predictable trend concerns a slight growth in immigrant entrepreneurship, namely in the commercial sector, restoration and the building industry; most of these small businesses are run by Chinese, Rumanians and Egyptians. Such growth, together with the recent increase in family reunions, may be considered an incipient symptom of better integration of foreign residents in the economic and social fabric of the province of Rome: which of course requires greater attention to support policies for second-generation immigrants, rather than merely focussing on measures to regulate first reception and settlement.

2.4 Territorial distribution of immigrant communities

The only available source to outline immigrants' territorial distribution within the Province of Rome (map 5) is ISTAT, the National Statistical Office. However, it must be noted that the figure of 170,000 foreigners living in the Province of Rome in year 2004, based on data drawn from the General Register, is inconsistent with Caritas' figures, based on residence permits issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and appears to be underestimated.

Map 5 Province of Rome


Percentage rate of foreigners on the total population in the Municipalities of the Province of Rome - 2003



Source: Osservatorio Provinciale sull'immigrazione based on ISTAT data

Map 6 Province of Rome

Percentage rate of foreigners on the total population in the administrative districts (municipi) of the City of Rome - 2003



Source: Osservatorio Romano sulle Migrazioni, based on data by the Ministry for Internal Affairs

Quite interestingly, map 5 clearly shows that the highest incidence of immigrants on the overall population may not be found in the City of Rome as a whole (4.8%), but rather in other municipalities, such as Sacrofano and Campagnano, north of Rome (9.9% and 8.4%, respectively), in the coastal municipalities of Ladispoli and Fiumicino (7.5% and 5.5%), and, albeit with a lower rate, in Grottaferrata and Nepi, in the eastern “Castelli Romani” area. The coastal municipalities also host, after the capital, the highest absolute number of immigrant residents, as Fiumicino and Ladispoli have become ‘dormitory towns’ for those groups who gradually fled from the city centre. As for the City of Rome – in which, according to Caritas’ Observatory on Immigration, the number of regular foreign residents is as high as 201,000 (as against 123,000 according to the city’s Register data) – the percentage of ‘new citizens’ living in its 19 administrative

districts (*Municipi*) is sometimes much higher than in the suburban municipalities, although it varies widely from area to area (map 6). Unlike other cities, where foreign communities tend to be quite segregated, it is however worth noting that no ‘ghettos’ clearly subdivided by ethnicity may be identified in Rome. Foreign communities are in fact quite spread out and intermingled among themselves, coexisting side by side with the autochthonous population. The only exception is provided by the Roma community, about 15,000 people mostly living in 25 camps (many of which illegal, run down and in appalling sanitary conditions) scattered around the suburbs of Rome, whose integration – starting from school – appears to be still quite problematic.

The highest concentration of foreigners may be found in *Municipio* I (more than 27% of the district’s population in 2003), comprising the historic centre and the Esquilino, an ancient neighbourhood around Piazza Vittorio. As a matter of fact, in recent years the Esquilino has become the symbol of multi-ethnic Rome, although many of the immigrants running their business there (shops, restaurants, etc.), notably the Chinese, actually live in more peripheral areas, if not in other municipalities. High percentages of foreigners (around 10% or more) can also be found in the eastern working-class neighbourhoods along the Casilina (*Municipi* VI, VII, VIII) and in the rich districts of Parioli (II), Prati (XVII), and Cassia (XX)⁶⁰, where a high number of Filipinos are mainly employed as household workers.

2.5 Legal status and representation of immigrants

The civic integration of immigrants in our country may be described as a work in progress, with legislation, regulation and relevant actions still lurching from inclusion to expulsion, also depending on the shifting political colour of the State and local governments.

The State

Starting from the early 1980s, the abrupt shift from being a country of emigration to becoming a country of immigration took Italy by surprise. Unlike post-colonial countries such as Great Britain, France and the Netherlands, Italy had first to deal with emergency issues such as welcoming and assisting the growing wave of newcomers, as until then immigration had been virtually unregulated and undocumented. The first law aimed at regulating the growing wave of immigration (Law 39/1990), besides giving amnesty to immigrants who had arrived in Italy before 1989, started to tackle the issue of integration. In spite of this new regulation, the migratory influx gained further momentum in the following years, with both clandestine immigrants and asylum seekers arriving notably from the Balkans. Under the centre left government in the second half of the 1990s, the Leg. Decree 286/1998 put immigration on a more legal footing,

60. The administrative districts used to be 20 until Fiumicino (originally *Municipio* XIII) became a municipality; the original numbering has however been preserved.

establishing entitlements to healthcare, education and social services. But as the influx of illegal immigrants inexorably continued – now mainly arriving from Northern Africa – a new Law 189/2002 was adopted, also due to the xenophobic pressure of the Northern League (one of the political parties forming the centre right coalition currently in power). While tightening border controls and introducing highly restrictive immigration regime, as well as easier expulsion procedures, Law 189 paradoxically produced the biggest amnesty of illegal immigrants ever witnessed in our country (703,000 between 2002 and 2004). Although this amnesty has helped regularise the pre-existent situation, there still is an urgent need for a rational policy of immigration, capable of matching the actual demand of the labour market. A bill has been presented in Parliament concerning the transition from *ius sanguinis* (citizenship by descent) to *ius solis* (citizenship acquired by birth in a given territory) as, under the present regulation, immigrants' children born in Italy can apply for citizenship only upon their 18th birthday. Given the high degree of controversy presently surrounding the issue of immigrant communities' integration in our country (Turco, 2005), it is however unlikely that such a bill will be passed before next year's general elections.

According to the most recent data (Caritas), legal immigrants in Italy amounted to 2,600,000 in 2004 (from only 300,000 in 1980); but the total including clandestine foreign immigrants could exceed 3,000,000, and is constantly increasing. In spite of a general climate of government hostility, both legal and illegal immigrants are entitled to the basic welfare measures enjoyed by all Italian citizens, in particular the right to education, social security and national healthcare services. On the other hand, their fundamental right to culture and freedom of expression, which is enshrined in our Constitution, has not yet been recognised and explicitly promoted by the central government, nor, more specifically, by the Ministry of Culture.

Regione Lazio

Regional Law 17/1990 established the right of non-EU immigrants not only to basic social services, healthcare and professional training, but also to "the safeguard of their cultural identity". In particular, the regional Action Plan in support of non-EU immigrants, to be issued on a yearly basis (art. 4), comprised "cultural and social initiatives" aimed at promoting not only the study of the Italian language, but also "the knowledge among Lazio's citizens of the immigrant communities' cultures". Funding for the implementation of the Action Plan, however, has always been far from appropriate: in 2005 the available financial resources amounted to 385,000, to be either directly allocated by the Region or transferred to the municipalities – the provinces acting as intermediaries – for supporting "associations providing social, cultural or welfare services to immigrants", or the immigrants' associations themselves. In fact, it is widely held that Regione Lazio has been

the least active level of government in supporting immigrant communities in the area, and that Law 17/1990 needs to be updated in the light of subsequent legislation: this task is now entrusted to the newly elected centre left regional government (May 2005).

Province of Rome

Leg. Decree 286/1998 provides that provinces draft and update Action Plans on a yearly basis, aimed at promoting the integration of immigrant communities, and drawing on the Ministry of Welfare's funds. In 2005, 4,335,000 euro was made available for the Province of Rome. Other similar, albeit less well funded, Action Plans, are drafted on a yearly basis drawing on the Regional fund established by the above mentioned Law 17/1990: in the Province of Rome, projects aimed at fostering cultural identity are generally funded through these latter Plans. Municipalities, non profit organisations and immigrants' associations are entitled to apply for grants.

Some projects dealing with "the safeguarding of migrants' cultural identity" have in fact been funded through the more recent Action Plans (2003 and 2004); as highlighted by Daniela Cardenia, Head of the Provincial Immigration Office, Department for Social Affairs, such projects mainly consist of native language courses for some of the largest immigrant communities, organised by municipalities with a high rate of foreign residents, like Ladispoli.

Recently, the Department has significantly broadened its scope in tackling multicultural issues. An ad hoc *Provincial Observatory on Migration*, in charge of producing an annual report (*Osservatorio Provinciale sull'Immigrazione 2005*), has been created, along with ten *Immigrant Service Centres* (two of which located in the City of Rome) aimed at providing foreigners with information and technical assistance.

According to Claudio Cecchini, Cabinet Member for Social Affairs of the Province of Rome, the highest priority is to give incoming foreigners civic and political representation. He therefore plans to allow foreigners living in the Province of Rome to vote for a representative in each of the 17 administrative districts regrouping the Province's 121 municipalities, following the example of the City of Rome. This would lead to the creation of a District Council for Immigration, an advisory body to assist the Province in drafting policies for immigrant communities. In Cecchini's opinion, these 17 elected foreigners, along with Rome's Assistant Councillors, should also give birth to a new advisory body responsible for the whole metropolitan area of Rome: the Provincial Council for Immigration. This would mean a significant step forward in the new citizens' active involvement in the decision-making process.

There are also plans to create a much-needed space where foreigners could meet for their social and cultural activities. The idea is to locate this venue in a former store-house of the Provincial library system, situated in the suburban area of *Il Trullo (Municipio XV)*, where a large immigrant community is located. (see: Territorial distribution of immigrant communities)

City of Rome

As underlined by Maurizio Bartolucci, Head of the Municipal Council's Commission for the Representation of Foreign Citizens, the City of Rome is today among the most advanced in Italy as far as the degree of civic integration of immigrants is concerned. Following the administrative elections in spring 2001, a Special Councillor for Multi-ethnic Policies – Franca Eckert Coen – was appointed by Mayor Veltroni “to facilitate the integration of foreign citizens into their local communities, not only through city services, but also through meaningful civic participation”. This is the only instance of this kind in Italy so far. The mission of the Special Councillor is to assist the Mayor in devising new ad hoc policies, also through the organisation of national and international debates and exchange of experiences. The main limit is the lack of financial autonomy (the Councillor's office is still without portfolio; project-specific funding is around 50,000-60,000 euro each year), which means that the implementation of the Councillor's programme is highly dependent on other municipal Departments (Social Services, Healthcare, Education, Culture etc.). And although the Councillor is supposed to “co-ordinate and implement a programme of objectives and strategies embedded within the Municipality as a whole”, effective integration between different policy agendas and productive cross-departmental work are still far from being the norm, as underlined by Franca Coen herself. Most of the initiatives so far taken by the Councillor and her small staff have focussed on the *political representation* of the new citizens: namely, the election on the part of non-EU foreign citizens of four *Assistant City Councillors* representing four continents – Europe (non-EU countries), Asia, Africa, Latin America – who take part in the City Council sessions, although without the right to vote, and of one foreign Councillor for each of the nineteen *Municipi*. The elections were held in March 2004; 33,000 foreign citizens enrolled in the register of voters, nearly 57% of whom actually voted. In parallel with the election of the Assistant City Councillors, three advisory bodies were created to promote ethnic, spiritual and cultural pluralism:

the *Foreign Citizens' Council of Representatives*⁶¹, in charge of promoting the civil and political rights of foreign communities living in Rome, supporting the four Assistant City Councillors, and actively participating in the development of strategies, priorities, objectives and implementation tools for the multi-ethnic and intercultural programmes of the City of Rome;

the *Council of Religions*, whose main functions are to promote meetings and seminars on the issues of religious pluralism; identify and solve deficiencies in infrastructure (places of worship, cemeteries, etc.) hindering the expression of different faiths;

the *Council for the Freedom of Thought and the Laity of Institutions*, designed to support, from a lay perspective, the key moments in the lifecycle of the members from different communities and groups.

The establishment of these councils is too recent to allow any sound evaluation of their effectiveness. But we do know that these institutional innovations have attracted the attention of other Italian cities, so much so that new councils for multi-ethnicity and religions are currently being planned by Florence, Turin and Bologna.

3. Policies, programmes and activities to support cultural diversity

In section 1 we provided a short overview of the metropolitan area's general features and cultural landscape. Then we dealt with multicultural issues in the broader sense, exploring how local governments have been promoting, in the past few years, the political representation and socio-economic inclusion of all foreign residents in the metropolitan area of Rome. This section will focus on the specific role of culture (i.e. cultural policies by local governments, cultural activities by private organisations and associations, the media) in promoting the full integration of the new citizens in the city's political, social and economic, and artistic fabric – which means not only developing access to mainstream cultural institutions and promoting recognition and support of ‘ethnic minorities’ cultures’, but also creating the conditions for cross-fertilisation between different cultures, and so enrich the cultural landscape of Rome and its hinterland. In the following paragraphs, we will examine the policies, programmes and activities devised to this end by the *local authorities* (focussing on multicultural and intercultural policies of the City and Province of Rome, which are by far the most active levels of government in promoting cultural diversity), *private organisations*, and the *media sector*.

3.1. The role of the City of Rome

The City of Rome's units responsible for policy-making in the fields of multiculturalism and cultural diversity – respectively understood by Tony Bennett as “a commitment to maintain, and accord equal respect and value to, the different cultures that coexist within a territorially defined jurisdiction” (Bennett 2006), and “the intersections and intermixings of, and crossovers between different cultural perspectives and traditions” (Bennett 2001) – are the Department for Culture and the Department for Education and

61. The Council is composed by the first 23 non-elected candidates (11 African, 6 Asian, 3 Europeans, 3 Latin American), 6 of whom are women.

School Policies. Although its programmes and activities are primarily aimed at promoting political representation of immigrant communities (see: City of Rome), the Councillor for Multi-ethnic Policies' Office has also begun to explore culture as a potential vehicle of integration, in projects which we will briefly examine in paragraph entitled Cultural initiatives of the Councillor for Multi-ethnic Policies.

The Department for Culture

The Department for Culture is organised in two main units: the *Soprintendenza Comunale ai Beni Culturali* (Office of Cultural Heritage), responsible for the management of the city's museums and the safeguard of monuments and archaeological sites, and the Directorate General for Cultural Policies, responsible for libraries, archives, performing arts and cultural events such as *Estate Romana*, *Notte Bianca*, *Festival delle Letterature* etc. The Department's overall budget amounts to 347 million euro (i.e. 136 euro per capita), almost equally divided between the two above mentioned units (see: Table 18). It should be noted, however, that each entity allocates its expenditures very differently: whereas the highest share of the financial resources made available for the DG for Cultural Policies is earmarked for current expenditure, the budget of the *Soprintendenza* is mainly earmarked for capital projects such as the restoration of historical and archaeological sites and the development of new cultural infrastructure. The unusually high rate of capital expenditure on the overall cultural budget of the City of Rome (53%) as compared with the average rate in other Italian municipalities (31%) (C. Bodo, C. Spada 2004) must also be emphasised as a marker of the City's particularly strong commitment not only to the protection of its outstanding heritage, but also – in more recent times – to the renewal and restructuring of its cultural venues system, with a view to upgrading the level of cultural services to the citizenship as a whole.

Table 18. Cultural Expenditure of the City of Rome – 2004 (Actual Expenditure in 1000 euro)

Administrative Units Domains	Soprintendenza		DG for Cultural Policies		Total
	Museums, monuments and sites	Libraries	Performing arts and cultural activities		
Current Expenditure	33,187,39	16,203,95	112,616,34		162,007,68
Capital Expenditure	152,660,39	921,8	31,042,95		184,625,14
Total	185,847,78	17,125,75	143,659,29		346,632,82

Source: City of Rome, Department for Economic Policies

Such a sustained financial effort to develop Rome's cultural services cannot but have an impact – at least in the medium to long term – on the cultural development of citizens at large, immigrant communities included. However, it is worth noting that only a meagre portion of this huge budget is explicitly earmarked for the direct support of cultural diversity, as is clearly shown in the case of the Intercultural Service of the Libraries of Rome, with a budget of only 47,000 euro in 2005 (of which 22,000 euro were transferred *ad hoc* from regional funds). There is no doubt that much more should be done to fill the existing gap, by granting 'new citizens' equal opportunities in cultural access and artistic creation.

1. Office of Cultural Heritage

Although this unit is responsible mainly for the management and safeguarding of its 25 municipal museums and several monuments and archaeological sites, as well as for the renewal of the City's cultural infrastructure – a responsibility that, according to the *Soprintendente* Eugenio La Rocca, is carried out on behalf of *all* citizens, irrespective of their nationality and cultural background – it has recently started to address the issue of cultural diversity in its broader meaning, starting from the removal of the physical barriers hindering access to cultural institutions. As for access development initiatives specifically aimed at a multicultural audience, it is worth mentioning the Office's plan to create a *House of Cultures*, and a new focus of MACRO's policies on the intercultural potential of contemporary art collections and exhibitions.

1.a. The House of Cultures project

In 2004 the City of Rome was awarded the Dan David Prize (US\$ 300.000), based in Tel Aviv, in the framework of the programme "Cities: Historical Legacy". The project to be funded is a Casa delle Culture (House of Cultures), understood as a multimedia space to present the multiplicity of cultures co-existing in Rome from antiquity to the present day. The House of Cultures will feature multimedia educational displays and exhibition space to portray the multi-ethnic character of ancient Rome, documentation produced by the different ethnic groups currently living in Rome to illustrate their cultures, events on multicultural themes (conferences, music, performances...) to be organised in collaboration with the city's immigrant associations.

During the first phase of the project (planning), a fellowship will be awarded to a young researcher to carry out a study on multiculturalism throughout Rome's history, which will result in the first exhibition. The second phase (implementation) will be devoted to the restoration and refurbishment of one of the towers of the fourth century Roman Walls and the surrounding garden, the chosen location for this multicultural centre.

In the medium term, the House of Cultures is meant to become the centre of a network of initiatives to emphasise and celebrate Rome's multicultural past and present.

1.b. MACRO – Museo Arte Contemporanea Roma

The new gallery for contemporary art of the City of Rome was established in 2000, when the former Peroni brewery, located in the downtown area, was converted into a museum venue. A significant gap was thus filled in Rome's cultural supply – all the more so as the national museum of contemporary art planned by the Iranian architect Zaha Hadid is still under construction – although MACRO is still a 'work in progress'. Both its main building and its peripheral branch, located in a former abattoir, are currently being developed to display the museum's permanent collections, as well as to expand its cultural programming. While MACRO's main branch is hosting high profile international exhibitions – the new wing will be opened in 2006 with a show devoted to the great Chinese artist Kai Kuo Kiong – the most experimental work is being carried out at the former abattoir. The latter hosted an exhibition on emerging young Chinese artists in 2003, and on contemporary artists from the entire Mediterranean area in 2004. The 35 young artists on show were selected by 10 curators of different nationalities and cultural backgrounds, including a Turk, an Egyptian and a Lebanese. The exhibition's success has been a precious opportunity for these artists to reach a wider audience; six of them have subsequently been invited to show their work at the Tate Modern in London, while three others took part in the 2005 Venice Biennale. The show in Rome has therefore initiated a successful cultural co-operation between institutions in different European cities, in support of contemporary creativity and intercultural dialogue.

As far as the situation of immigrant artists living in Rome is concerned, Danilo Eccher, Director of MACRO, detects growing symptoms of vitality, although much remains to be done in order to identify and properly support these new or little-known talents. Some of these artists have been fully trained in their countries of origin, and have been attracted, as have artists over the centuries, by the cultural and artistic fame of the 'eternal city'; others are emerging within their own communities. Rather than 'institutionalising' the new wave of immigrant artists by creating *ad hoc* prizes and competitions, Eccher thinks the creation of 'talent scout' teams (foreign experts included) exploring the city's most promising areas and communities would represent a far more fruitful way forward.

2. DG for Cultural Policies

The sector in which this unit seems to have developed more dynamic policies specifically targeted at Rome's foreign residents are libraries. As for the performing arts and cultural events, alongside the support of mainstream institutions such as the Opera, the Santa

Cecilia Academy Orchestra and the *Teatro Stabile* of Rome, in the past decade the DG for Cultural Policies has devoted growing attention to the development of a rich, cosmopolitan multicultural supply, mostly drawn from outside the city. The unit, however, does not seem equally committed to supporting local foreign artistic communities, as well as a cultural demand which is genuinely pluralist and inter-ethnic; the DG's Director, Giovanna Marinelli, admits that more could be done in the latter respect, although she thinks that the main responsibility for cultural integration of immigrant communities should lie with the City's Department for Social Affairs. As well as providing an overview of the DG's most significant multicultural programmes and activities, viz. the Intercultural Service of the Libraries of Rome and *Estate Romana's* multicultural festivals, we shall also briefly consider the actual and potential intercultural scope of the unit's two most important outsourced institutions, the *Auditorium–Music Park* and *Palazzo delle Esposizioni*.

2.a. The Intercultural Service of the Libraries of Rome

Since 1994, the Intercultural Service has been co-ordinating initiatives aimed at "fostering interaction, exchange and mutual knowledge of the different cultures co-existing in the city of Rome". The project was inspired by Law 39/1990 (see: The State), which recommended, among other things, the creation of a multicultural centre in every city. In 1992, the City of Rome earmarked 200 million lire as the annual budget line for multicultural work in the city libraries. In 1996, however, this budget line was abolished, and since then the unit's activities have been funded on a project basis. As Gabriella Sanna, responsible for the libraries' intercultural policies and programmes, observes, the goals and strategies of the Intercultural Service have evolved over the years.

The first step was to transform more or less Euro-centric libraries into institutions more open to the immigrant communities' cultures, by collecting new publications (mostly in Italian, but also in English, French, Spanish and Portuguese) on Africa, Asia and Latin America. As the main goal was to promote in the Italian public a greater knowledge and respect for other cultures, this first phase of the Unit's activity was defined as "knowledge-oriented multiculturalism". In parallel with this phase, the unit started to tap into local resources and reach out to schools to foster intercultural dialogue. An example of this work is the conference cycle *Stories from the world*, which invited youths in Rome's high schools to explore literatures and cultures from the global South under the guidance of foreign cultural mediators and experts living in Rome. Another successful experiment has been the creation of an on-line multi-ethnic guide of the city (www.romamultiethnica.it), with an editorial team mainly composed of foreign residents which allowed the unit's staff to establish a closer partnership with immigrant communities and associations.

The first initiative specifically targeted at immigrant residents was the creation of a book section in Arabic at the *Biblioteca Flaminia* in 1999; the experiment, however, was not successful, as it lacked the communication and outreach work needed to promote the new service with the local communities. A more recent phase was opened in 2003 by *L'italiano che mi serve*, a project revolving around the study and knowledge of the Italian language and culture, aimed at removing cultural and linguistic barriers for the exercise of a full active citizenship on the part of immigrant residents. The project (which should evolve into a permanent service) has just been extended to libraries in prisons.

In fact, since 2004 the Intercultural Service falls within the Socio-Educational Unit alongside the Prison Service and the School Service. Possibly a symptom that the libraries' intercultural work is gradually being confined to the domain of 'socio-culture'?

Current and future projects of the Intercultural Service include:

1. A specialised Intercultural Library (multicultural and multilingual), possibly to be located in the Esquilino neighbourhood.
2. The development of an Intercultural section at a library located in Ostia, with *ad hoc* services for immigrant minorities. The existing book section in Arabic (see above) has been acquired by this library, which is developing other foreign language sections devoted to Eastern Europe (Romania, Poland, Albania), in close collaboration with mother-tongue cultural mediators, universities, embassies, cultural institutes, publishers, schools and associations.

Also in view of these latest developments, it will be of vital importance to ensure that a better knowledge of attendance patterns is acquired at least through a new subscription system, and possibly through qualitative surveys aimed at evaluating the response of immigrant communities to these new services.

2.b. Multicultural programming at the *Estate Romana*

In the past decade, *Estate Romana* (see: Cultural policies of the City of Rome) has devoted growing attention to extra-European cultures by promoting and organising, often in collaboration with associations and co-operatives, several multicultural festivals and events (open air film shows, music, theatre, literature). Among the most significant for our research is the *Roma incontra il mondo* (Rome meets the world) Festival, which has been taking place in the park at Villa Ada's for the last 12 years, blending 'world music' with traditional Italian music; for the whole duration of the event, a 'multi-ethnic village' offers a variegated public the opportunity to explore arts, crafts and gastronomy from all over the world. Another popular event is Fiesta, a Latin American festival (music,

dance, theatre, crafts...) held at the Capannelle race-course, which has been particularly successful in drawing a multi-ethnic audience. Remaining within the framework of cultural activities organised during the summer, it is worth highlighting the attention paid by the City of Rome to the African continent through the active support of two important events: *Italia Africa* and Festad'Africa – *Festival Internazionale delle Culture dell'Africa Contemporanea* (International Festival of Contemporary African Cultures) (see case below).

Case 1

Focus Africa

Italia Africa

As the main goal of this event (now in its second year) is to muster Roman and Italian citizens' support to help alleviate the economic and social plight of the African continent; its fundamental nature is political rather than cultural, so much so that *Italia Africa* is directly organised by the Mayor of Rome's Departmental Staff. The event culminates in a great open-air gathering held in the Piazza del Popolo, with the participation of public authorities, artists, Italian and African musicians (this year's guest star was Benin's Angelique Kidjo), but also features a rich programme of meetings, conferences, exhibitions and concerts promoted and organised by individual African countries under the supervision of the City of Rome, which also covers communication costs. The overall budget for 2005 amounted to 100,000 euro (50% covered by municipal funding, and the remaining 50% by sponsors such as SKY and a few banks).

According to Matteo Rabesani, co-ordinator of *Italia Africa*, the event had a particularly positive impact not only in providing an opportunity for different groups of societies to interact and blend, but also in fostering dialogue between the city's different African communities, in particular those of North-African and sub-Saharan origin.

Festad'Africa – International Festival of Contemporary African Cultures

This interdisciplinary festival, launched in 2002 by Emanuela Giordano (co-operative Centro di Ricerca Teatrale Scena Madre) with the main goal of "promoting the latest developments of contemporary African art, and in particular sub-Saharan theatre, in Italy", is supported by the DG for Cultural Policies (which covers 70% of its overall budget, 200,000 euro in 2005) within the framework of *Estate Romana*, and organised also in co-operation with *Italia Africa*. Among other institutional supporters, the French

Embassy in Rome plays a particularly significant role through its artistic and operational input – one of the still far too few cases in which two European countries join their efforts to foster intercultural dialogue with an area of the South of the world. The festival programme ranges from theatre performances and art exhibitions to dance and music events, hosted in different city venues (Teatro Il Vascello, Università La Sapienza, Museo Pigorini...). While playwrights, theatre actors and dancers mainly come from African and European countries (notably France), there is a higher degree of involvement of African artists living in Rome as far as music is concerned. It is also worth mentioning that this year's performances were introduced by readings of contemporary African and non-African authors around the theme "Rome seen through the eyes of immigrants, and immigrants seen through the eyes of Romans"⁶². Unquestionably one of the most genuine "intercultural" events in Rome's cultural landscape, *Festad'Africa* is peculiar not only in its (albeit still limited) involvement of local African artists, but also in its effort to gain a better knowledge of its audience. A survey carried out for the first time in 2005 showed that of the 24,000 people who attended the festival 70% were Italian, 10% African and 20% from other countries. It is of course just a beginning, but nonetheless a significant methodological step forward.

2.c. Auditorium – Music Park

Alongside a repertoire more open to contemporary, 'heterodox' composers in the past few concert seasons organised by the Santa Cecilia Academy, also hosted in the Auditorium, this new and highly successful cultural premise offers a rich and cosmopolitan programming for an Italian as well as international audience, notably 'world music' events and world culture festivals. As acknowledged by Carlo Fuortes, CEO of *Musica per Roma* Foundation⁶³, however, the Auditorium has not yet devised audience development policies specifically targeted at Rome's foreign residents (with the only exception of special prices policies for foreign communities). Yet, their participation was particularly significant on the occasion of the interdisciplinary world culture festivals which have been taking place at the Music Park since 2003: India, Scandinavia, Russia and Thailand; a Chinese and a Brazilian festival will follow in 2006. The Thai Festival (May-June 2005), a co-production with the Government of Thailand, presented Thai culture in all its aspects, both traditional and modern: in addition to visual arts, performing arts and cinema, the programme also included the ancient art of massage, royal Thai cuisine, and the art of boxing.

A third type of multicultural supply concerns events in partnership with immigrant associations. Unlike international festivals, in this case the Auditorium has so far simply let its venues at a non-profit rate to communities (Philippines, Japanese, Kurds, Albanians, Rumanians, Bulgarians etc.) who then organised their own events: performances,

62. The authors and actors who took part in the readings were mainly drawn from the programme of another recently established festival, *Autori per Roma* (Authors for Rome), now in its second year.

63. The foundation entrusted with the management of the Auditorium-Music Park, whose main members are the City of Rome, the Province of Rome and Rome's Chamber of Commerce.

meetings, celebration of festivities, etc. Although the level of direct involvement of the Auditorium in these initiatives is very limited, it is nonetheless significant that a key mainstream institution is encouraging immigrant communities to use its spaces, thus at least partly addressing the problem of inappropriate public infrastructure devoted to multicultural and intercultural activities.

2.d. Palazzo delle Esposizioni⁶⁴

Palazzo delle Esposizioni – an imposing building dating from the late 19th century – was first restructured in the 1980s to become one of the most important exhibition venues in Rome. In 2001 it was shut for further restructuring, aimed at enhancing its interdisciplinary character: alongside visual arts, performing arts, cinema and new media. Before then, its rich international and multicultural programming notwithstanding, the Palace was primarily visited by an Italian and Western public – certainly in no wise the multi-ethnic audience drawn since its opening by the Centre Pompidou in Paris, the institution from which *Palazzo delle Esposizioni* probably drew its inspiration. In view of its reopening (scheduled around the end of 2006), however, the 'mission' and programming of *Palazzo delle Esposizioni* could be changing to reflect more appropriately the dramatic shifts that the demographic structure of Rome's population has undergone in the past decade⁶⁵. Thanks to the variety and dimensions of its spaces and the versatility of its functions, *Palazzo delle Esposizioni* may in fact turn out to be an ideal venue to promote world cultures as well as to favour the fruitful interaction of different publics – on the condition that its staff is properly supported by a strong team of 'mediators' with intercultural competencies. Much the same could be said of the recently opened venues falling under *the Palazzo delle Esposizioni's* responsibility – i.e. the House of Cinema and the House of Jazz – and of the Exhibition Centre at the Quirinale Stables, where a recent show on India (summer 2005) included a comprehensive festival of Indian cinema from the 1930s to Bollywood.

The Department for Education and School Policies

The most recent evolution in the socio-demographic makeup of Rome's population is particularly evident at schools: according to Paola Gabbrielli, special consultant on intercultural policies of the Department for Education, foreign pupils already account for 10% of the overall school population – a percentage which can reach as high as 47% in some schools located in those *Municipi* with the greatest concentration of immigrant residents. It is therefore not surprising that, within the City administration, the Department for Education and School Policies is a forerunner in dealing with the cultural integration of these "new citizens", pupils and families alike.

64. A public company entirely owned by the City of Rome.

65. The final destination of spaces, as well as the main guidelines for cultural programming, are currently being studied by the Palace's newly appointed President.

Alongside services such as linguistic and cultural mediation, teacher training and publications for immigrant families, the Department promotes networking and inter-institutional initiatives broader in scope, such as the *Inter-religious Table* – in the framework of a formal agreement signed with representatives of the Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Protestant and Jewish communities – and the *Polintermundia* (Intermundia Poles, see case below).

Case 2

Intermundia

Intermundia is the programme for intercultural education carried out by the Department in partnership with schools, universities, other institutions, and the many associations and NGOs operating in this field. Projects and activities are mainly aimed at developing mutual knowledge between people of different nationalities, cultures and religions, in the belief that schools are the ideal place to nurture intercultural attitudes and relations not only in pupils and teachers, but also in the social fabric within which they operate. The project started eight years ago with the *Intermundia Festival*, which takes place every spring in the gardens of Piazza Vittorio, at the heart of the Esquilino neighbourhood. Thousands of pupils, teachers, artists, experts, associations and NGOs take part in this important event. In 2005, an ethnically diverse audience reached 40.000 people (50% of them adults and teachers) in five days. Initiatives included theatre, dance, music, poetry, and visual arts workshops with schools; guided tours to shops, gathering places and artists' studios in the Esquilino; a conference cycle on immigrant literatures; performances by local and international artists; multicultural exhibitions.

The second phase of the *Intermundia* project, recently started, is the creation of a network of 19 *Polintermundia*, one for each *Municipio*, to foster interaction between schools, immigrant families and adult population. Such spaces (minimum 300 sq. metres) are to be located inside school buildings; activities include:

- a) *for children and youths*: language courses (both in Italian and in the languages of immigrant communities), linguistic and cultural mediation, workshops and exhibitions, a multicultural library, creation of a multi-ethnic choir or musical group, celebration of religious and lay festivities;
- b) *for adults*: language and computer literacy courses; exhibitions, film festivals, conferences on immigrant cultures and interculturalism; information and training concerning city services; networking activities with other educational and cultural agencies on immigration.

The Department for Education provides start-up funding for the four *Polintermundia* so far created in *Municipi* I, V, VI and XI; the hosting school supervises the ongoing use of these dedicated spaces, has financial and administrative responsibility, takes part in the planning of activities, and promotes partnerships with other schools and agencies; the *Municipio* covers maintenance costs and contributes in the development of and disseminates information on the Pole's activities. All three partners participate in the steering committee to identify guidelines for the Poles' activities.

The *Polintermundia* of *Municipio* I, for example, was opened at the end of 2004 in a school near Piazza Vittorio, and is run by a parents' committee. In the after-school hours, it is used by both children and adults; activities include music, ceramic and photography workshops, alongside exhibitions, folk dance classes and interethnic gastronomy. The focus of adults' activities is on mothers. As stated by Francesca Valenza, in charge of the venue, communication works better 'from mother to mother', and even Chinese mothers, who belong to the more secluded foreign community in the neighbourhood, actively take part in the Pole's activities, most notably language classes: Italian mothers teach the Italian language to foreign mothers and children; Arab or Chinese mothers teach their language to foreign and Italian children, and so on. The availability of some funding for these activities and, even more significantly, of free space, where people of such different backgrounds can meet and interact, makes a great difference. With a budget of 1 euro million (300,000 of which are earmarked for the *Intermundia Festival*) and an annual contribution of 15,000 euro for each of the four existing *Intermundia Poles* (in addition to the funds made available by the Department for Education, the four Poles get extra funding from their respective *Municipio* on a project basis), *Intermundia* is probably by far the most substantially funded of all municipal programmes aimed at fostering intercultural dialogue.

Cultural initiatives of the Councillor for Multi-ethnic Policies

The current policies of the Councillor revolve around two key projects: *Rome city of peace* (mutual knowledge, trust-building and cross-cultural fertilisation between the different communities living in Rome) and *Plural Rome, real Rome* (setting up of the three advisory Councils described in paragraph City of Rome). A great effort has been placed on the creation of a network of formal and informal foreigners' representatives (the three advisory Councils, the four Assistant City Councillors, embassies and consulates, cultural centres, associations, etc.), through the organisation of conference cycles, meetings and seminars, and of community-specific ceremonies and events. Few of these initiatives, however, focus on culture as a specific policy domain and identity issue.

The first such experiment was *The Hospitality of Culture, the Culture of Hospitality*, a project promoted by the Department for Culture of the City of Rome in partnership with the Councillor's office. The initiative was meant to initiate a new strategy of integration, also based on greater access to the city's cultural institutions. Free guided tours in Italian language for non-EU foreign residents were organised first to the Capitoline Museums (autumn 2002), and subsequently to the *Centrale Montemartini* (spring 2003), two of the main city archaeological museums. The latter cycle in particular was targeted at the six biggest immigrant communities in Rome, who were invited to present their cultures with music performances, poetry readings and the tasting of traditional food at the end of the visits. The guided tours were planned in collaboration with the communities' representatives, and the embassies were involved in the preparation of leaflets on their country's traditions and customs. Potentially, the visits were the first institutionalised opportunity for immigrant communities to learn about the city's cultural heritage, and in turn to promote and share their cultures with autochthonous citizens and museum visitors. In reality, the project has been a success in terms of visibility for the City of Rome, but participation of foreign residents has been very limited, also due to the lack of adequate communication. No funding was in fact made available – the City of Rome offered free museum entry and the organisational support of the Department for Culture and the Councillor for Multi-ethnic Policies office – and communities had to self-finance their cultural initiatives. The Councillor eventually decided not to repeat the experiment.

A new project is currently being started in collaboration with the University of Rome "La Sapienza" and the publisher Stranieri in Italia (see The press), called *In search of identity*. Its main goals are to promote a reflection on the meaning of 'identity' and 'multiple identities' in contemporary society, and to sustain the collective memory of the different ethnic, religious and national groups in the host country. The project will entail a survey of the evidence of the past life of foreign communities in Rome.

3.2 The role of the Province of Rome

The Department for Culture and Communication of the Province of Rome is organised in two main units: the Service for the Restoration of Cultural Heritage, and the Service for Cultural Goods and Activities, responsible for museums, libraries, performing arts and audiovisuals. In 2004, the Department's overall budget amounted to 9,832 million euro, of which 2,890 million euro was earmarked for capital projects – which clearly shows how little resources are available for culture at the provincial level, compared with the City of Rome. Moreover, as stated by the Department's Director, Giuliana Pietroboni, the Department's budget has been further reduced by 20% in 2005, following generalised cuts in local authorities' resources due to the current critical situation of Italy's public finance.

In these circumstances, it is quite understandable that a very small percentage of the Department's funds has so far been allocated for policies and programmes specifically aimed at supporting immigrant communities' cultural activities. On the other hand, it is also true that the Province of Rome supports the increasingly cosmopolitan and multi-ethnic cultural supply of the city, for example by funding not only mainstream institutions such as the Opera and the Teatro Stabile of Rome, but also *Musica per Roma* (see: DG for Cultural Policies) and *Romaeuropa Festival* (see: Foundations), which are more open to a multicultural programming. The main problem here, as is the case with virtually all publicly funded cultural institutions in Italy, is the under-representation of immigrant communities in their audience – which, in the near future, will pose a problem of democratic legitimacy for public expenditure at all levels of government (Klaic 2001).

Among the most interesting intercultural initiatives directly promoted by the Department is the *Intercontinental Mediterranean Festival* (music, dance, theatre and literature), which was held in six coastal municipalities of the Province of Rome in 2004 and 2005, and hosted artists from all over the world. Moreover, there are encouraging signs that future activity in support of cultural diversity in the Province's territory will increase. The Department of Culture and Communication, in fact, is particularly aware of the need for policies and programmes which are more sensitive to the cultural needs of immigrant residents. The Department's *Guidelines for Cultural Policies 2005* state the following:

"Cultural life in the Province's municipalities also includes events and festivities organised by immigrant communities. The growing presence of residents from European and extra-European countries is in fact one of the key developments in our local reality... The Province of Rome is therefore determined to support cultural policies and activities aimed at promoting integration, social cohesion and equal rights and opportunities, and so become an *Intercultural Capital Province*".

This is a very ambitious stance, which the *Guidelines* further reinforce by emphasising the role of ICTs (the 'future intercultural language') in developing creativity, optimising networks of competencies, and building a shared civic memory and identity. Given the growing importance of the media in general (and of new media in particular) in the information and communication activities of immigrant communities (see 4.4), such guidelines, along with the planned Audiovisual *Cluster* (see Cultural policies of the Province of Rome), may have a significant impact on second-generation immigrants.

Finally, the Department for Culture works closely with the Department for Social Affairs at a *House of Cultures* project (see: Province of Rome), to be located in the suburban area of *Il Trullo*, and so provide immigrant communities living in the Province of Rome with a new meeting space.

3.3 The role of private organisations

Foundations

Among Rome's foundation, one of the most active in our field of study is *Fondazione Romaeuropa*, a mainstream cultural institution also supported by national, municipal and provincial financial contributions. The foundation has been promoting contemporary music and performing arts through its well-known *Romaeuropa Festival* and several other programmes/events (e.g. *Romaeuropa Promozione Danza* and *Romaeuropa Cultura*) since 1985, and has gradually come to be seen as a key interlocutor for many groundbreaking artists from all over the world. In its 20 years of activity, the Foundation has managed to create and consolidate an impressive network of international co-operations and exchanges: 26 European countries have joined the Foundation through their Academies, Cultural Institutes and embassies. *Romaeuropa* is also an active member of several important European cultural networks, such as the EFC (European Foundation Centre), IETM (Informal European Theatre Meetings), the Association Européenne des Festivals and the European Dance Network.

In parallel with a high-profile programming, the Foundation has recently devoted increasing attention to the discovery and promotion of "alternative" cultural traditions and experiences from Asia, Africa etc., notably in the dance field. Furthermore, it was *Romaeuropa* to act as a catalyst in the creation of the intercultural ensemble *Orchestra di Piazza Vittorio* (see: case 3 in Associations, charities and NGOs).

Associations, charities and NGOs.

Associations, charities and NGOs play a vital role in promoting a vibrant multicultural society in Rome.

Catholic charities such as *Caritas Diocesana of Rome* make a significant contribution not only in providing assistance and services to the 'new citizens' (from first reception, housing and healthcare to language courses and professional training) and in disseminating knowledge on migration patterns and key issues affecting the city (with its yearly *Dossier statistico sull'immigrazione*, Caritas' Centre of Studies and Documentation is, to date, the most reliable and comprehensive source of information on immigration in Rome). In the past decade, Caritas has also been promoting the *Forum per l'Intercultura*, one of the city's main intercultural education programmes, in collaboration with several associations. Today, the Forum offers about 30 different courses to both school teachers and students, exploring different aspects of the immigrant communities' cultures including art, cinema and literature.

Although on an altogether different level, another interesting local example of Catholic involvement in migration issues is *Genti di Pace*, an international movement promoted by the Community of Sant'Egidio. Its members come from 115 different countries, work on a voluntary basis and often act as cultural mediators. Alongside Italian language courses, *Genti di Pace* organises meetings in schools, debates between immigrant and Italian/European young people, intergenerational and intercultural performances aimed at promoting a better knowledge of the social and cultural background of immigrant communities. The movement also organises monthly meetings (films, debates, exhibitions, festivals with traditional music, dances and gastronomy from all over the world) to foster intercultural exchange between people with different cultural backgrounds, languages and faiths.

Among the many NGOs and associations operating in the field of *intercultural mediation and education*, *CIES – Centro Informazione Educazione allo Sviluppo* is one of the most established. Its Agency for Intercultural Mediation holds courses for intercultural mediators, linguistic-intercultural mediators and intercultural entrepreneurship operators, and has a constantly updated database of nearly 500 mediators currently working in public immigration offices and information desks for foreign residents, in schools (where they hold workshops) and in the business sector.

The several *documentation centres*⁶⁶ located in Rome also make important contributions to intercultural awareness-building by offering scholars and researchers, operators and ordinary citizens materials on the history, sociology, politics and culture of the migrant communities' countries of origin, as well as on multicultural society at large. The Documentation Centre of the *Archivio dell'Immigrazione*, for example, gives access to a huge audiovisual archive on the issues of immigration, racism and political asylum, regularly updated with documentation from RAI, private broadcasters and independent producers; a rich library with the most recent and significant publications on migration (essays, collections, surveys, fables from the immigrant communities' countries, etc.); a newspaper library on immigration themes; an updated collection of immigration laws and measures, conference proceedings, materials for schools, researches and dissertations. The Archive also promotes intercultural education courses, organises workshops within the framework of the *Forum per l'Intercultura* programme (see: above), and publishes the mono-thematic diary *Agenda Razzismo Nonsolonoero* as well as the quarterly review *Caffè*, devoted to immigrant literatures.

As regards the many *associations*, both Italian (see case 3 on *Associazione Apollo 11*) and foreign, promoting the different cultures coexisting in the city, a concise description of their goals and activities may be found on the on-line guide to multi-ethnic Rome. It is not easy to provide a reliable estimate on the number of these associations, all the more

66. Mostly created by NGOs and Catholic or lay associations.

so as their lifecycle tends to be quite brief, depending on their sometimes precarious conditions or on the accomplishment of their often time-limited objectives. According to the available data, many among the most established associations are African or Latin American (respectively 23 and 18 in 2005). Also the Filipinos are well known for their network of formal and informal organisations. Some of these associations are nation-based; some were specifically established to co-ordinate initiatives aimed at communities belonging to the same continent (e.g. Panafrica, Unione Latina), or at promoting inter-community and inter-national relationships; others may be subdivided by professional and/or cultural categories. Their activities range from multi-ethnic infant schools to political representation and lobbying for citizenship rights, from healthcare and legal assistance to professional training and language courses, from cultural events (some of the associations regularly host artistic performances and workshops by international as well as local artists), sport and food tasting to the publication of newspapers and magazines and the organisation of multicultural festivities (among the most important are the Chinese and Bangladeshi New Year's celebrations, held respectively in Piazza Vittorio and Pietralata, and organised by the immigrant communities in collaboration with their embassies). The role of associations both in promoting and keeping alive immigrant communities' cultures in the host country, and in increasing the accessibility of Italian culture for foreign residents, has been particularly emphasised in an interview by the newly elected Assistant City Councillors (see: City of Rome); in their view, the creation of a roll of associations (as well as of cultural mediators) would be highly recommendable, and they are in fact about to propose a motion to the City Council on this issue.

Case 3.

Associazione Apollo 11 and the Orchestra di Piazza Vittorio

The story of the *Associazione Apollo 11* and of the intercultural ensemble *Orchestra di Piazza Vittorio* starts in 2002, when a group of artists, filmmakers, musicians and writers decided to create an association in an effort to save the Cinema Apollo, an Art Deco ex theatre located in the Esquilino neighbourhood, from being turned into a Bingo hall. The idea behind the recovery of this venue was to use culture "as one means of changing Rome's urban makeup by promoting the multicultural dialogue between the city's different communities", to enhance the neighbourhood's intercultural character, and to actively involve the immigrant communities and artists living in the Esquilino – as well as in other areas of Rome – in the Cinema Apollo's programming. In the association's view, Apollo 11 should become an 'international multidisciplinary workshop' open to all world cultures, most of them represented by the immigrant communities living around Piazza Vittorio, at the heart of the neighbourhood. A "Cinema of Memory" would

feature masterpieces of the past, independent films, documentaries, and especially films, music and literatures from far away corners of the world, with a programming in original language to be defined in close collaboration with the local foreign communities.

As a result of the association's campaign against the commercial interests surrounding Cinema Apollo, the building was eventually bought by the City of Rome (2003). But the final use of the theatre, whose refurbishment and management has been outsourced, has not yet been clearly established. In a recent document defining the guidelines for the Apollo's future operation and programming, the City of Rome states that this "multifunctional cultural centre 'will bear' particular reference to new generations and disadvantaged audiences, and acknowledge, as far as possible, the neighbourhood's multi-ethnic and multicultural make up".⁶⁷ The terms of the *Associazione Apollo 11's* future involvement in the operation of the new venue are currently being discussed. For the time being, to host the association's growing cultural programming, the space was found in a dismissed room of the Istituto Tecnico G. Galilei, a popular school of the Esquilino neighbourhood, and hopefully called "Piccolo Apollo" ("Little Apollo"). Since its opening, thanks to the gratuitous involvement of musicians, writers, screenwriters, film directors and actors, and with the free participation of the neighbourhood's population, the venue has hosted several self-financed cultural events.

Along the same lines of intercultural dialogue, *Associazione Apollo 11* supported the idea of one of its members, the musician Mario Tronco, to put together an ensemble with foreign musicians living in Rome that would reflect the resident's communities different cultures. This long-cherished project could be realised when the lump sum needed to start the ensemble was made available by the Romaeuropa Festival (see: Foundations), which acted as a catalyst by entrusting the (then only virtually existing) group of musicians with the closing concert of the 2002 festival, to be held in November. The *Orchestra di Piazza Vittorio* – possibly the biggest intercultural ensemble in Europe, made up of fifteen musicians from eleven countries and four continents (Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe), and speaking eleven languages – saw the light in a few months and started its success story, due to the peculiar intercultural quality of its sound. In spite of the high turnover of its musicians, depending on the expiry dates of their residence permits, the Orchestra has managed to work with enthusiasm and continuity in the first three years of its life, touring around Italy and in several foreign countries (Germany, France, UK...). "Before starting I thought we'd need funding or a loan" says Mario Tronco – in fact no funding has so far been made available neither by local authorities nor by the Ministry of Culture – "but miraculously, the Orchestra can almost finance itself through concerts; since 2005, it is even able to pay a regular salary to its musicians. Of course, we would love to find some additional funding so we can work with less stress and rehearse more frequently". The Orchestra's most cherished dream, however, is to secure a permanent 'in-residence' position at the Esquilino, in the future multifunctional cultural centre.

67. City of Rome, Determinazione dirigenziale n. 81 del 1/3/2004.

Last but not least, the 190 *places of worship* (such as churches and mosques) active in the City of Rome provide key spaces and opportunities for social and cultural interaction, where language courses, cultural and sport events, theatre and music performances are organised alongside catechism, sung masses and religious festivities. The huge community of immigrants coming from the Philippines, for instance, can rely on a network of 38 church centres, which have been co-ordinated by the *Sentro Pilipino* (located in the basilica of S. Pudenziana) since 1991. Another interesting example is provided by the *Grande Moschea di Roma* on Monte Antenne – the recently built (1995) biggest mosque in Europe – which also features an Islamic Centre organising courses in Arabic, conferences and meetings on issues regarding Islam, as well as offering library services. The Centre also organises celebrations for the end of Ramadan with music and other cultural events.

3.4 The role of the media

Far from promoting a better understanding of immigration, Italian and Roman media tend to consider immigrants only as a negative paradigm of diversity (crime, sexual harassment, unskilled labour, stereotyped ethnic diversity, etc.). This biased and distorted image of immigrants, and in particular of Muslim and Roma communities, is corroborated by several recent surveys⁶⁸.

On the other hand, media initiated and managed by immigrant communities, or in close connection with them, seem to play a crucial role both in promoting community cohesion (also by enabling immigrant residents to retain vital links with their own countries of origin), and in ensuring a better knowledge and understanding of their host country/city. This is particularly the case with the press and local radios, widely used by immigrant communities. The *Archivio dell'Immigrazione* (see: Associations, charities and NGOs) has carried out on our behalf a concise survey of this phenomenon in the metropolitan area of Rome. Considering the precarious conditions in which many immigrant media operate (the editorial teams of newspapers, radio and TV programmes often complain about the lack of funding needed to ensure the continuity of their project), it must be kept in mind that any facts and figures regarding them have to be constantly monitored and updated.

The press

The press is by far the most widespread immigrant medium in Rome, where 28 newspapers (only considering the most established ones) are published in about 20 different languages.

68. For the latest survey see CENSIS-COSPE 2003, carried out within the framework of the European project Equal.

Table 19. Newspapers for immigrant communities, based in Rome – 2005

Name of newspaper	Area of distribution	Number of copies	Language	Publisher
<i>Africa News</i>	nation-wide	20,000	English	Stranieri in Italia
<i>Africa Nouvelles</i>	nation-wide	20,000	English	Stranieri in Italia
<i>Agora Noticias</i>	nation-wide	10,000	Portuguese	Stranieri in Italia
<i>Ako Ay Pilipino</i>	nation-wide	5,000	Tagalog, Eng.	Stranieri in Italia
<i>Al Maghrebiya</i>	nation-wide	20,000	Arabic	Stranieri in Italia
<i>Azad</i>	nation-wide	10,000	Urdu	Stranieri in Italia
<i>Bulgaria Express</i>	nation-wide	5,000	Bulgarian	Stranieri in Italia
<i>Gazeta Româneasca</i> ¹	nation-wide	20,000	Rumanian, It.	Stranieri in Italia
<i>Il Tempo Europa Cina</i> ¹	nation-wide	9,000	Chinese	Stranieri in Italia
<i>La Hora</i>	nation-wide	5,000	Spanish	Stranieri in Italia
<i>Lakhiru</i>	nation-wide	10,000	Cingalese	Stranieri in Italia
<i>Nasz Swiat</i>	nation-wide	12,000	Polish	Stranieri in Italia
<i>Nuevo Expreso Latino</i>	nation-wide	20,000	Spanish	Stranieri in Italia
<i>Punjab Express</i>	nation-wide	7,000	Punjabi	Stranieri in Italia
<i>Nur</i>	nation-wide	20,000	Arabic	Nur Edizioni
<i>Altri</i> ³	nation-wide	5,000	Italian	Cooperativa Altri
<i>Assadakah</i>	regional	5,000	Arabic, It.	Centro Assadakah
<i>Shqiptari i Italisë</i> ¹	nation-wide	15,000	Albanian, It.	Bota Shqiptare
<i>Caffè</i> ⁴	nation-wide	5,000	Italian	Archivio Immigr.
<i>Confronti</i>	nation-wide	6,000	Italian	Coop. Nuovi Tempi
<i>Echo News</i>	nation-wide	10,000	English	Echo News Assoc.
<i>Forum</i> ¹ (Ucrain Edit.)	nation-wide	15,000	Ucrain	Assoc. Bravo
<i>Forum</i> ¹ (Russian Edit.)	nation-wide	7,000	Russian	Assoc. Bravo
<i>Il Leone di Giuda</i> ⁵	regional	n.a.	Italian	Assoc. Exodus
<i>Africantrumpet Intern.</i>	nation-wide	7,000	Eng, French, It.	Privat Individual
<i>Al Barid Al Arabi</i>	nation-wide	10,000	Arabic	Privat Individual
<i>Al Morscid Al Arabi</i> ²	nation-wide	5-10,000	Arabic	Privat Individual
<i>Tempo di Roma</i>	local	5,000	Bengali	Privat Individual

Source: ad hoc elaboration by Archivio dell'Immigrazione

N.B.: Most newspapers draw their financial resources from advertising and the market. Only Caffè, Confronti and Assadakah are also partly financed, in the framework of other projects, by public subsidies.

All newspaper are published monthly, unless otherwise stated:

¹fortnightly, ²monthly/bimonthly, ³bimonthly, ⁴quarterly, ⁵six-monthly

As far as the publishers of these newspapers are concerned, it is worth mentioning that 14 out of 28 are published by *Stranieri in Italia*, and regularly host advertisements of *Western Union*, the company which runs most of the financial transactions for immigrants' money transfers to their homelands; as a matter of fact, these ads are the main source of financial support for *Stranieri in Italia*. With a circulation ranging from 5,000 to 29,000 copies, these newspapers are distributed on a national scale, but are not always easy to find – with the exception of news agents located in urban areas with a high percentage of African population, Western Union/Angelo Costa shops (as free press), or embassies and consulates, where they are delivered by subscription or for free. As pointed out by Massimo Ghirelli, Director of *Archivio dell'Immigrazione*, the high percentage of Italians in the editorial teams is to be largely ascribed to the many difficulties met by foreign residents in becoming professional journalists; extra-European reporters registered in the foreigners' list may in fact be employed as members of the editorial staff only on condition that they are Italian citizens. As a result, foreign residents often work on a voluntary basis. Key topics of these newspapers include information on immigrant communities, on the Italian situation with respect to immigration policies and measures, and sometimes on cultural or religious events.

Radio programmes

The number of radio and TV programmes run by or targeting immigrants clearly shows how far the situation in Italy still is from providing equal access to the means of production and distribution of information. This is also a result of limited financial resources and difficulties in securing advertising as well as sponsorship. The metropolitan area of Rome, however, presents a slightly better picture as far as radio programmes are concerned. There are currently 16 of them, often in the languages of the respective immigrant communities (notably in Spanish and Cinghalese), and almost exclusively run by foreign residents.

Table 20. Radio programmes targeted at immigrant communities, based in Rome - 2005

Broadcasting Station Name of programme	Type of programme	Nationality	Language	Time
Radio Onda Rossa A cura della comunità di Sri Lanka	Information, culture, music	Sri Lanka	Cinghalese	45m. a week
Latino America	Information	Latin America	Italian	1h a week
Rom a Roma	Information, culture, music	Roma	Italian	1h a week
Bato Bato	Information	Philippines	Tagalog	90m. a week
Radio Città Futura	Music	Africa	Italian	1h a week
Afric'kan	Music	Latin America	Spanish, It.	2h a week
Brasileirinho	Information, news	Various	Italian	15m. a week
Notizie a cura di stranieriinItalia.it				
Radio Città Aperta Comunità Sri Lanka ¹	Information, culture, music	Sri Lanka	Cinghalese	1h a week
El Guaiycan ¹	Information, culture, music	America	Spanish, It.	90m. a week
La Voce Jugoslava ¹	Information, culture, music	Jugoslavia	Italian	30m. a week
Radio B.Leza ¹	Information, culture, music	Capeverde	Creole, It.	2h a week
Ugnayan Sa Impapawid ¹	Information, culture, music	Philippines	Tagalog	1h a week
Radio RAI ¹ Permesso di Soggiorno ³	Information, culture, music	Various	Italian	8m. a day
Radio inBlu (catholic, in collaboration with Università Gregoriana, Rome)				
Hola mi Gente ³	Information, culture	Latin America	Spanish, It.	220m. a week
Source: ad hoc elaboration by Archivio dell'Immigrazione	Information, culture, music	Various	Italian	30m. a week

N.B.: the programmes' broadcasting area is the City and the Province of Rome, unless otherwise stated:

¹Rome and Lazio, ²Rome, Lazio and Internet, ³nation-wide

Source: ad hoc elaboration by Archivio dell'Immigrazione

These programmes – most of them self-managed and self-financed – are broadcast on those local radios which have traditionally paid particular attention towards social and political issues, such as *Radio Città Futura* or *Onda Rossa*. Other programmes are broadcast on radios connected with the Vatican. Many of them have become a vital ‘voice’ for immigrant communities, providing them with news and information on their countries of origin as well as on Italian immigration policies, but also with a chance to listen to traditional music.

TV programmes

Lack of funding and the already mentioned difficulties in securing a regular flow of advertisements are the main causes behind the near-absence of programmes targeted at immigrant communities on Italian television. In fact, there are only two (bi-weekly) programmes currently being broadcast in our country: *Mondo a colori* (RAI 2), addressing a variety of nationalities, and *Sentir Latino* (SKY), mainly targeted at Latin American communities.

Book publishers

There are several Roman book publishers with collections specifically devoted to the themes of migration and cultural diversity. For some of these publishers (see for example Sinnos Editrice in the box below), such issues represent the ‘core business’ of their activities. Other publishers – such as *Jouvence*, which publishes a collection entirely devoted to contemporary Arab authors, or *Edizioni Interculturali*, with its *Koumà lettere migranti* collection – share a determination to give a voice to contemporary immigrant writers. Another interesting example is provided by *Meltemi Editore*, which explores themes such as cultural hybridity, anthropological studies and a mapping of the new dislocation of cultural production through a number of different collections.

Case 4

Sinnos Editrice

In 1989 the Information Centre for Foreign Prisoners in Italy promoted a training course in desktop publishing inside the prison of Rebibbia. The course was funded by Regione Lazio and had two primary objectives: to provide offenders with professional skills and reemployment opportunities, as well as to create a co-operative to employ those remaining in prison – which happened one year later, when the social co-operative Sinnos (‘signs’ in Sardinian dialect) was founded by a group of prisoners and volunteers.

Sinnos Editrice is nowadays an established albeit small publisher, whose main goals are to create reemployment opportunities for socially excluded individuals, to promote multicultural and intercultural education, and to encourage a better understanding of social issues such as immigration and citizenship rights. This is achieved through a number of collections largely addressed to children and youths, such as:

I Mappamondi: bilingual books written by immigrant authors “for Italian children with foreign schoolmates, but also for foreign children with Italian schoolmates”. These books are meant to allow the immigrant to express himself/herself in the first person, as well as to create bridges between stories, languages and traces of different cultures. At the end of each volume, the *Mappapagine* provide useful information on meeting places, associations, schools, shops, bibliographies and contacts with the author’s community in Rome.

Zefiro: unpublished tales and legends from the South of the world, also in bilingual text.

Underlying these publications is a notion of ‘intercultural dialogue’ as ‘provocation’, a dynamic process of interpretation, understanding and making/sharing of meaning.

More recently, Sinnos has started to publish collections also for an adult readership:

Dare voce: stories from prison and other places of exclusion and deprivation, written in the first person by their protagonists;

I dati: statistics and evidence on immigration and diversity;

Istituzioni Culturali: essays and surveys on Italian and European cultural institutions, with a special focus on libraries;

as well as two reviews:

Gli stranieri. Rassegna di studi, giurisprudenza e legislazione (since 2002);

Permesso di soggiorno (since 2003).

Funding of most of these publications – with a market mainly composed by teachers, pupils’ parents, libraries (although affected by shrinking resources), and alternative distribution channels – is made possible by Sinnos’ driving activity, i.e. editorial services for other important publishing houses, universities, public and private institutions. Such

services include professional training, data processing, research on immigration and foreign offenders in Italian prisons. Sinnos also has an established activity of professional training for prisoners (computer literacy, desktop publishing, statistics, cataloguing of books for libraries) and foreign cultural mediators (computer literacy and Italian legislation), and since 1997 runs an information desk for non-EU immigrants on behalf of the *Municipio V* of Rome.

The Internet

As far as the Internet is concerned, there are several websites of great cultural interest run by immigrant residents and acting as new 'bridges' for access and integration⁶⁹. These websites are often connected with immigrant associations and NGOs, and sometimes with newspapers or embassies. Of particular interest is the online news agency *Migra – Agenzia Informazione Immigrati Associati*, born from the European project *Equal* to give a voice to immigrant communities in our country, and run exclusively by foreign residents who publish all their materials in Italian. Another interesting example is the *Archivio delle Comunità Straniere*, which creates and/or provides a common showcase for the websites of immigrant communities in Italy. Because they are able to tell a different story on what it means "to be an immigrant in Italy", as well as for the opportunities they offer to immigrant communities to interact through forum and chat services, these websites are bound to have a significant impact on the future of intercultural and trans-cultural communication.

4. Concluding remarks

While they have certainly been given increasing attention and commitment by the local authorities in the past decade, policies, programmes and activities to support cultural diversity in the metropolitan area of Rome are still being shaped by different understandings of terms such as 'multiculturalism', 'interculturalism' and – most notably – 'cultural integration'.

In the course of our research, we found such terms being used by interviewees in two main senses. The first refers to 'cultural integration' in a broader sense, emphasising the need to promote meaningful civic participation and political representation of immigrant communities, besides social protection measures aimed at satisfying their most basic and immediate needs. The importance of this shift in the understanding of processes leading to integration should not be underestimated, as Italy has only recently become a country of immigration, and has so far tended to deal with this phenomenon in terms of 'social emergency'. In this respect, Rome is undoubtedly a pioneer. This innovative attitude

69. Some of these websites have been pointed out to Archivio dell'Immigrazione by its network of immigrant communities' representatives.

towards the civic integration of immigrant communities was initiated by the City of Rome, with its Special Councillor for Multi-ethnic Policies, its four Assistant City Councillors, its three advisory councils (in particular the Foreign Citizens' Council of Representatives and the Council of Religions), and its many initiatives to promote ethnic, spiritual and cultural pluralism. But recently also the Province of Rome has been developing its policies along similar lines, placing particular emphasis on the provision of new services for foreign residents. The President of the newly elected regional government (June 2005) has defined the integration of immigrant communities a 'priority'.

The second understanding of 'cultural integration' refers to culture as a policy domain (heritage, museums and exhibitions, performing and visual arts, cinema and literature, the media, etc.) and implies that there is a specific challenge of reflecting Rome's growing cultural diversity in civic life and identity. In this respect (with the notable exception of long-established services and programmes such as *Intermundia* and the Intercultural Service of the Libraries of Rome), the local authorities are only just beginning to explore the true potential of their cultural policies, institutions and activities. In fact, there is still a more or less evident tendency to consider the cultural life of immigrant communities as a domain of *socioculture*⁷⁰, if not an 'optional' for cultural policy makers. According to Antimo Farro, Professor of Sociology at the University of Rome "La Sapienza", the key role of 'cultural rights' in the development of individual and group identity has not yet been fully acknowledged in Italy, while the integration of immigrant residents is still largely seen as a socio-economic issue. And yet, as Jeremy Rifkin warned soon after 9/11:

"culture is the decisive factor; it is a powerful driving force in favour of democracy, resulting from shared values ... Every community should start a political debate on how to best nurture a tolerant acknowledgement of cultural diversities"⁷¹.

Against the current background of ongoing terrorist attacks and the increasingly fashionable thesis of a 'clash of civilisations',

"it would perhaps make more sense", as Dragan Klaić observes, "to look at culture budgets not in terms of their *economic impact* – as has been the case for the last 10-15 years, under the influence of the neo-liberal thinking – but rather as a *security issue*. An argument could be made that discrimination, exclusion and marginalisation in a political, ideological and socio-economic sense nourish a dangerous cultural insecurity; and that cultural policies aimed at inclusion and active participation of marginalised social groups nurture their sense of cultural security and belonging, and strengthen social cohesion" (Klaić 2006).

70. Similar conclusions have been drawn by Kira Kosnick in a research carried out in Berlin in the context of the EU Fifth Framework Project Changing City Spaces: New Challenges to Cultural Policy in Europe (Kosnick 2006).

71. *La Repubblica*, October 11, 2001.

Although not at the top of their list of priorities, the issue of 'cultural rights' has been emphasised by the City of Rome's four Assistant Councillors, who, in view of their safeguard, have suggested three main recommendations:

1. *formal recognition (and increased legitimacy) of migrant communities' representative bodies*, for example through the creation of a roll of associations;
2. *equal opportunities of access to public cultural funding*, as the actual exercise of cultural rights can only be assured through appropriate resources;
3. *creation of public meeting spaces* for cultural minorities, where cultural exchange and interaction can happen.

It must be noted that, albeit belatedly, and mostly as a result of pressure brought to bear by associations and NGOs, the issue of spaces has become one of the key challenges acknowledged by Rome's local authorities – as is the case with the House of Cultures planned by the Province of Rome in the suburban area of Il Trullo, or with the current debate surrounding the future use of Cinema Apollo in the Esquilino neighbourhood (see case 3). The latter could in fact turn out to be a crucial test for the city by creating a much needed *shared public space* in order to encourage not only multicultural *consumption*, but also genuine *participation* and *interaction* between Rome's different communities. The issue of resources, on the other hand, still seems largely unaddressed (see The Department for Culture) on the probably over-simplistic assumption that Rome's cultural policies, infrastructure and services are developed on behalf of all citizens. In fact, as Naseem Khan – former Head of the Arts Council of England's Diversity Unit – rightly warns us:

"people who favour the junking of multiculturalism will passionately claim that 'everybody should be treated as equal', and that people at the margins should be demeaned by being given special treatment. But unfortunately it is true ... that people at the margins are not treated equally. Report after report shows that people from ethnic minorities in general have access to worse education, worse housing, fewer opportunities to rise and very few role models at the top ... Some exceptionally talented people do get under the wire. And their rise gives the impression that intervention is unnecessary – indeed, it is nothing more than social engineering. But if you look into the background of the people who did make it, then more often than not you will find that they were subsidised by the Arts Council at an early and experimental stage of their work" (Khan 2006).

We have stressed the concepts of participation and interaction as this is where, in our opinion, the main problems lie. The key challenges may be outlined as follows:

The need to foster a *better understanding among Italians of the native cultures and artistic life of immigrants* has been quite effectively pursued by local administrations and cultural institutions in recent years. In the past decade, Rome has in fact managed to develop impressive international and multicultural programming, notably in the performing arts and cultural events (see for example the many activities and programmes of the *Romaeuropa Foundation*, the world culture festivals at the *Auditorium–Music Park*, the *Estate Romana*, the *Festival of Literatures*, the African events promoted by the City of Rome, as well as the *Festival del Mediterraneo* organised by the Province of Rome). What distinguishes most of these initiatives, however, is not so much a will to encourage attendance and participation on the part of the city's immigrant communities, as to promote a greater knowledge, respect and recognition for other cultures – a *'knowledge-oriented multiculturalism'*, as it was referred to by one of our interviewees, directed principally at the Italian public. Another common feature of these events is that they draw mainly on an international network of established artists, rather than tapping into local talent. And finally, neither the local authorities nor the cultural institutions promoting these multicultural initiatives carry out audience research (with the only, belated exception of *Festad'Africa*, see case 1), let alone seriously consider the need for audience development policies targeted at the city's 'new citizens'.

As regards *programmes and activities aimed at increasing the accessibility of Italian culture for foreign residents*, language courses are by far the most widespread, whereas projects aimed at removing cultural, attitudinal and emotional barriers to the city's mainstream cultural institutions are still the exception rather than the rule. The free guided tours to the Capitoline Museums for non-EU foreign residents, promoted by the City of Rome's Special Councillor for Multi-ethnic Policies in partnership with the Department for Culture (see *The Hospitality of Culture, the Culture of Hospitality* project), have turned out to be only partially successful, as participation of immigrant communities was in fact very limited due to the lack of a consistent communication and outreach policy. A more fruitful and genuinely participatory way forward may be opened up by initiatives such as the *Casa delle Culture* project of the City of Rome, which aims at highlighting the city's multicultural nature since antiquity⁷², also by actively involving local immigrant communities to illustrate their cultures through displays and events. There is an interesting potential here to help reshape the city's collective memory and develop an intercultural civic identity. It should be noted, however, that the most significant role in informing foreigners about the host country and its culture is for the time being played by the media, and in particular by the press.

72. Along similar lines, the office of the Councillor for Multi-ethnic Policies is promoting a survey of the evidence of the past life of foreign communities in Rome in its In search of identity project.

The problem of *allowing immigrants to safeguard their own identity by not losing contact with their homeland, language and culture* does not seem to have received much attention by local authorities. The teaching of foreign languages – at least those of Rome’s principal immigrant communities – is still only sporadically tackled (for example the programmes funded by the Province of Rome in its yearly Action Plans, or the courses run on a voluntary basis by immigrant mothers in the City of Rome’s *Intermundia Poles*). The local Chinese community, which has long advocated the creation of a school to teach their language, still has to send its children to an after-school programme organised in the Esquilino neighbourhood by the Waldensian Community of China. As a matter of fact, the safeguard of immigrant communities’ cultural identity is almost entirely in the hands of associations and other private organisations. Once again, an important role is played by the media: radio programmes, newspapers targeted at foreign communities, and a number of publishers such as Sinnos Editrice (see case 4). Not to speak of the great potential of the Internet, which is increasingly being used by immigrants to this end: in this respect, the opportunities offered by the planned Provincial Audiovisual Cluster should not be overlooked. A greater role could also be played by the embassies, which already act as important catalysts for people coming from their respective countries, through the organisation of major cultural and religious festivities.

The *potential for meaningful crossovers and hybridisation between different cultures* – which implies the recognition of cultural diversity as a source of mutual enrichment and a more thriving and cosmopolitan artistic life, as is already happening in European cities with a more established multicultural tradition – is also still largely untapped. The intercultural ensemble of the Orchestra di Piazza Vittorio provides the most successful example on this front. Also in the field of visual arts, ideas such as the use of ‘talent scout’ teams put forward by MACRO’s Director still await for implementation. According to Maria Immacolata Macioti, Professor of Sociology of Religions at the University of Rome “La Sapienza”, there are many artists, musicians, performing arts groups who would deserve support – whether it be in terms of funding, commissions or programming – but get none: ‘mainstream culture’ and ‘migrant cultures’ seem to belong to altogether separate circuits. Roman and Italian society in general do not yet seem mature enough to take full advantage of the many opportunities offered by intercultural exchange. Of course, while this goal should still be actively pursued now, it is likely that only the second and third generations of immigrants will be able to reap the benefits of these policies and programmes developed to support cultural diversity. Throughout our research, schools – where the percentage of foreign pupils is constantly growing – have in fact turned out to be important seedbeds for the spontaneous emergence and nurture of interculturalism. In this perspective, programmes and activities such as the several cultural initiatives promoted by the City of Rome’s Department for Education and School Policies, or the museums and houses for children and young people currently being

created (once again by the municipal administration) in Rome’s historical parks, are likely to represent the best hope for the future.

List of interviewees

Bartolucci, Maurizio – Head of the City Council’s Commission for the representation of foreign citizens, City of Rome
Cardenia, Daniela – Chief Officer for Migration, Province of Rome
Cecchini, Claudio – Cabinet Member for Social Affairs, Province of Rome
Darif, Aziz – Assistant City Councillor (Africa)
Eccher, Danilo – Director, MACRO (Museo Arte Contemporanea Roma)
Eckert Coen, Franca – Special Councillor for Multi-ethnic Policies
Farro, Antimo – Professor of Sociology, University of Rome “La Sapienza”
Fuortes, Carlo – CEO, *Musica per Roma* Foundation
Gabbrielli, Paola – Special Consultant on intercultural policies, Department for Education and School Policies, City of Rome
Ghirelli, Massimo – Director, Archivio Immigrazione; Coordinator, Archive of Foreign Communities and Migra Agency
Giordano, Daniela – Director, *Festa d’Africa* Festival
La Rocca, Eugenio – Soprintendente, Office of Cultural Heritage, Department for Culture, City of Rome
Macioti, Maria Immacolata – Professor of Sociology of Religions, University of Rome “La Sapienza”
Marinelli, Giovanna – Director, DG for Cultural Policies, Department for Culture, City of Rome
Okeadu, Emeka – President, Foreign Citizens’ Council of Representatives
Passarelli, Della – President and Editorial Director, Sinnos Editrice
Pavolini, Lorenzo – *Romaeuropa* Foundation
Perez Tobias, Irma – Assistant City Councillor (Asia)
Pietroboni, Giuliana – Director, DG for Cultural Heritage and Activities, Province of Rome
Rabesani, Matteo – Mayor of Rome’s Departmental Staff, Responsible for the organisation of *Italia Africa*
Rossi, Claudio – Office of the Special Councillor for Multi-ethnic Policies
Rusu, Gabriel – Assistant City Councillor (non-EU countries)
Sanna, Gabriella – Responsible for intercultural policies and programmes, Libraries of the City of Rome
Taboada, Santos – Assistant City Councillor (Latin America)
Tronco, Mario – Artistic Director, *Orchestra di Piazza Vittorio*

Vita, Vincenzo – Cabinet Member for Culture and Communication, Province of Rome

References

Bennett, T. (2006), *Culture and difference – The challenges of multiculturalism*, in S. Bodo and R. Cifarelli (ed. by), *Quando la cultura fa la differenza*, Roma, Meltemi.

Bennett, T. (2001), *Differing Diversities – Cultural policy and cultural diversity*, Council of Europe, ISBN 92-871-4648-9

Bianchini, F. and Bloomfield, J. (2004), *Planning for the intercultural city*, Comedia, ISBN 1-873667-92-2

Bodo, C. and C. Spada (ed. by) (2004), *Rapporto sull'Economia della Cultura in Italia 1990-2000*, Bologna, il Mulino, ISBN 88-15 -10229 -9

Bodo, S. (ed.) (2006), *Culture in movimento. Strumenti e risorse per una città interculturale*, proceedings of the international conference jointly organised by the Province of Milan and Associazione per l'Economia della Cultura (Milan, 12th-13th May 2005), Milano, M&B Publishing.

Bodo, S. and R. Cifarelli (ed.) (2006), *Quando la cultura fa la differenza*, Roma, Meltemi.

Cabasino, E. and Trimarchi, M. (ed.) (2005), *Beni culturali: intervento pubblico e occupazione – Giubileo del 2000, Roma*, Milano, Franco Angeli.

Carbone, A and Miele, R. (2002), *Immigrazione, asilo e cittadinanza*, Roma, Sinnos editrice

Caritas/Migrantes (2005), *Immigrazione. Dossier statistico 2004. XIV Rapporto*, Roma, IDOS–Immigrazione Dossier Statistico.

Caritas - Camera di Commercio (2005), *Osservatorio Romano sulle Migrazioni, Primo Rapporto – 2004*, Roma, IDOS.

Caritas - Archivio dell'Immigrazione (ed.) (2005), *L'immagine degli immigrati in Italia*, Roma, Ministero del lavoro e delle politiche sociali.

Caritas Diocesana di Roma - Migrantes Roma e Lazio (2004), *Immigrati a Roma. Luoghi di incontro e di preghiera*, Roma.

Caritas, (2003), *Gli immigrati nell'economia romana: lavoro, imprenditoria, risparmio, rimesse*, Roma, Camera di Commercio.

Censis - COSPE (ed.) (2003), *Tuning into diversity. Immigrati e minoranze etniche nei media*, Roma.

Censis - CLES (2005), *Roma al 2015. Gli scenari per il futuro della città*, Comune di Roma.

Comune di Roma, Organizzazione Internazionale per le Migrazioni (2005), *Immigrazione Internazionalità Multiethnicità* (also translated in English and French), Roma.

Comune di Roma (2004), *Policies for Multi-ethnicity*, Roma.

Comune di Roma (2004), *The Rome of Religions*, Roma, EDUP.

ECCOM (2005), *Composizione, evoluzione e opportunità di lavoro nei musei della Provincia di Roma*, Roma, Osservatorio del Mercato del Lavoro Provinciale, Provincia di Roma.

Ghirelli, M. (2005), *L'antenna e il baobab. I dannati del villaggio globale*, Torino, Società Editrice Internazionale.

Khan, N. (2006), *'Lo spazio condiviso e le sfide della diversità culturale'*, in S. Bodo (ed. by), *Culture in movimento. Strumenti e risorse per una città interculturale*, Milano, M&B Publishing.

Klaic, D. (2001), *Le organizzazioni culturali di fronte alla sfida del multiculturalismo*, in *Economia della cultura* n. 3/2001, Bologna, il Mulino.

Klaic, D. (2006), *Thematic priorities, altered institutional typology. Cultural policies and institutions facing the challenge of multicultural societies*, in S. Bodo and R. Cifarelli (ed. by), *Quando la cultura fa la differenza*, Roma, Meltemi.

Kosnick, K. (2006), *The challenge of culture in the plural. Cultural policy and diversity management in multicultural metropolitan spaces*, in S. Bodo (ed.), *Culture in movimento. Strumenti e risorse per una città interculturale*, Milano, M&B Publishing.

Osservatorio Provinciale sull'Immigrazione (2005), *Gli immigrati nella provincia di Roma. Primo Rapporto 2005*, Provincia di Roma, Assessorato alle Politiche Sociali.

SIAE - Comune di Roma, (2005), *Lo spettacolo a Roma*, 2004, Roma.

Turco, L. (2005), *I Nuovi Italiani - L'immigrazione, i pregiudizi, la convivenza*, Milano, Mondadori, ISBN 88-04-52992-X.

Main web sites

Archivio dell'Immigrazione

www.archivioimmigrazione.org (consulted 15/5/2005)

Main sections: a rich documentation centre, overview of the Archivio's projects and activities (including exhibitions and cultural events), training courses, newsletter and quarterly review *Caffè*, devoted to immigrant literatures.

Archivio delle Comunità Straniere

www.archiviocomunita.org (consulted 15/5/2005)

Archivio delle Comunità Straniere has set up a team of immigrant researchers to collect materials, texts, documents, photographs, video and cultural products of the several immigrant communities living in Italy – all available on this web site, which has been conceived as a portal to promote community visibility.

Associazione Apollo 11

www.apollundici.it (consulted 15/7/2005)

The web site includes the Association's story and plans for the future refurbishment and programming of Cinema Apollo, an overview of past and current activities at the Piccolo Apollo, and information on the Orchestra di Piazza Vittorio.

Caritas Diocesana di Roma

www.caritasroma.it

A complete overview of Caritas' activities, services and publications (including the *Dossier Immigrazione*), with the opportunity to download several documents and a newsletter.

CIES – Centro Informazione Educazione allo Sviluppo

www.cies.it (consulted 15/7/2005)

Main sections: education and development, co-operation and development, cultural mediation, exhibitions and cultural events, publications, online documentation centre, newsletter.

Intermundia

http://www.comune.roma.it/was/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_21L?menuPage=/Comune_Agenzie_e_Aziende/Dipartimenti/Dipartimento_XI/Intermundia_e_intercultural/ (consulted 15/7/2005)

Main sections: services (e.g. cultural mediation, teacher training and publications for immigrant families), Interreligious Table, Intermundia Festival, Intermundia News.

Migra – Agenzia Informazione Immigrati Associati

www.migranews.it (consulted 15/7/2005)

Online news agency run by immigrant communities with articles, dossiers and images on politics, culture and society; newsletter.

Orchestra di Piazza Vittorio

www.orchestradi piazzavittorio.it (consulted 15/7/2005)

The web site, also available in the English version, presents the Orchestra's story (includes an interview with Mario Tronco, artistic director), a profile of the artists, the listing of concerts, sections devoted to the square from which the Orchestra draws its name and to Associazione Apollo 11.

Roma Multietnica

www.romamultietnica.it (consulted 15/7/2005)

Alongside constantly updated information on multi-ethnic Rome (art, associations, libraries, publishers, music, religion, restaurants etc.), the web site, edited by the Intercultural Service of the Libraries of Rome, offers a showcase of multicultural and intercultural events, guidance on books and bibliographies, links with other web sites on interculturality, immigration, and the countries and cultures represented by immigrants living in Italy. By the end of 2005, an English version of the key sections of the web site should be available.

Stranieri in Italia

www.stranierinitalia.it (consulted 15/7/2005)

A rich web site presenting information on Stranieri in Italia's publications, thematic sections (including culture and performing arts), legislation on immigration and services for immigrants, news in real time on immigration issues in Italy, chat, forum, newsletter and opinion polls.

TALLINN AS MULTICULTURAL CITY: STRUCTURES, INITIATIVES, DEBATE

by Mikko Lagerspetz and Sofia Joons⁷³



Map 7

1 Portraying Tallinn

1.1 A general overview

Etymologically, the name of the Estonian capital derives from “*Taani linn*” – i.e. “the City of the Danes”. In 1219, the site was conquered from the then pagan Estonians by the Danish King Valdemar II (‘The Victorious’), who is said to have received the Danish flag, the famous Dannebrog, from heaven at the same occasion.⁷⁴ The city’s German name, *Reval*, does however bear remembrance of an older Estonian name of the same settlement: at least since the 9th to 10th centuries, this was the commercial centre of the enviroing Estonian county called *Rävala*. The city’s present architecture bears witness to several centuries of its subsequent history. From the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries, Tallinn was known as a member of the powerful Hanseatic League, after that

73. Mikko Lagerspetz, Estonian Institute of Humanities, Tallinn University.
Sofia Joons, Estonian Institute of Humanities, Tallinn University.

74. (that is, according to a legend of more recent origin)

as a Swedish provincial centre, and from 1710 as the administrative centre of the Russian Province of Estonia. In 1918-1940, Estonia was an independent republic, and Tallinn its capital. With Estonia's incorporation into the Soviet Union as a Soviet Socialist Republic in 1940, the city became the administrative centre of that unit. Since 1991, Estonia is once again independent, and Tallinn is at once the capital, the country's largest city and its economic centre.

With its approximately 400,000 inhabitants, Tallinn might not count as a 'Metropolis' in the eyes of most spectators. However, its key position in Estonia is beyond doubt: not only does it host more than a fourth (with envioning municipalities, a third) of the country's population of 1,370,000; the average wages and the percentage of employed population are higher than in other parts of the country.⁷⁵ Its economic development has been characterised by a rapid change of the employment structure. While the share of employees within industry was 46.7% in 1990, it had gone down to 25.5% by 2002. At the same time, the share of the service sector grew from 51.5% to 74.0%. In 1999-2002, the highest growth occurred in real estate and business services (+22.8%), health and social care (+38.2%), trade (+4.6%), hotels and restaurants (+10.9%), education (+10.6%) and finances (+14.2%). On the other hand, the number of employees has diminished rapidly in such sectors as energy, gas and water supply (-59.2%) as well as transport, storage and communications (-10.9%). The rapid change has caused structural unemployment; the unemployment rate has during recent years been between 9% and 12% (*Tallinna arengukava...* 2004). In 2002, the capital received 68% of all foreign direct investment in Estonia. In 2003, the city was visited by 2,69 million foreign tourists (*ibid.*).

Table 21. Registered population on 1 February, 2003 and 2004, by city district

year	district								total
	Haabersti	Central Tallin	Kristiine	Lasnamäe	Mustamäe	Nõmme	Pirita	Northern Tallin	
2003	35,748	42,493	28,797	109,829	63,329	36,216	9,516	53,978	379,906
2004	37,297	44,364	29,494	112,751	65,107	37,969	10,481	56,247	393,709

Source: population register

75. In 2004, the average monthly gross wage in Tallinn was 8,850 Estonian crowns (567 euro); average for the whole country was 7,287 crowns (467 euro). (Source: the Estonian Statistical Office).

Administratively, the city is divided between eight city districts (*linnaosad*), each with its own administration and advisory committees nominated by the City Council. Their location can be seen on the map on page XX, and their population is shown in Table 21.

1.2 The ethnic composition

The city is also given a metropolitan character by the presence of several ethnic groups and distinct subcultures. As can be understood from the historical events referred to above, its population has never been ethnically homogenous. Until the late nineteenth century, the majority of the city's inhabitants consisted of Baltic Germans. After the building of a railway to Tallinn in 1870 the city gained in economic importance and grew rapidly, which eventually gave majority status to ethnic Estonians. Along with other, smaller ethnic groups, the city also hosted a Russian community which was not, however, very numerous before 1940. Estonia's incorporation into the Soviet Union and the subsequent Second World War brought about a rapid change in the city's ethnic composition. During the period of large-scale industrialization that took place during the 1960s and 1970s, significant numbers of Russians and other ethnic groups from different parts of the Soviet Union were settled in Estonia. During 1945-89, the ethnic Estonians' share of the country's total population dropped from 94% to 61%; this was caused primarily by the deliberate Soviet policy promoting the immigration of urban industrial workers from Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia, as well as by wartime emigration and Stalin's mass deportations and executions. The share of immigrant workers became largest in the country's North Eastern region, where large industrial plants were situated. Also in the capital, the number of non-ethnic Estonians approached one half of the population; in addition to industrial workers, they included military and administrative personnel. The minorities continue to be concentrated in these geographic areas.

The 1992 *Law on Citizenship* had as its starting point the continuity of the present Estonian republic with the state that was occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940. For that reason, citizenship has been granted automatically only to persons who were themselves citizens before 1940 or who are descendants of Estonian citizens. Those Soviet immigrants and their descendants who have not naturalised themselves are either citizens of other countries (6.3% of the country's population are citizens of Russia, 0.7% of other countries) or stateless (12.4%).⁷⁶ It should be pointed out that a majority of the stateless persons are, in fact, born in Estonia (see also Lagerspetz 2005). Most of non-citizens are holders of permanent residence permits,⁷⁷ which in most spheres of social life guarantee them rights that are similar to those enjoyed by Estonian citizens, with the exception of political rights. Non-citizens have no right to vote or to run as candidates in national elections, while they can vote in local elections if they have lived in the

76. In official usage, the term "stateless" is avoided, and reference is rather made to "persons with undetermined citizenship".

79. In 2005, the total number of resident Estonian citizens was 1,153,972, while 244,254 more people were not Estonian citizens and had either a temporary (41,067) or permanent (203,187) residence permit (*Postimees*, 31 May 2005: 6).

municipality for a period of at least five years. According to the *Housing and Population Census* of 2000, the largest groups of foreign citizens resident in Tallinn originate from the former Soviet Republics: Russian (34,971), Ukrainian (1,696), Byelorussian (949), Latvian (623) and Lithuanian (586) citizens. The number of stateless persons was 72,155, or 18.0% of the city's population 74.2% were citizens of Estonia.

During the 1990s and 2000s, there has been some immigration from countries outside the former Soviet Union. In the 2000 census, people with Finnish citizenship numbered 926 in the whole of Estonia, and they were the largest group of foreign citizens from outside the former Soviet Union.⁷⁸ The other groups are much smaller, those of German, U.S. and Swedish citizens being the largest (respectively 147,145 and 137 persons). The number of non-Soviet immigrants is largest in the capital and its neighbouring region; the university town Tartu also hosts a number of foreign students, among which Finnish citizens form the largest group. In Tallinn, the number of people with Finnish citizenship was 334, while there were 70 Swedish, 45 Polish, 45 U.S., 36 German, 33 U.K. and 32 Indian citizens. The total of all immigrants from outside the former Soviet Union with citizenship of an Asian country was 82, while 71 persons originated from the Americas and seven people were citizens of an African country. Three people came from Australia and one from New Zealand. Apart from students, the immigrants often arrive for work in foreign-owned companies; besides geographical proximity, this is one explanation of the relatively large number of Finnish citizens living in Estonia. By June, 2005, in all Estonia, only four people had been granted refugee status (*Postimees*, 16 June 2005: 6).

As a result of these developments, ethnic Russians (including both Estonian citizens and non-citizens) now constitute around 26% of the country's population. It should be borne in mind however, that the two next largest groups, Ukrainians and Byelorussians (with the respective shares of 2 and 1% of the population; see Table 22 below), are culturally close to Russians, and that the first language for many of them is Russian and not their 'national' language (*Minority Protection...* 2002: 228). The same applies to many members of other minorities also; in Estonian statistics, 'ethnicity/nationality' (*rahvus*) refers to self-reported ethnic belonging and is independent of both citizenship and mother tongue. The number of Russophones (sometimes also referred to as 'Slavs' – e.g., Kaplan 1993) is thus bigger than the number of people classed statistically as Russians. On the other hand, the Estonian language belongs to the Finno-Ugrian family of languages (along with Finnish and Hungarian), and is usually considered difficult to learn by adult speakers of Slavonic and other Indo-European languages.

78. According to information from the Population Register (Eesti Päevaleht, 4 December 2005), the number of registered residents with citizenship of another EU member country, Norway, Iceland or Switzerland was 6929 (November 1, 2005). Among them were 2204 Finns, 1545 Latvians, 1243 Lithuanians, 500 Germans, 334 Swedes, 196 Britons, 143 Italians and 130 Poles. In addition, a number of Finnish citizens (e.g., retired people) are known to live at least part of the year in Estonia unregistered (Eesti Päevaleht, 7 December 2005).

Estonian is the country's only official language. However, the state has in practice continued to function on some level of Estonian-Russian bi-lingualism (see Lagerspetz & Joons 2004: 13). In such towns and municipalities where the majority's mother tongue is Russian, the inhabitants have the right to receive answers from local authorities either in Russian or Estonian (this is the case in several towns in North-Eastern Estonia, but not in Tallinn). In other municipalities, civil servants have no obligation to serve citizens in other languages than Estonian, but usually do so when a practical need arises.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, there is a downward trend of both the total number of population and the share of minorities. This is related, firstly, to the age structure and a diminution of the birth rate and, secondly, to large-scale emigration. From 1990 to 1993, almost 80,000 people left Estonia, mostly for Russia and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). After that, the general population decline due both to emigration and to a low birth-rate; the unfavourable age structure has not changed the proportions of different ethnic groups.

Table 22. Ethnic composition of the population in Estonia, 1934-2000

Ethnicity	1934		1989		2000	
	thou.	%	thou.	%	thou.	%
Estonians	993	88	963	61	930	68
Russians	93	8	475	30	351	26
Germans	16	2	3	0.2	2	0.1
Swedes	8	0.7	0.3	0.02	-	-
Jews	4	0.4	5	0.3	2	0.1
Finns	-	-	17	1	12	1
Ukrainians	-	-	48	3	29	2
Byelorussians	-	-	28	2	17	1
Others	13	1	30	2	27	2
Total	1,126	100	1,566	100	1,370	100

All numbers are from population censuses.
Sources: Lauristin & al. 1997; Statistical Office

According to information from the Housing Register, the current population of Tallinn is 396,375 people, a slight majority of which are ethnic Estonians (see Table 23 below). The population has somewhat decreased during 2000-2004, but the proportional shares of different ethnic groups have remained largely unchanged. According to the Housing and Population Census of 2000, around 99,000 people (24.7% of Tallinn's population) were born outside Estonia, most of them (70,000) in Russia.

Table 23. Ethnic composition of the population of Tallinn in 2000 and 2004

Ethnicity	2000		2004	
	number	%	number	%
Estonians	217,248	54	215,248	54
Russians	147,783	37	143,634	36
Ukrainians	14,849	4	14,490	4
Byelorussians	8,045	2	7,766	2
Finns	2,469	0.6	2,355	0.6
Jews	1,628	0.4	1,497	0.4
Tatars	1,276	0.3	1,243	0.3
Lithuanians	959	0.2	954	0.2
Poles	944	0.2	932	0.2
Latvians	835	0.2	817	0.2
Germans	519	0.1	532	0.1
Others	4,226	1	4,192	1
Total	400,781	100	396,375	99

Source: Statistical Office

The Housing and Population Census of 2000 also included questions about mother tongue and religion, and allows a comparison between different city districts. It should be noted that the reported mother tongue does not always correspond to the reported ethnicity; for this reason, the number of Russian speakers is in fact larger than the number of those reported as ethnic Russians. Despite the large number of different ethnicities reported, the general picture is rather that of a population linguistically divided into two groups – Estonian-speakers and Russian-speakers.

Table 24. Population by mother tongue and city district, %

mother tongue	district								total
	Haabersti	Central Tallinn	Kristiine	Lasnamäe	Mustamäe	Nõmme	Pirita	Northern Tallinn	
Estonians	50.4	67.3	66.1	32.6	58.7	81.6	88.8	41.9	52.5
Russians	45.1	28.6	29.8	62.1	37.7	16.0	9.1	53.1	43.3
Ukrainian	1.5	0.8	1.2	2.0	1.2	0.7	0.4	1.8	1.4
Byelorussians	0.7	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.9	0.6
Finnish	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.3
Latvian	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Others	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.2	0.8	0.6	0.7	1.0	0.9
Unknown	1.1	1.6	1.1	1.1	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.9	1.0
Total	100.1	100.2	99.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.1	99.9	100.1
	(37,394)	(45,009)	(30,407)	(115,343)	(67,842)	(37,203)	(9,962)	(56,809)	(400,378)

Source: Housing and Population Census 2000

A comparison between the eight city districts reveals distinct differences. Whereas Estonian-speakers are in a slight majority in the city as a whole, there are districts where they are in a minority. This is true above all of the district of *Lasnamäe*, which is also the largest district, home for nearly 30% of the city's inhabitants. The district is a suburb consisting mainly of apartment houses of 5 to 9 storeys in height, built mainly during the late 1970s and 1980s. This was also a period of intensive immigration to Estonia from other Soviet Republics; in fact, no more than 56% of *Lasnamäe*'s inhabitants are Estonian citizens (*Lasnamäe arengukava* 2002). One can even say that the ethnic composition of a district generally corresponds to the period of its most intensive construction. The district of *Haabersti* hosts a large number of Russian-speakers, and also contains an area of high-rise apartment houses from the 1970s and 1980s; *Mustamäe* is a suburb created in the 1960s, when the immigration to Tallinn from other Soviet Republics had not yet reached the same scale as it had in the late 1970s. The district of *Northern Tallinn* consists of three rather different parts. The pre-war working class districts of *Kalamaja* and *Pelgulinn*, with typical wooden houses from 1920s and 1930s waiting for gentrification processes to gain momentum, and the northernmost district called *Kopli*, which during the Soviet period became a residential area for immigrant industrial workers and ship-builders. The ethnically almost homogeneously Estonian districts of *Nõmme* and *Pirita* are, in turn, garden suburbs mainly dating from the early twentieth century. *Central Tallinn* is the city centre and *Kristiine* its westward continuation.

The districts with highest percentage of ethnic minorities are also the ones showing highest unemployment figures. According to the census of 2000, the share of unemployed in the whole of Tallinn amounted to 11.7% of the economically active population of 207,925. At the same time, the corresponding figure was 15.9 for *Northern Tallinn*, 13.7 for *Lasnamäe*, 10.4 for *Haabersti*, 10.1 for *Mustamäe*, 9.5 for *Central Tallinn*, 9.4 for *Kristiine* and 9.3 for *Nõmme*. The lowest unemployment percentage (6.3) was that of Pirita, the ethnically most homogenous district. The correlation between ethnic composition and the unemployment rate is not surprising, as the labour market position of ethnic minorities clearly worsened during the 1990s (Asari 2002: 85).

Most respondents to the census did not report any religious affiliation; among the 338,560 residents of Tallinn aged 15 or more, no more than 111,400 (32.9%) did so. Although Lutheran Christendom has historically been the dominant religion in Estonia, the fifty-year period of Communist rule caused a break of this tradition. In Tallinn, the percentage of Lutherans was 34.5% of all believers (corresponding to 11.5% of the whole population, or 38,437 in absolute numbers). Their share of the believers in different city districts varies from 73.1% in *Pirita* to 17.8% in *Lasnamäe*; in other words, differences between districts are related to the share of Estonian speakers in the population. It would seem that members of minority groups have reported their religious affiliation more often than ethnic Estonians; this is probably an indicator of the relative importance of religion as a component of ethnic minority identity. The largest religious group are the Orthodox, whose share was 55.7% (62,055 people). Other major groups include Roman Catholics (2.3%/2,538), Baptists (1.5%/1,626), Jehovah's Witnesses (1.1%/1,301) and Muslims (0.7%/725).

1.3 The culturescape

Framework of cultural institutions and policies

The *Law on Local Self-Governance* gives Estonia's 42 towns and 205 municipalities responsibility for the educational and cultural needs of their inhabitants. The municipal authorities are responsible for providing their populations with services, including general education and cultural services. For this purpose, the local governments maintain different cultural institutions, which are administered by Cultural Departments (in Tallinn: the *Cultural Heritage Department*). In addition, they give project-based support to civic cultural organizations and private cultural establishments of a non-profit nature. They are, however, essentially dependent on support from the state budget, from which their main resource requirements are received as subsidies. The central government finances

municipal schools according to the number of registered inhabitants within the age of obligatory education. Similarly, the responsibility for maintaining public libraries lies with municipal governments, who receive financing from the state for purchases of books etc., for Internet connection, and for costs related to government-initiated programmes. However, the ability of municipalities to offer cultural services of other kinds is more varying and dependent on their overall economic situation. The limited financial resources of most towns and municipalities do not leave them much freedom in designing their own cultural policies. Here, larger and more affluent municipalities such as Tallinn are in a better position than others.

There are 15 counties (*maakonnad*), which are representatives of the state in different regions. Their primary function is to control the work of the local self-governments. The 15 county museums are administered by the county governments. On the state level, decision-making in cultural policy has remained relatively centralised within the Ministry of Culture. Parliament has not played an active role here; on the other hand, the local governments' share has grown to over 38.5% of the total public expenditure on culture (Lagerspetz & Rummo-Laes 2004). For 2004, the local government of Tallinn budgeted 194.0 million Estonian crowns (124,000 euro) for cultural expenses, which corresponded to 4.1% of the total municipal budget. In both absolute and proportional terms, the sum was smaller than that spent in 2003 (217.0 million, or 4.9% of all expenses) (*Tallinn arvudes...* 2004: 170-172). At the same year, a total of 184 cultural establishments located in Tallinn were listed by the Cultural Heritage Department (see: Table 25 below). Among them, the Department administers 34 establishments, while the others are either state-owned, private, or governed by other branches of the city administration. In addition, the Department has established a commission that distributes grants for cultural projects proposed by non-profit organizations (see section Public support for minority organizations below).

Table 25. Cultural establishments

Type of establishment	number
Museums	31
Theatres	11
Cinemas	5
Galleries and exhibitions halls	40
Libraries	30
Concert halls	15
Culture centres, community centres	16
Day centres for the elderly people	10
Youth centres	20
Open Youth centres	4
Zoo	1
Botanical garden	1

Source: Tallinn arvudes ... 2004: 131

Whereas there are culture centres, youth centres and libraries located in all city districts, the other types of cultural establishments have a tendency of being centred in the district of Central Tallinn (see Table 26 below). The development plans of other city districts stress the need to develop the possibilities offered for recreational and cultural activities.

Table 26. Cultural establishments by type and city district, October 2005

Type of establishment ⁷⁹	Central Tallinn	Haabersti	Kristiine	Lasnamäe	Mustamäe	Northern Tallinn	Nõmme	Pirita
Theatres ⁸⁰	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Culture youth and community centres ⁸¹	10	2	2	4	2	2	4	4
Museums ⁸²	36	2	-	-	-	1	2	2
Cinemas ⁸³	4	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Libraries ⁸⁴	17	1	2	3	4	6	3	4

79. The total numbers of different types of institutions are slightly different in Tables 25 and 26 This is partly due to changes between 2004 and 2005, but mostly to differences in classification criteria.

80. Members of the Estonian Theatre Union situated in Tallinn.

81. www.tallinn.ee, visited 20 October, 2005.

82. www.tallinn.ee, visited 20 October, 2005.

83. www.1182.ee, visited 20 October, 2005.

84. www.eniro.ee visited 20 October, 2005.

Estonian is the most visible language in which the public is served. During recent years, English has more or less completely replaced Russian as the second language in museums, galleries, and in state or municipally owned concert halls. Cinemas continue to use Estonian and Russian bilingual subtitles in films of foreign origin. The state-owned Russian Drama Theatre located in the city centre has its performances in Russian. Among theatres, the National Opera and Concert Hall *Estonia* has the largest number of foreign visitors, among which Finnish tourists form the largest group.

The former House of the Soviet Marine Officers, located in the centre of the city, was turned into a municipally financed Russian cultural centre in 2001. Along with the Russian Drama Theatre, it is the most important centre of Russophone cultural activities in the city. At present, the centre hosts around thirty different cultural amateur groups, a Russian-speaking People's University, and three societies of minority culture (see Debate 2 below in section Cultural policies and actions).

(http://www.venekeskus.ee/o_centre_ee.htm; visited 6 July, 2005).

Participation in cultural life

After Estonia regained its political independence in 1991, there was a rapid decline in participation statistics. On the one hand, culture had during the Soviet regime served a compensatory function which it now lost: with the introduction of democracy and market economy, culture was needed neither as a substitute for public discussion nor as compensating the lack of other consumer options (Lagerspetz & Raud 1995). On the other hand, Estonia was relatively hardly hit by the post-Communist economic crisis of the early 1990s, and people's purchasing power did not start to grow again before mid-1990s. From around 1996, one can discern a slow recovery of most indicators of participation in cultural life.

A comparative analysis of the existing recent survey data has been done by Tiiu-Liisa Rummo-Laes (2004). She has used the results from two nation-wide surveys from 2003, the *Eurostat* time budget survey from 1999-2000, and the regular household consumption surveys to distinguish between culturally more and less active population groups. In general, the different sets of data show similar tendencies. Participation in cultural activities tends to correlate with gender, level of education, income, ethnicity and place of residence. Women are more active than men, native Estonians more active than people belonging to ethnic minorities, and residents of Tallinn more active than people from small towns and the countryside (see Table 27 below). In terms of ethnicity, the surveys divide the respondents into two groups – Estonian speakers and Russian speakers (sometimes termed 'Non-Estonians'). Most of the ethnic minorities belong to the latter group. Analysis of the consumption of cultural goods and services shows a


dramatic difference between households of native Estonians and of ethnic minorities (see chart 1); as the average income of people belonging to minorities is lower than that of native Estonians, the differences in absolute volume are even greater than the differences between percentages of total household expenses used for cultural consumption. However, Russian speakers spend more than average time reading, watching the TV and video films, and listening to music at home (Rummo-Laes 2004: 85).

Table 27. Visiting cultural institutions, in percentages of respondents

Cultural institution	Frequency of visiting	All respondents	Russian speakers	Respondents in Tallinn
Cinemas	Often/regularly	7	4	10
	Sometimes	19	13	23
Theatres	Often/regularly	4	3	8
	Sometimes	29	17	31
Exhibitions	Often/regularly	4	4	7
	Sometimes	24	17	27
Libraries	Often/regularly	23	22	22
	Sometimes	25	22	23
Concerts	Often/regularly	6	6	9
	Sometimes	42	35	43

Source: Rummo-Laes 2004: 120; based on information from Faktum Ltd., survey project Meema 2002/2003

Chart 1. Household expenditure on culture as percentages of total expenditure according to the ethnicity of the head of household




Source: Rummo-Laes 2004: 49; based on information from Estonian Statistical Office, household consumption surveys

Schools

According to the *Basic Schools and Upper Secondary Schools Act* (1993), any language may be used as the language of instruction in basic schools. The local government council makes the decision on the language. There has been a long-standing controversy over the future of secondary school tuition in Russian, and several previous decisions of changing them into Estonian-language schools have been postponed. The amendment of 2000 to the Act still states that the language of instruction in the upper secondary school stage shall be Estonian and that the decision will be implemented from the academic year 2007/2008. However, the same amendment defines 'the language of instruction' as the language in which at least 60% of the teaching of the curriculum is given. This would allow schools to continue teaching some subjects in Russian. Whether the decision will be implemented within the given time frame or be postponed again, remains to be seen (cf. section The current debate below). The right to establish private schools with any language of tuition is guaranteed. The government has, however, no obligation to support them financially.

The Department of Education of the Tallinn city government lists in all 91 primary and secondary schools. In 53 of them, the language of instruction is Estonian, in 32 it is Russian. Among the remaining six schools, three have both Estonian and Russian classes, one is an international school with tuition in English, one uses the sign language, and one has not given account of its language of tuition. Chart 2 shows the distribution of schools of different languages of tuition in different city districts.

Chart 2. The distribution of schools by district and language of tuition , frequencies



Source: City of Tallinn, Department of Education (www.haridus.ee, visited 6 July 2005)

The numbers include both municipal and privately owned schools; of the 14 private schools, six used Estonian, six Russian, one both languages, and one English as its language of instruction. In addition to the 91 schools listed by municipal authorities there is one privately owned school, the Finnish primary school (with an internet-based secondary school) located in Central Tallinn. The Finnish school is mainly financed by the Finnish government and follows the curricula of the Finnish educational system.

1.4 Preliminary conclusions

Despite older international traditions of other kinds, the present multicultural character of Tallinn is mainly due to immigration from other parts of the Soviet Union during the

fifty years of Soviet rule. Around a fourth of the city's population was born outside Estonia; however, the total share of ethnic minorities is larger than that – around 46%. In short, the city hosts a large number of immigrants but also people sometimes depicted as 'immigrants of second (or third) generation'. In legal terms, a quarter of the population are classified as foreigners and hold a residence permit, even if many of them are in fact born in Estonia. One can say that having originally changed their place of residence within a federation, the Soviet-period settlers became defined legally as immigrants after Estonia's independence, and the following post-communist restructuring of the economy has weakened their labour market position. Immigration from other countries has remained minuscule; in 2000, the total number of foreign citizens from outside the former Soviet Union was no larger than 804 (but their number has certainly grown since then).

There are certain city districts and residential areas where the ethnic minorities form a majority of the population, such as *Lasnamäe* and the areas of *Kopli* in *Northern Tallinn*, and *Õismäe* in *Haabersti*; despite large population figures, these areas are rather poorly served by cultural institutions. On the average, members of ethnic minorities are less frequent visitors of cultural institutions than native Estonians, and their average expenditure on cultural goods and services is considerably lower.

The most visible public cultural institutions serving the minorities are the state-owned Russian Drama Theatre and the municipal Russian Cultural Centre. There are both Estonian and Russian schools in most city districts; other languages of instruction are English, Finnish and the sign language.

Despite the fact that the minorities consist of a large number of different ethnicities, mainly Estonian and Russian are used in public life. Other languages and cultural traditions are basically confined to the private sphere, and they can gain recognition and higher visibility only through the activities of non-profit organizations.

Case 1

Lindakivi Community Centre: Multicultural activities in Lasnamäe district

Lasnamäe district is large and new, and a majority of its population are Russian speakers. During the last two decades of Soviet rule, 650 panel houses were built in the district. In comparison to other city districts, the infrastructure and public spaces still need refinement. Although it hosts almost 30% of the city's population, there is only one cultural centre. In 1988, the cinema theatre *Lindakivi* was opened. Due to

low attendance figures, it was decided in 1994 that the building would be re-cycled as a cultural centre. After reconstruction works, the centre was opened to visitors in 1997. In 2000, a kindergarten located in the district was shut down and the city council handed the building over to the cultural centre, allowing it to expand. At present, new reconstruction works have started, and the centre is temporarily closed for visitors. According to the plans, the main building with its stages, studios and a café/restaurant will open again during 2006.

Organization

The present director of the centre has a background in building engineering and politics; he has not worked with cultural centres before taking over the Lindakivi cultural centre. This might explain why Lindakivi managed to reorganise its basic structures much faster than other cultural centres. Instead of employing a number of regular workers, the centre bases its activities on circles, courses and ensembles registered as NGOs. The cultural organizations have free access to the localities at Lindakivi centre, and are expected to give performances for its visitors. The NGOs are economically independent and will have to find means for their activities and for wages of their employees themselves.

Activities

The cultural groups active at Lindakivi centre include both Estonian and Russian traditional dancers and musicians, a Russian youth theatre, a puppet theatre, vocal groups, art studios, a music school, a traditional handicraft studio, dance groups, a pensioners' association and a chess club. The public and the participants are 'both Estonians and Russians', the expression referring to language of communication rather than to ethnic origin. Some of the amateur groups, such as art studios and dance ensembles, are bilingual, as the leaders are able to instruct the participants in two languages simultaneously.

Debates and tensions

In 1997, problems arose in the relations between the culture centre and the authorities of the city district. According to former employees at the centre, the Russian-minded authorities were unhappy with its new, Estonian-minded leadership, and were supporters of the Russophone political parties. In 1999, the district mayor suggested the centre's director to be fired. This led to a major crisis and at this point, Estonian and Russian-speaking newspapers started to evaluate the situation differently. The Russian papers suggested that the culture centre's director had abused his power, while the Estonian papers accused the district government for trying to use the culture centre for party

political purposes. The problems and tensions between the district government and the culture centre were not relieved before a new district mayor was appointed. On its home page, the centre mentions that its relations with the district government have improved a lot (www.lindakivi.ee, visited 7 July, 2005). The leadership sees the centre as a potential role model for other cultural establishments in ways of connecting citizens, NGOs and the local government.

2 Expressions of cultural diversity

2.1 The public, business and non-profit sectors: A comparison

The maintenance of the public (i.e. municipal and state) institutions such as schools, theatres, libraries and cultural centres described in the previous section is the most central part of cultural policy implementation by the state and local government. However, the city's ethnic heterogeneity is, in fact, much more reflected by the practices of private institutions, i.e. business and non-profit organizations. The public sphere in Tallinn and Estonia is by law monolingual and Estonian (information from the website of the *Language Inspection Authority*, www.keeleinsp.ee, visited 8 July 2005). However, if service and information in Estonian is guaranteed, the service sector has the right to use other languages also; thus, many spheres of city life (such as markets, banks, advertisement, medical service, etc.) are in practice bilingually Estonian and Russian. The city centre is sometimes even multilingual, as English and Finnish are often used in order to approach tourists.

We can distinguish between different types of multicultural services and activities. First, there are those concentrating on the possibilities offered by ethnic minority cultures as bearers of specific aesthetic traits, thus fostering artistic forms clearly distinguishable from those of the majority culture. On the other hand, the concept of 'ethnic culture' can also refer to the (traditional) way of living of an ethnic group, i.e. to their culture in a broader, 'anthropological' sense. Finally, the language and other specific ways of communication of a minority group may be seen merely as factors to be taken into account when an organization wants to address its potential clients or other target groups (see Table 28 below).

Table 28. Non-profit, business and public sectors as organisers of different types of multicultural services and activities

Ethnic cultures and languages as...			
The three sectors	art forms	ways of life	instruments of information
Non-profit organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Concerts Art exhibitions Theatre (Estonian and Russian) Audience-centred events 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Language schools and courses Political initiatives Community-centred events Religious activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Social campaigning International events and festival
Business organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Concerts Restaurants concentrating on special dishes, not on communities Courses and hobby circles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restaurants with bonds to ethnic communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Banks, insurance companies, etc. Telephone companies Shops and markets Medical services Private schools Private media
The City and the State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Museums Concerts Theatres 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Community centres Support to NGOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Schools Medical care Public services

Comparing, in turn, the multicultural services and activities offered by public, business and non-profit sectors, many distinct differences can be found. In the case of cultural events organised by business entrepreneurs, advertisement is directed to a wide audience interested in exotic art forms, rather than to members of a certain ethnic group. One might say that multicultural activities organised by the business sphere are more likely to be based on a rather narrow understanding of culture as certain forms of art and experience. Ethnic community organizations, on the other hand, work with a wider understanding of culture as history, language, traditions, memories, identities, etc. In contrast to business companies, ethnic-group organizations often address their activities to a narrow audience, often consisting of their own members only. Umbrella organizations, such as the *Estonian Union of National Minorities*, offer

their member organizations a base for intercultural meetings and political discussions. In several situations, however, the role of language and culture is reduced to that of communicating information with no substantial relation to minority cultures of any kind. In these cases, both the business and the non-profit sectors tend to opt for Estonian/Russian bilingual communication as the most effective alternative. In other words, even much of the non-profit activities become based on Estonian/Russian bilingualism, even if the ethnic cultural organizations use their own ethnic languages in their contact with members. When the ethnic organizations meet in action, for instance at events organised by the umbrella organizations of minority groups, the individual organizations will have to leave their own language behind and shift to Estonian and Russian. Even the City and the state have adopted a similar kind of unofficial practice of providing basic educational, administrative and social services in both Estonian and Russian, even if the public visibility of Russian language has been greatly reduced. The supply of 'high culture' through public institutions is based on a naturally occurring internationalism, with the Russian Drama Theatre as the main public cultural institution specially designed to serve the Russian speakers. The main channel of public involvement in the reproduction of ethnicities as ways of life and, indeed, in other minority cultures besides the Russian, is support to Community Centres and to the activities of NGOs. Recently, a Consultative Board for the Cultural Integration of Ethnic Minorities (*Rahvusvähemuste Kultuuriintegratsiooni Konsultatiivnõukogu*) was established at the Tallinn City Government, but in addition to one conference organised in September 2005 (see section The current debate) it has not yet shown much signs of activity.

Advertised multicultural events take place in connection with music festivals such as Jazzkaar (www.jazzkaar.ee) and Baltika (an annual folklore festival that circulates between the three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and is held in Tallinn and other places in Estonia every third year, with participants mainly from the Baltic countries, but also from others). There are also recurring multicultural conferences organised by ethnic umbrella organisations such as the *Information Centre of Finno-Ugric Peoples* (www.suri.ee) and the *Estonian Union of National Minorities* (<http://www.ngonet.ee/nationalminorities>). Multicultural events are usually organised by non-governmental organizations with financial support from the City and, at times, from the state. In general, there have been a few more or less stable forums for multicultural activities during the last 10 years, with a mixed and interested audience. When trying to reach out to a larger audience, the minority organizations often have to re-think their presentation of traditions and rituals. One example of this is the local Armenian radio, whose audience is larger than the Armenian community alone. To serve the mixed audience with news from and information about Armenia, Russian is used as the language of communication (see Case 2 in section Debate on immigration, minorities and cultural diversity below).

2.2 The media

Until 1991, Russian-speakers tended to prefer listening to radio programmes broadcast from Russia, even if the Estonian radio did send programmes in Russian a couple of hours daily. In order to counteract this tendency, a state radio station *Raadio 4* was founded in 1993. It broadcasts 24 hours a day all over Estonia (Jakobson 2004: 221). The radio station is mainly Russian-speaking, but there are Ukrainian, Byelorussians, Armenian, Jewish, Swedish, German and Finnish programmes as well (information from the Estonian Radio, www.er.ee/r4, visited 7 July, 2005).

In 1994, Raadio 4 has received funding from the project 'Multicultural Estonia' of the *Non-Estonians' Integration Foundation* for children's programming and for the production and broadcasting of programmes in Byelorussians and Ukrainian. The radio also receives funding in order to produce Jewish programming in the three minority languages that are used by the Jewish community in Estonia – Yiddish, Hebrew and Russian. According to a note on the integration foundation's homepage, the project was well received by the audience, and new programmes will probably be produced in 2005. During the past year, the Integration Foundation funded also several Russian and bilingual TV programmes concentrating on integration matters.

(<http://www.meis.ee/est/uhiskpadevus/tvrsaated>, visited 7 July, 2005).

There is no public Russian TV-station in Estonia. In 2001, Baltic versions of Russian TV-channels started to be transmitted in Estonia and in 2003, there were three private Russian cable-TV channels broadcasting in Estonia, of which two were visible in Tallinn and one in Narva (Jakobson 2004: 221). All cable-TV companies in Estonia offer packages with Russian, Scandinavian and international (BBC, CNN, Euronews etc.) channels; some of the companies even offer Ukrainian channels.

At present, there are two Russian-speaking Estonian dailies with nation-wide circulation. In general, the circulation of newspapers decreased dramatically during the 1990s. While the Estonian papers managed to stabilise their circulation in 1995, the Russian print-runs continued to fall until 1999. According to results of survey research, Russian-speakers are much less frequent readers of daily newspapers than ethnic Estonians. At the same time, their daily TV viewing time is clearly higher than that of the Estonian-speakers (Vihalemm & al. 2004: 134 f.).

2.3 Non-governmental organizations

An overview

According to the law, everybody has the right to participate in the activities of trade unions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), irrespective of his or her citizenship. Trade union membership is, in fact, more common among ethnic and immigrant minorities. However, both population surveys and surveys of registered NGOs indicate that Russian speakers are less frequently members of other kinds of NGOs than ethnic Estonians. There seem, however, to exist great differences between minorities with reference to their degree of organization.

The first organizations with the aim of strengthening ethnic identities and belonging were founded or re-established in the late 1980s. In the Soviet Union, there were no or few possibilities for the activity of ethnic-cultural movements. During the revolutionary period of 1987-1991, some of the most fundamental changes were concerned with identities. It suddenly became important to be local, to belong to an ethnos, to speak a native language, to be in possession of a local and ethnic history. Some of the minorities, such as the Estonian-Swedes and the Jews re-established their historical organizations. There were also other ethnic groups which had no pre-war organizational traditions in Estonia to lean upon, but which nevertheless mobilised their members according to the same model. It should also be pointed out, that such mainly Estonian-speaking mass movements of the late 1980s as the *Movement of Estonian Citizens' Committees*, and especially the *Popular Front*, had a positive attitude towards the cultural activities of national minorities; their growing national awareness was understood as a counterweight to the Soviet official ideology of Communist patriotism (Lagerspetz & Joons 2004).

Many of the organizations dealing with minority cultures now are members of an umbrella organization, the *Estonian Union of National Minorities*. For the largest minority in Estonia, Russians, the *Union of Slavic Educational and Charitable Societies in Estonia* is the dominant cultural organization, uniting more than 20 organizations under its umbrella, and conducting a regular series of cultural events and activities. In addition to the Union, a number of other organizations also represent the educational and cultural interests of ethnic Russians, including the *Russian Cultural Union*, and the *Union of Teachers of Russian Schools*.

Public support for minority organizations

In Estonia, most non-governmental organizations have limited resources; typically, the most important source of funding is membership fees. However, the role of local governments in financing cultural, recreational and social services offered by NGOs has grown rapidly during recent years (Rikmann & al. 2005). Local governments, the Ministry of Culture and the government-funded *Integration Foundation* have given financial support to minority organizations among others. On the national level, a body called the *President of the Republic's Roundtable of National Minorities* acts as a link between some of the best-established organizations and the government. Public funding is normally given in the form of project grants, on the basis of applications and descriptions of projects, even if representatives of the minority organizations have repeatedly challenged the efficacy of funding on such a basis. However, sometimes the funding actually received remains invisible in statistics or financial reports. This is the case, for example, when a local government provides rent-free premises for courses or other activities.

In Tallinn, the financial support to minority organizations is a part of the more general framework of supporting amateur cultural activities through grants distributed by a commission acting under the auspices of the Department of Cultural Heritage. According to the Development Plan of the City Council (*Tallinna arengukava ... 2004*), "80% of amateur cultural activities in Tallinn take place within non-profit associations". The total of grants distributed for all NGOs (including both Estonian and minority organizations) amounted to 8.9 million crowns (570,500 euro) in 2003. The sum has grown since then.

During the first six months of 2005, the commission distributed a total of 7,343,250 crowns (470,700 euro) as grants to cultural projects of non-profit organizations. Around a third, or 2,373,100 crowns (152,100 euro) was received by organizations of minority cultures on the basis of 92 different applications. The largest grant, 1,000,000 crowns, was given to a non-profit organization that runs a Russian Museum located in Kadrioru district of Central Tallinn. Other large grants were received by the organisers of a Slavonic Song Festival (*Slaavi Pärg*) and by the umbrella organizations *Lüüra and Eestimaa Rahvuste Ühendus* (Estonian Union of National Minorities), which both coordinate activities of smaller organizations representing several different minority cultures. Apart from these and a few other exceptions, typical grants were much smaller. The median of money granted for a minority cultural organization on the basis of one application was 5,000 crowns (321 euro); in the case of unspecified grants, these were often meant to cover the

organizations' general expenses for a period of six months (based on information from the Department of Cultural Heritage, Tallinn City Government, available on: www.tallinn.ee/est/ametid/kultuurivaartuste_amet/mittetulundustegevuse_toetus, accessed 3 July, 2005).

Apart from the grant support, an important means by which the city has supported minority organizations has been by offering space for their activities in the Russian Cultural Centre or in other cultural and community centres (see Case 1 above and Debate 2 in section Cultural policies and actions). The building of the Russian Cultural Centre is in need of renovation, and the city government has spent a total of 21.5 million crowns (1,380,000 euro) for the reconstruction works during the years 2002-2004; however, the estimated total cost will be no less than 60 million (3.8 million euro) (*Tallinna arengukava... 2004*).

2.4 Dilemmas of institutionalization

All in all, there seems to exist a rather clear division of tasks between the public, business, and the non-profit sectors with respect to the organization of multicultural services and activities. From the point of view of assessing the degree of institutionalization of ethnic minority cultures in Tallinn, one could say that there exists a clear system of policies and statuses. While Estonian is the only official language of administration, the status of the Russian language is in practice recognised both by the city administration (with regard to, e.g., education and other services), the business and media. Other minority languages and cultures are much less visible; they are expected to be represented by non-governmental organizations. Although the public sector is bound by a legal and political commitment to the objective of securing the leading position of Estonian language and Estonian culture in society, the city government however allows, and to some extent even furthers, cultural initiatives by these organizations; their activities in municipal cultural centres and outside them have become a recognised part of the city's cultural political strategy vis-à-vis ethnic minorities.

For both NGOs and private entrepreneurs, taking part in multicultural settings includes what can also be called efforts of cultural 'brand' naming. This means that there appears a need to manifest difference, while still remaining comparable with other cultural elements (Lundberg & al. 2003: 27). A good example of the balancing act between originality/visibility and existing norms is the typical ethnic organization (see Case 2). A precondition for receiving funds from the city government is that the

organization fits into a pre-given format – that the minority activists have founded a non-profit organization in accordance with the legally correct forms. Still, the main goal of the ethnic organizations is to produce and preserve cultural differences. For some ethnic groups this task is harder than for others. For instance, Byelorussians and Ukrainians might find it hard to protect their language against the dominating Russian language, as the three languages are mutually intelligible, and as they together can be categorised as Slavonic ethnic groups. Borders between different ethnic cultures can be difficult to draw, when the differences understood and recognised are relatively small. On the other hand, cultural brand naming may turn out to be difficult also for the more clearly distinguishable ethnic communities, if they are quantitatively small. Even when they manage to convince their own members of the existence of a clear-cut ethnic identity, it may turn out to be hard to spread this message outside their organization or ethnic community.

In a previous study on migrants, minorities, belonging and citizenship (Lagerspetz & Joons 2004), we analysed the activities of ethnic minority organizations as a way of constructing and reconstructing cultural and personal identities. In terms of reported ethnicity, the minorities consist of around 140 different groups; however, most members of other minorities have adopted Russian (or, in the case of most Finns, Swedes and some Jews, Estonian) as their everyday language of communication. For this reason, one of the usual activities of minority organizations is the teaching of the group's 'mother tongue' for members and their children. The ethnic cultural organizations can be seen as participating in a more general process of 'minority building', which corresponds to the expectations of the government and international organizations as well. On the one hand, the formally established minority organizations offer a potential channel of (unofficial, indirect and maybe spurious) participation in decision making on cultural issues; they do have a real impact in making the city culturally more diverse and the inhabitants more aware of its ethnic heterogeneity. On the other hand, the activities of ethnic organizations address the minorities' concerns related to language, religion and culture alone, but not those resulting from their social and economic position, which is more vulnerable than that of the majority population. Of course, the same kind of criticism can be directed towards many other examples of multiculturalist practices as well (e.g., Ålund & Schierup 1991).

Case 2

Institutions put into praxis: Armenians and Byelorussians – ethnic minority networking in Tallinn

Although the presence of individual Byelorussians and Armenians was registered in Estonia already at the end of the 19th century, almost all present members of both ethnic groups arrived to Estonia during the period of Soviet rule. Neither of the two cultures is particularly visible in Tallinn – a fact willingly recognized by activists of the minority organizations themselves. There is one Byelorussian and a few Armenian restaurants in Tallinn, but little more than that. Both minorities have created non-governmental organizations, the offices of which even function as meeting points both for their ethnic groups and for other persons interested in their culture and their countries of origin. Both offices are centrally located – Armenians are housed in the Old Town, while Byelorussians recently moved from a dark basement room outside the city centre to the Marine Officers' House (see Debate 2 in section 3.2). As a second cultural centre, the Armenians have their church, the *Estonian St. Gregory's Congregation of the Armenian Apostolic Church*, the building of which is located in the midst of the city's business centre and was handed over to the Congregation in 2000.

Since early 1990s, both ethnic groups have a regular broadcast time in the state radio. The Byelorussian programme is broadcasted in Byelorussian, while the Armenian programme mainly uses the Russian language. The two minorities differ greatly in size: there are far fewer Armenians in Estonia than there are Byelorussians. The Armenian radio programme therefore has a somewhat different task, as they do not function as an ethnic mobilisator only, but also aim at informing the general public on Armenia and the Armenians. The broadcasts are, however, structured in a similar way. They include news both from the minorities' countries of origin and from Estonia, along with interviews of prominent Armenians or Byelorussians in Tallinn, Estonia or elsewhere, and information about their national histories and culture. The Byelorussian programme is broadcast three times a week for 45 minutes; the Armenian used to be broadcast once a week, but the editors have now cut the frequency to once or twice a month. The programmes are also accessible worldwide via internet.

The main goal of the cultural associations is to bring together the members of their ethnic groups. The everyday life of the culture organisations bears witness to the fact that both groups are essentially new minorities in Estonia: there are different programmes for different generations. For the first generation of immigrants, the associations offer the possibility to meet with other persons of the same origin, to share memories in order to

preserve a common culture and tradition. For this reason, they organise traditional parties and celebrations. For the next generations, it becomes important to receive tuition in the ethnic mother tongues, which the Estonian and Russian schools do not offer. Both the Armenians and Byelorussians make efforts at running a Sunday School for children and youth. In addition to the weekly school and church activities, the remaining occasions organised by cultural associations take place rather 'yearly' or 'monthly' than 'weekly'. The Armenians also use the Armenian restaurants as meeting points, and the owners sometimes lend the room for reduced prices. The Byelorussians do not mention this kind of cooperation, which might be explained by the fact that there is only one Byelorussian restaurant in Tallinn, meaning that there is less competition. Both culture associations are members of the Estonian Association for National Minorities and participate in the President of the Republic's Roundtable for National Minorities. Neither the Byelorussians nor the Armenians publish any newspapers or magazines, but concentrate rather on internet homesites instead. Information and advertisements on cultural events are spread through the radio and networks within the organizations. This type of organisational networking can be categorised as hardworking, only weakly institutionalised, and almost invisible in the metropolitan context.

3. Debates and policies

3.1 Debate on immigration, minorities and cultural diversity

General characteristics of the public discourse⁸⁵

The issue of immigration became a hotly debated issue in Estonia during the revolutionary development of the late 1980s that eventually led to a restoration of Estonia's independence in 1991. At that time, immigration meant the inflow of work force and retired military officers from other parts of the USSR; it had already led to a major change in the population's ethnic composition (see Table 22 in section The ethnic composition of this report). Along with a growing linguistic Russification of public life, the independence activists interpreted immigration as a threat for the future existence of the Estonian nation. During 1988 to 1990, debate on both issues became central in the political life and media, which were gradually freeing themselves from censorship. The city district of *Lasnamäe*, in which many Soviet immigrants had settled, became a symbol of the awkward development; one of the well-known slogans of the revolutionary movement was, indeed, *'Put an End to Lasnamäe!'* (*Peatage Lasnamäe!*).

The discourse on immigrants and migration has so far been intertwined with the debate on such issues as the integration of minorities, citizenship policies and language

policies. The number of immigrants to Estonia from countries outside the former Soviet Union has until now remained almost insignificant. In fact, the need to develop a policy towards new immigrants has become apparent only very recently, partly due to Estonia's membership in the European Union. Accordingly, the discourse on migration related issues has primarily been concerned with the Soviet-time settlers to the country.

The development of debate

When analysing the debate both in media and in the political sphere, scholars tend to distinguish between different (sometimes, three) consecutive phases during the period of Estonia's new independence (e.g., several articles in Lauristin & Heidmets 2002; Jurado 2002; Pettai 2000). In general, the dynamics of discussion can be presented as a gradual shift from initial rejection and non-recognition of the Russian-speaking immigrants by the majority population towards acknowledging them as fellow members of Estonian society. No doubt, the first phase was a continuation of the debate initiated by Estonian pro-independence activists in 1988. During the second half of the 1990s, the discourse became growingly conscious of the need to adopt more active and less exclusionist policies. An official State Programme was launched in 2000 with the aim of integrating the immigrants/minorities into the new society now dominated by the Estonian language and ethnic Estonians. The programme was preceded by the adoption of a preparatory parliamentary document in 1998. These events denote another turning point in the policy and in the discourse as well. After initial and long-lasting separation between the Estonian-speaking and Russian-speaking communities, the government became more conscious in its efforts to promote their integration (within a society in which the Estonian culture occupies the most prominent place). The latest change in the discourse is very recent; from 2004, both the media and administrators have taken up the issue of Estonia's policy towards new immigration. This change is related to the country's changed international position as a member of the European Union (EU).

The discursive and policy changes have been attributed to different causes. The role of international organisations such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the EU and the Council of Europe (COE) has been mentioned frequently (for a thorough analysis, see Jurado 2002, also quoted in Lagerspetz & Joons 2004: 31-34). Estonian scholars tend to stress the importance of internal developments for policy change, such as the consolidation of the overall political framework, the lack of clear-cut differences of economic status between ethnic Estonians and Russian-speakers, processes of cultural modernisation and Westernisation, and social psychological factors (Heidmets & Lauristin 2002: 322-330).

85. The present and the two following sections ("The development of debate and The current debate" are partly based on a previous report on active civic participation of immigrants in Estonia, written as part of the research project POLITIS (Lagerspetz 2005).

The current debate

Estonia's EU accession has added some new migration-related issues to the current debate. On the one hand, increasing mobility of labour has given Estonian citizens a chance of migrating to other EU countries. This concerns both unskilled workers and highly skilled professionals such as doctors and nurses. The rather large-scale emigration of people from the latter category has been seen as a problem. On the other hand, Estonian migration policy has started to be discussed in the context of all-European migration policies. EU in general, but also Estonia in particular has an ageing population; in 1998, the fertility rate dropped to 1.21 and has now only crawled back to 1.38 (2002) (Vetik 2003: 78). Immigration has been mentioned as a possible means of supporting the sustainability of the pensions system, and also as a way of continuing to keep labour costs low. These claims have been answered by the demographic argument that the immigration of people of working age will just postpone the demographic crisis, not prevent it, and that the total costs of immigration to the host society are higher than the gains (Professor Kalev Katus interviewed in *Eesti Päevaleht*, 20 November, 2004). In general, there is no lively debate over migration-related issues, and popular attitudes towards immigration and immigrants seem to be disinterested and negative rather than positive.

At the same time, some issues related to the immigrant/minority population already present have remained unsolved and continue to be debated. The most crucial issue is the future of Russian-language secondary education. According to the official policy, Russian-language secondary schools should adopt Estonian as the language of instruction of at least 60% of the lessons. This change should be introduced in 2007. However, some politicians have doubted the practical possibility of realising the task within the planned period; moreover, the Prime Minister (until 2005) Juhan Parts announced in September 2004 his stance that Russian-language secondary education should remain available after all (*Eesti Päevaleht*, 16 September, 2004). Within minority organizations, the future of secondary education in Russian is debated actively; even for people with other than Russian ethnicity, the Russian language and culture may (sometimes, but not always) be experienced as closer than those of the Estonians. On 9 September 2005, the City Government of Tallinn contributed to the debate by organising a one-day conference on minority cultures and education. The discussion at the conference showed mercilessly how far the standpoints of Russian school administrators and the state officials in charge of integration policies still stand from each other (*Participant observation at the occasion*).

The introduction of the strict requirement in the public sphere and in service professions of knowing the Estonian language has fostered feelings of protest among ethnic minority activists – not unlike what many native Estonians felt about Russian language during the Soviet rule. The minority activists sometimes express their stance by saying that the integration process should be 'two-sided', implying that the Estonians should pay more attention to the Russian language and culture. It is not without interest that neighbouring Latvia has recently started the implementation of a school reform analogous to the Estonian one, to which Latvian Russian-speakers have reacted by a massive protest movement.

3.2 Cultural policies and actions

During the Soviet period, culture was as a field within which Estonians could express political opposition in covert forms, and through which Estonian national identity could be preserved. Both the high prestige enjoyed by culture, and its close relationship with the nation-building process are reflected by the Constitution adopted in 1992, which states that "*the preservation of the Estonian nation and culture through the ages*" is one of the central aims of the Republic. In general, both policies and debate started their development in a situation where the Estonians had just fought their way out of an authoritarian empire, within which they had every reason to feel worried about the survival of their culture and national identity. Much of the debate of the 1990s and even later can be understood as rooted in a continuation of such fears. At the same time, the Constitution also recognizes the right of national minorities to express their identity and develop their cultural traditions, and the central and local governments have allocated resources for the support of NGOs dealing with minority cultures. One could say that the expression of traditional forms of minority cultures (such as folk dance, music, traditional festivities) usually receives positive response both from the government and from publicity; meanwhile, demands concerning minority languages' position in public administration and education are more than controversial. There is also in Estonian-speaking public debate a pointed hostility against cultural expressions that somehow could be seen as legitimating the Soviet occupation of Estonia, or Russia's putative future imperialist ambitions. The state and the politicians have taken pains in stressing what they see as Estonia's belonging to the Western cultural sphere, and tend to react against phenomena that visibly demonstrate something else (see Debate 1 below).

The legislative measure most directly concerned with minority cultures is the *National Minorities Cultural Autonomy Act* (1993). The provisions of the Act give the national minorities the possibility to organise their cultural and educational life through representative bodies elected by registered members of the minority. These provisions, however, have never been applied and the necessary implementation legislation was, in

fact, not adopted before 2003 (*Riigi Teataja I*, 13 May 2003, 40, 25). The institutions designed by the Act have only been established for the first time by the Ingrian Finns in May 2004, who still have to go through some remaining formalities of registering (information from the Ministry of Culture, December 2004). Obviously, the whole procedure requires quite a large amount of organizational work – probably too large when one considers the abilities and organizational resources available – while the law gives no guarantee of enhanced financial support from the government. The Act has, hence, largely remained a dead-letter; minorities continue to organize their cultural life through voluntary associations and non-profit foundations, in accordance to the general legislation on non-profit organizations.

Debate 1

The Matryoshkas - Slavonic souvenirs symbolising Tallinn?

In late spring 2005, the souvenirs sold for tourists in Tallinn became an issue of public debate. Some newspapers presented the assortment of souvenirs available in the Old Town of Tallinn, coming to the conclusion that most of them represent Slavonic, not Estonian culture. The *Matryoshka* (colourful wooden Russian dolls of different sizes that can be put into each other) very soon became the symbol of the debate, although the discussion also concerned the sale of Slavonic-style painted eggs, ceramics and Lithuanian amber. The Estonian state has spent millions of crowns on the creation of a Western image, and in this context the fact that many Western tourists return from Estonia with Slavonic/Russian and not Estonian souvenirs can be seen as a problem.

The issue was taken up in the city council by Keit Pentus, a prominent politician of the opposition, who called for regulatory measures to be introduced by the city government.

Her proposal was answered in the media by economic argumentation: restriction of the sales of souvenirs would also be directed against the free market and enterprise as such. The problem is not only about the assortment of souvenirs, but also about the demand. If a tourist associates Estonia with Slavonic culture and wants to bring home a matryoshka, there is very little one in fact can do. Some voices express the idea of giving guides better training in influencing the tourists' demand. A voice from the public relations sector mentioned that there is almost nothing one could do about demand; on the other hand, what Estonians could do is to present something completely different and unique instead. The Estonian mythical hero Kalevipoeg has remained completely unexploited by

the souvenir industry and his picture could easily be printed on T-shirts. As there are far-reaching plans to erect a sculpture of Kalevipoeg in the midst of the Bay of Tallinn, he could become the new symbol of Tallinn.

Other debaters tried to find reasons why Russian souvenirs have become as dominant as they have. Conspiracy theories have also been hatched... According to tourist guides, shops selling Russian souvenirs have offered guides free coffee and a share of 10% of the sum tourists in her or his group spend in the shop. A well-known cultural worker based in the Old Town, Tiina Mägi, considers the prospects of prohibiting the sales of any kinds of souvenirs as unrealistic. In her opinion, there is nothing bad about Russian souvenirs as such. It is the poor quality that worries her...

In Tallinn, the official policy statement of the city council stresses the need to develop "the national minorities" manifold autonomous cultural activity (omakultuuriline tegevus) integrated with the Estonian cultural space" (Tallinna arengukava ... 2004). In order to reach this objective, the Development Plan adopted by the City Council in December, 2004 envisaged the establishment of a consultative board with the participation of representatives for national minorities (see section The public, business and non-profit sectors: A comparison). One of the tasks of the new body formed in 2005 is to review the principles according to which minorities' cultural activities receive financing from the city. Among the more concrete objectives is the renovation of the Russian Cultural Centre (see Debate 2 below), which has already been started and for which money has been allocated. In addition, the Department of Culture has presented the plan of building a new cultural centre, the House of National Minorities (ibid.).

Debate 2

The Russian Cultural Centre: Slavonic culture in the middle of the city

On one side of a well-maintained park, just outside Tallinn's medieval centre, there stands a large neo-classical building from the early 1950s. Built partly on the foundations of two older houses destroyed during the Second World War, a new building called the *Marine Officers' House* was erected. During the first decades after the war, it was one of the most representative buildings in the city, with its magnificent artificial marble and stucco. The house was administered by the Soviet Marine Corps located in Tallinn, and was handed over to the city after the last Russian troops left Estonia in 1994. In spring 1998, the city council decided that in the coming 36 years, the Marine Officers' House should be let out for rent to a private company with the requirement that the house's

main function will be to act as a centre for Russian culture. However, already in February 2001 the city government cancelled the rent contract and founded the Russian Cultural Centre as a municipal institution. At present, the building hosts around 30 vocal, dance, drama and other amateur cultural groups. In addition, some non-profit organizations (People's University, Belarusan and Ukrainian Culture Associations, Marine Veterans' Club) also have their offices in the house.

"Games involved"?

At the end of the 1990s, the Marine Officers' House was the issue of a heated public debate. The debate concerned its economy, including the operating entrepreneur's extremely advantageous contracts with the city government. On the other hand, the relations of different ethnic groups and political parties with the house were brought out. Representatives of real estate companies claimed in 1998 that judging from the extremely low rent, it was obvious that there are "some kinds of games involved". As their answer to growing criticism from the opposition, politicians of the ruling coalition claimed the building to be in such a bad condition that no company can be interested in investing money in it if the rent is too high. Eventually, two persons and the son of one person associated with the operating company were killed. Following these events, journalists have discussed the operating company's possible contacts with Russian organised crime, e.g. describing expensive cars in the yard behind the Marine Officers' House.

The Russian Cultural Centre and politics

In addition to the putative corrupt 'games' between politicians and the private company that rented the Marine Officers' House, journalists have hinted, that political parties' interest towards the centre was triggered by attempts to recruit 'Russian votes'. At the end of the 1990s, there was a political debate in Tallinn city council on what kind of culture the house should function as centre of: should it rather be multicultural, open for different minorities, not only Russians or Slavonic minorities? In the end, it was decided to let the house remain a centre of Russian culture (in Estonian, *Vene Kultuurikeskus*; in Russian, *Centr Russkoi Kultury*). In practice, organizations and hobby groups concerned with other Slavonic cultures locate their activities in the centre as well. The City Council has budgeted money for the reconstruction of the building, and the first phase of the extensive work has already been carried out.

4. Conclusions

The preceding sections gave an overview of Tallinn as a multicultural city; of the population that is heterogeneous both in terms of ethnicity and citizenship; of the existing cultural services, their administration and consumption; of the role of non-profit organizations and of the ongoing policy debates.

The population that has been referred to here as 'ethnic minorities' is a clearly visible and established part of the cityscape. In some legal and international contexts, a distinction is sometimes made between 'old', or 'historical' and 'new', or 'immigrant minorities' (Sicakkan 2004: 7-11). Following this distinction, most present members of ethnic minorities in Tallinn and Estonia would be classified as belonging to new minorities; before the Second World War, Estonia was ethnically a relatively homogenous country, and the ethnic composition was changed by rapid immigration, particularly in the 1960s. Of Tallinn's population, one-fourth was born outside Estonia, and the share of people without Estonian citizenship is likewise around one fourth (although these groups are not identical). At the same time it should be borne in mind that the immigrants arrived during the period when Estonia was considered a part of the Soviet Union; they had usually access to housing through their employers, and cultural and other services were available in Russian. The number of immigrants arriving since 1991 has been minuscule. Thus, the bulk of the members of Tallinn's ethnic minorities could most adequately be described as belonging to a 'post-colonial' minority (or an 'imperial new minority', cf. Sicakkan 2004: 50-51), facing the need to accommodate themselves in a situation where their relative social position has grown weaker. They have had to recognize the leading position of ethnic Estonians.

The restoration of Estonia's independence created a situation in which the new challenges were not only economic and political, but were to a large extent related to the symbols used for the definition of the political and national identity of the country and its inhabitants (Lauristin & Vihalemm 1997: 77-84). The great attention paid to the preservation and defence of the Estonian language during the revolutionary period is reflected by the Constitution and the legislation on language, which quite unambiguously defines Estonian as the only official language. In the same way, the ethnic minority organizations stress the need to preserve or revive the minorities' 'mother tongues'. At the same time, the society has in practice continued to function on some level of Estonian/Russian bilingualism, especially in such ethnically mixed localities as Tallinn. This can be clearly seen from the language strategies adopted by larger businesses: even if public advertising in other languages than Estonian is restricted by legislation, clients are offered services in Estonian and Russian (and eventually English or even Finnish) as

a matter of fact, as part of daily routine. The same can be said of most public services such as education, health care, police, communications, etc., and also of many types of activities of non-profit organizations.

On the level of state politics, there is a strong symbolic commitment to the idea of a monolingual Estonian nation-state. Coming to the level of Tallinn's city government, the policies can be seen as balancing between official monolingualism and pragmatic bi- or multilingualism. Even if the city itself does not organise cultural services in Russian or in other minority languages, it finances the activities of a number of NGOs dealing with minority cultures, and also provides them with space in the Russian Cultural Centre and in other cultural and community centres. The other than Russian minority organizations also make different types of compromises between their symbolic commitments and practical needs. Whilst they organise language courses and traditional festivities using their own language, they have also had to recognize that in order to address a public wider than a few dozens of enthusiasts, they will have to use either Russian or Estonian. As can be seen from the statistics on ethnicity and mother tongue (Tables 23 and 24 in section 1.2), many members of other minorities have already given up the original language of the group in favour of Estonian or, more often, Russian. This concerns the younger generation especially, that have often been born in Tallinn, who have no memories of the minority group's locality of origin, and who have received their education in one of the two dominant languages.

Even if the number of different organizations for minority culture operating in Tallinn is large, they have remained very small in size, and their ability to reach out to the members of minority groups is limited. On the other hand, there are some events and institutions that are able, at times, to remind the inhabitants of the capital of its ethnic diversity – the Slavonic Song festival, the Swedish and Armenian churches, or the radio programmes in minority languages. The cultural policy of the city government towards ethnic minorities has mainly consisted of direct and indirect support to the activities of non-profit organizations and amateur cultural groups. No doubt, this is needed in order to preserve some of the cultural diversity that has been brought to the city by the immigrants representing more than a hundred different ethnicities. However, these organizations and groups cannot by themselves have much influence on one of the most acute problems faced by cultural policy today: the minorities' low level of cultural participation and consumption. This phenomenon is certainly dependent on socio-economic factors that cannot be changed by cultural political measures; however, a more even geographical distribution of cultural services within the city would certainly enhance participation and make culture a more efficient tool for supporting integration.

References

Books, documents and Internet sources:

Ålund, Aleksandra & Carl-Ulrik Schierup (1991): *Paradoxes of Multiculturalism. Essays on Swedish Society*. Aldershot: Avebury

Asari, Eva-Maria (2002): "Eesti keele oskuse ja kodakondsuse mõju mitte-eestlaste tööturuvõimalustele". IN: Saar, Ellu (ed.): *Trepist alla ja üles: edukad ja ebaedukad postsotsialistlikus Eestis*, pp. 210-235. Tallinn: Teaduste Akadeemia Kirjastus

Eesti Päevaleht, 16 September 2004; 20 November 2004; 4 December 2005; 7 December 2005

Heidmets, Mati & Marju Lauristin (2002): "Learning from the Estonian case". in: Lauristin & Heidmets (2002), pp. 319-332

Jakobson, Valeria (2004): "Venekeelse meedia areng Eestis 1987-2004". in: Vihalemm, Peeter (ed.) (2004): *Meediasüsteem ja meediakasutus Eestis 1965-2004*, Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus

Jurado, Elena (2002): *Complying with "European" Standards of Minority Protection: Estonia's Relations with the European Union, OSCE and Council of Europe*. D.Phil Thesis, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford

Kaplan, Cynthia S. (1993): *Political Culture in Estonia: The Impact of Two Traditions on Political Development in: Tismaneanu, Vladimir (ed.): Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, pp. 227-267. Armonk, NY & London, England: M.E. Sharpe

Lagerspetz, Mikko (2005): *Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Estonia*. Research report for the research project POLITIS, available at <http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe/download/Estonia.pdf> (visited 8 July, 2005)

Lagerspetz, Mikko & Sofia Joons (2004): *Migrants, Minorities, Belonging and Citizenship: The Case of Estonia*. Bergen: BRIC/University of Bergen

Lagerspetz, Mikko & Rein Raud (1995): *Estonian Cultural Policy and Its Impact, 1988-1995. National Report*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe CC-Cult (95) 20 A

Lagerspetz, Mikko & Tiiu-Liisa Rummo-Laes (2004): *Estonia*. Country report in the Compendium of European Cultural Policies, available at <http://www.culturalpolicies.net> (visited 3 July, 2005)

Lasnamäe arengukava (2002): *Lasnamäe arengukava. Lühiversioon*. Developmental plan of the Lasnamäe city district, available at http://www.tallinn.ee/linnaosade_valitsused/lasnamae/lasnamae_arengukava/lasnamae_arengukava (visited 27 June, 2005)

Marju Lauristin & Mati Heidmets (eds.) (2002): *The Challenge of the Russian Minority. Emerging Multicultural Democracy in Estonia*. Tartu: Tartu University Press

Lauristin, Marju & Peeter Vihalemm (1997): *Recent historical developments in Estonia: Three stages of transition (1987-1997)* in: Lauristin & al. 1997, pp. 73-126

Lauristin, Marju & Peeter Vihalemm with Karl Erik Rosengren & Lennart Weibull (eds.) (1997): *Return to the Western World. Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transition*. Tartu: Tartu University Press

Lundberg, Dan; Krister Malm & Owe Ronström (2003): *Music, Media, Multiculture – Changing Musicscapes*. Stockholm: Svenskt Visarkiv

Minority Protection... (2002): *Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Minority Protection, Volume I. An Assessment of Selected Policies in Candidate States*. Budapest & New York: Open Society Institute

Pettai, Vello (2000): *Competing conceptions of multiethnic democracy: Debating minority integration in Estonia*. Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research, Joint Sessions workshop on "Competing Conceptions of democracy in the Practice of Politics", April 14-19, 2000, Copenhagen, Denmark. Available as: <http://www.ut.ee/SOPL/cv/pettai/Competin.pdf> (visited 20 November 2004)

Postimees, 31 May 2005; 16 June 2005

Riigi Teataja I, 13 May 2003 [the official magazine publishing legislative acts]. Available at www.riigiteataja.ee (visited 16 March 2005)

Rikmann, Erle; Meril Ümarik; Sofia Joons & Mikko Lagerspetz (2005): *The Institutionalization of Civic Initiative in Estonia: The Organizational Structure and Resources. Summary of Research*. Summary of research report delivered for the Baltic-American Partnership Programme Estonia, Tallinn

Rummo-Laes, Tiiu-Liisa (2004): *Kultuur kõigile? Sotsiaal-demograafiliste tegurite mõju kultuurielus osalemisele ja kultuuri tarbimisele Eestis*. MA Thesis, Estonian Institute of Humanities, Tallinn

Sicakkan, Hakan Gürçan (2004): *Belonging and the Quality of Citizenships: A comparative study of new public spaces in six European countries*. Bergen: BRIC/University of Bergen

Tallinn arvudes... (2004): *Tallinn Arvudes 2003*. Tallinn: Tallinna Linnavalitsus. Available at http://www.tallinn.ee/linna_juhtimine/linnakantselei/struktuur/avalike_suhete_teenistus/teabeosakond/tallinn_arvudes/tallinn_arvudes_2003 (visited 4 July 2005)

Tallinna arengukava ... (2004): *Tallinna arengukava aastateks 2005-2014*. Development plan for 2005-2014 adopted by the City Council, available at <http://tallinn.andmevara.ee/oa/page.Tavakasutaja?c=1.1.1.1&id=98848> (visited 12 June 2005)

Vetik, Raivo (ed.) (2003): *Eesti inimarengu aruanne 2003. Inimarengu trendid ja ühiskondliku kokkuleppe vajadus*. Tallinn: TPÜ RASI

Vihalemm, Peeter; Maarja Lõhmus & Valeria Jakobson (2004): *Ühiskond meediaruumis: traditsiooniline meedia* in: Kalmus, Veronika; Marju Lauristin & Pille Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt (eds.): *Eesti elavik 21. sajandi algul: ülevaade uurimuse Mina.Maailm.Meedia tulemustest*, pp. 131-145. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus

List of interviews:

- 1) Timur Seifullen, Estonian Union of National Minorities, Chairman of the Islam Congregation in Tallinn, 28 June, 2005
- 2) Jelena Klausen, Russian Cultural Centre, Byelorussians Cultural Society, 30 June, 2005
- 3) Rein Tamme, Director, Lindakivi Cultural Centre; Maire Pragi, Arts Director, Lindakivi Cultural Centre, 5 July, 2005
- 4) Jüri Vartanjan, Estonian Radio, Editor of Armenian programmes, 6 July, 2005

WARSAW: A CITY OF REVIVING MULTICULTURALISM

by Dorota Ilczuk
(in co-operation with Kazimierz Krzysztofek,
Rafał Pankowski and Jan Stanisław Wojciechowski)⁸⁶

1. Portraying Warsaw

1.1. Overview

Warsaw has been the capital of Poland since 1596. The number of its inhabitants is 1,689,000 (of whom 909,000 are women)⁸⁷. The city attracts young people: 64.5% of its residents are between the age of 18 to 59 as regards women and 18 to 64 as regards men.

Altogether in the Mazowieckie Voivodship of which Warsaw is also the capital (a voivodship is an administrative region; there are 16 in Poland) 37.2% of the employed people work in market services and 14,2% in non-market services. The percentage of those working in agriculture is still quite high in the region (25.1%), although it is diminishing each year⁸⁸. The unemployment rate in Warsaw is 6.5% (2003), relatively low in comparison to the average national rate, which is as high as 18.3% (2003). As Table 29 shows, most people are employed in the real estate, renting and business activities (16.9%), trade and repairs (16.34%) and manufacturing (14%).

Table 29. Employment in Warsaw by sectors, 2003

Sector	Employment	Sector	Employment
Total of which:	668,661		
Trade and repair	16.34%	Construction	5.65%
Real estate, renting and business activities	16.90%	Health and social work	4.24%
Manufacturing	14.00%	Hotels and restaurants	2.45%
Transport, storage and communication	9.72%	Electricity, gas and water supply	1.70%
Education	8.26%	Agriculture, hunting and forestry	0.14%
Public administration	7.86%	Mining and quarrying	0.03%
Financial intermediation	7.25%		

Source: GUS (National Statistics Office)

86. Dorota Ilczuk, Warsaw School of Social Psychology, Pro Cultura Foundation, President of CIRCLE.
Kazimierz Krzysztofek, Warsaw School of Social Psychology, Pro Cultura Foundation.
Rafał Pankowski, Warsaw University.
Jan Stanisław Wojciechowski, Jagiellonian University.

Authors would like to thank Magdalena Kulikowska (Pro Cultura Foundation co-ordinator) and Pro Cultura Foundation volunteers (students of the Warsaw School of Social Psychology and the Jagiellonian University).

87. Data from September 2003. Source: Urząd Miasta Stołecznego Warszawy (Warsaw City Hall) (www.um.warszawa.pl).

88. "Strategia rozwoju Warszawy 2004-2006. Synteza" (Warsaw Development Strategy 2004-2006.Synthesis). Zarząd Miasta Stołecznego Warszawy (Warsaw City Hall).

These employment prospects, together with a high level of educational facilities (see Table 30) are the key factors that attract young people to the city.

Table 30. Schools and the attending pupils/students in Warsaw, 2001/2002

Type of schools	Numbers of schools	Number of pupils/ students
Primary	306	86 909
Gymnasiums	213	53 299
Secondary	465	90 849
Post-graduate	99	11 927
Higher and universities	62	255 323
Total		498 307

Source: Urząd Miasta Stołecznego Warszawy. (Warsaw City Hall), www.warszawa.um.gov.pl

School pupils and university students constitute 29.9% of Warsaw's population. In the last five years their number has been increasing rapidly, especially as regards students. In the academic year 2001/2002 students made up 15.9% of Warsaw's inhabitants, which compared to 1995/96 grew by 7.3%. This does not include foreigners studying in Warsaw, who in the year 2001/2002 were registered in the number of 1,878.

In 2002, some 2,510,000 foreigners visited Warsaw. Most of them came from Germany (610,000), Ukraine (310,000) Byelorussia (240,000), Russia (190,000), the USA and Canada (120,000) as well as from Austria, Lithuania, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Italy and many more. Over half of them (55%) came to Warsaw as tourists or in order to visit relatives and friends, while 45% visited for business.

Culture

The document elaborated by the city authorities on Warsaw's development strategy 2010 states that "culture and arts are an indispensable element of national identity and are necessary for the progress of civilisation".⁸⁹ The authorities described their aims in the field of culture as follows: facilitating access to cultural goods and their preservation, as well as support for and development of institutions popularising culture.

The strategy also refers to the strengths and weaknesses of the city and its suburbs. The opinion of the authors is that after the period of political system transformation, Warsaw became the centre of cultural life, where artists concentrated. They pointed out that, on the one hand, the number of cultural events, including international ones, is growing.

89. "Strategia Rozwoju Warszawy do 2010 roku – synteza." Zarząd Miasta Stołecznego Warszawy. Wydział zagospodarowania przestrzennego, str.51 (Development strategy for Warsaw till the year 2010 – a synthesis), Department of Land Development, Warsaw City Hall, p. 51.

On the other, however, Warsaw is not yet a metropolis with a major international impact in the field of culture and the authors attribute this partly to the lack of adequate infrastructure.

Altogether, in Warsaw there are 1,576 cultural institutions⁹⁰. These include private entities as well as historic buildings⁹¹. At the central level, public cultural institutions were founded by the Ministry of Culture whereas regional, provincial and municipal institutions - by local authorities (in Poland, when speaking about regional institutions or authorities – voivodships are meant). Out of the 37 so-called 'national institutions', founded by the Ministry of Culture, 17 are situated in Warsaw. The Authorities of the Mazowieckie Voivodship are founders of 25 institutions in the region, out of which 14 are located in the capital itself. There are also 66 local government institutions subordinated to the Warsaw City Hall (18 libraries; 27 community and cultural centres; 3 museums; 17 theatres; and the *Stołeczna Estrada* – a cultural agency which acts on behalf of the Mayor, promoting artistic events and organising concerts, performances and exhibitions)⁹².

Table 31. Public cultural institutions in Warsaw, 2004

Type of institution	Organiser (founder)		
	The city of Warsaw	The authorities of the Mazowieckie voivodship	The Ministry of Culture
Libraries	18	1	5
Community centres, clubs	27	1	0
Museums/galleries	3	8	9
Theatres	17	2	2
Philharmonics/operas	0	1	1
Others	1	1	0
Total	66	14	17

In 2003, public expenditure on culture in Poland amounted to 0.82 billion euro (PLN 3.3 billion). The Ministry of Culture allocated 169 million euro (PLN 679 million) whilst local authorities designated 0.65 billion euro (PLN 2.6 billion), which on the average was 3.18% of their total budget.

The expenditure of the local authorities on culture and heritage protection in Warsaw are financed mainly from the Warsaw City Hall budget. In 2003 this amounted to 43,440,000 euro, which was 3% of the city's total expenditure (detailed fund allocation


90. Data from September 2003. Source: Urząd Miasta Stołecznego Warszawy. (Warsaw City Hall), www.um.warszawa.pl.

91. Theatres and musical institutions - 34; cinemas - 34; museums - 51; libraries - 305; historical buildings - 1152.

92. Source: Urząd Miasta Stołecznego Warszawy. (Warsaw City Hall), www.bip.warszawa.pl.

in the year 2003 is given in section 3.3). In recent years, this spending has been constantly increasing. In 2004 it amounted to 63,960,000 euro, constituting 3.8% of the city's total expenditure, which were as high as 1,670,000,000 euro. The planned expenditure in the 2005 budget for culture and heritage protection exceeds 81,880,000 euro, in other words 4% of the total.

Maps 8 and 9 show the major cultural institutions in Warsaw and thus the cultural supply, and the places of minorities' cultural activity.



1.2. The city seen by three generations

Warsaw in the eyes of the last three generations is really three different cities.

The Nestors, or Poles born before World War II, still remember the pre-war shape and atmosphere of Warsaw – the capital of the revived Poland; the seat of Parliament and of many central government organisations; of prominent cultural institutions; the city of trade, restaurants and parks. For them, also a numerous Jewish community was an inherent feature of the city. Among the dwindling group of the oldest Varsovians one can still find participants of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 and eyewitnesses of the total destruction of the city and later also of its so-called socialist rebuilding. The latter dramatically changed the urban, architectural and social character of the city. Most of the numerous Jewish community perished in concentration camps, mostly Treblinka, or died during the Jewish Ghetto Uprising in 1943. The cultural identity of the Warsaw Jews has its symbolic representations in the architectural remains (the Nożyk Synagogue in the city centre, municipal houses in the vicinity of Próżna Street, the former orphanage, Mikvah and houses of God in the Praga district), at the cemetery (the Warsaw Jewish Cemetery is one of the oldest and biggest in Europe), and also in the collections of the Jewish Historical Institute Association (Żydowski Instytut Historyczny) - which includes the famous Ringelblum Archive from the time of the Nazi occupation.

The middle generation – people born in Warsaw just before and after World War II or, what is even more common, immigrants from other Polish cities, towns and villages (with roots and cultural identity that create a tangle of differences that is difficult to unravel) undoubtedly remember Warsaw as a capital of the Polish Peoples Republic. The city of a new architecture of 'socialist realism' (*soc-realism for short*) with the Palace of Culture and Science as its hallmark in the centre, the head office of the authorities of the Polish Communist Party, central offices, centre of May-Day celebrations on Labour Day, the zone of the Warsaw Steelworks, the Nowotko car factory and many others established in order to transform Warsaw into an industrial city and the capital of a socialist nation.

The young generation, born just before or just after the year 1989, has witnessed Warsaw's transformation from the Polish People's Republic 'headquarters' and heavy industry centre into a new, modern capital city. A capital of business centres, and one that became one of the European Union capitals. These people will always treat Warsaw as a city of shining skyscrapers, clubs, pubs and shopping centres, as a cluster of street trade and omnipresent stalls but also as a huge East European market place at the former *Stadion Dziesięciolecia* (the name of the stadium commemorates the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the communist Polish People's Republic). The latter is a specific anthropological hybrid that emerged on the commercial ground.

The cultural anthropologists call the *Stadion Dziesięciolecia*, now transformed into a bazaar – the multiethnic village. Traders, most of them Asians (Vietnamese) but also Russians, Byelorussians and Ukrainians along with Poles have for over a decade exchanged all kinds of goods brought to Poland both legally and illegally. They form a multi-linguistic community which has developed its own specific rites and quite effective *lingua franca* – a mix of their mother tongues. Due to the bazaar's likely liquidation, this phenomenon does not have any prospects for the future. After its renewal, the Stadium is going to play its initial role of an arena for sports.

Warsaw has also a brand new character – it is a place of expanding prostitution and pornography (e.g. with various forms of erotic fairs), unsuccessfully controlled by ineffective law regulations.

Today, a new dimension of difference is re-emerging in Warsaw once again, as the result of the inflow of numerous foreigners. These newcomers are becoming increasingly visible in Warsaw's social structure. The Vietnamese stand out because of physical difference. Numbers of people from former Soviet republics, mostly Ukrainians, who strongly affirm their identity through cultural activity, and Byelorussians, are increasing. The Roma have become very noticeable because of an inflow, in the 90's, of Roma women (without Polish citizenship) begging in the streets (especially in the city centre). In recent years, other kinds of difference have also been affirmed. Homosexual groups try to emphasise their presence by setting up clubs and organising parades (leading to objections from the local authorities). There are also organisations fighting for women rights.

The present shape of Warsaw is a result of political, urban, architectural, social, economic and cultural differences. Therefore, diversity will become a more and more important feature of the city. There are both positive and negative aspects of this phenomenon. There are 'good sides' simply because *varietas ludet et delectat*. However, the question is whether Warsaw's 'real face', through which it could be recognisable, actually exists. Does the city have its own 'fingerprint', a legible image, or does every single inhabitant, as well as every foreign newcomer, has to create his or her 'own Warsaw'?

1.3. The influence of historical and social diversity on the cultural landscape of Warsaw

How do historical and social diversity shape differences in the cultural structure: its architecture, cultural institutions, creative communities, artists, symbolic representations in public space and cultural institutions?

Signs of Warsaw remembered by its oldest citizens are still visible. Nevertheless nowadays, one can hardly speak of still active groups of pre-war Warsaw culture representatives or any vivid offer visibly connected with the Warsaw of those days. However, some performances, concerts and 'exhibitions – reconstructions' are being organised. The remembrance of history and symbols of past events can be found in numerous monuments. In Warsaw there are 70 such monuments and new ones are still being built. A rare example of a memorial to a foreign hero is the memorial of Charles de Gaulle, unveiled in the city centre in May 2005; it is a copy of the French original. The city that emerged under the gaze of now middle-aged citizens, born after World War II, still determines the urban and cultural atmosphere. The Palace of Culture and Science – a gift from the Soviet Union to the Polish nation at the time when the Soviets were taking over the whole region – is still the highest building of the city. It has also retained its former cultural functions – as before it is full of theatres, museums, galleries and science institutions. After the political transformation, the Palace's surroundings were soon enriched by a new institution – the Museum of Communism – which is now a symbolic supplement to the role the Palace had played in communist times.

In Warsaw, one can see plenty of the eclectic 'soc-realistic' architecture, e.g. the Marszałkowska Street Housing District. Still visible is the soc-modernist architecture (mainly in the city centre) with its huge geometrical 'cubes' from the 1960s and 1970s - one might say in the Corbusier style - scattered, built with neither technological precision nor urbanistic justification. The monumental character of the Palace of Culture and Science together with the unfriendly *grandeur* of the surrounding urban space, could not foster the creation of cultural 'sense of place' ...

The broken balance of inter-generation continuity and change, the torn tissue of interactions between creative communities and artists has certainly affected the post-war reality of Warsaw, yet it did not undermine its cultural life. It is impossible to mention all the important artistic initiatives and cultural developments that occurred. One of them however, probably the most important, was the rebuilding of the city's Old Town. It was also then, that many institutions had their years of glory based on the highest European traditions: The National Museum (which, thanks to the successes of Polish archeologists, obtained world-famous collections); National Philharmonic, Academy of Fine Arts; Institute of Art; Institute of Literature Research and the Polish PEN Club. At the time Warsaw became a city of international festivals, such as the Warsaw Musical Autumn (*Warszawska Jesień*), the Poster Biennial (*Biennale Plakatu*) or the Jazz Jamboree. It is worth noting that one of the most interesting and independent communities in the Polish People's Republic was created by Jazzmen. In those times, many magnificent books, authored by Warsaw writers, as well as cultural, social and artistic magazines were published. In such broken urban space artistic enclaves – small centres of cultural events,

private or semi-private institutions – also flourished. Among those were student clubs (e.g. *Hybrydy*, the Bogucki Gallery, the Foksal Gallery, Sigma, Remont). Authors' theatres were also very active – a cluster of such could be found on Tarczyńska Street, where outstanding artists had their creative space. Artistic cafés were also very popular: the Foksal Café - a place of avant-garde artists and the Readers' Café (*Kawiarnia Czytelnika*) – where well known writers and actors met. Along with their popularity also satirical and political cabarets founded by known performers had flourished.

This period was summed up by the Congress of Polish Culture broken by the martial law enforced by general W. Jaruzelski in December 1981. The period of martial law exposed and strengthened this characteristic mobility and initiative of small, independent groups and networks (functioning also in sacred buildings).

Warsaw remains the city of numerous public cultural institutions. In the mentality of the people working there and in the institutions structure, the 'climate' of the former socialist system is still present. After 1989, these organisations were substantially transformed. The proportions of funding from public and private sources changed dramatically; decentralisation took place; more vigorous promotional work was required; openness to new content developed. Nevertheless, the institutional structure remains based, to a large extent, on full-time employment of the personnel. One of the most important effects of the overall change of the institutional landscape is that, alongside public institutions, non-governmental and private/commercial ones are gaining in importance. Many artists from the middle generation still however remain in the orbit of public institutions. This concerns both traditional cultural institutions (museums, theatres, galleries and music institution) and new entities such as public media (TV and broadcasting). It does not apply to private broadcast stations and press, which are governed by market rules.

Let's now take a closer look at Warsaw of the third generation – witnesses of the "third", capitalistic Warsaw creation. What has changed in the last 15 years? Did this period allow a restoration of the capitalistic and democratic Warsaw that existed before World War II, veiling at the same time the period of real socialism? Have recent events favoured the process of free communication and revived cultural co-operations in the face of dispersion and diversity? How has culture interfaced with democracy? In the field of civic initiatives as well as in cultural institutions, not so much has been achieved as it has been expected. New monuments to people and events that the Polish People's Republic wanted to consign to oblivion have reappeared in various places.

The customs and culture of the Jewish community are slowly reviving in a few scarce religious sites (e.g. the Nożyk Synagogue mentioned earlier), periodicals ('Midrasz' and 'the Jewish Word'), kosher restaurants, schools and in cultural institutions such as the famous Jewish Theatre in Warsaw – one of the very few European institutions where performances are given in Yiddish.

At the same time, institutions like the Modern Art Centre (*Centrum Sztuki Współczesnej*) in the Ujazdowski Castle and the Zachęta Gallery, which took-up intensive artistic cooperation with people and avant-garde art centres, have emerged on the cultural map. In this milieu rudiments of serious debates on artistic freedom and threats to it in the democratic society started to reappear. The National Museum, the Royal Castle and the National Library became very important places on the map of modern art. Institutionalised entertainment was enriched by musicals in the 'Roma Theatre'. Also, the number of private galleries is rapidly growing. Impresario theatres, concerts and acting agencies are mushrooming. Worth mentioning is the National Priesthood of the Artistic Community which gathers artists of Christian background, that found its place in Saint Andrew's Church. Varied streams of Christian and national tradition institutionalise themselves in the form of museums; and sites of memory such as monuments, books, albums and magazines. We also observe integration of artistic communities, e.g. the cluster of artists in the Praga district. New artistic magazines are being founded, even though the market in the 1990s was dominated by illustrated magazines. The idea of adapting old industrial buildings for cultural goals is taking hold. Slowly the market is starting to play a more and more important role. As a consequence, private theatres are developing (e.g. Studio Buffo); peculiar hybrids combining gastronomy, elite culture and popular entertainment are becoming popular and very active (e.g. Le Madame restaurant, The Trzcina Factory); also actors such as Krystyna Janda and Emilian Kamiński have opened their own theatres.

These new cultural phenomena have not prevented the spatial and cultural dispersion of Warsaw, however. A well known Polish writer, Andrzej Stasiuk, described Warsaw in the following terms: "it is, in fact, a suburb, a huge suburb". It is difficult to disagree. An ever-increasing role is played by feasts, mass events and huge shopping centres focused on the needs of the mass consumer. Great religious and patriotic mass events are also to be found. The multiplication of shopping centres with their architecture, interior design and offer imitate the western standards, imposed by real estate developers with little concern for the development of the surrounding public area.

2. History, legal framework, social conditions and cultural practices of minorities and immigrants

The aim of this section is not to provide a comprehensive presentation of the situation of cultural minorities in Warsaw, but to outline the forms of expression of selected groups in the cultural life of Warsaw (and point out some of the problems they might have). Four groups were selected for the purpose of detailed description and analysis: Jews, Ukrainians, Vietnamese and Roma. In the authors' opinion they are the most visible in Warsaw's cultural landscape. Here and in the next section interview data have been incorporated (either directly into the text or in the form of quotations). All interviews were carried out in May and June 2005 in order to gain opinions on the plurality of cultural offer in Warsaw, the cultural activity of minorities and immigrants living in Warsaw, the character of the relations between the culture of minorities and the general cultural activity of Warsaw and the challenges awaiting Warsaw as a metropolis facing an increase in the number of new immigrants.

2.1. 'National minorities' and immigrants in Warsaw landscape

Historically, Poland's population has been characterised by its high percentage of ethnic and religious minorities. In the Middle Ages Poland was a place of refuge for minorities, mainly Jews, escaping anti-Semitism and religious persecution in some European countries. In 1918, after Poland regained independence, still over one third of its citizens belonged to national minority groups⁹³. In 1931 66.5% of citizens declared Polish nationality, 15.7% - Ukrainian nationality, 9.5% Jewish, 6.1% Byelorussian, 2.2% German. This ethnic structure did not change until World War II. It was then that 3,500,000 Polish Jews, 3,000,000 Christian Poles and hundreds of thousands of Roma were murdered by the Nazis. As a result of the loss of the eastern territories and the agreement between Poland and the Soviet Union, 490,000 of the 600,000 Polish-Ukrainians and 36,000 of the Polish-Byelorussians were deported to the territory of the Soviet Union. The remaining 160,000 Ukrainians, previously settled in the south of Poland, were forcibly dispersed across the north-western territory. Estimates also indicate 3,200,000 Germans resettled or expelled from Poland. Between the years 1945 and 1950 millions of Poles were re-patriated – 2,100,000 from the USSR, and 200,000 from Western countries. As a result of war extermination, enforced emigration and assimilation policies Poland became one of the most ethnically homogenous countries in Europe. In 1968 most Jews (mostly artists and university professors) were forced to leave Poland. Until 1989 minorities were excluded from public life and their cultural autonomy was suppressed. A change in the approach towards issues related to minorities did not occur until the

93. According to the pre WWII law those Polish citizens who declared their non-Polish nationality on Census had the national minority status.

political system transformation started in 1989. It was then that protective programmes and efforts stimulating the development of cultures and languages of minority groups began to appear.

Table 32. National minorities in Poland in the years 1931-1997

National minorities	Population of minorities in 1931 ⁹⁴	Population of minorities in 1993 ⁹⁵	Population of minorities in 1997 ⁹⁶
Germans	748,300 (2.2%)	350,000-400,000	750,000-1,100,000 (1.9-2.8%)
Ukrainians	5,042,500 (15.7%)	250,000-350,000	350,000-500,000 (0.9-1.3%)
Byelorussians	1,956,600 (6.1%)	250,000-300,000	200,000-300,000 (0.5%-0.8%)
Jews	3,050,000 (9.5%)	8,000-10,000	
Slovaks		10,000-15,000	10,000-20,000 (less than 0.1%)
Czechs		5,000-10,000	5,000 (less than 0.1%)
Lithuanian		15,000-20,000	10,000-30,000 (less than 0.1%)
Roma		20,000-25,000	15,000 (less than 0.1%)
Others*		309,700 (1%)	2,000

*others: Tatars, Armenians, Macedonians, Russians.
The source is given in footnotes 96, 97 and 98.

The issue of multiculturalism in Warsaw is almost a mirror reflection of the situation throughout the whole country. Warsaw has a rich historical experience of multiculturalism. Throughout decades it was a city where Polish, Jewish, Russian, Armenian and other cultural influences used to meet. The dramatic events of the twentieth century, with the tragedy of the Holocaust, caused the loss of that multiculturalism. The authorities in those times were creating an image of an ethnically homogenous country, putting special attention to its capital. The political transformation in 1989 gave the minority groups a larger formal and legal freedom of cultural activity and the growing number of those coming from other countries began to enrich the cultural offer of Warsaw.

Making a precise estimate of the minority population is impossible, as there is a practical difficulty of finding objective criteria allowing to assign a person to a 'minority'. It is also difficult to give a reliable figure of immigrants living in Warsaw. The 2003 data of the Warsaw City Hall concern solely 6,911 foreigners, who held a work permit in Warsaw. These data show that over a half (53.1%) are scattered individuals from Africa, Asia, smaller European countries, Australia and New Zealand, spread across the city. The other groups of foreign citizens employed in Warsaw are: French – 10.7%; British – 8.8%; Germans – 7.0%; Ukrainians – 6.5%; Turks – 5.6%; Indians – 4.7%; Vietnamese – 3.6%. Most of those with a work-permit occupy posts at the executive level (77%). Other

professional groups are teachers (8.1%) and artists (1.6%)⁹⁷. These data are significantly lower than the real figures. Even the data from the 2002 Census are far from credible – it was pointed out that many people from the minority groups declared Polish nationality in fear of possible discrimination, and many representatives of non-Polish culture were not included in the census for formal reasons. Last but not least, questions about national and ethnic affinity could have been interpreted in many ways. Moreover, the census did not allow a declaration of double identity: Polish and another. This deformed the real picture of ethnic structure of Warsaw and the whole country. That being said, the final comment can be that the number of people taking part in the social and cultural life of minorities and immigrants in Warsaw varies between **about twelve thousand to a several dozen thousands**. They live in various districts as well as in the suburbs. Therefore, areas specially preferred, as living space, by minorities or immigrants cannot be indicated.

A dynamic development of minority cultural activity can be observed from the beginning of the new century. One could even say that the culture of minorities, often born in complex circumstances, is one of the brightest points on the cultural map of Warsaw. This especially concerns the cultures of the so-called 'new minorities', which are flourishing in spite of institutional barriers and are successfully and daringly entering public space, not only the niche segments but also the broader, visible space. The "traditional" minorities are also active. These various groups belong to several categories identified by Tony Bennett. The Polish law on national minorities effectively deals with and recognizes as national minorities only those groups that can be classified (in Bennett's typology) as "sub- or multinational, which dispute the homogenising tendencies of national cultures, but do so on the basis of essentially similar strategies by articulating a competing set of associations between a territory, its people, and their culture" (Bennet 2001). Among these groups are Ukrainians, Belorussians and Lithuanians, who live in generally compact territorial settlements and have a tradition of statehood combined with a (supposed) affiliation with a neighbouring country. Their cultural presence in Warsaw is seen as an 'extension' of their existence as national minorities on the territory of the Republic of Poland. Obviously, in the context of Central-Eastern European history this category overlaps with another type identified by Bennett, namely "autochthonous, in other words the situation and circumstances of ethnically marked minority communities that are the result of earlier movements of peoples (or of national boundaries) within Europe". For example, some Armenians or Tatars whose ancestors have lived on the territory of Poland for centuries, could be classified under this heading as well.

The Warsaw Jews can be regarded as an example of typically "diasporic cultures produced in association with the histories of displaced peoples, involving the development of mobile international cultural networks operating across, and offering an alternative to,

94. Eberhard ,P (1996) *Między Rosją a Niemcami. Przemiany narodowo ciowe w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w XXw* (Between Russia and Germany. National Changes In Central East Europe in the 20th century), Warsaw, p.106.

95. *World of Minorities* (1997) London: Minority Rights Group, p.137.

96. *Ibidem*.

97. Source: Urząd Miasta Stołecznego Warszawy. [Warsaw City Hall], www.bip.warszawa.pl.

the territorial logic of national cultures". Nevertheless, Polish law classifies them as a 'national minority', apparently due to the existence of the state of Israel, i.e. a state with whom the Jews are supposed to empathise. This is certainly a gross oversimplification of the complex nature of Jewish identity, including the identity of Polish Jews and Poles of Jewish background. The Roma do not have a state and therefore they are classified differently, as an 'ethnic minority', though they share aspects of the 'diasporic' experience (and the legacy of discrimination and oppression) with the Jews.

Newer (and growing, although still small in number) diasporic communities in Warsaw include the Vietnamese, Arabs and Russian speakers (this group would include not only migrants from the Russian Federation itself, but also from other countries of the former Soviet Union) and smaller communities such as the Sikhs.

2.2. Current legal and social status of minorities in Poland

Minority rights originate both from Polish law and from international obligations. As regards the former there are the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (articles 27 and 35) as well as other legal acts, including those on the electoral law, the Polish language, the educational system and the television and radio broadcasting. As for international obligations, minority rights result from: the UN Charter, Council of Europe instruments, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Central European Initiative, international bilateral agreements and, lately gaining in importance, the European Union. The representatives of minorities have the right to associate, on a par with other inhabitants, by virtue of "the Act on Associations from the 7th of April 1989". Before there were only seven minority associations formally constituted with the agreement of the authorities. Since then, their number has risen to several dozens. Most of those with country-wide reach have their seats in Warsaw or their branches there.

On the 6th of January 2005, after many years of arduous parliamentary work, as a result of political compromise, "the Act on National Minorities and Regional Languages" was adopted. Comparing with the definitions of minority used by the Sub-Commission Against Discrimination and Minority Protection of the UN Commission on Human Rights⁹⁸ and in the European Convention on Human Rights, the Polish legislator, contrary to modern, global and socio-cultural trends, decided to narrow down the strict definition and concept of ethnic and national minority. The need of support and protection was stressed and the list of national and ethnic minorities elaborated. The new law acknowledges the following groups as national minorities: *Byelorussian, Czech, Lithuanian, German, Armenian, Russian, Slovak, Ukrainian, Jewish and the following groups as ethnic ones: Karaite, Ruthenian (Lemko), Roma and Tatar*. The newly formulated rules of the law exclude the rights of those not belonging to the so called 'historical' minorities. In other

words, those who immigrated to Poland during the last decade do not have equal rights with the previously mentioned minorities, even though in Western European countries they are the ones who above all, as immigrants, are most often associated with the term: 'ethnic minorities'. The representatives of public administration are obliged by law to take due steps in order to support full and real equality in the field of economic, social, political and cultural life of members of the minorities and the Polish majority, and to protect those who, as the consequence of their ethnicity, could be exposed to discrimination, hostility or violence. They are also obliged to strengthen intercultural dialogue.

The law also regulates the issue of minority languages in the administration. In June 2005 new regulations came into effect allowing national and ethnic minorities to use and write names and surnames in their original version, to use their languages in all administration offices as well as to introduce additional streets and localities' names in minority languages.

The public administration is also obliged to support any activity leading towards the protection, preservation and development of minorities' cultural identity. This can be achieved through: grants and subsidies; artistic movement; minorities' creation; cultural events of great importance for the minority culture; publishing books, periodicals and leaflets in Polish and minority languages, in printed forms as well as in other techniques of recording; supporting TV programmes and radio broadcasts; protection of places related to minority culture; activities of community centres, libraries and the collection of documentation of cultural and artistic life of minorities; education of children and teenagers; promotion of knowledge; and other programmes supporting social integration of minorities. According to Polish law, financial resources for the above-mentioned activities can be taken from both the central budget and local governments' budgets and are to be distributed to organisations and institutions undertaking tasks related to the protection, maintenance and development of minorities' cultural identity.

The rights of the legally recognised minorities, incorporated in different texts, could be summed up as follows: the freedom to preserve and develop their own language; the freedom to maintain, preserve traditions and cultures; the right to learn and learn in their own language; the right to run religious practices; the right to create own cultural and educational institutions; the right to take part in adjudicating matters concerning their 'national' identity; and, finally, the right to some privileges in the electoral law.

According to the Polish law, one can also have the status of a foreigner. In this case, it is the acts on foreigners (of June 2003) and on the rules and conditions of the entrance and stay of EU citizens and their families (July 2002), that regulate the rights and status of

98. Quoted after "Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce" (National Minorities in Poland), (1995) Warsaw, p. 40.

the aforementioned. Among such are for example access to social insurance and medical care on equal rights as Polish citizens.

Citizens from non-EU member countries need visa to enter Poland. Depending on the character of the visit, one can obtain a visa with a work-permit, a visa permitting stay in the country for a certain period of time (depending on the purpose of the visit), a transit visa (one very rarely applied for), or permanent resident status.

Table 32. Visas granted to people of selected nationalities in Poland, 2000

Nationality	Visas with a work-permit	Regular visas
Ukrainian	186	2,363
Byelorussian	29	834
Vietnamese	15	205

Source: Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration ⁹⁹

As the data show, most foreigners coming from the countries not in the EU structure, and in this case those where the most numerous minority groups in Warsaw come from, do not have the right to work legally in Poland. Looking at the Mazowieckie Voivodship the disproportion between all foreigners receiving visas is similar: 364 those with a work-permit and 5,099 without, in the year 2000.

By virtue of the Polish law, all children have the right to attend public schools, regardless of the legal status of their parents. Foreigners with permanent residence right are however the only ones who have access to free higher education.

In practice, Jewish, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Vietnamese children attend Polish public schools. Furthermore, throughout the country, minorities organise their own educational facilities either within Polish schools or through their own foundations or associations. The most examples of both solutions can be found among the Jewish community. As described in section 2.3 below, religious education is led by many organisations. Regular education has diverse forms. Apart from classes organised by non-profit organisations, one can also find them in Polish public secondary schools. Those usually have a Yiddish or Jewish profile (e.g. VIIIth Secondary School in Cracow). In Wroclaw and Warsaw the Lauder Foundation established the 'Lauder Morosh School'. The latter comprises a kindergarten, primary school and high school. Children are taught mainly in Polish but the programme includes extended Hebrew lessons. Also, to meet the needs of children and parents, the school has a kosher canteen. In 2001-2002, some 170 children attended the school.

⁹⁹. Data do not include those with diplomatic status.

The Vietnamese seem to send their children to Polish schools, whilst Roma children are usually not visible among the school population (this probably is caused by Roma custom of not sending girls to schools). The representatives of these minorities have not established any organisations for the education of their children.

In conclusion, it may be said that the status of foreign citizens in Poland is diversified. Those recognised as ethnic or national minorities are the most privileged. Out of the four national or ethnic groups present in Warsaw selected for our research only one, the Vietnamese, do not have such privileges. Of course, the present-day status of foreigners is also determined by their own culture and habits, as well as the attitude of the majority population towards them. Jews, who have been present in Poland for centuries, are well organised and benefit from all rights assured by the law and are therefore very visible in Warsaw's cultural landscape. On the other hand the Roma, also recognised as a minority, remain a closed community, function rather in their own clusters, do not take an active part in the social, political or cultural life of the city, and do not seem to fully use the rights they have. Such a situation is to some extent an effect of their culture, but to some extent it is also probably determined by the attitude of the Polish majority towards them. In contrast, the Vietnamese, who are not identified by law as a minority, are quite active culturally, have the ability or will to integrate, send their children to Polish schools, organise themselves, etc.

2.3. Jewish cultural activity

The social and cultural activity of the Jewish minority in Warsaw is very rich. The largest cultural institution of the Jewish community is the ER Kamińska State Jewish Theatre. The theatre's repertoire is sometimes criticised, also by the Jewish community itself. This however is a proof of the high importance of its cultural offer to the community. It should be added that this institution is a phenomenon not only in Warsaw, but also throughout the country, as the only artistic establishment of its kind focused on cultivating minority traditions. The performances, both theatrical and musical, also attract a large non-Jewish audience interested in Jewish culture and many tourists can be found among the audience.

The organisation animating the social and cultural life of the Jewish minority in Warsaw is the Jewish Religious Community, reactivated in 1997. As the largest of the nine Jewish Communities in Poland, it has 300 members. It undertakes religious, social and educational activity, such as lectures on Jewish religious celebrations and traditions, Hebrew language courses, etc. There is also a Seniors' Club (meetings, lectures, tours), a kosher canteen, and charity activities for the elderly and poor health members of the community. In Warsaw there is also the office of the Union

of the Jewish Religious Communities of Poland, which co-ordinates the Jewish religious life in the whole country. The centre of religious life in Warsaw is the historical Nożyk Synagogue at Twarda Street. For those who find the dominant in the community orthodox religious model too narrow, the Association 'Beit' comes forward with a cultural and religious offer which originates in the open Judaism formula.

Another significant factor in the Jewish community in Warsaw is the activity of the Social and Cultural Association of Jews in Poland, created in 1950 and so one of the oldest among Jewish organisations. Its statutory aims are: fulfilling cultural needs of Jews through both preserving tradition and promoting the modern accomplishments of Polish and Jewish culture, and helping the Jewish community in every-day problems.

In Warsaw one can also find the 'Makabi' Sports Club, registered in 1990. It is a small organisation referring to the rich tradition of Jewish sports from the pre-World War II Warsaw.

A different category are social organisations preserving the memory of history and martyrdom of Polish Jews. The Association of Jewish Veterans and Victims of World War II in Poland is an independent organisation functioning since 1989. Apart from granting social aid, among its activities are publications documenting the Jewish participation in the battle against Nazism and commemoration of Jewish soldiers' graves in Polish military cemeteries. The 'Children of Holocaust' Association mostly acts by searching for families and reconstructing family histories of those who survived the Nazi persecution. The Association-Jewish Historical Institute was created in 1947. Among its statutory aims is cultivating the cultural traditions of the Jewish community, disseminating knowledge of the history and culture of Jews living for generations in Poland, heritage preservation, gathering information and documentation on Poles who helped Jews during World War II. The entity set up for the realisation of these aims was the Jewish Historical Institute, which in 1994 was transformed from a non-profit research organisation into a state research institute. Within the Institute the following departments are to be found: science, education, museum, archives, libraries, documentation of antiquities. Every four months *The History of Jews Quarterly (Kwartalnik Historii Żydów)* is published (in Polish), as well as the yearbook in *Yiddish Bleter far Geszichte*.

The Jewish community in Warsaw is very active in the publishing field (including the Internet). For years now, thanks to the efforts of the Social and Cultural Association of Jews in Poland, a magazine entitled *Dos Jidisze Wort – The Jewish Word (Słowo Żydowskie)* on Jewish social and cultural affairs in Poland and worldwide is published every fortnight with the financial support of the Ministry of Culture. It is quite unique as half of the articles are in Yiddish – a language so rare nowadays and at the same time so

important for the history of Polish culture. Of a slightly different character is the monthly *Midrasz*, published since 1997. In contrast with the above mentioned periodical, *Midrasz* is not a news magazine but a forum for the exchange of ideas on the life of Jews in Poland, Israel and the Diaspora. Many of its articles are devoted to religion.

The main founder of *Midrasz*, as well as many other Jewish cultural initiatives, is the Roland S. Lauder Foundation operating in Warsaw since 1990. The Foundation runs mainly educational activity and supports Jewish cultural events. Along with the Lauder Foundation, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in Warsaw is an important source of financing the Jewish social life. The foundation taking care of the places of memory and cultivating Jewish tradition is the American-Polish-Israeli Foundation for Promoting Polish-Jewish Culture "Shalom". Also in 1993 a Jewish Forum foundation was registered; its activities concentrate on animating Jewish life on the elite level.

The cultural and social activity of Jewish youth, gathered in the Polish Union of Jewish Students is also worth mentioning. The organisation takes part in awareness rising campaigns against anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance.

Another form of cultural activity of the Jewish minority in Warsaw is the Warsaw Jewish Book Fair, has been held since 1998. The fair aims at popularising publications on Jewish affairs, organising meetings with authors and discussions, as well as showing films. Another interesting event is the international film festival "Jewish Motives" (*ydowskie Motywy*), organised in the Muranów cinema theatre since 2004.

Thus, the often expressed pessimistic view that the Jewish culture in Poland, and so in Warsaw, is withering away, seems rather exaggerated.

2.4. The cultural activity of the Warsaw Ukrainians and Byelorussians

The Ukrainians are at present the largest minority group in Warsaw. The main cultural life animation centre of Ukrainians in Warsaw is the Union of Ukrainians in Poland (*Związek Ukraińców w Polsce*). It was created as a result of the transformation of the Ukrainian Social and Cultural Association (*Ukraińskie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne*) in 1990. The establishment of the latter was possible thanks to the political 'thaw' in 1956, and was then a limited representation of the cultural aspirations of the Ukrainians in the Polish People's Republic. Contrary to the Ukrainian Social and Cultural Association, the Union of Ukrainians in Poland enjoys full freedom and political independence. It is actively taking advantage of the freedom gained after 1989. This goes beyond cultural activity alone. They also take up initiatives aiming at organising the political representation of Polish Ukrainians and improving the relationship between the Polish and Ukrainian nations

countries. The Ukrainian communities also skilfully take advantage of the warm feelings towards them, visible in Warsaw that revealed during the so-called 'orange revolution' in Kiev in December 2004. In such activities they are supported by Polish groups, such as Free Ukraine (*Wolna Ukraina*) created by the supporters of Victor Jushchenko. Among the most interesting initiatives at the intersection of popular culture and politics are performances and recordings of Polish and Ukrainian rap musicians, initiated by a well-known Polish TV presenter and music journalist Robert Leszczyński.

The case below describes a significant cultural event organised in support of the Ukrainian orange revolution.

Case 1

*Kiev-Warsaw – a Common Cause, a concert, 27th November 2004 – A cultural undertaking that brought together two nations*¹⁰⁰

The process of profound social changes in the Ukraine in autumn of the year 2004 brought about the activation of Ukrainians and the pro-Ukrainians in Warsaw. The Kiev-Warsaw – a *Common Cause* concert, organised by Ukrainian and Polish civic initiatives, with the support from the Warsaw authorities, became a symbol of the phenomenal interest in Ukraine and of the solidarity with the Ukrainian democracy.

The initiative itself came from students: Poles and Ukrainians studying in Warsaw. From the students community two youth groups emerged which then were transformed into the Free Ukraine (*Wolna Ukraina*, www.wolnaukraina.pl), created by the Poles and *The Initiative "Our choice - Ukraine"* (*Inicjatywa "Nasz Wybór - Ukraina"*, www.ukraincy.prv.pl), created by the Ukrainian students. The initiators addressed the city authorities with a proposal to organise jointly a concert of solidarity with the Ukrainian democracy. Polish music and TV stars, and social activists were invited. To underline the symbolic bond between Poland and Ukraine the event was organised at the Piłsudski Square (where the alliance between two great leaders Piłsudski and Petlura took place during the Bolshevik war).

In order for the Ukrainians to know of the event, it was decided that the Polish public television Channel 3 and the opposition Ukrainian Channel 5 would organise jointly a transmission bridge between Warsaw and Kiev. The Warsaw authorities were in favour of this. The Office of Theatre and Music, the *Stoleczna Estrada* and the city community services (transport, police) took part in the organisation of the event.

The efforts of the organisers, among which was also the Union of Ukrainians in Poland, made it possible to prepare an event in merely 48 hours. A day before the concert, a large media campaign was launched. It should be noted that also the commercial media joined the campaign on a non-profit basis. Popular actors and musicians, representing all age groups and styles, took part – from those known in the 80s to hip-hop performers. For example the Ukrainian jazz singer Roksana Wikaluk, actors such as Daniel Olbrychski, Piotr Machalica, Stanisław Tym, Robert Kudelski, Michał Żebrowski, Agata Buzek, also the Rampa Theatre presented parts of the „Wielka Woda” play, *Elektryczne Gitary*, *Gawęda* and a folk group from *Gdańsk Chutir* gave concerts, as well as many others. Robert Leszczyński, a well-known TV music presenter, hosted the concert. The event was opened by Lech Kaczyński, the then President of Warsaw.

The outdoor beams and live TV transmission from the Ukrainian capital were also a success. Two beams on the square showed, during breaks, what was happening in Kiev, whilst those gathered in Kiev could watch fragments of the Warsaw concert. Also during the concert there was a connection with the manifestation participants on the Independence square in Kiev. Victor Jushchenko's spokesperson Iryna Gerashchenko stressed the role Poland played in the negotiations between the Ukrainian opposition and the authorities. In spite of cold rainy weather about 5000 people attended the concert and the whole square was covered by the colour of the revolution – orange.

The fact that the success of the concert, a cultural undertaking with a very positive effect on the relationship between Poland and Ukraine (which not long ago was not very good), was a result of co-ordinated work and engagement of a Polish civic initiative, Ukrainian minority and the city authorities, is undoubtedly important.

The Union of Ukrainians in Poland publishes "Our Word" (*Nasze Słowo*), a nation-wide weekly in Ukrainian. Its editorial office is in Warsaw. They publish about 5 thousand copies mostly thanks to the support of the Polish Ministry of Culture. It is addressed above all to Ukrainians living permanently in Poland, rather rarely the authors engage themselves in initiatives addressed to a larger audience. This weekly is the main Ukrainian medium in Poland. The magazine entitled "Ukraine", created in 2005, is of a different character. It is edited partly in Lviv and published in Polish. Its aim is to bring the Polish reader closer to the political and social realities of today's Ukraine. Moreover, the Ukrainian minority is the only one to have its own television programme, broadcast by the public Polish Regional Channel 3. The programme, entitled *Telenowyny* (TV News) is devoted to issues concerning the Ukrainian minority and to the history and the present-day relations between Poland and Ukraine. The programme is in Ukrainian with Polish subtitles. The activity of the Union of Ukrainians in Poland also includes cultural events addressed

100. Case study by Rostyslav Kramara.

mainly 'inwards' that is to cultivate Ukrainian identity among the minority itself. Nevertheless, major events are sometimes organised and addressed 'outwards', that is, to the representatives of the ethnic majority interested in the different aspects of Ukrainian culture, like the memorable Polish-Ukrainian Youth Festival in 1998. In 2005 the Green Jolly group gave several concerts in Poland, and a year before that, the Eurovision prize-winner Ruslana came. These events, organised in co-operation with the Ukrainians living in Poland, had undoubtedly a positive influence on bringing the two nations closer to each other.

Throughout the years, music was a very important ground for the Ukrainian minority cultural activity in Warsaw. The *Koka* music company, established by Volodymyr Nakonechny in 1989 (a graduate of the Ukrainian philology), has had a significant and specific place on the map of the Ukrainian cultural life.

Case 2

The "Koka" music company

The initiators of "Koka" originated from the young Ukrainians community, which took part in the 80s in the generation contesting ferment, which combined the Polish inspirations and the western counter-culture with discovering their own ethnic roots. One of the expressions of this ferment was the creation of a rock band Oseledec (which gave also concerts in Warsaw) and a low-edition periodical "Widryka", published in Warsaw. Among the most important accomplishments of "Koka" were: the Polish edition of a long-play of a popular British group "The Ukrainians", the co-organisation of events such as the above mentioned youth festival and the Independent Ukrainian Music Festival (with the participation of the Warsaw "Postregiment" group) in Lvov in 1995. Moreover, "Koka" published many long-play recording and cassettes with various kinds of Ukrainian music - from folk music to rock avant-garde and organised concert tours of Ukrainian artists. According to the company manager's estimates, ethnic Ukrainians made one fifth of the buyers. The rest were the young Poles with a growing interest in Ukrainian music. In February 1999 the Polish pop magazine "Machina" published a large article on Ukrainian music on the Polish scene and attached to each issue a CD of Ukrainian music compilation, prepared by "Koka". Taking into consideration the large edition that the paper had at the time (about 70 thousand copies), it can be said that it was the first presentation of young Ukrainian culture in Poland on such a large scale. Regrettably, the sad reality of the market did not allow "Koka" to continue its intense cultural activities in the following years, which proves the existence of real barriers hindering valuable cultural activity of minorities.

In the opinion of the representatives of Ukrainian community:

"The most interesting individual acting in the field of Ukrainian culture is Piotr Tyma, until recently the Secretary of the Federation of Ukrainian Unions in Poland (Zjednoczenie Związków Ukraińców w Polsce), and a representative of the young generation. He is the initiator and main organiser of the Ukrainian concert in Sopot. One should also mention several people, who have significant merits in the field of supporting Ukrainian culture in Poland. This is, above all, Włodzimierz Chanas – composer and conductor, until recently the director of the Warsaw Polytechnic Choir. He would like to see a festival of Ukrainian cuisine organised in summer as well as a large concert in the Congress Hall on the fourteenth anniversary of regaining independence by Ukraine. What is interesting is that this particular event is not an official initiative but of one of Ukrainians living in Poland. From the young generation of the Ukrainian minority. I could also name Włodzimierz Kleban – the chairman of the Civic Initiative (Inicjatywa Obywatelska), a law student at the University of Stefan Wyszyński and Marta Popowicz, who organises encounters with Ukrainian writers and poets." (from an interview with Rostyslav Kramar¹⁰¹).

A minority community relatively sparse, but nevertheless present in Warsaw is the **Byelorussians**. Young intelligence is dominant within the community. Many activists, originating from the Białystok region, come to Warsaw in order to study. Therefore the most visible organisation handling cultural activities is the Warsaw unit of Białystok based the Byelorussian Students' Union. A group of political emigrants from Byelorussia is also active in the field. The Byelorussian youth, among other events, frequently organises interesting and politically significant rock concerts showing their resistance against the regime of Lukashenko.

The low degree of institutionalisation of the Byelorussian activity seems to be a characteristic feature of their presence in Warsaw. This is clearly confirmed in the statement of the Byelorussian Initiative representative:

"As the Byelorussian Initiative we do not have our own headquarters. We usually gather in private houses. At the moment our own office would be an unnecessary cost, although it might happen that in the future we will have to have a place of our own. When we organise events we rent a place. Very active and favourable towards us is the club "Punkt" on 55 Koszykowa Street. Its owners are open to the Byelorussian initiatives. Yearly about 20 Byelorussian events are carried out there. Recently we also have a very good relationship with the University Library, where we have organised a film review on Chernobyl. The auditorium was given to our disposal free of charge. As regards other Byelorussian organisations, the situation is similar, which means that none of them

101. Rostyslav Kramar – senior lecturer at the Warsaw University, the Faculty of applied linguistics and East Slavonic Studies, the Department of Ukrainian Studies.

their own headquarters and their meetings are held in private houses or institutions. The same regards the fact that nobody prevents our activity or hinders us from organising professional events.” (from the interview with Włodzimierz Michniewicz).¹⁰²

2.5. The influence of the Vietnamese on the multiculturalism of Warsaw

The Vietnamese have been in Warsaw for only a decade but are now probably the most numerous of the minorities described here. Their number according to different estimates reaches several tens of thousands. It is hard to define precisely how big the community is, as some of its members do not have Polish citizenship or reside in Poland illegally. Additionally, the distinction between permanent residents in Poland and those planning to return to Vietnam after achieving a financial success is rather blurry. Nevertheless, a Vietnamese community of those living permanently in Poland, speaking Polish and sending children to Polish schools, some of them also with Polish citizenship, is crystallising in Warsaw.

This community, internally pluralistic, shows a growing social and cultural activity, and is also politically active, showing various attitudes towards the situation in Vietnam. Within the structures of the Vietnamese Association in Poland there exists a charity organisation “Solidarity and Friendship” set up in 1989, with the aim of helping both needy Vietnamese (e.g. the victims of the flood in Vietnam in 1998) and needy Poles (e.g. gifts for the Warsaw children’s hospices). The founders were Vietnamese, who after graduating in Poland, settled down here. Since then the number of Vietnamese in Warsaw has multiplied. In order to meet their needs numerous events are organised in the city, such as film shows with Vietnamese translations. There are also many music groups and a Vietnamese football league.

The Warsaw Vietnamese have marked their presence most strongly in cuisine, opening up and running many restaurants and stands with Asian food. From the beginning of the 90s until their close in 1999, a cluster of small fast-food restaurants and stands located on the Constitution Square, in the heart of Warsaw, was extremely popular. Since then, largely due to municipal pressure and negative media campaigns, their number has decreased. Nevertheless, it was the Vietnamese who were the first to radically expand the culinary horizons of Varsovians after 1989. Over the last several years small places offering ‘Turkish’ food have become popular (they are in fact run most often by Arabs, who after September 11 are afraid to manifest their identity). This new culinary diversity in Warsaw’s culture should not be underestimated, as new ‘national’ restaurants often play an important role in terms of integration and promotion of minority communities, through for example concerts and other events.

2.6. The Roma

A community poorly organised but certainly numerous in Warsaw are the Roma (Gypsies). Among them are both Polish citizens and people who came from Romania (the number of the latter has significantly decreased over the last several years). The relations between the two groups were sometimes not at all good. The Polish Roma blamed the newcomers from Romania for strengthening the negative stereotypes of Gypsies through begging in the streets. The most common form of direct contact between the Roma minority and the Polish majority is fortune-telling by the Roma women in few places in Warsaw. The customary dissimilarity becomes the reason for smaller or larger conflicts of the minority with the majority. It is the Roma who distinguish themselves the most among the minorities present in Warsaw.

Two Roma foundations, registered in Warsaw, oppose this situation. The Roma Baxt Foundation was registered in 1991. Its aim is to promote and disseminate culture, art and tradition in Poland and abroad, as well as to create an objective image of the Roma in the public opinion world-wide. The aims of the Roma Foundation, created a year later, are similar: support for Gypsy families, co-operation with domestic and international research Gypsy associations, etc. Unfortunately the mentioned foundations do not show much activity outside the Roma communities.

Meanwhile, the unfavourable image of Roma in the public opinion which leads to discrimination and violence (described e.g. in reports of the European Centre of Roma Rights) would require special activity aimed at counteracting the negative stereotypes among the majority. Also the social situation of Roma families is very difficult, this being also deepened by the said stereotypes. There is a state educational and social care program for the Roma but only in the Małopolska Region. The best ambassador of the Gypsy culture in Warsaw is still Jerzy Ficowski, a poet, translator and intercessor of Gypsy creation, the laureate of many prizes.

2.7. Other minorities

A group of a changing influence and number (dependent on visa policy, inter alia), but of importance in the cultural landscape of Warsaw, are the Russian-speaking immigrants (this includes people from the Russian Federation as well as post-Soviet republics like Moldova or Armenia). The “Europa.ru” and “Ruskij Warsaw Courier” (Ruskij Kurier Warszawy), the two regularly published magazines (not subsidised, which among minority publications is a rarity), are a proof of the intellectual potential and needs of this group, which in Poland is exposed to discrimination and stereotyping. It is especially

102. Włodzimierz Michniewicz – representative of Stowarzyszenia Biellaruskaja Inicjatywa.

monthly, that has a very interesting cultural offer. At the same time, the number of Russian bookshops is growing, offering often ambitious literature. The representatives of different Slavic minorities get together, with others, in these bookshops and in the Centre of Slavic Culture.

More and more active and growing rapidly is the group of Warsaw Muslims, a community ethnically diversified, but clearly noticeable due to religious distinctiveness, concentrated in the Muslim Religious Union. The Warsaw mosque on Wiatraczna Street is a place where also activities such as lectures and meetings for all interested in the culture of Islam and the Oriental East, are organised. The Muslim community co-operates, among others, with the Polish-Arab Friendship Society and the editorial staff of the Internet portal *arabia.pl*, active especially among the youth. The great political mobilisation of the community could be seen in its participation in the protest against Polish military participation in the war in Iraq.

A small ethnic and religious community in Warsaw are the Karaites, united in the Karaite Religious Union. One of the only three in Poland Karaite communes is located in Warsaw. The successful efforts of the Karaite Religious Union ended in taking the Karaite cemetery, from a historical perspective one of the most interesting Warsaw necropolises into their possession in 1994.

3 Debate, policies and actions

3.1. Problems and discussions on the cultural activity of minorities

The common problem of national minorities in Warsaw is the social atmosphere, sometimes marked with diffidence towards them. This contradicts many declarations of the Poles, who claim that they are a nation generally accepting foreigners and their settling in Poland. Nobody carried out the research of public opinion of Varsovians on the subject, therefore it is difficult to determine to what extent incidental acts of aggression or aversion towards minorities are representative for the general public's attitude towards minorities living in the Polish capital (one can hope that Warsaw is more tolerant than the rest of the country). Undoubtedly however, the attitudes of Warsaw inhabitants (as of Poles in general) range from acceptance to distrust or even hostility towards national minorities. In the opinion of Helena Datner¹⁰³:

"The first restraint is certainly the homogenous character of the Polish society. The problems of national minorities are often disregarded and treated as unimportant. Secondly, groups strongly countering minority programmes can be seen in Poland. At

the same time we are dealing with weak forms of organising immigrants and minority groups (here I mean mostly ethnic groups). They lack strength and verbalise their needs very weakly. In confrontation with strong majority groups they often do not stand a chance." (from the interview with Helena Datner).

A problem, perceived mainly by the young members of minority groups, pose the activities of right wing, nationalistic groups, or ones of even neo-fascist character, spreading hatred towards minorities, such as "Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski" (National Polish Revival), or "Młodzież Wszechpolska" (All-Polish Youth). The social atmosphere is also poisoned by racist and xenophobic press, which – in breach of the law – disseminates hatred towards minorities, especially towards the Jews (e.g. *Szczerbiec*, the National Monthly (*Miesięcznik Narodowy*), the Nationalist (*Nacjonalista*). The readership of these pamphlets is not wide, but the mere fact of their existence damages the image of Warsaw.

On the other hand, more and more often, independent civic initiatives are being created aiming at making the atmosphere around minorities better and combating chauvinism. One of them is the "Never Again" Association (*Stowarzyszenie "Nigdy Więcej"*) which publishes a magazine under the same title and launches educational, public awareness campaigns targeting young people. Among them are "Music against racism" and "Kick out racism from the stadiums". The Association has initiated and co-organised, for two years now, the International Film Festival "Jewish Motives". An initiative well known among the Warsaw intellectual elite is the "Open Polish Republic" Association against Anti-Semitism and Xenophobia (*"Otwarta Rzeczpospolita" Stowarzyszenie przeciwko Antysemityzmowi i Ksenofobii*). Activity for immigrants and refugees is also run by the Polish Humanitarian Action (*Polska Akcja Humanitarna*) and the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights.

Representatives of minorities perceive these initiatives with great approval and, to some extent thanks to them, define the relation between the culture of minorities and the overall cultural activity of Warsaw in a positive way. Having to choose from such terms as full assimilation, exclusion, integration (emphasising autonomy) of their own culture, they unanimously choose integration, with some elements of exclusion. As a representative of the Ukrainian minority states:

"The Ukrainian culture reconciles the principle of civic integration with the right to difference. We are living in time where we cannot talk about assimilation or isolation any more. Especially in Warsaw, which thanks to its liberal attitude towards minorities creates good conditions for the integration of cultures. I know the articles of association of the

103. Helena Datner – the founder and director of the Jewish Pedagogical Centre.

national minority organisations, not only Ukrainian. In every one of them, one of the main aims is the integration with the Polish society.” (from the interview with Rostyslav Kramar). And a Jewish minority representative says:

“Nearly every cultural difference brings about a different answer. (...). I could characterise the situation of immigrants in Warsaw using the term: exclusion. But speaking of the Jewish community, I would incline towards the term: ‘integration’. Jews are without a doubt a part of the Warsaw society and national heritage. At the same time, we would like to continue our own cultural identity and to acquaint the majority with it.” (from the interview with Helena Datner).


Finally, a visible problem is the ambiguous attitude of the local authorities towards the ‘national minorities’ and immigrants. At the same time, Warsaw aspires to becoming a European metropolis in varied fields, particularly in that of culture. These ambitions, expressed in various forms of symbolic affirmation of Warsaw identity and in reference to the years of its cultural glory, have recently been strengthened by Poland’s accession to the European Union. The ambitious political and local government leadership of the Polish capital, which puts emphasis on the symbolic aspects of cultural policy, creating events in order to constitute strong city and national identity, in the context of European integration, are of great importance here.

Unfortunately however, the fundamental issue, multiculturalism, one of the most important elements of European metropolis’ identity, is rarely raised in Warsaw. Over the last five years the presence of minorities in the cultural landscape has spontaneously grown and is still dynamically developing. This, however, is poorly reflected in the thinking on Warsaw’s culture at the institutional level.

3.2. The cultural policy of the City

The cultural policy of the capital derives from various levels of government, both central and local. Warsaw is the seat of the Ministry of Culture and of many national institutions funded from the central budget. This report focuses solely on the cultural policy of the Warsaw local authorities. Nevertheless, analysing this issue one must bear in mind that in 2005 the Department of National Minority Cultures in the Ministry of Culture was abolished. Warsaw local government policy is shaped, above all, at the municipal level. Its realisation is the responsibility of the appointed entities of the Warsaw City Hall. As regards culture they are as follows: the Office of Theatres and Music, subordinate to the Mayor, and the Office of Culture and 18 Cultural District Units subordinate to the Vice-Mayor (diagram 2).

Diagram 2.
Responsibility for cultural affairs in the Warsaw City Hall¹⁰⁴



The responsibilities of the *Office of Theatres and Music* (directly subordinate to the Mayor) are:

- current evaluation of theatres’ activity and co-ordination of their repertoire,
- awarding subsidies and grants for theatres’ activity,
- animating co-operation within the field of theatre and music activity, with local and regional communities of other countries, and organising cultural events in the field of theatre and music.

104. Source: www.bip.warszawa.pl

The responsibilities of the *Office of Culture* are:

- formulating cultural policy and supervision of cultural institutions for which Warsaw is the organiser,
- supporting and co-ordinating initiatives in the field of cultural policy implementation,
- supporting cultural projects,
- international co-operation in the field of culture.

The responsibilities of the *Cultural District Units* are as follows:

- promotion of cultural activity,
- maintaining and supporting cultural activity of institutions and gathering information
- animating cultural activities.

In 2003, out of the total city of Warsaw budget for culture and heritage preservation amounting to 43,442,185 euro, 16,121,054 euro were allocated by the Warsaw City Hall, 6,364,158 euro by the County Authorities and 20,956,973 euro by Cultural Districts' Units.

Table 34. Total expenditure on culture in the city of Warsaw, 2003, (in euro) ¹⁰⁵

Detailed list	Total Expenditure	Including		
		The city	The country	Districts
Total (current and capital) expenditure of Warsaw	1,441,269,480	757,675,066	131,620,002	551,974,412
Culture and heritage preservation	43,442,185	16,121,054	6,364,158	20,956,973
Other activities in the field of culture	3,374,949	2,451,789	74,714	848,446
Dramatic and puppet theatres	12,341,667	7,860,727	4,480,940	0
Music theatres, operas and operetta houses	2,380,471	2,380,471	0	0
Comunity and culture centres, common rooms and clubs	7,156,236	27,377	428,074	6,700,785
Other cultural institutions	350,896	350,896	0	0
Libraries	12,575,059	0	96,381	12,478,678
Museums	3,998,851	2,714,802	1,284,049	0
Protection and conservation of monuments	279,990	279,990	0	0
Other activities	984,066	55,002	0	929,064

Subsidies from the city budget for cultural institutions in 2003 amounted to 34,654,332 euro, from which the most was granted to libraries (12,23,248 euro) and to dramatic and puppet theatres (11,990,144 euro).

105. Uchwała nr IX/106/203 Rady Miasta Stołecznego Warszawy z dnia 27 marca 2003 w sprawie budżetu m.st. W-wy na rok 2003 (Resolution of the Warsaw City Hall No. IX/106/2003 of 27th March 2003, on the 2003 budget of Warsaw).

Table 35. Subsidies for cultural institutions in the city of Warsaw (current expenditure), 2003, (in euro)¹⁰⁶

Type of institution	Granted subsidies
Dramatic and puppet theatres	11,990,144
Music theatres, operas and operetta houses	2,380,470
Community and culture centres common rooms, and clubs	6,357,760
The Capital Stage (Stołeczna Estrada)	350,896
Libraries	12,239,248
Museums	1,261,150
Cultural Centre Ochota	74,664
Total	34,654,332

In the city current expenditure structure, there are means reserved for project funding assigned for commissioned activities to non-public institutions (mostly non governmental organisations) for the realisation of tasks in the field of culture and cultural heritage. In 2003 they amounted to 1,991,331 euro, of which 16,177 euro were allocated for preservation of monuments.

Table 36. Project funding for non public organizations, 2003, (in euro)¹⁰⁷

Culture and national heritage preservation	1,991,331
Other activities in the field of culture	1,957,154
Preservation of monuments	16,177

Since 2005, project funding in the field of culture has been allocated according to new rules (tenders). The Mayor of Warsaw assigned The Office of Culture, the Office of Theatres and Music, and the Cultural Districts Units to be responsible for organising the bidding procedures; the tenders are organised by virtue of "the Act of Public Benefit Activity and Voluntary Service".

The City of Warsaw grant given to the Office of Theatres and Culture for the year 2005, was allocated by the latter to non-public institutions, realising tasks in the field of culture, as follows :

for the organisation of international reviews, competitions, music festivals of a cyclic character of utmost importance, the Office was given a grant of 1,443,504 euro and of this it allocated 1,002,202 euro;

for theatrical creation in Warsaw in particular through: organising reviews, competitions and theatrical festivals of utmost artistic importance and promoting non institutional theatrical activities etc., the Office was given 771,528 euro and allocated 761,996 euro.¹⁰⁸

The City of Warsaw grant to the Office of Culture for the year 2005 was allocated by the latter to non public institutions realising tasks in the field of culture, in the following way: for preparation and realisation of 'around holiday's projects', including Passion Week events (575,162 euro); for preparation and realisation of cultural events offered by "the Warsaw Cultural Spring" (83,375 euro); for preparation and realisation of events popularising knowledge on Warsaw and commemorating Warsaw history (176,954 euro); for preparation and realisation of cyclical events (167,496 euro).¹⁰⁹

3.3. Cultural policy of the city towards national minorities

The cultural policy of the local authorities towards minorities is rather ambivalent. Neither the Office of Culture nor the Office of Theatres and Music have an operational strategy towards national minorities. In consequence, their actions in this field are of an ad hoc nature. In the rich cultural co-operation of the city of Warsaw with other metropolitan cities and regions, the offer addressed towards national minorities comes into view only when the city/region with which Warsaw is co-operating is itself multicultural and has programmes devoted to the development of cultural diversity. One can however clearly see a growing interest in the aspect of multiculturalism. The support given to the Round Table devoted to cultural diversity in the European metropolises organised by CIRCLE (Cultural Information and Research Centres Liaison in Europe) can serve as evidence of this tendency. Looking into the experience of other metropolises in the field and the will to exchange experiences is a good step towards developing one's own programme. It must be noted, that city officials take part in some of the events organised by the minorities. The subsidies for the organisation of such events are, however, granted in a rather unpredictable way, which causes many difficulties, for example those which were planned to be yearly fall out of schedule due to lack of funds.

At the same time, the strong emphasis placed on national identity and national tradition in the policy of the local authorities – and the participation of Warsaw's elected officials

106. Ibidem.
107. Ibidem.

108. Załącznik do Zarządzenia nr 2288/2005 Prezydenta m.st. W-wy z 12 kwietnia 2005 r. (Appendix to the Directive of the Warsaw Mayor No. 2288/2005 of 12th April 2005).
109. Załącznik nr 1 do Zarządzenia nr 2211/2005 Prezydenta m.st.W-wy z 28 lutego 2005 (Appendix no.1 to the Directive of the Warsaw Mayor No.. 2211/2005 of 28th February 2005).

in nation-wide politics, including their speeches on international policy (e.g. anti-Russian)– create an unfavourable climate for the presence of minority representatives in public life. Decisions such as granting financial support to the raising the monument of Roman Dmowski, sends a negative signal, as it is a symbol of policy hostile towards minorities. Also the presence of the Polish Family League Party (*Liga Polskich Rodzin*) which is of a nationalistic character, in the Warsaw authorities (among others, until recently, the chairman of the Council of Warsaw) is not a positive sign when Warsaw’s opening up to multicultural perspectives is at stake.

The minority representatives’ opinion on the co-operation with local authorities is not a good one, both in terms of the overall situation of minorities and immigrants and matters directly relating to culture. They say:

“A lot depends on who is in power at the moment. One can not really see a well thought-out policy in all of this. Moreover, in order to improve the situation of minorities some of the institutional solutions ought to be simplified, where crucial existence matters are concerned. Here I mean for example the excessive bureaucracy towards foreigners, which most certainly does not make taking roots in the Polish society easy.”¹¹⁰ (from the interview with Marcin Kornak).

The criticism of the present situation is however a constructive one. For example Włodzimierz Michniewicz and Rostyslav Kramar, respectively, propose:

“(…) on the official website, the city authorities should offer information in different languages. This way it would be much easier to co-operate, communication would be facilitated and the representatives of minorities would easily have the access to information on the cultural offer of the city. In public offices all brochures should also be in different languages, and not only in English and Russian – it would make it easier for the future inhabitants of Warsaw, representatives of new national minorities, to integrate with the Polish society. It also would be a good idea for the city to invite offers to organise cyclic events for national minorities. The national minorities would then apply and the best would be granted subsidies. Such support should also be granted to all the preparatory actions for example with a year’s advance. I think, that in this way, the national and ethnic minorities’ and immigrants’ initiatives would be stimulated, encouraged to a broader presentation.”¹¹¹ (from the interview with Włodzimierz Michniewicz).

Rostyslav Kramar proposes:

„A special unit should be created in the Warsaw City Hall, which would develop a comprehensive map of national minorities. It should also be responsible for gathering

data on minorities: assessment of the exact number of minority representatives, and their social background. The creation of a data base regarding minorities would be the first step. (...) Particular immigrant groups are seeking information on themselves, they seek places where they could share experience on living condition in a metropolis like Warsaw. Many immigrants want to settle in Poland, start a family, work and integrate with the society. A one-sided integration is however impossible.” (from the interview with Rostyslav Kramar).

3.4. Programmes and actions for national minorities

There are two public institutions¹¹² in Warsaw that promote the culture of different ‘nationalities’:

● The State Jewish Theatre in Warsaw (*Państwowy Teatr Żydowski w Warszawie*),

● The Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw (*Żydowski Instytut Historyczny w Warszawie*).

Of a great significance is the involvement of local public cultural institutions – community centres and libraries – in creating attitudes of openness and tolerance.

Case 3

*The municipal Cultural Centre in the Bielany district - activities for mutual acceptance*¹¹³

The Warsaw district of Bielany has already several years ago begun the realisation of a series of events entitled: “Let’s Get to Know the Culture and Customs of other Nations” (*Poznajemy Kultur i Obyczaje Innych Narodów*). In the Bielany Cultural Centre at 1 Goldoni Street, once every two months, ‘free crossing of borders’ is made possible to its participants. The advantage of these events, organised in local communities, is that participation is free and all are welcome. The recipients of the above mentioned series of events judge it very highly. The lectures, film shows, artistic performances, orientation courses on culture and civilisation of a chosen country, meetings with diplomats, artists, travellers, photo and art exhibitions – this is what the events scenario includes. One can not underestimate the cognitive and educational value of such international events.

The main aim is of course mutual cognition, getting acquainted with differences and similarities, as well as cultural specifics, eliminating stereotypes and disenchanting commonplace opinions and prejudices, such as: a ‘cold Swede’, ‘phlegmatic

110. Marcin Kornak – the chairman of the “Nigdy Więcej” Association.
111. Włodzimierz Michniewicz –the “Bielarusskaja Inicjatywa” Association.

112. The profile and character of their activity is described in detail in Section II. 3.
113. Case study by Wanda Górka - the head of Bielany Cultural District Unit.

The choice of the thematic evenings does not result from precise programming. Nor is there any censorship on the preference of one country above another. We meet with everyone - sometimes even to set a justification of matters that appear to be controversial when based only on the information passed by the mass-media. Soon after the evening on South Korea, one on North Korea was organised. After a Cuban evening there was a Colombian one. China was a guest, and a few months later so was a group demanding Tibet's independence. It also happened that the institution was surrounded by a cordon of security guards as the Israeli evening was organised at the time of the escalation of the armed conflicts in the Near East. Discussions on the discrimination of women carried on till late night at the Iranian meeting.

Thanks to such confrontations, numerous participants have the opportunity to get together and enlarge their knowledge of the complex modern world.

Another form of the Bielany district authorities activity for tolerance and understanding is the organisation of the National Days. During the annual Bielany Days of Culture the events have a more celebratory character, the attendance is higher and there is access to wider information on different sorts of workshops, exhibitions, concerts, performances of artists from foreign countries. During the Week of Japanese Culture, organised twice already, several hundreds of people took part in calligraphy workshops, ikebana, ceremonies of brewing tea. Many people participated in concerts, exhibitions, reciting evenings and theatre performances. The Dni Kresowe Polish Eastern Borderlands Days, held for the past several years in March, present to the Bielany audience the modern artistic activity of acknowledged Lithuanian and Ukrainian artists and the borderland holiday traditions.

All the mentioned activities were initiated and financed by the local authorities and implemented, with full commitment, by the Bielany Cultural Centre. They are one of the ways of how to lead activities aimed at building integration on the local level by a local and public cultural institution.

In Warsaw, so far, there have been no projects exclusively dealing with the preservation of cultural diversity. In 2005, for the first time, at the initiative of Andrzej Urbański, the then Deputy Mayor of Warsaw, whose responsibilities included cultural affairs, a festival "On the Cross-roads of Culture" (*Na Skrzyżowaniu Kultur*) was organised. It presented the minority cultures in Warsaw and also the cultures of the nations which they come from. The festival was a large undertaking incorporating presentations of Warsaw twin-cities. There were hopes on the city authority side, that many Warsaw residents would want to take part in this festival addressed to national minorities and immigrants. In fact, the festival itself was not a unilateral presentation but it enriched the process of civic

integration of the Varsovians and representatives of other nations living among them. One cannot underestimate the importance and value of large events, usually co-financed by the city, in shaping an attitude of openness towards other cultures among Varsovians, e.g. the annual Trans-Caucasian Festival (*Festiwal Transkaukazja*), the Multicultural Week organised on the yearly basis by students of the Warsaw School of Social Psychology, or the Refugee Day (*Dzień Uchodźcy*) organised by the Polish Humanitarian Action and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Regrettably, however, the latter did not take place in 2005, for the first time, due to the refusal of the city authorities to co-finance it.

The Refugee Association of the Polish Republic (*Stowarzyszenie Uchodźców RP*) in Warsaw – only occasionally supported by the local authorities – belongs to the most interesting animators of cultural activity – theatrical, educational and of other type. Those active in the Association join, on a regular basis, in the organisation of sports events under the banner of "Let's kick out racism from the stadiums". They publish a bilingual (Polish-English) magazine "Refugees' Voice" (*Głos Uchodźcy*). Their activity especially deserves attention as they also engage representatives of different ethnic groups of refugees (Africans, Chechens and others), thus promoting a valuable intercultural experiment.

The minority representatives judge the cultural offer of Warsaw without great enthusiasm:

"There is some kind of offer in Warsaw addressed to us, but it is mostly ourselves who propose something. (...) The impression is that from time to time there are festivals of many cultures. It is likeable and light in form, bringing together (often in a rather mechanical way) different cultures. Most often music and cuisine is presented. It is nice and not harmful, and it is multicultural. In this way all reefs and difficulties are avoided – those related to the true understanding of cultural distinctiveness. And this is the cultural distinctiveness which usually is difficult, requires great effort, knowledge and above all a suitable attitude – of authentic curiosity for others." (from the interview with Helena Datner).

4. Concluding observations

The large cities of Europe have always been multicultural, yet their cultural landscape has been substantially transformed, enriched and pluralised over the last decades through the inflow of ethnic minority groups and immigrants. It is hardly possible to analyse the metropolitan culture of capital cities without taking into account the cultural presence of these minority communities. The influence of minority cultures goes far beyond

the minorities themselves; in specific ways the immigrants' culture leaves imprints on contemporary popular culture and on the life of the minorities themselves. Minority cultures inspire and revive the culture of the city as a whole. Contacts and encounters with minority cultures broaden mental horizons, help in reducing xenophobia and in grasping the contemporary globalising and multicultural world which makes us closely co-exist with each other, together with all its implications. That is why the minority cultures in the metropolitan Warsaw environment play a much more important role than the mere cultivation of cultural traditions for the use of small immigrants groups living in Warsaw.

Warsaw is a city which lost its multicultural face due to dramatic events of the twentieth century. Only after 1989 was a new social setting created that made for a multicultural revival. The systemic breakthrough enabled the minorities legal freedom of cultural creativity. Increasing number of immigrants significantly enriched the cultural offer in the Polish capital city. Activities of ethnic groups are far from having a mass character, yet it is an important element of the process which makes for the shaping of the new face of Warsaw on the cultural map of Europe.

Most cultural activities of the minorities in Warsaw, and especially those supported by the authorities, seem to focus on preserving their identity and, occasionally, on presenting it to the general public. If one uses Bennett's typology, the cultural practices (and the city policy) are on the level of support of 'ethnic minority cultures', and not 'multiculturalism', let alone 'cultural diversity'. The cultural reality of Warsaw is still in many ways a mono-cultural model of the ethnic majority, national culture being simply an extension of the ethnic majority culture. Sometimes cultural events organised (or co-organised) by minorities acquire a political significance; in such cases it is usually oriented toward a country of origin or national affiliation, e.g. in the case of the 'orange revolution' in Ukraine, events in the countries of the Caucasus, the struggle for human rights in Vietnam etc. Interestingly, a few of the creative initiatives aimed at cultural fusion, combining elements of Polish and 'minority' culture appear in the circle of the African migrant community. Polish Africans have also taken to the streets protesting against discrimination and for equal rights in Poland, something other minority groups have not done. Thus, paradoxically, the longer (real and symbolic) distance from 'home' for the Polish-Africans may mean their increased engagement the social and cultural reality of 'here and now' (but not assimilation).

It is critical to get to know what is the nature of the cultural offer presented by immigrants and minorities living in Warsaw. Obviously, it is not possible to use one universal standard in evaluating the activity of social environments which are diverse and multiple by their very nature. Yet, it is worth seeking some affinities which will help us

in finding important general features. The cultural offer of minorities and immigrants is still only an additional element of the Warsaw cultural landscape; a fascinating element underlining the new modern character of the city, but only supplementary as it has been said. It should be added in this context that this cultural offer presented by minorities is richer than that offered them by the city itself. What is offered by minority cultures shows a relatively small degree of institutionalisation. The basic organisational and legal framework for the cultural activities of minorities is provided by NGO's – associations, foundations etc. Varied, not infrequently sporadic and spontaneous, actions are also developed via informal structures, social networks.

On the majority side it is also the non-governmental institutions that are the chief partners of the minority NGO's. This results from the lack of institutionalised, permanent co-operation with the city authorities, which do not prioritise such a co-operation and did not define its framework and rules. Both the state administration, with the Ministry of Culture, and the Warsaw local government do not satisfactorily perform their role, and that is why third sector organisations strive to fill this institutional gap. Here the Warsaw Jewish community deserves special attention. Apart from the NGO's, it co-operates with the local government and the Ministry of Culture as well as with the public and private cultural institutions. They have also built partnerships with American Jewish organisations.

The parallel development of city cultural offer and minority cultural activities in this field is worth underlining. This is connected with general features of multiculturalism – a process demanding more time to work out desirable patterns - as well as with the specificities of Warsaw. The Warsaw problem with multiculturalism is not about its monolithic character, closeness and lack of diversity but its general dispersion and insufficiency of dialogue, co-operation, initiatives shared in common. Actions taken by the central institutions continue the old-fashioned, state-centred cultural exchanges. Warsaw has for a long time been a venue of international exhibitions, concerts, festivals, fairs. New ideas in this field are missing, though. New guest ateliers for artists in the Centre for Contemporary Art and international workshops aimed at elaborating on the Warsaw artistic subject matters do not create a new quality in this domain. To help reduce the cultural distance separating Warsaw from other European cities, the authorities launched an initiative to build the Museum of Modern Art in the city centre but the date of its opening has not yet been fixed.

Against this background, the new phenomena of both artistic and life-style character should be stressed as they create a new quality. These are initiated by minorities living in Warsaw, e.g. the celebration (according to the Orthodox rite and calendar) of the New Year by both the Poles and Ukrainians in the Central Cultural House-Club at Burakowska

Street, gaining more and more publicity over the last couple of years. Good occasions for intercultural integration and togetherness are also created in the Sowiński Reduta Centre in the Wola district aiming at enabling contact of people from the eastern and western cultures. One of the successful multi-religious events organised by the Reduta Centre are prayers and processions on the Orthodox graveyard in both rites – Orthodox and Catholic.

A city with a long lasting multi-national and multicultural tradition should not confine itself solely to spontaneous forms of social integration such as the aforementioned *Stadion Dziesięciolecia*. Critically needed is a cultural policy addressed to the minority cultures going beyond religious rites and the marketplace. Yet Warsaw is still waiting for a coherent and well meant policy aimed at integrating minorities; a policy addressed both to the Warsaw Polish majority and minorities and aimed at promoting dialogue as well as creative co-existence of cultures. To embody this goal we need a political will as well as collaboration on all levels of local government, the Ministry of Culture, artistic communities and, last but not least, minorities' representatives. The city civil servants responsible for culture should be more flexible in their views on multiculturalism and, in fact, they are daily becoming more and more so. Until recently they would argue that Warsaw is mono-cultural, hence the problem of minorities' participation in the city cultural landscape could be marginalised. Now they are engaged in working out programmes favouring multicultural development.

As mentioned already, the cultural offer on the minority side is much richer than provision under the city cultural policy. However, they expect more from the city and complain at its passive attitude. The Warsaw practice shows that promotion of cultural identity and diversity depends only in part on legal measures; to a larger degree it depends on the general social and political culture, mentality, tradition of tolerance and the perception of the 'us-them' relationship. The process of Poland's democratisation revealed existing differences between various social groups. National, religious, sexual etc. minorities acquired a possibility to articulate their right to be different. The situation nowadays is much better than a decade ago. Still existing problems result mainly from the very fact that democracy and pluralism are yet in the making.

The media play an important role in self-presentation and self-portraiture of minorities in the age of multiculturalism. However, a desirable level of ethno-culture in a democratic society is hard to achieve only via appropriate cultural and educational policy. It is because media only in a small measure constitute the public sphere, in a larger degree they are part of the private sector governed by market rules. Thus, intellectual and artistic elites have limited possibilities of action. The cultural offer under patronage of the state institutions or civic society organisations (associations, foundations) is only an iceberg.

The very access of minorities to media guaranteed by the equal opportunity principle in the public life of a democratic and open society does not suffice to ensure the public minority presence. The regional media broadcast ethnic programming, yet most of this does not bring about a larger public resonance. This results partly from the limited attractiveness of such, created often by minorities' representatives themselves. This is to say, that minorities should themselves care for their self-promotion rather than wait for someone other's commitment and efforts to do so. This situation relates however solely to television and radio stations. The press on the other hand, seems to fulfil its tasks in this field exceptionally well, especially as it usually subsidised by the state.

Some spontaneous processes can, however, help in finding solutions. To be sure, globalisation exerts stronger pressure on the minority cultures, challenges them, but at the same time gives them new opportunities. Globalisation needs locality and this is best expressed by the oxymoron 'glocalisation'. In some ways, markets encourage homogeneity and, in the others, a post-mass culture. The market by no means has to be dysfunctional for multiculturalism; indeed, it can even promote it. Such a hypothesis is sharply at variance with the prevailing view which is that the market, as the vehicle of globalisation, destroys identity, regiments cultures, eliminates differences, imposes dominance, Americanises, Macdonaldises, etc.

Manifestations of unwillingness and distance to others expressed by some Warsaw inhabitants result from various reasons. One of these is having for decades made people believe in mono-ethnic face of the Polish society and its moral and political unity. Diversity was not seen as something desirable. This resulted in the low level of the social capital in Poland (79% of the Poles show generalised mistrust towards not only 'other' ethnic groups but also 'other' Poles) which weakens the social bonds. This weakness in the case of Warsaw was also caused by the destruction of the old urban community and social fabric as well as by an inflow of masses of people subject to anomie. The process of community-building is far from completion. One can, however, find optimistic premises: some 30% of Varsovians over 28 years of age possess higher education which should in the near future make the better ground for tolerance. This factor, along with a generation shift, will improve the prospects for inter-ethnic co-existence. Thus, one can hope in building the image of Warsaw as a pluralistic city. Also because it is worth doing, as multiculturalism 'sells' well in culture, particularly in culture industries. Many European cities capitalise on their diversity. No local or city government in Western Europe conceals the multicultural and multi-ethnic face of the city or region; moreover, this diversity is exposed not only because European standards demand this but also because it increases the development assets.

The 'metropolisation' of Warsaw as an important middle-European urban centre will be ever increasing which also means its rising attractiveness for would be migrants. As an actor in global processes, Warsaw will be more and more subjected to the mobility of labour, exchanges, transfers and international co-operation. This by itself will strengthen its cosmopolitisation as well as its cultural diversification. Warsaw will produce new culture border lands on its territory which will complicate the problem of balance between diversity and social cohesion. On the one hand, we will be witnessing a positive shift in 'social culture', creativity will increase as the Polish community will gain new resources: knowledge, culture, new social relations with the others. On the other hand, however, people will be anxious about rising exclusion and the negative aspects of excessive diversification and pluralisation, which augments uncertainty and risk. This manifests itself nowadays in luxurious and safeguarded housing estates, the number of which in Warsaw exceeds 200, thus reducing the public space. That is why building inter-ethnic interfaces, translating idiomatic identities into discursive ones to understand the others and be understood by them is critically needed. Without it, one can hardly solve the city problems and create friendly space for all. This is one of the main tasks faced by city authorities as well as the Warsaw inhabitants. This problem was well defined by a Vietnamese woman having lived in Warsaw for many years:

"Warsaw should strive for its inhabitants to live better, for everyone to have a chance to present his/her own culture. An awareness-building campaign should be launched to promote being open to otherness. Knowledge is the key word. We must de-mythologise reality: it is not true that the labour market is destroyed by immigration – it is quite the reverse. Warsaw will not be flooded by the migrants and refugees. Warsaw must grasp the chance offered by the encounter with others on your-our land. I am grateful for having a chance to be intellectually and culturally richer owing to this encounter and I know that I can share this richness with the Poles. Let us simply like ourselves; let us not fear each other."¹¹⁴ (from an interview with Ton Van Anh).

The relationship between migration and civic membership or citizenship is becoming a key issue considering the fact that Warsaw, with its communities from post-soviet countries or Vietnam, has rapidly moved towards a receiving city status. Hence, Warsaw should do its best to embody its own formula of social citizenship comprising the newcomers. The extension of rights and duties to the 'new Varsovians' will generate legitimacy and civic activism. Both city authorities and people do not have enough experience in practising multiculturalism. This demands time, the lifetime of an entire generation. This experience will become richer and richer with the course of time. It is therefore highly recommended that Warsaw acquaint itself with the good practices of other metropolitan cities of Europe. This will allow it, on the one hand, to benefit from

them and on the other - to avoid bad solutions. That is why so valuable is for Warsaw's policy makers and citizens to learn from the experience and good examples highlighted in the findings of our international research project.

References

Bennett, T. (2001), *Differing Diversities – Cultural policy and cultural diversity*, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

Bennett, T. (2005), "Culture and difference – The challenges of multiculturalism", in S. Bodo and R. Cifarelli (eds.), *Quando la cultura fa la differenza*, Roma, Meltemi.

Borowiak A., Szarota P. (eds.) (2005) *Tolerancja i wielokulturowo. Wyzwania XXI wieku* (Tolerance and Multiculturalism. Challenges for XXI c.) Wydawnictwo SWPS Academica, Warszawa.

Eberhard ,P (1996) *Między Rosją a Niemcami. Przemiany narodowościowe w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w XXw* (Between Russia and Germany. National Changes In Central-Eastern Europe in the 20th century), Warszawa.

Grzelak, J. Zarycki, T. (2004) *Społeczna mapa Warszawy. Interdyscyplinarne studium metropolii warszawskiej* (The Social Map of Warsaw. Interdisciplinary Study of the Warsaw Metropolitan City), Instytut Studiów Społecznych Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, wyd. Scholar, Warszawa.

Kultura w Warszawie. Ekspertyzy (Culture in Warsaw. Expertise) (2000). Zarząd Miasta Stołecznego Warszawy, Warszawa.

„Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce” (National Minorities in Poland), (1995) Warsaw. *Strategia rozwoju Warszawy 2004-2006. Synteza* (Warsaw Development Strategy for the years 2004-2006. Synthesis). Zarząd Miasta Stołecznego Warszawy.

Strategia Rozwoju Warszawy do 2010 roku – synteza. (Development strategy for Warsaw till the year 2010 - a synthesis) Zarząd Miasta Stołecznego Warszawy. Wydział Zagospodarowania Przestrzennego.

Uchwała nr IX/106/203 Rady Miasta Stołecznego Warszawy z dnia 27 marca 2003 w sprawie budżetu m.st. W-wy na rok 2003 (Resolution of the Warsaw City Hall No. IX/106/2003 of 27th March 2003, on the 2003 budget of Warsaw).

114. Ton Van Anh – the editor of the Vietnamese magazine „Cau Vong”.

Waldron, J. *Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative*, in: Kymlicka, W. (1995) *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, Oxford.

World of Minorities (1997) London: Minority Rights Group,

Załącznik nr 1 do Zarządzenia nr 2211/2005 Prezydenta m.st.W-wy z 28 lutego 2005 (Appendix no.1 to the Directive of the Warsaw Mayor No. 2211/2005 of 28th February 2005).

Załącznik do Zarządzenia nr 2288/2005 Prezydenta m.st. W-wy z 12 kwietnia 2005 r. (Appendix to the Directive of the Warsaw Mayor No. 2288/2005 of 12th April 2005).

Periodicals:

„Bleter far Geszichte”
„Cau Vong”
„Dos Jidisze Wort”
„Europa.ru”
„Kwartalnik Historii Żydów”
„Midrasz”
„Nasze Słowo”
„Nigdy Więcej”
„Ruskij Kurier Warszawy”
„Ukraina”
„Widryżka”
„Voice of Exile”

Main web sites

www.um.warszawa.pl (visited 01/07/2005)
www.stat.gov.pl (visited 01/07/2005)
www.bip.warszawa.pl (visited 01/07/2005)
www.mswia.gov.pl (visited 01/07/2005)

List of interviews:

Ton Van Anh – the editor of the Vietnamese magazine „Cau Vong”

Helena Datner – the founder and director of the Jewish Pedagogical Centre

Wanda Górską – the head of Bielany Cultural District Unit

Marcin Kornak – the chairman of the „Nigdy Więcej” Association

Włodzimierz Michniewicz – the „Bielarusskaja Inicjatywa” Association

Leszek Napiontek - the department head of international co-operation in the Office of Culture in the Warsaw City Hall and Ma gorzata Naimska – the director of the Office of Culture in the Warsaw City Hall

Dr Rostyslav Kramar – senior lecturer at the Warsaw University, the Faculty of applied linguistics and East Slavic philology, the Department of Ukrainian Philology,

Natalia Sinaeva – Helsinkis Citizens’ Assembly

Ilia Zmiejew –journalist, actor, Polish Radio Channel 3; Russian redaction.

CULTURAL POLICY DISCOURSE AND DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT IN BERLIN

by Kira Kosnick¹¹⁵

Introduction

This essay will explore the uses of the culture concept in cultural policy practices and institutional frameworks directed towards immigrants in Berlin, Germany's capital city. The research on which it is based was carried out by the author in the context of the EU Fifth Framework Programme "Changing City Spaces: New Challenges to Cultural Policy in Europe", which examined cultural policy towards immigrants and cultural developments induced by migration in seven different European metropolitan centres. Apart from Berlin, the consortium studied these issues comparatively as well as trans-nationally in Vienna, Belgrade, Ljubljana, Paris, Rome and London. While arguments of a comparative nature have been made elsewhere (Kiwani and Kosnick 2005), this essay focuses on Berlin, situating the city within the context of German cultural policy structures and trans-national flows that connect Berlin's largest immigrant group with Turkey.

As regards the difficulties immigrants face in achieving recognition as artists and cultural producers in Berlin's highly state-subsidized cultural landscape, I shall describe the way in which the divide between culture as *Hochkultur* (high art) and cultures as the ethno-cultural diversity of life-forms has trapped immigrant cultural production in separate funding schemes, institutional structures and discourses. I argue that this divide inscribes what might be called an implicit normative 'whiteness' into those areas of cultural production that claim to be merely 'quality-oriented' and shall discuss examples that demonstrate the practical consequences of this divide. In my conclusion, I shall outline an argument about the 'whiteness' of cultural policy, and suggest some implications for the cross-border dimensions of Turkish immigrant cultural life.

Turkish Tunes

In the late summer of 2003, a new poster began to appear on street corners and unused wall spaces along the sidewalks of Kreuzberg, Berlin's neighbourhood with the highest percentage of immigrants from Turkey. Pasted next to or on top of countless other Turkish-language posters announcing concerts, political gatherings and nightclub events, this one advertised the release of a new CD by Turkey's most famous pop-star, Sezen Aksu. Rather than simply enticing passers-by to go buy it, however, the poster featured another important announcement: this CD would be available in large-chain German music stores only. Unlike the myriad of imported CDs and cassette tapes which are sold in small Turkish stores all over the city, often together with other goods in import-export shops, Sezen Aksu's CD would try to break into the market and distribution networks which sell the bulk of audio consumer products in Germany. For immigrant consumers, this was anything but good news. Used to paying about 8 euros for CDs imported from

Turkey, they would now have to pay twice that amount to buy Aksu's *Yaz Bitmeden* (Before the Summer Ends).

Another Turkish pop-star followed suit: Mustafa Sandal's song *Aya Benzer* (She's Like the Moon), was re-released by the German label Polydor in a spiced-up version. The new version targeting the German market featured a thumping beat and a guest appearance by young and attractive Gülcan Karahanci, known to television audiences as the moderator on the music channel *Viva*, Germany's equivalent of MTV. The channel had also heavily promoted the video of Eurovision Song Contest winner Sertab Erener, well-established as a singer in Turkey, but new to non-Turkish European audiences. German newspapers took note, announcing Turkish pop music to be the latest wave of global pop exoticism to make it big in Germany (<http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/musik/0,1518,262420,00.html>).

At first sight, this was hardly surprising, given that immigrants from Turkey and their descendants constitute the largest ethnic minority group in Germany, and have over the past forty years established a lasting presence. One might expect this presence to make itself felt in the cultural sector as well, and introduce Turkish cultural influences into the German world of arts and entertainment. While the admission that Germany has become a country of immigration came late, the dominant political discourse shifted in the course of the 1990s toward speaking of Germany as a multicultural society, despite conservative forces arguing for a German "*Leitkultur*" which should ensure the primacy of traditions and values deemed indigenous over those introduced by immigrants (Bloomfield 2003). Yet, Turkish cultural influences nevertheless still play almost no role in German cultural life, even though interest in world-music and non-Western art forms has been growing steadily over the past decades (Greve 2003).

The acknowledgment of Germany as a multicultural society obviously does not answer the question of how the cultural contributions associated with different immigrant groups are to be categorized and valued in national public arenas. Nor does an apparent increase in trans-national flows of cultural commodities and musical production between Turkey and Germany necessarily mean that immigrant and postmigrant¹¹⁶ artists find it easier to achieve public recognition in German cultural arenas. In the following, these issues will be examined by looking at the case of immigrant and postmigrant artists in the city of Berlin, and at the ways in which their work is categorized, channelled and made public sense of by German cultural institutions.

116. The concept of postmigrant has been recently developed and promoted by second- and third-generation immigrants in order to claim both local belonging and migration background.

Berlin

Both federal and state government efforts have concentrated over the past decade on bolstering Berlin's image as a 'world-open' (*weltoffene*) capital city composed of diverse groups, fast-changing and in synchronicity with global cultural flows (Vertovec 1996). While Berlin economic importance does not allow it to claim the status of a 'global' city (Krätke 2001), it nevertheless represents Germany's image to the world, and in the national context figures as the place where Germany is most intimately caught up in global cultural developments (Hoffmann and Schneider 2002). To reinforce this image, city representatives point to the ethnic diversity of Berlin's population as well as to the range and quality of cultural institutions and artistic scenes. Two different concepts of culture are intermeshed in the representations of Berlin as a 'happening' capital city: culture as a marker of ethnic groups, characterizing traditions, values and a particular way of life, and culture as a limited domain of artistic activities and institutions, associated with theatres, museums, opera houses and the like. The characterization of Berlin as a world-open city hinges upon both its multicultural composition and its creative-artistic vibrancy. Ideal conditions, one might assume, for immigrant and postmigrant artists who can lay claim to making cultural contributions in this double sense.

Yet, unlike other world cities that emphasize their cosmopolitan qualities, Berlin does not have a particular reputation for launching the careers of immigrant or postmigrant artists. And despite the recent cross-over attempts of Turkish pop music into German mainstream markets mentioned above, these artists are based in Turkey, not in Germany. There is no Turkish equivalent in Germany to the success stories of French Rai and British Bhangra music, both of which have been significantly shaped by artists with immigrant backgrounds based in cities like Paris and London, even though Turkish pop has been similarly described as a synthesis of 'oriental' and 'western' elements (Co kun 1995, N.N. 1995b).

Different histories of migration might account partly for this lack. But taking into account the popularity of Turkish music among immigrants and their descendants, as documented by music sales as well as by the numerous party events that have emerged in German cities in the 1990s, it seems curious that Turkish pop stars should not also emerge from within the migrant population. In fact, they have, but the German music business has scarcely taken note. Like Turkey's most famous male pop-star Tarkan, several well-known singers were born or spent parts of their childhood in Germany, but launched their musical careers in Turkey (Bax 1999). As Martin Greve describes in his detailed study of Turkish musical life in Germany, aspiring migrant musicians of all musical genres hope to gain fame in Turkey, as the context which provides the true yardstick for both musical quality and audience appeal (Greve 2003).

Ten years ago, the relatively brief success of Rap and Hip Hop artists from Berlin formed an exception. In the mid-1990s, groups like Cartel and singers like Aziza-A were heralded by German music publications as the representatives of authentic ghetto-voices, doing for postmigrant youths what American Rap stars had done for African-Americans in the United States (Cheesman 1998, Rose 1994). However, they had only moderate commercial success in Germany. Cartel enjoyed a brief period of notoriety in Turkey, heralded as defending Turkish culture abroad (N.N. 1995a). A decade later, it appears as if scientific interest has by far exceeded musical and commercial interest in migrant Hip Hop artists, judging by the number of recent academic publications (Burul 2003; Kaya 2001; Soysal 1999, 2002). But also in other musical domains, artists with a Turkish background have hardly been able to make a dent in German cultural life. Are German music companies simply unwilling to take risks and promote local talent (Kreuzer 2004)? Or does Turkey loom too large in the cultural imaginaries of artists with migrant roots? Are the 'three T's' – travel, television, telecommunications – which have all reinforced the position of Turkey as a point of orientation for migrants in Germany, now leading to segregation? All of these arguments have been advanced as explanations for the conspicuous absence of Turkish influences in German cultural life.

But immigrant and postmigrant representation in music and the arts does not have to do with personal initiative, interest and commercial markets alone. Cultural policy has a crucial role to play in providing access to arts education and performance opportunities, in structuring artistic genres and defining the standards by which artistic quality is judged. This is particularly the case in Germany, where public expenditure for 'culture' is high, and continues to be seen as a necessity despite economic crisis (Ahearne 2003, Elpers et al. 2000, Weiss 1999). And nowhere is the commitment to public spending on culture more visible than in Berlin, despite the fact that the city has accumulated a stunning deficit from which it is unlikely to recover in the near future. Burns and Van der Will argue that the city is living beyond its means, supporting a cultural life that is second to none in Germany despite crippling debts, mainly because of a continuing political investment in publicly financed cultural politics that characterizes the country as a whole.

"The commitment to culture, while certainly being tested by Germany's lagging economic performance, still appears very strong indeed. ... To be sure, this comes at a price, but for the moment the big German cities, and not just Berlin, appear to prefer to live in a state of technical bankruptcy rather than forswear their commitment to culture" (Burns and Van der Will 2003:150).

In a country where the public financing of culture and the public administration of cultural politics reign supreme, cultural policy issues cannot be neglected when it comes to the success or failure of different forms of cultural production. Thus, in order to

understand the current situation of immigrant art and the role of non-Western cultural influences in the allegedly 'world-open' city of Berlin, it is important to look at the specific policy conditions under which immigrant and postmigrant artists can engage in cultural production and find audiences for their work. Following a decentralized approach, cultural policy in Germany is primarily a matter of the *Länder*, the different regional states, and their municipal councils (Heinrichs 1997, Sievers and Wagner 2002). Over the past years, however, the federal government has increased its involvement, particularly in the new capital city. Owing to Berlin's particular status as a city-state that is also Germany's capital, the three levels of municipal, regional state and federal cultural politics coincide, making for a complex picture of public involvement that has significant consequences for immigrant and postmigrant cultural production. Turkish-German music coming out of Berlin is an interesting case in point.

Soziokultur and High Culture

Ayşe Çağlar has pointed out that the phenomenon of German-Turkish Rap might be ironically described as a 'prescribed rebellion' (Çağlar 1998). A musical genre that crucially relies on its street-credibility – 'keeping it real' is the motto of the voice from the ghetto - Rap has in fact been explicitly promoted to postmigrant youths in Berlin as a mode of expression and activity deemed appropriate and beneficial by social workers and youth centre institutions, with public funds going into the creation of performance spaces, workshops and public contests. Though often presented as rebellious 'organic intellectuals' who articulate the plight of postmigrant youths in clear opposition to a dominant 'system' that excludes them (Kaya 2002a, 2002b), German-Turkish Rap artists have been able to benefit from cultural policy measures in the city.

Like other cultural activities supported by public institutions concerned with social issues at the city or district level, the main aim behind such promotion has not been to create artists, but rather to get kids off the streets and out of 'trouble'. In the context of neighbourhood associations, youth centres and *Volkshochschulen* (publicly subsidized schools that offer training courses in everything from arts and languages to vocational courses for a small fee), culture is firmly linked to social goals. German-Turkish Rap is valued by policy-makers for its alleged integrative potential and expected social benefits, not as an art form. It thus falls into a domain of cultural policy that has been termed *Soziokultur*, or socio-culture.

The notion of *Soziokultur* dates back to the 1970s in the Federal Republic, when in the context of a general revolt against traditions, *Kultur* was redefined as a good to be enjoyed and practiced by all parts of the population (Heinrichs 1997). Rather than

promoting what was seen as an elitist and conservative cultural establishment restricted to the middle- and upper-classes, cultural policy was to promote widened access to both cultural consumption and production. Particularly on a communal level, different forms of culture were as a result 'discovered' for cultural policy-making, such as folk music, photography and cultural activities formerly labelled as 'hobbies'. The focus thereby shifted from performative, public-oriented forms of cultural production toward the recognition of cultural production as a form of self-realisation and social participation, not geared toward a public audience but toward the transformation of its active participants. The concept of *Soziokultur* emphasised the importance of creative activities for personal growth and social cohesion, and sought to radically democratise cultural landscapes, particularly at the grass-roots level of the communes (*Deutscher Städtetag 1992*).

However, the new institutions and initiatives that were to implement these goals did not replace the established landscape of theatres, opera houses and concert halls that were associated with the concept of *Kultur* as "high art" and "national traditions". In times of relative affluence, federal states and communes could afford to simply add to what was already there. The result has been a dual structure of *Soziokultur* and *Hochkultur*, in which different meanings of culture and different aims associated with those meanings have been institutionalized in different arenas.

Soziokultur tends to be the concern of low-level public bodies and institutions, with city districts and communal governments allocating funds that serve different purposes of cultural education and social integration. *Hochkultur*, on the other hand, falls within the domain of higher-level policy-making. It is Berlin's state senate which provides the budget for established theatres, museums and orchestras in the city.¹¹⁷ In matters deemed to be of particular representational relevance, the federal government has been stepping in. Cultural institutions in the capital city whose image is deemed to reflect upon the entire country receive funding from the federal government, as stipulated in the *Hauptstadtkulturvertrag*, the Capital City Culture Contract signed between the city and the *Bund* (Regierung Online 2001).

Another level of distinction between *Soziokultur* and *Hochkultur* pertains to the areas of policy-making: Berlin's Senate Administration for Science, Research and Culture (*Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur*), finances and regulates primarily the arts-oriented domain of *Hochkultur*. However, other Senate Administrations also deal with cultural matters and engage in policy-making in cultural domains. The Senate Administration for Education, Youth and Sports as well as the Administration for City Development, for example, provide funding for cultural activities and initiatives that are deemed to further their respective policy goals. Thus, the task of managing

disadvantaged neighbourhoods (*Quartiersmanagement*) might entail engaging residents in cultural activities, and the latest family pass (*Familienpass*) offering discount theatre, movie and concert tickets to families is advertised on the Senate's education web pages. The divide between *Soziokultur* and *Hochkultur*, the forms of its institutionalization and its influence on cultural policy-making have significant consequences for immigrant and postmigrant cultural production.

Immigrant Culture(s)

Historically, the rise of socio-cultural politics in the 1970s Federal Republic coincided with the peak of labour migration to West Germany, and its public perception as a socio-cultural rather than just economic phenomenon. Civil society organisations (such as unions, the churches etc.), employers, politicians and the media debated the distinctive cultural needs of labour migrants, and how these needs could be met in order to increase productivity and minimize social conflict (Kosnick 2003). Cultural difference needed to be managed in the interest of social harmony.

Up until the mid-1980s, it was preserving the connection with cultural traditions 'back home' which formed the undisputed centre of cultural policy concerns towards labour migrant populations (Kosnick 2000). Most immigrant cultural activities took place in the very contexts and locations that also enabled "*Soziokultur*": in youth centres, *Volkshochschulen*, neighbourhood associations, and local cultural facilities linked to the smallest entities of cultural policy-making in Germany, the *Kommunen* or city districts.

With the gradual political recognition in the 1980s that Germany had in fact become an immigration country, public discourse and policy shifted slowly toward a politics of integration, with the image of a multicultural society gaining ground. Immigrant groups came to be understood as culturally distinct groups whose 'difference' needed to be accommodated. In this context, discourse and policy concerned with immigrant and postmigrant cultural production has remained primarily tied to socio-political goals. The preservation of distinctive cultural traditions has thus remained high on the agenda, now linked to ethnic identity politics in a multicultural framework (Kolland 2003). In a society seen to be composed of multiple ethnic groups that are carriers of distinct cultural traditions and qualities, cultural production can demand public support, both to 'preserve identity' and to publicly represent its traditions as a contribution to multicultural life and diversity in Germany. It is important to note, though, that the culture to be supported in this context is a marker of ethnic group identity, and not *Kultur* in the sense of the creative arts.

117. See also below.

When artists from immigrant backgrounds seek recognition in this second domain of cultural production, both meanings of culture are potentially mobilized. As a consequence, their work faces a collusion of semantic contents as it were and, linked to them, different policy contexts and modes of public intervention which have profound consequences for immigrant and postmigrant cultural participation and expression. Despite the recognition of immigrant cultural influences as an asset for the city and its cosmopolitan ambitions, this has not automatically opened the doors of 'high culture' to immigrant and postmigrant cultural production, as occupied by state theatres, opera houses, concert halls and museums. Instead, this kind of production remains closely associated with socio-culture, a link that becomes particularly visible in the institutional structures and practices that deal with non-Western cultural-artistic forms in the city.

In Berlin, two cultural institutions deserve particular mention when it comes to the representation of non-Western cultural traditions and developments in the arts. The first one, the House of World Cultures (*Haus der Kulturen der Welt*, HKW) receives its funds from the federal government, which signals its strategic importance in representing the new capital city.

The House of World Cultures

"The House of World Cultures has set itself the task of presenting cultures from outside Europe through their fine arts, theatre, music, literature, film and the media and engaging them in a public discourse with European cultures. The House of World Cultures' programme focuses on the contemporary arts and current developments in the cultures of Africa, Asia and Latin America as well as on the artistic and cultural consequences of globalisation. It gives priority to projects that explore the possibilities of both intercultural co-operation and its presentation" (House of World Cultures, mission statement, 2004).

The House of World Cultures (*Haus der Kulturen der Welt*, HKW) might be Berlin's strongest argument for taking seriously the artistic potential and relevance of non-Western cultural influences. The HKW is Berlin's most prestigious cultural institution focusing explicitly on the representation of artistic work from outside Europe and the 'Western World'. Significantly, this includes artists and art forms that might be located in Europe or the West, but are importantly influenced by cultural developments and traditions in the non-Western world. In terms of cultural policy in Berlin, the HKW plays an important role as a show-case institution for the city's artistic vibrancy – to both the rest of Germany and to the rest of the world. It was taken over as a cultural institution by the federal government in 2001, along with several other institutions likely to enhance

Berlin's image. For artists, to perform at the HKW is tantamount to confirmation that one has reached the 'highest' level of artistic development as an 'international' artist and (at times or) that one's work is cutting edge. Just what is considered cutting edge can be learnt from its internet mission statement:

"The House of World Cultures' programme work reflects changing global conditions and creates a basis for new forms of interdisciplinary artistic co-operation. ... Migration, international networks, encounters with other traditions and other modernities have transformed cultural conditions throughout the world and created new conditions for art. National cultures, even where they are still experienced as homogeneous by many people, no longer ensure binding cultural affiliation. ... All over the world, artists, authors and scientists are relating to these changes in their works. In co-operation with them, the House of World Cultures seeks to develop a programme presenting responses and artistic models that reflect these international conditions in terms of what they mean for the individual and for human beings living together in a global world" (http://www.hkw.de/external/en/profil/das_hkw/c_index.html).

The prominence of motives such as migration, international networks and new living conditions in a global world is an indication that the HKW is not content to put 'foreign cultures' on display, in the tradition of out-of-date anthropologies that see culture as firmly rooted in (preferably national) territories. Instead, global transformations and interconnections form the central artistic interest for the House, reflected in programmes and festivals that stress cultural hybridity and flow: yearly events such as the festival for new music, *TranSonic*, the performance festival *In Transit*, and the open-air music festival *popdeurope – migrating sounds in and out of Europe*.

Thus, migrants in one sense are key for the House of Cultures and the fluid concept of culture it tries to promote. The cross-border movement of people complicate the relationship between culture and place, and migrants seem particularly likely to have multiple and complex cultural affiliations. The HKW's then Secretary-General, Hans Georg Knopp, liked to quote Homi Bhabha when reflecting upon approaches that can adequately capture the cultural state of the current world. The migrant is a key figure, in an abstract sense, in so far as this figure epitomizes the shifting forms of identification and challenges to notions of cultural homogeneity. In a more concrete sense, however, migrants enjoy far less representation at the House of World Cultures. Immigrants and postmigrants living in the city of Berlin are not particularly targeted as an audience for HKW events¹¹⁸, and no special effort is made to recruit them as performing artists. When describing the pedagogical mission of the House of World Cultures, Knopp painted a telling picture of its audience:

¹¹⁸ Though space is occasionally let to immigrant organizations for independent events.

"It is something of a pedagogical mission, one could say, but one that is filled with art, to make people realize that there are other values, be it social or aesthetic ones, that there are other modes of expression, which carry the *same* value as that which I know, that which represents *my* culture" (Author's interview with Hans Georg Knopp, 21 August 2003, translation from German).

While cultural hybridity and global flows are very much at issue in the contents of what the House tries to offer Berlin, these processes seem not to have transformed the city itself – at least not that part of the population which Knopp imagined to be the HKW's audience. Despite claims that national cultures can no longer ensure binding affiliations, this targeted audience seems to be in firm possession of one particular culture, against which the equality of non-European cultures needs to be asserted. Thus, implicitly, cultural difference still comes from elsewhere. Berlin needs to be taught about the cultural dimensions of globalization, it does not participate in them.

As much as cultural hybridity, migration and globalisation are addressed in the work of artists and thinkers presented by the HKW, they are almost always brought in from "outside" the city, and rarely represent the cultural complexity and dynamics of Berlin itself.

Even the *popdeurope* festival, claiming to present the diversity of popular music cultures that the children of immigrants have created in European metropolises, does not enter Berlin into the mix. The concerts offering "migrating sounds in and out of Europe" featured musicians from cities such as Lisbon, Marseille, Budapest and London, but none from Berlin. Turkish musical influences were represented by the artist Mercan Dede, who moves between Istanbul and Toronto, and fuses religious Sufi music with electro beats. Local Turkish DJs were invited to spin tunes for the crowd before and after the concert, but no Berlin artist was featured in the concert line-up.

When asked why the House of World Cultures does not seek to cooperate more with Berlin's immigrant population, Knopp referred to the particularities of the city's migration history:

"Berlin has a different migration history. Berlin has labour migration. I am not quite certain, but I think most of the Turks who came here came from Eastern Anatolia." (ibid.)

They have little understanding of contemporary developments in the arts, he claimed. Lacking intellectuals, Berlin's immigrants are less likely to produce, let alone appreciate, artistic work of the kind the HKW seeks to present. To Knopp, immigrant and postmigrant artists are not disadvantaged through the HKW's policies.

"I still think that an artist is either good or he (sic) isn't. No matter where he comes from, no matter in which milieu he is working, he is either good or not. And I don't give any credit because of someone's background, not in an art project. Neither positive nor negative." (ibid.)

Knopp saw no potential conflict between this dismissal of relativist standards regarding artistic quality and the HKW's mission to assert the equality of non-European modes of expression. But the precise nature of his standards of judgment when it comes to "good art" remains unclear. If artistic quality will automatically assert itself and rise to the top, one would indeed have to infer from the line-up at the House of World Cultures that such quality is lacking among immigrant and postmigrant artists in the city. However, Knopp offers another explanation for the situation: while the HKW has a more international orientation, another institution in the city concerned with non-European culture focuses on work emerging in the context of the city: *the Werkstatt der Kulturen* (Workshop of Cultures).

The Workshop of Cultures

"With their culture, religion and language, with their aesthetic notions and their art, almost half a million people from more than 190 nations, among them many artists and intellectuals, make up the international atmosphere of Berlin – a world city in transformation. In this context, the *Werkstatt der Kulturen* presents itself as a place of intercultural art and communication, as a platform for the impulses of new social and cultural movements emerging from the urban milieus shaped by migration" (<http://www.werkstatt-der-kulturen.de/index2.htm>, translated from German).

While the HKW has its home within a stone's throw of the German Chancellor's office in the centre of Berlin, the Workshop of Cultures (*Werkstatt der Kulturen*, WdK) is located in the district of Neukölln, one of Berlin's poorest neighbourhoods with a high percentage of immigrant residents. Conceptualized as a "workshop for integration in a new Berlin" in 1993, the WdK seeks to play an active role in facilitating intercultural encounter, exchange and transformation among and across different ethnic, cultural and religious groups in the city. The former Commissioner for Foreigner Affairs (*Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats*, today renamed Commissioner for Integration) who coined the term "workshop for integration" (*Integrationswerkstatt*) was a driving force behind its inception, and her office continues to provide the basic financial support for the WdK. At present, the Workshop has a guaranteed budget of no more than 625.000 euros per year – just enough to cover basic overhead costs. Financial support for the WdK's different projects has to be obtained from other sources of funding, and thus the WdK

staff each year enters the application race for grants from institutions like the Capital City Culture Fund, the Klassenlotterie (public lottery money), the socio-cultural Fund of the *Kulturpolitische Gesellschaft* and others.

Presenting intercultural art is only one of the aims of the WdK, as part of a wider conception of intercultural exchange and development to which the Workshop seeks to contribute. As a “forum for the multicultural civil society”, the WdK foregrounds not so much artistic as social criteria and goals, stating in its profile that it understands itself “as a place of active citizenship and self-determined engagement with the legal and political processes of the democratic society.” (WdK 2004, translated from German) The presentation of immigrant and postmigrant artists consequently aims at showing the diversity of lifestyles and aesthetic orientations as a cultural resource and development potential of the city, with the hope of promoting dialogue and social change in the urban environment.

Significantly, it is the House of World Cultures and not the Workshop of Cultures which has been taken on by the federal government as a showcase institution for the new capital Berlin. What is more, the WdK’s finances are not anchored in Berlin’s proper cultural budget (*Kulturhaushalt*), but in that of the Office of the Commissioner for Integration (formerly for Foreigners). It is thus culture in the plural, particularly immigrant cultures deemed to form part of a multicultural Berlin, which is key at the Workshop of Cultures, not culture as a singular domain of aesthetic production. While both the House of World Cultures and the Workshop of Cultures speak of cultures in the plural, it is culture in the singular, with reference to an implicit standard of artistic quality, which dominates the work at the HKW.

The Workshop of Cultures is best-known in the city for its yearly Carnival of Cultures (*Karneval der Kulturen*), with four days of street festivities and a large parade to which a wide range of immigrant groups in the city contribute. Over the past eight years, the Carnival has been growing steadily in size, with around 1.5 million visitors per year and around 5,000 active participants. The parade is advertised as a demonstration of Berlin’s cultural diversity, put on display by “participants from more than eighty nations living in Berlin” (ibid.). In this context, the cultural diversity of urban life in Berlin is strongly tied to ethnic groups which are mobilized to represent their cultural distinctiveness. It is thus difficult for the Carnival to avoid accusations of staging a form of ‘picturesque multiculturalism’ (Frei 2003) which glosses over the social inequalities and conflicts that characterize everyday life in Berlin. Though participants are encouraged by the organizers to represent intercultural projects and groups in the city, the overall impression of culture as a marker of ethnic or national group identity remains central to the Carnival’s choreography and reception.

The WdK’s managerial staff does not subscribe to this vision of urban multiculturalism at all, and works politically to challenge the boundaries of publicly financed culture in the singular.¹¹⁹ Yet, given its main sources of funding, its public mission and its representational practices in the city, the Workshop of Cultures operates as a firmly socio-cultural institution, rather than an arts-oriented one. The House of World Cultures, on the other hand, strongly rejects sociocultural projects as part of its own agenda. It also rejects any particular responsibility for showing the work of immigrant or postmigrant artists, or targeting immigrants as part of its audience, deeming this the task of the Workshop of Cultures.

Importantly, then, a correlation can be detected between immigrant/postmigrant cultural production and the domain of *Soziokultur*, with institutional structures and public funding schemes favouring the recognition and evaluation of such production in integrationist terms. Just as importantly, there is significantly less public funding and support available for work with an ‘intercultural’ agenda that draws upon local experience, as Andreas Freudenberg, the director of the Workshop of Cultures, explained succinctly in a debate at Berlin’s House of Representatives (*Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin*):

“There is a big difference between international art and international arts exchange and that what is developing in terms of intercultural work in urban milieus. The difference is that in one area, impulses are brought in from outside, while the other area brings in and integrates the substance available here, thus taking on and culturally working through experiences that take place here in the urban milieu. It is important to clearly mark this difference ... International cultural work receives support, the urban, intercultural scene does not receive such support” (Ausschuss für Kulturelle Angelegenheiten 2003:15).

The Whiteness of Cultural Policy

The Cultural Budget of the city serves as a stark reminder what kind of culture is deemed most worthy of state support. The following simplified table shows both how different domains of cultural production are separated out as categories, and how they are ranked in terms of their importance and financial needs.

The table reveals the primacy of ‘high culture’ institutions as a matter of municipal concern, with socio-culture and immigrant cultural activities ranking lowest on the scale of financial support. What the data reveal is firstly that socio-culture is anything but a priority in the overall budget allocation. Secondly, ‘foreigners’ – a term meaning in fact immigrants living in the city¹²⁰ – have to make do with a very small slice of this socio-culture budget.

119. To give one example, the director of the WdK co-organized the Second Federal Congress for Cultural Politics, *Inter.kultur.politik. – kulturpolitik in der multiethnischen gesellschaft*, Berlin, 26-27 June 2003.

120. The term ‘foreigner’ has been all but dropped from public language and official documents dealing with immigrant groups. Its continued appearance in the culture budget gives additional support to the argument made in this essay, namely that immigrants have yet to ‘arrive’ in the domain of dominant culture and cultural funding in Berlin.

Table 37. Culture budget for the city of Berlin (simplification)

Budget Area	Among for 2005 (in 1000 euro)
Total city budget	21,109,162,2
Culture budget total	377,295,3
Theatres	206,349,0
Museums	53,654,0
Music, orchestras	30,638,7
Libraries	25,614,4
Socio-culture	2,836,0
Sub-heading: Support for foreigners	343,0

* data: 7.7.2004, Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur

As stated above, public funding for socio-culture in general and for immigrant and postmigrant artistic expression tends to be made available in other policy contexts as well, such as the Senate Administration for City Development or the Office of the Commissioner for Integration. But it is worth taking a look at the ways in which immigrants and postmigrants are considered within the public sector of *Kultur* proper, the domain of culture in the singular.

The fund "Project Support in the Area of Cultural Activities of Citizens of Foreign Descent" (*Projektförderung im Bereich der kulturellen Aktivitäten von Bürgerinnen/ Bürgern ausländischer Herkunft*) has been established to offer competitive grants for which eligible groups and individuals can apply once a year. In the information material distributed by the Senate Administration, the criteria for funding are described as follows:

"Support is given to artistic and socio-cultural projects of citizens of foreign descent living in Berlin, at the centre of which stands the maintenance and development of cultural identity, and/or the encouragement of intercultural dialogue" (Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur 2003, translation from German).

It is evident that the concept of culture employed in this context refers to cultures in the plural, linking them to ethno-national groups as their representatives. Even though the funds are to be made available for projects, not for institutional support, more than half of the budget has for the past years been going toward Berlin's Turkish-language theatre *Tiyatrom*, founded in 1984. Representatives of the theatre have so far failed in their efforts to be re-categorized as a 'regular' theatre and receive part of the institutional support the

Senate provides for the city's theatre landscape. What is more, within German-Turkish circles there is a heated and ongoing debate as to the lack of quality productions at the *Tiyatrom*, and the exclusive reign of some theatre producers to the disadvantage of other groups and individuals producing Turkish or German-Turkish theatre in the city (Türkođlu 2003). Reflecting back on the history of Turkish-language theatre production in Berlin, dramatic advisor Hülya Karcý has pointed out the connection between the current miserable state of this theatre scene and its 'exotic' status in academic and cultural policy contexts: "To be interesting/exotic at the same time carries within it the notion of being foreign. But it is impossible to create culture as a foreigner." (Karcý 2002, translation from Turkish)

Intended as a kind of affirmative action tool to increase participation of immigrant and postmigrant artists, the fund for 'citizens of foreign descent' has become something of a trap, keeping artists out of other funding circuits which offer considerably more money and/or institutional continuity. A Senate Administration representative for the fund has stated that the advisory council which makes funding decisions in the area of non-institutionalized theatre projects regularly turns away Turkish applicants, advising that they should rather submit an application to the 'foreign descent' fund.¹²¹ Instead of being just an additional source of funding complementing opportunities open to everyone, the fund thus now hinders immigrant participation in 'mainstream' categories of cultural production, effectively keeping out people and issues deemed to represent culture(s) in the plural. What is more, the fund's resources have been more than halved over the past ten years. In this sense, it is possible to speak of the 'whiteness' of cultural policies in Berlin.

Whiteness has been established as an object of study and analytical concept in the Anglo-American context to investigate how structural positions of privilege and power are simultaneously constructed and masked (Frankenberg 1993). Noting that the study of 'race' had been by and large focused on people of colour, scholars have focused on the question of how whiteness could become an implicit norm against which racial 'otherness' is measured. It is precisely the lack of an obvious racial bias within seemingly neutral institutional practices and discourses that characterises white privilege and establishes whiteness as an unmarked, normative position (Hartigan 1997). It is blackness that carries the burden of 'race' as a category of difference and deviance from the norm. Along similar lines, Janet Halley has analysed the obsession with publicly identifying gays and lesbians in the U.S. as the implicit construction of heterosexuality, stable as a category and norm only in the context of labelling its Other (Halley 1993).

In exploring the 'whiteness' of cultural policy in Berlin, I do not wish to claim that policy-makers in the city operate with racial categories. Instead, I propose to use the

121. Author's interview with Manfred Fischer at the Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur, 20 May 2003.

concept of whiteness to analyse how the difference between 'culture' and 'cultures' similarly inscribes immigrant and postmigrant cultural production as Other, denoting the primacy of ethno-cultural difference over artistic ambition.

'Whiteness' in this sense is at issue when Berlin actor Nursel Köse finds it difficult to obtain film roles that do not replicate her performance as a Turkish cleaning woman in the film *Anam*, when film maker Yüksel Yavuz has problems obtaining funds for projects that have nothing to do with migration issues, or when the fact that the singer Aziza A. makes a point of giving concerts at feminist and queer events is completely ignored. It is at issue when the Bavarian film company representing Fatih Akın's new film at the Berlin Film Festival seeks an interpreter for press interviews who knows Turkish as well as German and English, even though all the German-Turkish actors involved are unsurprisingly in perfect command of German. It is at issue when a helpful music editor trying to facilitate contacts for me at Berlin's public-service radio station *Radio MultiKulti* sends an email to the host of one of their weekly radio programmes, Erci E., stating that an academic would like to interview him about Turkish identity, after I had in fact stated that I wanted to talk to Erci E. about his career as a Rap musician.

It comes as no surprise that Hip Hop and Rap have been the artistic genres in which the contributions of musicians with Turkish background have achieved the strongest public recognition. Instead of assuming that that young postmigrants are simply naturally drawn to these genres because they best express their authentic marginalized urban experiences, it is worth asking to what extent such assumptions structure cultural policies, market opportunities and media interest, making Rap and Hip Hop the sensible choice for young aspiring artists who aim for public success.

The 'whiteness' of the *Kultur* establishment in Germany is stabilized by deep-seated expectations that immigrant and postmigrant cultural contributions will be either concerned with maintaining ethno-cultural traditions or with expressing cultural hybridity, always invoking culture as a marker of group identity. Even though the *Ausländer* (foreigner) concept has gradually become less acceptable as a term for immigrants and their descendents in German political discourses, the cultural contributions of immigrant and postmigrant artists are expected to be statements about cultural difference and Otherness.

Trans-national Culture

It is in light of these circumstances that the trans-national circuits of cultural production and exchange between Germany and Turkey have to be considered. Turkey's pop-stars and other famous musicians are regularly brought to Germany on concert tours,

performing in front of almost exclusively immigrant and postmigrant audiences. Since the country's economic recession has hit these population groups in disproportionate numbers, concert organizers are even less likely to risk failure by presenting little-known artists from Berlin. The latter might appear as background musicians, but will not take centre stage for fear of not filling concert halls. Stars from Turkey, well-known in Germany partly through the ubiquitous presence of satellite television, promise greater crowds.

When the 24-hour Turkish-language radio station *Metropol FM* went on air in Berlin in 1999, a new opportunity seemed to open up for representing the variety of local Turkish life in the city, and offering a platform for local musicians. But given the station's difficulties in becoming commercially viable with a relatively small and economically weak target group of listeners, every effort has been made not to alienate any part of its potential audience. As a result, the Turkish music that is featured in its programmes must have already proven its chart potential and thus audience appeal – which up to now it can only prove in Turkey, as explained above. Certain musical genres, for example Rap and Hip Hop, are considered by the station's management as too particular, and too disruptive, to be played on air.

Another local radio station, the public-service *Radio MultiKulti*, makes a much more deliberate effort to report on local developments in its daily hour of Turkish-language programming. Its funding secure, its editors can afford to ignore mainstream tastes and present topics as well as music that are not as easily digestible. But since the Turkish programme has lost its one-time monopoly on Turkish-language broadcast with the influx of satellite imports and the emergence of *Metropol FM*, few listeners still make the effort to tune in.

Returning to the example I cited at the outset, the local company responsible for the poster campaigns in the streets of Kreuzberg advertising the release of Sezen Aksu's latest CD, once used to produce the work of local artists like Aziza A. and Cartel. Ünal Yüksel's *Ypsilon Musix* tried out innovative marketing ideas, such as selling a döner-shaped CD with the work of local Turkish-German musicians at döner-kebab shops which offer Germany's preferred fast food. None of these strategies proved successful. While the company still produces a few German-rapping Hip Hop artists from Berlin, the focus of its business has now shifted toward promoting the work of pop stars from Turkey, in cooperation with larger international labels.

Given a situation in which Turkish cultural life in Germany cannot rely on public financial and institutional support, commercial reasoning has out of necessity taken centre stage, allowing little room for the nurturing of local talent. The current economic crisis in Germany, which has affected immigrants from Turkey and their descendents disproportionately with high unemployment and declining consumer power, has dealt

another blow to the feeble cultural scene that has been able to emerge on the commercial terrain. Infighting, fierce competition and even legal battles between Turkish cultural organizations, groups and individuals are a well-known constant of Turkish cultural life in Berlin.¹²² As Martin Greve concludes:

“The central problem is that after decades of exclusion from German institutions and from public funding, German-Turkish musical life is in a condition of advanced atomization, in which almost all musicians have learnt to fend for themselves only, and in which institutions promising continuity seem like new and daring experiments” (Greve 2002:17)

In light of these findings, an increasing orientation of immigrants and postmigrants towards Turkey and its cultural life as well as cultural industries seems like a logical and rather sensible turn. As much as the famous three ‘T’s of television, travel and telecommunications might facilitate the growth of trans-national affiliations among migrant populations, it needs to be asked what kinds of alternatives to such affiliations actually exist at their place of residence.

Political scientist Thomas Faist has recently problematized the link between cultural recognition and migrants’ emphasis on ethno-cultural distinctiveness, as well as their ties to the country of origin (Faist 2000: 43). He has stated that ethnic minorities’ insistence on collective status has long been understood as resulting from a denial of cultural recognition within the majority society, as Max Weber argued already in the 1920s. Faist points out the irony of his own findings, which suggest that the multicultural politics of liberal democracies can in fact promote the retention and development of trans-national ties. Refraining from cultural assimilation, ‘tolerant’ immigration countries such as Germany open up possibilities for trans-state networking and resource mobilization. The trans-national ties of migrants are thus not simply a result of repressive political measures, but might on the contrary be accelerated in their development by multicultural rights and policies granted in immigration countries.

The research findings presented in this essay indicate a somewhat different twist in the link between multicultural politics and trans-national affiliations: policies and institutions that are designed to acknowledge ethno-cultural distinctiveness promote trans-national activities not simply by leaving space for them, or offering resources. The seemingly liberal and tolerant character of such policies itself needs to be questioned.

I have tried to show that there is an important divide that runs through cultural politics, institutions and artistic work in Berlin: a division between a domain of culture in the

singular (*Hochkultur*) that aims for ‘artistic quality’ and is governed by standards that are rarely questioned as to their implicit and sometimes explicit non-immigrant bias, and a domain of ‘socio-culture’ which has socio-political aims and targets those at the bottom of economic and ethnic hierarchies. This latter domain seeks to emphasize cultures in the plural, namely the distinctiveness of ‘cultures of origin’ that immigrants are assumed to have brought with them. Berlin appears as a patchwork of cultures which are tied to social groups as their representatives. The cultural production of immigrant and postmigrant artists is evaluated mainly with regard to its integrative-political potential. Though established in the seventies with emancipatory aims, the domain of socio-culture has in many ways become a prison-house for immigrant and postmigrant artists.

The case of Turkish artists in Berlin shows the all-but-liberal consequences of contemporary German multiculturalism in action, which in fact excludes them from funding opportunities and venues available to non-immigrant and external artists. In the gap between *culture* and *cultures*, immigrant and postmigrant artists are bound to disappear. Instead of tolerating their alleged urge and desire to turn to Turkey, the politics of culture in Berlin often leave them little choice but to seek their fortunes abroad.

What is more, trapping immigrant cultural production within policy frameworks that focus almost exclusively on ethno-cultural traditions might present a dangerous political path. At a time when immigrants are disproportionately affected by cuts in the German welfare system, when many inner city households plunge into poverty, and when unemployment among young people is at an all-time high, the promotion of ethno-culture rarely leads to immigrant empowerment. To treat immigrants as the carriers of nationally distinct, homogenous ethno-cultures can instead ethnicise conflicts that are not primarily, and sometimes not at all about ethnicity. It is crucial in this context to realise that cultural diversity also exists apart from ethno-national traditions. In Berlin we find, for example, a pronounced and distinctive urban youth culture in which young people of different ethnic backgrounds participate, most of them working class. We also have a vibrant gay and lesbian culture, maybe the biggest in Europe, in which people from immigrant backgrounds play an increasingly visible role. Focusing policy support on these new and, in ethno-national terms, *cross-cutting* cultural developments might be one way of challenging forms of ethno-cultural or religious fundamentalism in so-called immigrant ‘communities’.

On the other hand, there is also the less desirable face of cultural diversity, where cultural differences are affected and partially produced by social and economic inequalities: the cultures of poverty, of drugs, and closely interlinked in Berlin, cultures of violence. It is crucial not only to define what exactly we mean by cultural diversity, but also not to close our eyes towards those kinds of diversity which do not fit the currently dominant

122. To give a few examples, the quarrels between different Turkish theatre groups in the city has received public attention even in the German media (Kosnick 2003). Also notorious is the conflict between two institutions seeking state recognition as academies for Turkish music (so far in vain), the Conservatory for Turkish Music (Berliner Konservatorium für Türkische ISN'T THE WORD MUZIK MISSING HERE?) and its rival, the German-Turkish Music Akademy (Deutsch-Türkische Musikakademie), and the infighting in the more-or-less inactive Turkish Cultural Council of Berlin (Türkischer Kulturrat Berlin).

multicultural paradigms that implicitly define culture as a marker of ethnic groups. To question this definition of culture is indispensable if we are to develop urban policies that encourage forms of diversity which can enrich our cities and the people living in them. But this cannot be the task of socio-cultural policy alone. In Germany, and very probably in many places elsewhere in Europe, it is time for cultural policy-makers to challenge the divide between cultures in the plural and culture in the singular.

References

- Ahearne, Jeremy. *Cultural Policy in the Old Europe: France and Germany*. International Journal of Cultural Policy 9, no. 2 (2003): 127-31.
- Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats. *The Commissioner of Foreigner Affairs of the Berlin Senate. Principal Duties*. Berlin: Senatsverwaltung für Gesundheit und Soziales, 1999.
- Ausschuss für Kulturelle Angelegenheiten. *Wortprotokoll der 25. Sitzung*. Berlin: Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, 2003.
- Bax, Daniel. *Her mit den jungen Türken*. Taz, 24 October 2003, p. 14.
- . *Türkische Küsse*. Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch, no. 3 (1999): http://www.ifa.de/zfk/themen/99_3_hysterie/dbax.htm, visited 24.08.2003.
- Bloomfield, Jude. *'Made in Berlin': Multicultural Conceptual Confusion and Intercultural Reality*. International Journal of Cultural Policy 9, no. 2 (2003): 167-83.
- Burns, Rob, and Wilfried Van der Will. *German Cultural Policy: An Overview*. International Journal of Cultural Policy 9, no. 2 (2003): 133-52.
- Burul, Ye im. *The World of Aziza A.: Third Spaces in Identities*. New Perspectives on Turkey, no. 28-29 (2003): 209-28.
- Çağlar, Ayşe. *Verordnete Rebellion. Deutsch-Türkischer Rap und Türkischer Pop in Berlin. in Globalkolorit: Multikulturalismus und Populärkultur*. eds. Ruth Mayer, and Mark Terkessidis, 41-56. St. Andrä/Wörtern: Hannibal Verlag, 1998.
- Cheesman, Tom. *Polyglot Politics. Hip Hop in Germany*. Debatte 6, no. 2 (1998): 191-214.
- Co kun, Zeki. *Beyaz Türklerin Türküsü (The Türkü of White Turks)*. Cumhuriyet, 7 August 1995, p. 15.
- Dallach, Christopher. „Neuer Pop-Trend - Türkischer Honig.“ *KulturSPIEGEL*, 25 August 2003, <http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/musik/0,1518,262420,00.html>, visited: 25.08.2003
- Deutscher Städtetag, editor. *DST-Beiträge zur Bildungs- und Kulturpolitik: Fünf Jahrzehnte kommunale Kulturpolitik*. Vol. C. Köln: 1992.
- Elpers, Susanne, Marion Fischer, Margrit Müller, and Andreas J. Wiesand (eds.) *Handbook of Cultural Affairs in Europe*. 3rd Ed. ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000.
- Faist, Thomas. *Grenzen überschreiten. Das Konzept transstaatliche Räume und seine Anwendungen. in Transstaatliche Räume. Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur in und zwischen Deutschland und der Türkei*. ed. Thomas Faist, 9-56. Bielefeld: transcript, 2000.
- Frankenberg, Ruth. *White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
- Frei, Kerstin. *Wer sich maskiert, wird integriert. Der Karneval der Kulturen in Berlin*. Berlin: Hans Schiler, 2003.
- Greve, Martin. *Der Marsch in die Institutionen: Auf der Suche nach Deutsch-Türkischer Musikausbildung*. Üben & Musizieren, no. 1 (2002): 16-22.
- . *Die Musik der Imaginären Türkei. Musik und Musikleben im Kontext der Migration aus der Türkei in Deutschland*. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2003.
- Halley, Janet. *The Construction of Heterosexuality*. in *Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory*. Michael Warner (ed.), 82-102. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
- Hartigan, John. *Establishing the Fact of Whiteness*. American Anthropologist 99, no. 3 (1997): 495-505.
- Heinrichs, Werner. *Kulturpolitik und Kulturfinanzierung*. Munich: C.H.Beck Verlag, 1997.
- Held, Jutta. *Kunst und Kulturpolitik der 90er Jahre in den Zentren der Welt - Zur Einführung*. in *Metropolenkultur*. Jutta Held (ed.), 9-19. Weimar: VDG, 2000.

Hoffmann, Hilmar, and Wolfgang Schneider (eds.) *Kulturpolitik in der Berliner Republik*. Köln: Dumont, 2002.

House of World Cultures. *Mission Statement*. http://www.Hkw.De/External/En/Profil/Das_Hkw/Wirueberuns_1.Hmtl, January 2004, visited 8 January 2004.

John, Barbara, ed. *Bericht zur Integrations- und Ausländerpolitik in Berlin 2000*. Berlin: Beauftragte für Migration und Integration des Senats von Berlin, 2002.

Karcý, Hülya. *Egzotik olmanýn dayanýlmaz hafifliði...* Tiyatro Bülteni, no. 7 (2002): 7.
Kaufmann, Therese, and Gerald Raunig. „Anticipating European Cultural Policies.“ <http://www.eipcp.net> (2002): 1-28.

Kaufmann, Therese, and Gerald Raunig. *Anticipating European Cultural Policies*. <http://www.eipcp.net> (2002): 1-28.

Kaya, Ayhan. *Aesthetics of Diaspora: Contemporary Minstrels in Turkish Berlin*. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28, no. 1 (2002): 43-62.

———. *Sicher in Kreuzberg': Constructing Diasporas: Turkish Hip-Hop Youth in Berlin*. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2002.

Kiwan, Nadia and Kira Kosnick, *The 'Whiteness' of Cultural Policy in Paris and Berlin*. In: *Transcultural Europe: Cultural policy in the changing European Space*, Ulrike H. Meinhof und Anna Triandafyllidou (eds.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Forthcoming 2005.

Kolland, Dorothea. *'Kiez International' in der 'Contact Zone': Interkulturelle Konzepte in Berlin-Neukölln*. Berlin: Jahrbuch Beitrag, 2003.

Kosnick, Kira. *Building Bridges - Media for Migrants and the Public-Service Mission in Germany*. European Journal of Cultural Studies 3, no. 3 (2000): 321-44.

———. *Reaching Beyond the Local: A Study of Turkish Migrant Broadcasting in Berlin, Germany*. Doctoral Thesis: Department of Anthropology, New School for Social Research, New York, 2003.

Krätke, Stefan. *Berlin: Towards a Global City?* Urban Studies 38, no. 10 (2001), pp. 1777-1799.

Kreuzer, Margarete. *Turkish Pop Made in Berlin*. Stilbruch Online, RBB Berlin-

Brandenburg, 3 February 2004, www.rbb-online.de/_stilbruch/beitrag_manuskript_jsp/key=stilbruchbeitrag_31780.htm, visited 3 February 2004.

Massey, Doreen. *The Conceptualization of Place*. in *A Place in the World? Places, Cultures and Globalization*. Doreen Massey, and Pat Jess (eds.), 45-77. Oxford: The Open University Press, 1995.

Massey, Doreen, and Pat Jess, eds. *A Place in the World? Places, Cultures and Globalization*. Oxford: The Open University, 1995.

Mokre, Monika. *Identity Matters. On European Cultural Policy*. <http://www.eipcp.net> (2003), visited: 23 August 2003.

N.N. *Turkish Pop: The Rise of a Spontaneous Synthesis*. Turkish Daily News, 13 November 1995, sec. 2, p. B1.

Peters, Harald. *Drängend: Die Meister des Rap heißen Rapüstad*. Taz, 19 November 2003, section Lokales, p. 25.

Pohlmann, Markus. *Kulturpolitik in Deutschland*. Munich: Minerva Publikation, 1994.

Ritter, Waldemar. *Kultur und Kulturpolitik im Vereinigten Deutschland*. Bonn, Berlin: Deutscher Kulturrat, 2000.

Robins, Kevin, and David Morley. *Almanci, Yabancı*. *Cultural Studies* 10, no. 2 (1996): 248-54.

Rose, Tricia. *Black Noise: Rap Music and Black Culture in Contemporary America*. London: Wesleyan University Press, 1994.

Senat von Berlin. *Bericht zur Integrations- und Ausländerpolitik*. Berlin: 1994.

Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung. *Innovations- und Technologiekonzept*. Berlin: Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, 1999.

Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur. *Merkblatt - Projektförderung im Bereich der Kulturaktivitäten von Bürgerinnen/Bürgern ausländischer Herkunft für das Jahr 2003*. Berlin: 2003.

Sievers, Norbert, and Bernd Wagner. *Germany*. in *Cultural Policies in Europe: A Compendium of Basic Facts and Trends*. Council of Europe, 1-32. 2002.

Soysal, Levent. *Beyond the 'Second Generation': Rethinking the Place of Migrant Youth Culture in Berlin*. in *Challenging Ethnic Citizenship: German and Israeli Perspectives on Immigration*. Daniel Levy, and Yfaat Weiss (eds.), 121-36. New York: Berghahn Books, 2002.

———. *Projects of Culture: An Ethnographic Episode in the Life of Migrant Youth in Berlin*. Ph.D. Dissertation submitted to the Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, 1999.

SPD Bundestagsfraktion. *Kulturelle Integration als politische Aufgabe*. Berlin: Discussion Paper, 2001.

Terkessidis, Mark. *Life after History: How Pop and Politics are changing Places in the Berlin Republic*. *Debatte* 6, no. 2 (1998): 173-75.

———. *Vertretung, Darstellung, Vorstellung. Der Kampf der MigrantInnen um Repräsentation*. <http://www.Eipcp.Net/Diskurs/D02/Text/Terkessidis01.html> (2000), visited 23 August 2003.

Türkođlu, Sevim. *Die Kurdische und Türkische Theaterlandschaft in Berlin*. Berlin: unpublished Manuscript, 2003.

Vertovec, Steven. *Berlin Multikulti: Germany, 'Foreigners' and 'World-Openness'*. *New Community* 22, no. 3 (1996): 381-99.

———. *Multiculturalism, Culturalism and Public Incorporation*. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 19 (1996): 49-69.

Weiss, Christina. *Stadt ist Bühne. Kulturpolitik Heute*. Hamburg: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1999.

Werkstatt der Kulturen. *Selbstdarstellung*. <http://www.werkstatt-der-kulturen.de/Index2.htm>, visited 5 January 2004.

THE PROMOTION OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY THROUGH INTEGRATION POLICIES IN HELSINKI

by Ritva Mitchell¹²³

A Portrait of Helsinki

Finland's capital, Helsinki, is located on the coast of the Gulf of Finland in the Baltic Sea. The city has some 563,000 inhabitants, but the population of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area (HMA) is about one million. The surface area of greater Helsinki is 686 km² in total, but 500 km² of this is water, leaving 186 km² of habitable land. The population density is some 3,000 inhabitants per km² (excluding the sea-area).

The Helsinki Metropolitan Area consists of the City of Helsinki and three neighbouring townships: Espoo, Kauniainen and Vantaa. All four are independent municipalities, and, as Finland has an extensive system of autonomy for local self-government, each has its own decision-making and administrative bodies. The main features of local self-government are municipality taxation rights and their central role as service providers, together with the legislative and financial measures of central government to safeguard equal social, health, educational and cultural services to all citizens irrespective of their domicile. Furthermore, the municipalities have the right to carry out detailed zoning and land-use planning within the framework of regional master plans. Each of the four cities has a municipal cultural office of its own and three of them a Multicultural Advisory Board. As a result of their autonomy, co-operation between the four municipalities in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area is carried out by and large on a voluntary basis.

The growth and present central position of Helsinki have come about as a result of three historical/geographical events: the construction of the fortress of Suomenlinna/Sveaborg on an island off the coast of the peripheral small town of Helsinki in the eighteenth century, the Russian conquest of Finland in 1809, (which made Helsinki the capital in 1812), and the loss to the Soviet Union after the Finno-Russian wars of 1939-1945 of Viborg, a Hanseatic and cosmopolitan city on the Baltic Sea close to what was then called Leningrad.

During Russian rule, which ended in 1917, St. Petersburg was one of the gateways to Europe, Berlin and Paris in particular, for many Finnish artists and intellectuals. The loss of the St. Petersburg link after World War I and Finland's independence as well as that of other Baltic States meant that direct interaction between the cities of the Baltic Sea Region became more bilateral and nationally oriented. After World War II the Iron Curtain around the Baltic States put an end to these inter-city interactions and flow of people, cultural ideas and products – and brought about closer ties between Finland and Helsinki with the Nordic countries and their capitals.

The elimination of the Iron Curtain in 1990-1991 re-opened inter-city interactions across the Gulf of Finland and the flow of people, products and ideas gained speed and

¹²³. Ritva Mitchell, CUPORE, honorary CIRCLE board member.

intensity surprisingly quickly. Cultural exchanges between Helsinki and the other cities on the Baltic Sea area reached their present level and became stabilised by the mid-1990s. The flow of people in three respects – as shoppers, as city tourists and as job and residence seekers – has increased steadily between Helsinki and the other Baltic cities, and particularly between Helsinki and Tallinn, which is exceptional by any yardstick. More than 12,000 Estonians reside now in Finland – of which 4,000 live in Helsinki.

Historical cultural diversity

The brief historical background provided above does not illustrate the impact of geopolitics on cultural diversity in Finland and Helsinki and needs to be supplemented by the following statistics:

‘Historical’ cultural diversity in Finland consists of the following categories:

Constitutionally protected minorities and indigenous people:

Swedish-speaking Finns (‘second national culture’)	290,000
The Sámi-people as a conglomerate of cultural communities of this: speakers of the Sámi languages	7,000 1,700

Historical minorities:

Roma people	13,000
Russians of the old origin, whose families settled in Finland during the Czarist rule	5,000
Tatars	850
Jews	1,500

These figures indicate that Finland has been a relatively homogeneous country, especially as Swedish-speaking Finns are not considered a minority constitutionally but a second national culture parallel to that of the Finnish-speaking population. Constitutional and legislative responses to the claims of the ‘old’ minorities have concentrated, by and large, on two of them: Swedish-speaking Finns and the Sámi. Due to their special historical position, they have a high degree of cultural autonomy with cultural institutions of their own, special linguistic and educational rights and special budget considerations

in the state and local government budgets. The Roma people have been the target of special educational, cultural and social welfare measures, while the three other small ethnic minority groups have their own small communities and institutions (associations, churches, kindergartens). Some 23% of Swedish speaking Finns live in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area; the Sámi-people live mainly in Finnish Lapland (although there is also a City-Sámi Association in Helsinki). The ‘old’ Russians, Tatars and Jews are concentrated mainly in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area.

The internal migration of the 1950s and 1960s

The aftermath of the World War II in the 1950s and the explosive modernisation of the 1960s brought internal migration from other regions of Finland into the Helsinki Metropolitan Area in two major waves: in 1951-1956 net migration was some 50,000 people from all regions of Finland and in 1966-1970 some 75,000, mainly from Eastern Finland.¹²⁴ This internal migration along with the parallel modernisation of the industrial and economic, and social structure in a way “de-urbanised” the city in the 1960s. New suburban areas being built in the northern and eastern part of the city and the old Helsinki city culture has thus been overshadowed by a new half-rural half-urban culture. This period of internal migration to the Helsinki Metropolitan Area and the surrounding province of Uusimaa ended temporarily in the mid-1980s, but accelerated again at the beginning of the 1990s because of the severe economic recession that Finland experienced in 1991-1993. Present internal migration consists largely of movement between cities by professionals and skilled labour seeking employment in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area.

In the 1960s Finland also experienced major emigration to Sweden, and until the mid-1980s it had more emigrants than immigrants.

The inflow of foreign citizens, immigrants and refugees to Finland and the Helsinki Metropolitan Area in the 1990s

The inflow of foreign citizens, immigrants and refugees started only in the first half of the 1990s. It was due to two factors: an increase in the number of refugees allowed to enter Finland, especially so-called ‘quota refugees’ from Somalia, and ‘repatriation’ policies which allowed Ingrians of Finnish origin from the former Soviet Union to enter as ‘returning nationals’.

124. Two additional processes, the relocation of some 400,000 Karelians from the areas ceded to the Soviet Union and the “big migration” of Finns to Sweden in 1960s, contributed to the “new mix” caused by these migration waves.

The first 'official' refugees from Chile and Vietnam were accepted at the request of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in the 1970s and 1980s; the system of 'quota refugees' was adopted in 1988, and the first wave of Somali refugees arrived in Finland in 1992. This was followed by an influx of 'quota refugees' from Southeast Europe, Iraq and Turkey, and migrants from Asia, e.g. from China and Thailand. The Ingrians were officially recognised as 'returning nationals' by President Maunu Koivisto in 1990, and they contributed to about one-third of the close to 62,000 immigrants entering Finland in the 1990s. This wave was paralleled by a steady escalation of individual immigration from the Russian Federation and Estonia.

Table 38. The number and share (%) of foreign citizens in Finland and in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area in 1980-2004 (selected years)

Year	The whole country		Helsinki Metropolitan Region (HMA)		Foreigners HMA /whole country
	Number of foreign citizens	% of the total population	Number of foreign citizens	% of the total population	
1980	12,835	0.3	5,522	0.7	0,430
1985	17,034	0.3	6,828	0.9	0,401
1990	26,255	0.5	10,581	1.3	0,403
1995	62,012	1.2	26,444	3.0	0,425
2000	87,680	1.7	38,429	4.1	0,438
2001	91,074	1.8	39,460	4.1	0,433
2002	98,577	1.9	42,810	4.4	0,434
2003	103,682	2.0	45,148	4.6	0,435
2004	107,003	2.0	46,982	4.8	0,439

Source: Munther, Arja, "Statistics on immigrants to Helsinki Metropolitan region" in Joronen, Tuula (ed.), The Living Conditions of the Immigrants in the Helsinki Metropolitan Region, Helsinki, 2004, 12.

Table 39. The share (%) of foreign citizens from different regions of the world in the population of Helsinki, the Helsinki Metropolitan Region and the whole country 1/1/2004.

Country group:	City of Helsinki	Helsinki Metropolitan Region	The whole country
Russia and CIS	19.0	18.2	24.1
Asia	18.8	20.3	17.9
Baltic countries	16.8	15.8	13.1
Eu countries (15)	15.9	14.9	17.5
Africa	14.0	14.1	8.5
Other Eastern Europe countries	7.1	9.1	9.5
The Americas, North and South	5.0	4.4	3.9
Other global regions	2.2	2.2	1.8
Other Western European countries	1.0	1.0	3.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Munther, op.cit. 18.

Of all this influx, the city of Helsinki and the Helsinki Metropolitan Area received relatively more than the rest of Finland.

The increased influx of foreign citizens as such is not yet an indication per se of increased multiculturalism. A better indicator is the number of native speakers of foreign languages, including those so-called foreigners residing in the country even after their naturalisation (see Table 40). The number of foreign-language native speakers is higher than that of foreign citizens; and it is considerably higher in Helsinki and in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area than in the whole country, reaching the figure of 6.7% in Helsinki.

Table 40. Foreign language speakers by their native language in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area and the whole country 1/1/2004

Language	City of Helsinki		Helsinki Metropolitan Region		The whole country	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Russian	9,388	24.9	13,824	23.1	35,222	28.2
Somali	4,183	11.1	6,781	11.3	7,777	6.2
Estonian	4,170	11.1	6,349	10.6	12,746	10.2
English	2,913	7.7	4,333	7.2	8,186	6.6
Arabic	1,654	4.4	2,731	4.6	6,040	4.8
Chinese	1,257	3.3	2,284	3.8	3,812	3.1
German	941	2.5	1,525	2.5	3,762	3.0
Turkish	880	2.3	1,480	2.5	3,074	2.5
Kurdish	864	2.3	1,655	2.8	4,340	3.5
Vietnamese	766	2.0	1,782	3.0	3,927	3.1
Albanian	525	1.4	1,746	2.9	4,508	3.6
Other Languages	10,171	27.0	15,461	25.8	31,423	25.2
Foreign languages total	37,712	100.0	59,951	100.0	124,817	100.0
All languages						
Finnish	486,502	87.0	851,716	87.3	4 805,047	92.1
Swedish	35,116	6.3	64,482	6.6	289,868	5.5
Foreign languages total	37,712	6.7	59,951	6.1	124,817	2.4
Total	559,330	100	976,149	100.0	5 219,732	100.0

Source: Munter, op. cit, 12

By far the three largest groups are Russians, Estonians and Somalis. As the figures indicate, of these groups Russians and Estonians are spread around the country; while close to 82% of Somalis have established their homes in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area, in the eastern districts of Helsinki and in the Hakunila district of the city of Vantaa. This makes Somalis a visible and audible minority in Helsinki, in the sense of community spirit, religion, and habitus, while the Russians¹²⁵ and Estonians have been characterised as 'invisible' and 'inaudible' minorities.¹²⁶

125. Ingrians are descendants of Finnish migrants who moved to Russia in the 17th century. The majority of them who immigrated as returning nationals to Finland in the 1990s contributed to the growth of the Russian-speaking population, because most of them were able to use Finnish only slightly or not at all. This group has also brought about many social problems in terms of unemployment and social exclusion among the young people in particular. Recently the Finnish police and justice authorities have been accused of starting to return young Ingrian drug users to Russia – that is, forcefully emigrating some of the returned nationals.

126. For this "invisibility" and "inaudibility", see the case illustration below.

District-based settlement of immigrants and refugees in Helsinki

Table 41 below provides information on the settlement of the main migrant groups in different districts of the City of Helsinki (See map 10). The classification is based on regional or global-origin definition and not linguistic/cultural groupings. This leads to the classification of Somalis as Africans. Yet the table offers some insights into the integration/ segregation of residents. The clearest indication is the concentration of immigrants – African/Somalis, Russians, Estonians and Asians - in the eastern and north-eastern districts.

Table 41. Helsinki foreign citizens (% distribution) by global regional country groups and the Helsinki city districts 2004

Group	District										
		City, total	South Centre	South Eastern	West Eastern	North Centre	Northern	North Eastern	East-ern	Other	
EU member countries		15.9	34.6	17.6	18.8	20.1	16.3	7.8	7.0	17.6	
Other West-European Countries		1.0	2.6	1.1	1.4	1.1	1.5	0.4	0.3	0.9	
Baltic countries		16.8	8.5	16.6	13.9	13.9	16.8	21.3	21.9	13.7	
Russia & the CIS		19.0	15.0	18.8	16.4	11.5	18.0	25.7	23.9	9.5	
Rest of Eastern Europe		7.1	7.1	6.8	8.2	6.8	8.4	7.0	7.8	6.4	
Africans		14.0	14.0	14.9	15.0	15.4	15.5	13.4	15.0	23.3	
The Ameri-cas, North & South		5.0	5.0	4.7	5.3	6.3	4.6	2.6	2.3	8.2	
Asia		18.8	18.9	17.1	19.2	23.1	15.9	19.7	19.2	17.8	
Other global regions		2.2	2.2	1.4	1.8	1.8	3.9	2.1	2.5	2.6	
Total		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Source: Munter, op.cit. 20.

About 43% of foreign citizens in Helsinki have their domicile in those districts where the share of foreign population already surpasses 8%. There is, however, an opposite rather distinct 34% concentration in the City's business areas (South and North centres) and the more expensive and highly esteemed real estate areas close to the suburbs of South Eastern and Western districts. These areas are mainly inhabited by people from other EU countries (in the table: EU of 15). The otherwise seemingly rather even distribution of the Russian, Estonian, African and Asian groups through all districts is due to the heterogeneity of the groups. These groups consist of varying nationalities including foreign university students and teachers, diplomats and managers of foreign companies.



In summary, from the point of view of cultural diversity we can detect three major groups of immigrants in Helsinki and the HMA, which can be considered to form a cultural and linguistic community in one sense or another: the Russians, the Estonians and the Somalis. Of these three only the Somalis form an expressive cultural community, while the Russians and the Estonians, at least until now, have been rather invisible and inaudible communities. The numbers of these two groups are continuously growing though: the Russian speaking population in Finland increased by 122% from 1996 to 2003 and the Estonian speaking population close to 50%. The Estonians in particular, but also Russian newcomers, are increasingly made up of professionals: scientists, engineers, physicians and skilled workers. The largest group of immigrants and refugees comes, however, from Asia (Vietnam, China etc.), forming 19% of the city's immigrant population and 20% of the immigrant population of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area.

Integration policies of the Government

Several studies have explored the premises and different aspects of the integration policies of the Finnish Government. If we take a closer look at these policies, we find that certain priorities set by the Social Welfare State seem to give them the main direction. These priorities are:

- observing the stipulations of international conventions/agreements and national legislation on human rights, including cultural rights;
- provision of social services and welfare provisions for all, including immigrants and refugees;
- levelling of costs and benefits between regions and municipalities, including those accruing from the flows of refugees and immigrants.

Finland has ratified all the main international human rights and cultural rights conventions and agreements and also monitors their observance according to international practices. What is more important, however, is the inclusion of specific human rights and cultural rights stipulations on *Equality of Minorities* in the newly codified *Constitution of 1999*. In this Constitution basic rights are stipulated to belong to all inhabitants, not only to Finnish citizens. The linguistic and cultural rights of the two national minorities, the Swedish-speaking Finns and the Sámi, are specifically confirmed in Article 17. The same article also stipulates that other groups, too, have the right to maintain and develop their own language and culture. Here we have, however, a change in the expression. Other basic rights belong to 'everybody', all individuals, and the right to language and culture to a group. From the point of view of public policies this causes a problem: *what*

is considered to be a group? Due to this and other problems, it is easier to focus on welfare policy measures to the maintaining of more substantial 'rights' than on the right to one's own language and culture. The problematic – and also secondary – position of the right to culture is also reflected in the Finnish government's 1997 decision on the basic premises of the programme for immigration and refugee policy:

"... immigrants participate in economic, political and social life as equal members of society, having the same rights and being subject to same responsibilities as other members of society. They also have the right to maintain and develop their own culture and religion in accordance with the legislation of Finland."

Thus rights to language, culture and religion are considered fundamental rights, but with definite provisions: they are "group rights" and they can be "maintained and developed" only "in accordance with national legislation". This has two consequences: first, public support for foreign cultural groups is not automatic as is support to individual social welfare; and it also presupposes that the 'group' must organise itself into associations and organisations.

The greater importance attached to maintaining 'material' rather than 'spiritual' rights through welfare policies is reflected in the *1999 Act on Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Refugees*.¹²⁷ This legislation stipulates in detail that the state and the municipalities must provide economic, political and social security to these groups for a period that is sufficient for them to integrate into Finnish society. The most important measures for this period are those providing economic support and employment opportunities.

According to the principles of the Finnish welfare society, basic social services are provided jointly by the state and the municipalities. This principle applies also to services provided for immigrants and refugees. In the case of refugees the division of labour is very clear: the municipalities, which agree to receive refugees, make a contract with the state (central government). Social welfare support paid to new refugees for three years is channelled to them through municipalities which can apply for additional state subsidies for special services (like interpretation). Furthermore, the state pays 'cost levelling subsidies' to the municipalities for 'additional costs' caused by refugees, over and above the subsidies paid for the provision of services to Finnish citizens. At present the latter subsidy is about 1,900 euros for an adult refugee and about 6,200 euros for children under the age of seven.

127. The term "integration" is not actually used in the Act. In the preparatory process a new term, *kotouttaminen*, was coined to replace it. This term cannot be translated precisely into English, but it indicates something like "having a domicile and feeling like being at home".

Why review all these legislative and social welfare measures in the context of the development of cultural diversity in Helsinki and the Helsinki Metropolitan Area? We have done so for three reasons.

First, there are only limited provisions for the promotion of immigrant or refugee cultures on the part of the state.¹²⁸ Such provision depends on the cities themselves. Secondly, the system of joint implementation by the state and municipalities is part and parcel of regional development and decentralisation policies.¹²⁹ As such, it tends to disperse refugee groups regionally, at least to start with. As the case of the Somali refugee groups indicate, there is, however, a tendency for these groups to settle close to one another and particularly in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area.¹³⁰ Thirdly, all this provides a background for the following two case studies, which reflect what a city can do and what it cannot do in respect to promotion of multiculturalism and cultural diversity.

The problem of the atomisation of immigrant groups has also been recognised by the immigration units of the central government and local authorities. It was felt that some kind of communality was needed as a prerequisite for immigrants and refugees in order to maintain their own language and develop their own culture. The response to the problem has been the one used in the other Nordic countries: to co-operate with the voluntary associations in order to structure the civil society of the immigrants and to link them to political system and the planning and implementing of legislation and policy measures concerning them. The associations are formally registered and operate within the framework of the Act on Voluntary Associations; they are linked to each other and policy makers through umbrella organisations and representation in advisory bodies. These associations are often supported both by the central government and the local authorities.

According to a recent study¹³¹ in 2002 there were 230 actual immigrant associations of a given immigrant group, 39 multicultural associations, 88 friendship associations (uniting Finns and foreigners) and 63 solidarity associations (for aiding politically and/or economically refugees or their countries), and 152 other associations for specific purposes. Out of these associations 48% operate in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area and 76.4% in the HMA plus in two other major cities (Tampere and Turku). Most associations (40) were founded by Somalis and immigrants from the Baltic countries (Estonia), Islamic/Arabic immigrants have 29 associations and Russians 29. Some of the immigrant

128. The Ministry of Education and Culture has provided a sum of 400,000 euros in 2005 for the cultural activities of migrants' associations. As an example we can cite the event called the Somali Books and Art Fair.

129. By the end of 2003 about one-third (140) of the Finnish municipalities had "contracted" refugees.

130. A recent study indicates that in six years the refugees "accumulated" in urban environments. Originally only 20% of the refugees in 1991-1993 from Somalia, ex-Yugoslavia and Iran were located in the five largest cities. Six years later, 60% of them lived in these cities. (See Ahlgren-Leivuo, "Pakolaiset Suomen kunnissa- kuntapaikasta pääkaupunkiseudulle" (Refugees in the Finnish municipalities - from original locations to the Helsinki Metropolitan Region", in Joronen, Tuula (ed.), *Maahanmuuttajien elinolosuhteet pääkaupunkiseudulla* (The Living Conditions of Immigrants in the Helsinki Metropolitan Region), Helsingin kaupungin tietokeskus, 2005, 25-46.

131. Saksela, Sanna, "Immigration organisations in Nordic countries with special focus on Finland". A working paper presented at CWDEM, ULG, November 12, 2004.

groups are distinctly split, e.g. Kurds have 21 associations, of which 13 operate in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area.

These associations and networks have provided an interface between 'top down' and 'bottom up' initiatives for improving the status of immigrants and facilitating their integration into Finnish society and its way of life. Yet the study also makes it clear that the ability of the associations to function depends greatly on the financial support received from the central government and local authorities and their ability to run the associations in an effective way. In general, the results of the study seem to suggest that the associations are especially effective when dealing with specific issues, such as providing language education and information on public services to immigrant women. As the municipal officials responsible for immigrant affairs have their own networks and there are informal networks for specific immigrant groups (e.g. women), interaction between these two levels is important. Yet the study admits that

"...the co-operation between these two (networking) levels have been so far very weak... More effective sharing of information is being needed to facilitate co-operation between formal and informal levels".¹³²

The public face and place of immigrants in Helsinki

Despite the small number of immigrants and refugees, particularly seen from a European perspective, recent flows of immigrants and refugees have caused social problems even in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area. There have been some outright racist attacks on foreign citizens and their small businesses and some racially oriented youth confrontations. Recent research, however, has also pointed out some more pervasive adjustment problems, which are due to a lack of 'faces' and 'spaces', that is, to the inability of immigrants to find appropriate faces and meeting places for interaction.

These problems are not only, or even mainly, due to the inability of individual persons but to the community's inability to provide the right environment and facilities. The problem is thus one of making social resources and opportunities available for meeting and participation. We can illustrate these problems with three studies and articles, the first giving an explanation to the accumulation of Somalis in the city of Vantaa and eastern Helsinki, the second illustrating the nature of 'inaudible' and 'invisible' migrant groups and the third comparing the 'faces' and 'spaces' of immigrants in Helsinki and in Athens.

The first of these studies suggests that Somali housewives felt more secure in Vantaa than in the City of Helsinki.¹³³ They also felt that people in Vantaa were more supportive

132. Saksela, op.cit., 2004,11.

133. Tiilikainen, Marja, Arjen Islam. *Somalaisten elämää Suomessa* (Islam of the Everyday. The lives of the Somali Women in Finland), Vastapaino, Tampere 2003.

to their families and life styles than in Helsinki. These feelings were probably based on the fact that their role as Somali housewives 'blended in' better with the prevailing social practices and family patterns in Vantaa than in the more urban Helsinki.

The opposite alternative has been to dilute migrant 'faces', their culture and community transient. This has been described as follows by the researcher Timo Cantell who suddenly found himself in a minority at a Russian pop concert:

"The show took place at the Tavastia Club (2003), Helsinki's leading rock venue. The place with a capacity of 900 seats was almost fully packed with an audience whose appearance suggested they were relatively normal and regular rock venue visitors. People in their 20s and 30s, casually dressed. Early on I became distinctly aware of the fact that when the band invited people to sing along, the audience joined in enthusiastically. And the singing took place in the Russian language relatively often heard on the streets of Helsinki but rarely spoken by Finns. This occasion turned things on their head and I found myself in a language minority as there seemed to be only a handful of people who were not able to understand the lyrics.... This was quite a revelation for me: here I was standing in the middle of the familiar rock arena in my home city, in the midst of a crowd that I was physically close but socially and culturally distant from, strongly aware that there seems to be hundreds of young people with Russian origin in Helsinki. ... The concert opened my eyes to the fact that there has to be a strong Russian sub-culture in Helsinki that one rarely hears anything about or would know much of..."¹³⁴

Being invisible and inaudible at an early socialisation period and then becoming integrated as fast as possible has been a variant strategy of some other migrant groups, e.g. the Vietnamese refugees.

The third study, by Michail Galanakis,¹³⁵ has made an interesting comparison between Helsinki and Athens in respect to the public spaces that these cities provide for immigrants. In his study 'provision' is not a planned offering of such places, but emerges as a result of 'para-urbanism': the formation of a city environment in the 'grey area' where official city planning and the interest of businesses and people are adjusted to each other. Temporary dwelling areas, ethnic markets and shops and squares as meeting places for immigrants emerge 'bottom up', irrespective of official plans and calls for civic order. From this perspective Galanakis compares the Helsinki Railway Station area and Omonia Square in Athens. The repute of these places as meeting places for immigrants has resisted the strict surveillance (in Helsinki) or architectural reorganisation (Athens). Galanakis summarises his research results by stating that:

"The from-the-top-down policies of the Finnish welfare system do not encourage transnationals to establish a positive public face.... (in contrast) Greece neglects transnationals, policies are either top-down or absent, but immigrants have still thought up survival strategies that have empowered them and gradually their public faces have become increasingly alive."

Our two case studies, *Caisa* and *Kassandra* will illustrate below how the problems of 'spaces' and 'faces' have been addressed by the city of Helsinki and its artistic community. In order to understand their administrative context and their different roles, we should return to the 'top down' perspective and have a look at the main municipal and regional organisations implementing immigrant policies in Finland.

Voluntary organisations of immigrants and policy implementation in Helsinki and the Helsinki Metropolitan Area

The following table provides an overall view of the main regional and municipal organisations involved in the integration policies and provides examples of the types of activities they are engaged in Helsinki and the Helsinki Metropolitan Area in collaboration with the associations of immigrants.

Although immigrants' associations participate and are active, Multicultural Advisory Councils and the co-ordinators for immigrants' and the employment policies are, of course, in the driving seat in the implementation of the local authority multicultural policies. The associations themselves are, however, represented in the councils¹³⁶.

The present local government structures and most of the voluntary associations of the immigrants are still tuned to respond to the problems of the first generation of immigrants and their children, and particularly those who arrived to Finland during the 1990s.

134. Cantell, Timo, "Non-visible and Non-Audible Migrants", in Eurocult21 Stories, City of Helsinki Cultural Office, Helsinki 2004, 83-86.

135. Galanakis, Michail, Socio-spatial discrimination in urban public space. The cases of Helsinki and Athens, University of Industrial Arts and Design, School of Design, research work in progress.

136. These Councils were created in the 1990s.

Table 42. Organisations responsible for the integration of immigrants and their co-operation with voluntary associations of immigrants

Type of organisations	Organisations in Helsinki and in the HMA	Examples of joint activity with immigrant organisations
Central government regional economic and employment centres	The Regional Economic and Employment Development Centre of the Province of Uusimaa	Organises seminars and courses for immigrants, informs about employment opportunities
Multicultural Advisory Councils	Advisory Council for Foreigners (in Helsinki); Multicultural Advisory Council (in Vantaa and Espoo)	Advises municipal decision-makers in planning , financing and implementing immigrant policies (also cultural policies)
Co-ordinators for immigrants' employment (only in the bigger municipalities)	An official sub-ordinate to above advisory councils	Advises immigrants to design their integration plans and in finding training, education and employment opportunities
Multicultural Centres	Helsinki Multicultural Centre "Caisa" (see the case study below)	A meeting point, multicultural interaction, information services, production of multicultural events/exhibitions etc.
Project organisations: Social cohesion projects	Joint management by the local authorities and associations of immigrants	For example JOIN- Joint Promotion of Anti-Discriminatory Action at Local Level
Project organisations: Educational projects	Project management by associations of immigrants	Language courses; courses in Finnish society and culture
Project organisations: Social welfare projects	Joint local authority/ voluntary associations management	Helsinki Eastern district project to rehabilitate young Ingrian drug users
Project organisations: Artistic multicultural projects	Project management by professional organisations of artists and individual artistic groups	For example Kassandra, Taru and Faces festival – see the case study of Kassandra below

Caise 1

The case of Caisa

The City of Helsinki started to plan its integration policy in 1991. Even to start with this was not done merely in order to solve potential social, political and economic problems, but also as a part of urban development and cultural policies. This approach was expressed for the first time distinctly in 1991 in the report of the committee that made proposals for the premises of the city's future immigration policy:

"The objective of the Helsinki City immigrant policy is to enable the transformation of the city into an international multicultural capital, where immigrants have equal rights to municipal services and can maintain their own language and culture while also having an opportunity to become integrated into city life."¹³⁷

The report led first to the establishment of an immigrant service unit and an Advisory Council for Foreigners. The latter drafted an immigration policy programme which was enacted in 1995. The programme listed ten strategic policy areas that by and large followed the outlines of national integration legislation.

However, they also emphasised the need to increase immigrants' social and cultural participation and multiculturalism. The establishment of meeting-points and forums where different ethnic groups and native Finns could meet was proposed as the main means to these ends.¹³⁸ Enhanced interaction through meeting points was to be organised on two levels: on the level of different city districts in their cultural centres and in the centre of the city. On the district level the responsibility was to be shouldered jointly by district associations and city officials. At the city level the establishment of a new international 'foyer' was proposed. The latter proposal led to the decision in 1995 to establish *Caisa* (International Cultural Centre), which began its activities in March 1996. Its objectives were defined as the following:

- to enhance encounters between immigrants and the Helsinki denizens;
- to provide services that facilitate the immigrant's ability to face the problems of everyday life;
- to promote the evolution of a multicultural city according to the objectives of the City's immigration policy programme.

137. For this and the following quotations and their original sources, see Joronen, Tuula (ed.), *Helsingin ulkomaalaispolitiikan teoria ja käytäntö* (The immigration policy of the City of Helsinki: its Theory and Practice), *Helsingin kaupungin tietokeskus, verkkojulkaisu* 17, 2003, 14.

138. The idea of establishing the meeting point came from the third sector, a group of immigrants associations.

More specifically, the proposal stated that:

“Helsinki wishes to become a European multicultural city. The cultural activities of ethnic groups will be supported so that they will have an opportunity to maintain their ethnic identity.” It also stipulated that “New items will be included in the supply of cultural services, and services will be brought closer to immigrants, to schools and joint meeting places. One goal is to provide migrants with a means to bring forth artistic expressions of their own.”

Caisa's activities have grown significantly since 1996. It facilitates a space (international cultural centre), means of communication (IT- facilities) and personnel (especially those recruited from among immigrants) responsible for programming and advice. It operates under the City of Helsinki's Cultural Office and in 2004 received a subsidy of 1.7 million euro from the City.¹³⁹

One of its practical problems has been that *Caisa* was originally planned to be a forum for different associations of immigrants and other foreigners to plan and organise events and other programmes together with it. These associations, however, basically have members only from their own ethnic groups, but there has been too little genuine intercultural interaction between different ethnic groups living in Helsinki. There are, after all, people from almost 150 nationalities living in the capital.

When about a half of the personnel comes from the ranks of the immigrants and are able to advise them in their own language:

“Listening to problems, advising, looking for solutions and directing them to the right service counters of the city and voluntary organisations have become an import function of the *Caisa* personnel.”

Recently an extensive evaluation of its activities was carried out.¹⁴⁰ It found out that *Caisa* had managed well, by and large, in achieving its main goals:

“It appeared that *Caisa* has successfully reached both the immigrant groups and Finns and that contacts had taken place in practice. The centre has been a meeting place and a channel for making other cultures better known... It has managed to create a more favourable public image of immigrants, and thereby possibly contributed to the reducing of prejudices and discrimination.”¹⁴¹

139. The City of Helsinki Cultural Office was founded in 1979. The main objectives of its policy are: support for professional artists, arts education, cultural work in the suburbs and international cultural co-operation and multiculturalism. In addition to the Cultural Office, the city's cultural administration consists of the City Library, the City Orchestra, the City Museum and the City Art Museum. Their total expenses in 2003 were 77,3 million euros.

140. Joronen, Tuula (ed.), op.cit., 2003.

141. For this and following quotations, see Joronen Tuula, op.cit. 2003, 135-138.

But, on the other hand:

“Our study also showed that immigrant associations, although they play an important role regarding immigrant integration, cannot manage without the support of the city. They do not have the economic resources needed for activities targeted at the (Finnish) majority, e.g. for intercultural interactions.... Their resources are not always even enough to maintain the activities of their own.”

Caisa still has a long way to go in creating an intercultural platform for genuine interactions between different cultures. Providing services and a meeting place for immigrant's associations¹⁴² and enhancing mutual understanding and diminishing racial prejudices and discrimination are definitely steps on the road to multiculturalism and cultural diversity.

On the other hand, such genuine artistic intercultural interactions have been achieved successfully by such projects as *Kassandra* and *Faces*.¹⁴³

Case 2

The case of Kassandra

Art can transform diversity into a resource

The initiator of the project is one of the leading figures in the Finnish experimental theatre, Ritva Siikala, who had earlier produced ground-breaking work on themes concerning women's life experiences. In the *Kassandra* project, female 'otherness' was related to the otherness felt by immigrant women, and these two spheres were examined through intellectual debates, public discussions, multicultural theatre performances, and a three-day performance called “*Kassandra* celebrates”. All the stories on which the performances were based came from Finnish and immigrant participants (74 together). The project lasted for three years (1997-2000) and was linked to Helsinki's year as one of the European cities of culture. It was funded partly by the foundation established for cultural capital activities, partly from other public sources and private foundations.


142. For the important role of immigrants own cultural associations for the internal integration and cohesion of first generation immigrant groups in particular, see Pyykkönen, Miikka “Integraatio ja maahanmuuttajien yhdistystoiminta” (Integration and associations of the immigrants), in Hänninen, Sakari, Anita Kangas and Martti Siisiäinen (eds.), *Mitä yhdistykset välittävät: tutkimuskohteena kolmas sektori*, Atena, Jyväskylä 2003, 89-120.

143. *Faces* Etnofestival is a multicultural festival that has been arranged since 1998 and has become largest of its kind in Finland, with some 8,500 visitors in the summer of 2003. The festival offers three days of music on stage and on the festival area, art exhibitions, children's programme, dance, and discussion forums. The festival is organised every summer in a small town outside Helsinki. It is run by an association called Etnocult, which has been active in the construction of an open and tolerant atmosphere in Finland towards immigrants and refugees. It collaborates with Radio Helsinki, the International Cultural Centre *Caisa* (see above), the Cultural Arena Gloria (run by the Youth Department of the city of Helsinki), Pori Jazz Festival, Service Centre for Development Cooperation –KEPA. KEPA is a service base for Finnish NGOs interested in development work and global issues.

The results of this project led, among other things, to a multicultural theatre production of the play *Rainbow* and to an art exhibition-and performance production called *The Ocean of the Worlds*. These events and all other activities were aimed at producing a cascade of meetings of creators and audiences coming from different cultures and ethnic groups where the participants produced new cultural definitions of place and identity. As one of the participants in the project stated, while examining changes that took place in her understanding of herself: "My orientation ...to other cultures has been transformed into a search for my own identity, which expands my perceptions of difference and otherness."¹⁴⁴

Kassandra was a successful experiment and it has been formalised as an association with multiple partners from different cultural centres, art universities, schools and kindergartens. Its motto is: "Kassandra – towards a multicultural Finland – Art can transform diversity into a resource". Under its umbrella there is also the *Monika* project, which produces television programmes aiming at bringing multiculturalism from the women's point of view to the centre of discussion. It is also building networks between native Finnish artists and artists from different ethnic groups. The words of a participant in the project just cited allow us to complete the spectrum of multiculturalism we have covered in the case of Helsinki. In contrast to geopolitics, statistics and integration policies and the joint and counter-strategies of migrant groups, *Kassandra* reminds us that so much intercultural interaction takes place within individuals, in their thoughts, images and orientations. If integration policies do not reach these internal spheres of individuals, they are bound to fail...

Map 10. Districts of Helsinki (the dash line=city border)



CITY OF HELSINKI, Department of Surveying, 1995.

144. Quoted in *Kassandra – a Journey Across the Borders of Culture*, Helsingin tietokeskus, 2005, 2, 21.

MOSCOW: THE MELTING POT UNDER PRESSURE

by Kirill Razlogov¹⁴⁵

Overview

Moscow is the capital of the Russian Federation, one of the two cities (with Saint-Petersburg) legally considered as a 'subject' of the Federation, whose status is equivalent to that of a region. The city is the centre of the Moscow Region – a separate administrative entity. The residence of the President of the Russian Federation and the seats of the Federal Parliament, the Government and other Federal bodies and authorities, the official representations of other subjects of the Federation and foreign Embassies are all located in Moscow¹⁴⁶.

Geographically, Moscow is located in the centre of the Eastern European Plain around the rivers Moscova and Yauza and between the rivers Volga and Oka in the middle of a forest region. Its territory (without the technopolis Zelenograd and other settlements administered by the municipality) is 994 square kilometres, including 878.7 square km inside the ring road. Moscow is divided into 10 administrative units and more than 120 neighbourhoods.

Population

The population of the city began to grow in the fourteenth century together with the importance and influence of Moscow County. At the end of that century it was evaluated at 30 to 40 thousand. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, after a period of social crisis, Moscow had 200 thousand inhabitants and had become the centre of commercial activity in Russia. When the capital of the Russian Empire was moved to Saint-Petersburg, its attraction obviously diminished. Its growth resumed with the abolition of serfdom (1861) and the beginning of railroad construction when industrial development became more important than the Imperial court. During the second half of the nineteenth century the population tripled to more than a million and stood at 1.8 million in 1917 (see Table 43).

145. Kirill Razlogov, Russian Institute for Cultural Research, CIRCLE board member.

146. Most of the data in this article are based on Moskva Encyclopaedia.(ed.) S.O. Shmidt. "Bol'shaya Rossijskaya Encyclopaedia", Moscow, 1997 and updated from the last census (October 2002), www.gks.ru.

Table 43.

Years	Polulation Million	Years	Polulation Million
1917	1.8	1987	8.8
1940	4.4	1988	8.9
1956	4.9	1989	9.0
1959	6.0	1990	9.0
1960	6.2	1991	9.0
1970	7.2	1992	9.0
1980	8.1	1993	8.9
1981	8.3	1994	8.8
1982	8.4	1995	8.7
1983	8.5	1996	8.7
1984	8.6	1997	8.6
1985	8.7	2002	10.4
1986	8.7		

Source: http://www.gks.ru/scripts/db_inet/dbinet.cgi?pl=2403012

Moscow became the capital once again in 1918, but its population diminished because of the October Revolution and the ensuing civil war. The city lost all the aristocracy and trades people, most of the intelligentsia and the priesthood. The destruction of these social groups continued with Stalin’s purges of the 1930s and late 1940s. As a result, only 3% of the present population are direct descendants of Muscovites from before the revolution. In 1932 the so-called passport system was introduced. Its purpose was to limit the immigration flow to the city from the neighbouring villages and remote parts of the USSR. The system is still extant in the form of obligatory registration of all new residents, including temporary. Legal immigration during the Soviet period consisted of high level bureaucrats and specialists hired by powerful state enterprises and the so-called *limitchiki* – manual workers imported by plants and city authorities to carry out basic tasks, refused by Muscovites themselves. As a result, the basic culture of Moscow, as of most big cities in Russia, has remained semi-rural, referred to as *slobodskaya* – from the term *slobod*, referring to incorporated villages at the limits of the city.

Today, with the tightening of administrative barriers, (precautions against terrorism and steps to limit immigration that combine obvious corruption with bureaucratic limitations and police raids) a significant proportion of the working population and migrants has become illegal. This explains the 2 *million* difference between the official data of 1997 and the census results. To the 10 *million* we have to add between 2 to 4 *million* daily visitors, who in fact guarantee the high level of participation in cultural life, especially theatres, concerts and other entertainment events. The legal growth of the population

is the result of consecutive waves of elected bureaucrats who usually remain in Moscow after the end of their term of office, and rich people from all over the country who can afford to buy an apartment in the capital where real estate value is rising continuously. The even larger volume of illegals is composed of workers (mostly construction workers – there is a building boom in Moscow) from former Soviet Republics, Turkey and ex-Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent, other Eastern and Central European countries, as well as Vietnamese and Chinese traders.

This explains why it is difficult to calculate the exact socio-demographics of migration. In the 1960s and 1970s the population grew by 1 *million* every 10 years due both to the birth rate and immigration. In the 70s it was mostly and from the 90s on – only – immigration, as the death rate exceeded the birth rate. After the *perestroika* of the mid-80s, emigration to Israel and the Western countries became also an important factor. The socio-demographic structure is characterised by an ageing population, even if life expectancy in the country remains relatively low – 59 years for men and 64 for women (see Table 44). From after World War II the number of women has been superior to the number of men (55% to 45% in the 90s).

Table 44. Age (%)

	1959			1970			1979		
	Total	Men	Woman	Total	Men	Woman	Total	Men	Woman
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Below working age	20.8	24.8	17.9	19.0	22.1	16.6	17.7	20.4	15.6
Working age	65.5	68.3	63.4	61.5	67.4	56.8	62.2	67.9	57.7
Above working age	13.7	6.9	18.7	19.4	10.4	26.5	20.1	11.7	26.7
Average	33.1	-	-	35.8	-	-	37.1	33.9	39.7

	1989			1995			2002		
	Total	Men	Woman	Total	Men	Woman	Total	Men	Woman
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Below working age	19.8	22.6	17.6	18.8	21.4	16.6	13.2	14.2	12.2
Working age	58.5	64.6	53.5	57.8	64.5	52.3	65.1	71.6	59.2
Above working age	21.7	12.8	28.9	23.4	14.1	31.1	21.5	13.9	28.4
Average	37.5	34.4	40.0	38.4	35.5	40.7	39.3	36.6	41.7

The education level of 'legal' Muscovites remained relatively high (see Table 45).

Table 45. Education (per 1000 aged over 15)

	Entire				Including							
	1970	1979	1989	2002	Men				Woman			
Education of people over 15 y.o	1970	1979	1989	2002	1970	1979	1989	2002	1970	1979	1989	2002
College degree and above	155	206	264	299	190	239	292	293	130	182	182	304
Courses above high school	39	38	35	61	48	44	38	63	33	33	33	59
High school professional degree	107	142	199	254	100	124	171	246	112	156	156	261
High school degree	182	232	248	162	177	239	277	174	185	226	226	151
Middle school	242	212	156	81	270	235	160	80	227	195	195	83
Elementary	166	144	72	97	172	100	54	96	161	125	125	98

Official data on professional distribution (Table 46) is largely inaccurate, statistics of wealth distribution even more so. The present Moscow situation is now even more in contrast with the rest of the country than during Soviet times. It is reasonable to estimate that 10 to 20% of the Muscovites are millionaires, another 40% are people who work for them and specialists with high salaries (equivalent of the middle class) and an important part of the rest are members of their families. This leaves a small percentage of people (mostly elderly, not supported by their children) in the very low income bracket – with "state" salaries and pensions. In most other cities (except in regions with oil, gas and valuable natural resources) this proportion is of 0.5% very rich people, another 1% of people who serve them and 98% of really poor, subsisting on their country house and vegetable garden. This makes Moscow a very privileged place, whose situation does not at all reflect that of the country as a whole.

Table 46. Professional distribution (%)

	1940	1960	1970	1980	1989	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	2002
Professional Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Industry	43.7	36.4	30.3	25.9	24.1	22.6	22.0	21.9	19.4	18.0	13.2
Construction	1.1	2.6	3.1	2.8	2.7	2.5	13.3	11.5	13.3	13.5	9.4
Transportation and communications	10.0	10.3	9.5	9.6	8.6	8.3	7.6	6.5	7.2	7.2	11.4
Retail sales, hotels, and restaurants	9.2	8.0	9.2	9.2	9.7	10.0	10.4	12.7	14.7	16.0	19.9
Housing, real estate, and related services	6.9	5.7	4.9	4.9	5.0	4.9	3.9	4.1	4.3	4.1	8.2
Health and social services	3.3	4.4	5.2	5.2	6.1	6.6	6.0	5.8	6.2	6.2	6.5
Education	4.1	5.9	7.1	7.1	9.0	9.4	10.3	9.1	9.5	9.6	6.7
Finances	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.3	2.1	2.6	3.4
Government	7.3	3.2	4.7	4.7	2.8	6.0	3.8	3.6	2.5	3.1	4.2
Other	13.8	23.1	30.1	30.1	31.5	29.1	21.9	23.5	20.8	19.7	17.1

The ethnic and religious structure of the Moscow population has been shaped by consecutive waves of wars and migrations. The population of Moscow has never been ethnically homogenous, even if for political reasons most Muscovites define themselves as Russians.

The last census, conducted in October 2002, listed representatives of more than 100 different ethnic groups. The first 18 of them are as follows:

Table 47.

Russians	8, 808, 009
Ukrainians	253,644
Tatars	166,083
Armenians	124,425
Azeris	95,563
Jews	79,359
Byelorussians	59,353
Georgians	54,387
Moldavians	36,570
Tadjiks	35,385
Uzbecks	24,312
Mordva	23,387
Chuvash	16,011
Vietnamese	15,616
Chechens	14,465
Chinese	12,801
Ossetes	10,561
Koreans	8,630

The census data is based on answers only without any verification. This explains why one can find in the lists (but not in Moscow) exotic Harry Potter's groups, like elves and hobbits. Almost half a million Muscovites did not answer the question about nationality (= ethnic origin). But the most important distortion was due to the fact that they had to give only one answer, while many are of mixed origins. Hence the Tatar Centre of Moscow gives a figure of 800,000 Tatars-Muscovites – four times more than in the census.¹⁴⁷ Comparisons with the 1989 census give interesting results. The number of Jews diminished more than 2 times – in 1989 they were the third largest group after the Russians and the Ukrainians and there were no Vietnamese, Chinese and Koreans in the leading group.

During Soviet times the official ideology was atheism. The number of religious people was usually not mentioned at all in the official statistics. After the change of regime the Russian Orthodox Church became the more or less official religion. In the *Moskva Encyclopaedia* it has been stated recently that the majority of Muscovites are Orthodox

Christians (with no data given, p. 29). Experts have different views on the issue. Most sociological surveys agree that the majority of the population affirms just 'believing in God', with a very small number (less than 10%) observing the rules and rituals of any religion. Some 30% are atheists. Cross-religious marriages – a rule during Soviet period – make it possible to have only rough estimates of religious traditions. The *Encyclopaedia* affirms that 650 thousand Muscovites have some Jewish roots, 800 to 900 thousand some Muslim roots. There are 60 thousand Catholics in Moscow.

Cultural life in the capital has been and still is diversified. The legacy of the Soviet period is a relatively large number theatres and concert halls (85 in 1997) which used to have very low ticket prices, affordable to any one. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the economic reforms, theatres became less affordable but more numerous, due to the absence of censorship and less limitations on the creation of new establishments. The city authorities have been more active than the Federal ones in supporting new theatres legally and economically. At the same time, economic difficulties have limited the number of new productions and the rise in ticket prices has not matched inflation rate; subsidies have grown from 50% to 80% of their total income. Commercialization helped the creation a new (for Russia) form of theatrical entrepreneurship – travelling theatrical troupes offering a single show with one or two domestic stars. Show business boomed with foreign stars giving concerts in Red Square. Casinos and night clubs became privileged places for popular singers and dancers. Prestige art forms – the Bolshoi Theatre, the Moscow Conservatory, the old dramatic theatres – *MKHAT* and *Maly* – have conserved their symbolic status and high standards, even if music stars, ballet dancers and opera singers preferred travelling abroad (for purely economic reasons). Cultural policy – both federal and municipal – has not been able to continue supporting a large volume of cultural supply, so even at the prestige level conflicts have arisen, e.g. the controversy about the reconstruction of the Bolshoi with its permanent budget overruns.

The most visible impact of the new city management under Mayor Yuri Luzhkov was the destruction of architectural heritage such as Hotel Moscow or the *Voyentorg* – a jewel of Art Nouveau – and the implementation of a new eclectic style, combining Russian medieval features with High Tech. The reconstruction of the city centre, largely influenced by opulent Western cities, has given mixed results. Yuri Luzhkov unconditionally has supported the prolific Georgian sculptor Zurab Tseretely. His monument to Peter the Great (which is in fact a monument to Christopher Columbus that was rejected outside Russia) became a source of scandal in the artistic community, as was the rebuilding of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, destroyed by the Bolsheviks.

147. *Moskva pozdravlyayet Kazan'* (Moscow greets Kazan) (brochure), Moscow, 2005, p. 3.

The visual arts were dominated by an assimilation of (post)modern Western style art (the First Moscow Biennale in 2005) and the remains of traditional realism, supported by the Artists' Union. The treasures of the architectural heritage, such as the Kremlin, and the main Art museums –The Tretyakov Gallery and the Pushkin Fine Arts Museum – have benefited from the crisis, gaining larger audiences made up of visitors of the capital. The overall number of museums increased for the same reason as the number of theatres. There are 106 museums in Moscow, starting with the Kremlin, including 8 historical museums, 6 museums of war history, 24 art museums, 17 museums of theatre and music, 20 museums of literature, 23 scientific and technical museums and 3 museums of sport.

The cultural industries have undergone the most radical changes. Television became less unified (even if still politically controlled) with 5 national channels, including a special cultural channel called *Kultura* which has no advertising, two major networks, one terrestrial and one cable city channel, and hundreds of satellite channels available to rich Muscovites. The competition, as elsewhere in the world, gave priority to information (for political reason) and general entertainment (for commercial ones). The late 80s and beginning of the 90s saw a wave of American and Latin-American series on television. Ten years later they have been almost everywhere replaced by domestic series in prime-time slots. By contrast, the film distribution system, revived after a profound crisis at the end of the 90s, has been mostly Hollywood oriented until the breakthrough of Russian blockbusters in 2004-2005, financed by the main TV channels. This return to the local started with the book market, where American mysteries lost out to detective stories written by Russians, the most famous authors being women. The very small numbers of copies purchased, as compared to Soviet times, was compensated for by an increase in titles and the ideological and cultural diversity of the printed works.

There have been limits to diversity policy. Soviet policy was ruled by a unifying trend. When the class struggle achieved the goal of destruction of the enemies: the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy – culture was supposed to become one. Ethnic groups were declared dissolved in the 'new historical community – the Soviet people' and cultural policy was oriented to 'the people'. At the same time, the intelligentsia preserved the obsolete vertical cult of a unique culture for the 'reading and writing public.' Public policies gave practical results in the capital. If in the beginning different ethnic groups lived in specific parts of the city, as reflected in the names of the streets that are still there: *Arbat* and *Taganka* for the Tatars; *Gruzinskie ulitsy* – the Georgians; *Armyansky pereulok* - Armenians, etc., now the cultural strata are divided not by ethnic origin and religion, but by the division between 'old' and 'new' Muscovites and by income level. You live in an expensive neighbourhood either because you are in an old family home or because being wealthy you can buy a home.

Initially, the revival of nationalisms did not affect the city structure. In the long run, however, the opposition between 'old Muscovites' and aggressive newcomers from the Caucasus and Asia became apparent, accentuated by the Chechen War and related acts of terrorism in Moscow, one of which took place in a musical representation in a theatre. There have been paradoxes in the distribution of public feelings. Azeris were disliked because they took control of the agricultural markets; the few remaining Jews for their trade activity and Chechens as the 'enemy'.

Armenians found themselves heading almost all the big film and video distribution companies, and no animosity was shown towards them. The fact that Zurab Tsereteli was Georgian did not have any positive or negative impact, even if he paradoxically lived in the former Georgian quarter.

In other words, Moscow is characterized by a melting-pot mentality to a larger extent than the rest of the country. The basic law on National Cultural Autonomy, adopted by the Russian Parliament in 1996 (and partly revised in 2003), provided a basis of cultural rights to minorities in Moscow. Several National Cultural Centres were created by regional national cultural autonomies. For the moment their impact on the overall cultural life is minimal. They serve as meeting points for 'new' Muscovites. Some of their events might take on a certain importance in connection with the political conjuncture. A good example was the Moscow reflection of the celebration of the 1000 years of the City of Kazan – the capital of Tatarstan, a wealthy, oil-rich and mostly Muslim republic in the centre of the European part of Russia. Moscow initiated the first Festival of Muslim films under the patronage of the head Mufti in Russia and a huge concert was organized, featuring an impressive group of stars of Tatar origin, none of whom, with rare exceptions, had been perceived as Tatars before. These included the composer Sophia Gubaidullina, Fuat Mansurov, Head of the Bolshoi Orchestra, ballet dancers Lilia Musavarova, Aidar Akhmetov, Lilia Sabitova and Rinat Arifulin, the pop-stars Renat Ibragimov, Alsu, Bari Alibasov, the film director Bulat Mansurov, the film stars Chulpan Khamatova, Sergei Shakurov, plus many others. This concert called "The Bridge of Love", took place in the *Rossiya* concert hall on the 14th of March, 2005. Its main importance was to raise the awareness of the impact of one ethnic group in artistic excellence.

Following this and similar events, the Moscow Government adopted (on August 9, 2005) a special medium-term city programme entitled "Multinational Moscow: the implementation of social cohesion, culture of peace and tolerance (2005-2007)". The programme includes many cultural events which will be financed from the city budget. Their main aim is to ease growing tensions in the city, which are mostly due not to ethnic diversity, but to contrasts between rich and the poor.

EXPRESSIONS OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN ZAGREB

Nada Švob-Đokić¹⁴⁸

Zagreb became the capital of the independent Republic of Croatia in 1990. Although it was already the capital of Croatia when the latter was one of the federal units of Yugoslavia, its new position has promoted its 'metropolitan' role, combining the weight of its new administrative functions, rapid growth and the widening of international communication, co-operation and investment. The metropolitan history of Zagreb has therefore been rather short, very much shaped by political events and developments in the recent transitional history and identity of Croatia. The new position of the city has raised a number of controversies on its character and role, and these are still actively debated.

A short historical overview

Zagreb is about nine centuries old, spread across a favourable geographical position from the northern slopes of Mount Sljeme down to the river Sava and across it to the southern plains. There was no need to destroy the old parts of the city in order to build the new ones. Zagreb has enjoyed an abundance of space and time as it has gradually been transformed from an ancient artisan and commercial centre to a modern industrialized city. The traces of its growth and development have never been destroyed. This gives the city a certain homogeneity in the spatial, temporal and cultural perspectives.

This was not endangered even during the period of intense socialist industrialization after the Second World War, when Zagreb grew mainly as a result of immigration from rural areas. The city just spread, and added the role of being the main industrial centre of Yugoslavia to the many traditionally-established functions it had long held. The spatial growth of the city acquired new axis: the East-West spread of industrial capacities and communication lines that have almost overshadowed the traditional North-South axis.

De-industrialization in the transitional period resulted in a temporary recession, but did not stem the population growth. Unfortunately, the latter was mainly the result of the inflow of refugees from the war-affected parts of Croatia, combined with the fact that the administrative functions of the city grew as Zagreb became the capital of an independent state. New immigration strengthened the national character of Zagreb, but also affected very much its infrastructure, and made city life complicated in many respects. Thus in less than half a century, Zagreb has been twice exposed to the heavy inflow of mainly rural populations who have flocked to the city because of either economic (industrialization) or war and political reasons (refugees). As most of these new immigrants stayed in the city, the cultural image of Zagreb has been largely influenced by the values and cultures of these diverse rural populations.

Tracing cultural diversity

The traditional homogeneity of the city of Zagreb has indeed dominated many of the diverse functions it has acquired in different times and under different conditions. It is difficult to deconstruct its historically established homogeneity in order to identify elements of cultural diversity. Yet in this short analysis we may nevertheless attempt to address the question of how cultural diversity may be traced in an ethnically and nationally rather homogenous metropolis. In order to do so, the issue of cultural diversity will be approached on the three different levels:

1. Cultural diversity embedded in the ethnic or national diversity of the city populations;
2. Cultural diversity reflected as social and economic inequality; and,
3. Cultural diversity reflected as technological exclusion or dis-connectedness.

1. Ethnic or national diversity: recent migrations and population of the city

According to the 2001 census, the city of Zagreb had 779,145 inhabitants, out of which 383,959 or 49.4% have been born in Zagreb; 240,981 or 31% have migrated to Zagreb from other parts of Croatia, and 15,5% have come from other ex-Yugoslav republics (the most important immigration being from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11.8%). Only 0.5% or 4,140 persons came from other foreign countries (Europe, Asia, America and Australia)¹⁴⁹. Most of the immigrants from ex-Yugoslavia are of Croatian origin and they usually hold the Croatian citizenship as their first or second nationality. They are not particularly diversified as regards culture, although the internal regional differences are clearly discernible in language, inherited folk cultures and living customs and habits. These are visible notwithstanding the fact that all identify themselves as Croatians, are mostly Catholics and hold Croatian citizenship.

Zagreb thus displays a rather homogeneous ethnic and 'national' population structure, with the kind of clearly visible '*internal*' differences that may be considered *regional differences* within Croatia, e.g., Southerners (Istrians and Dalmatians) offer a specific Mediterranean cultural mix that is easily discernible in their way of life, cultural preferences and artistic expressions; Northerners bring in mostly Central European and Austro-Hungarian influences and display a kind of 'continental' cultural mix.

Most immigrants from the EU countries, Asia, the Americas and Australia also belong to the fourth or fifth generation of Croatians who emigrated at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the period 2000-2004 the number of foreign immigrants in Zagreb was 1,716, which is very low indeed. Their cultural influences are therefore hardly visible. Most of those who have recently settled in Zagreb are Chinese, but except for small shops (126 in 2005) and a few restaurants, their presence is not strongly felt, although it is rather visible. The Chinese choose to settle together, in previously little-inhabited parts of the city. They may be in the process of creating a Chinatown, which is a very new experience for the Croatian metropolis, and perhaps a sign of its future enhanced multicultural character.

After the 1990-1995 war, the migration dynamics slowed down. Zagreb nevertheless registers a constant positive increase in the number of inhabitants coming from other parts of Croatia, from the ex-Yugoslav republics and from foreign countries. As already mentioned, these immigrants are mainly of Croatian origin, and holders of Croatian citizenship. For them, Zagreb is primarily the symbol of Croatia and its independence and they are not interested in a possible multicultural character of their metropolis. Since this new immigration is international mainly because the neighbouring countries are now independent, it appears that the intention to homogenize on the city level is much stronger than the vision of Zagreb in the international multiculturalist perspective. Thus independence is reflected much more as an effort to homogenize nationally and even ethnically than to develop new approaches to multiculturalism, or establish new types of intercultural relations. Now that immigration has stabilized at a low level, national and ethnic homogenization has become even more transparent.

National minority groups in Zagreb

The recent migrations have not much affected the number and structure of the long-established "national minorities" in the city of Zagreb. According to the 2001 census, there were 40,066 members of the latter in the city, or 5.14% of the population. Most of them have traditionally been well integrated into city life and activities. They are rather well organized in their respective associations and clubs, which exercise some influence on the political and economic life of the city. The split is the following:

149. The source of these and other statistical data is the Croatian Statistical Bureau, www.dsz.hr.

Table 48.

National minority	Number	% of the Zagreb population
1 Albanians	3,389	0.43
2 Austrians	53	0.01
3 Bosnians	6,204	0.80
4 Bulgarians	110	0.01
5 Czechs	813	0.10
6 Germans	288	0.04
7 Hungarians	841	0.11
8 Italians	277	0.04
9 Jews	368	0.05
10 Macedonians	1,315	0.17
11 Montenegrins	1,131	0.17
12 Poles	133	0.02
13 Roma	1,946	0.25
14 Romanians	37	0.00
15 Russians	250	0.03
16 Ruthenians	123	0.02
17 Slovaks	171	0.02
18 Slovenian	3,225	0.41
19 Serbs	18,811	2.41
20 Turks	65	0.01
21 Ukrainians	333	0.04
22 Vlachs	1	0.00

The Zagreb city assembly has provided for the establishment and functioning of the Council of national minorities representatives in the City of Zagreb, which has six full members and a president¹⁵⁰. The effort to fully comply with all the laws and regulations on national minority groups is clearly visible. It should be noted that there are hardly any problems in relationships with or among the national minority groups.

150. In the Republic of Croatia minority rights have been regulated by the Constitution (1990) and the subsequent laws: Constitutional Law on human rights and liberties, and rights of ethnic and national communities and minorities (1992, partly suspended in 1995); Constitutional Law on changes and amendments to the 1992 Constitutional Law (2000); Law on the use of language and script of national minorities in the Republic of Croatia (2000).

Metropolitan perspectives on cultural diversity

There are different models of cultural diversity and multiculturalism in Europe: the French model of assimilation; the German Gastarbeiter model (economic connectedness, but limited contacts with different cultures and ways of life); the segmented pluralistic Italian model; British and the Dutch models of 'parallel worlds', etc. Differences among city inhabitants' cultures remain to be discovered, negotiated, individualised, folklorised, or treated as social anachronism¹⁵¹. However, none of these models or situations is at the moment significant for Zagreb. Its ethnic homogeneity is accompanied by the feeble cultural diversification of minority groups', mainly concentrated on the promotion of the identities of these groups, particularly through religious ceremonies, additional school programmes, publishing of specific journals or preserving elements of folk cultures. The multicultural setting of Zagreb is thus not the result of an inflow of foreign workers, but a mixture of Croats who are living together in the same country, together with the minority groups who have been traditionally well established.

2. Cultural diversity reflected as social and economic inequality

Links between national economic development and regional inequalities, so typical of most European countries, are now clearly visible in Croatia and its regions. The regional inequalities inevitably rise as economic development proceeds, and thus reflect "some degree of heterogeneity in regional economic development".¹⁵² Cities are likely to play a major role in fostering growth and technological diffusion, particularly in the relatively poor European countries. Therefore the economic position of the capital city tends to support its metropolitan functions and its metropolitan role. Enhanced economic and social differences have become the reality in the city of Zagreb, and they are as well evident within all of Croatia. The concentration of the new rich is obvious in the city, as well as the new (economic) diversification of the city neighbourhoods, particularly reflected in the prices of apartments and houses.

Social and economic (dis)integration

There are some underprivileged groups in Zagreb, who may be identified ethnically, but also primarily through their opportunities to integrate into the mainstream economic and cultural city life. Their positions might be illustrated through the experiences of the two groups: the Roma (1,946 members, according to the 2001 census) and the Slovenes (3,225 members, according to the 2001 census).

151. Richter Malabotta, Melita, "Managing Cultural Transitions: Multiculturalism, Interculturalism and Minority Policies", manuscript of the lecture delivered in IUC, Dubrovnik, May 2005 (to be published).

152. Barrios, Salvador and Strobl, Eric, "The Dynamics of Regional Inequalities", EC Economic Papers, Bruxelles, June 2005, p.26.

The *Roma* mostly live segregated in city quarters where running water and electricity are rare or non-existent. They are generally poor, and mostly engaged in petty trade on the margins of city bazaars, or in small artisans' services. School attendance as well as general educational levels are low, although efforts have been made to improve this situation. Most of the inhabitants of the Roma quarters have settled for good, but they live isolated and are not fully included into the city life.

The *Slovenes*, on the contrary, are fully integrated in the economic, social and cultural life of the city. However, they cherish their national identity as a kind of distinction, and pay a lot of attention to preserving both their language and a selection of their cultural practices. This is visible in the organized support their community provides to artists, students etc. of Slovenian origin. However, their presence in the city life as a distinctive group is practically invisible. They are fully integrated in the economic, social, cultural life of the city. The language or cultural differences are displayed as 'inner' elements of cultural identity, mostly within the group itself, and through various cultural activities.

The existence of both groups may be visible in the city, but for quite different reasons. The difficult and inadequate social and economic position of the Roma is largely the result of the inherited traditional circumstances that make their assimilation into the city life inadequate. This is matched by a rather passive tolerance of their exclusion by both citizens and the city authorities, combined with an absence of policies and measures to change the situation. On the contrary, the good position of Slovenes may result from their full involvement in the economic and social life of the city. The positions of both groups are reflected in their visibility and image. The Roma are usually perceived as problematic and difficult group, mostly useless for the city. The Slovenes, on the contrary, enjoy a good reputation and are generally regarded to be fully acceptable in all respects.

Economic position of Zagreb in Croatia

Zagreb is the richest and most developed part of Croatia. According to data published in 2005, the city of Zagreb is about eleven times richer than the poorest region of Croatia, the Vukovar district. The second richest region is Istria, which is, however, two and half times poorer than Zagreb¹⁵³. The average GDP value of Croatia in 2004 was USD 7,732 per capita, while Zagreb had about three times more or USD 23,361 per capita. This clearly reflects the extreme differences among Croatian regions and cities, as well as the obviously inadequate recent economic development of the country. Regional divergences in the shape of economic inequality have been constantly growing, and are much more pronounced every year. Zagreb definitely appears to be the economic metropolis of Croatia. Although this position results mainly from state administrative functions (that include decisions linked to privatization and investments), it provides for a dominant

cultural position as well. Zagreb's budget for culture is about 450 million kunas, or approximately 60 million euros, which is about 75% of the cultural budget of the Republic of Croatia. Zagreb hosts many of the state-supported or state cultural institutions, e.g., the national opera and ballet, philharmonic orchestra, a number of national museums, archives, galleries, etc. The cultural institutions and cultural potentials of Zagreb dominate the Croatian cultural scene, and the city has become definitely 'metropolis' in national terms. Although a number of Croatian cities (Pula, Rijeka, Split, Dubrovnik, Vara din, etc.) have a diversified and rich cultural life, they are culturally overshadowed by the cultural potential and creativity in of Zagreb.

Nevertheless, for years the city's cultural policy has remained un-elaborated and not at all transparent. Zagreb definitely lacks a well-elaborated modern concept and policies of cultural development. The city has hardly followed the concepts promoted in cultural policy and strategy of Croatia¹⁵⁴. Most cultural institutions remain marginalized and have never been restructured. The cultural infrastructure has not been renovated and modernized. Some large projects, like the building of the Museum of Modern Arts have been launched, but are still not completed. The programmes of most of Zagreb's cultural institutions lack consistency and sound financial management of resources and programmes. This situation reflects the permanent dissension among political parties on cultural activities, programmes and institutions, and a possible drain of resources for other purposes.

The concentration of economic and cultural potentials in the city of Zagreb strongly supports its metropolitan role. However, it also creates a controversial issue: should the diversity and richness of Croatia as a whole be ever-more concentrated in one single city? Why is such concentration combined with a very limited and slow rate of immigration into the city?

3. Cultural diversity reflected as technological exclusion or (dis) connectedness

The cultural city life in Zagreb is diverse, and, by all standards, rather rich. It is indeed a cultural metropolis. Although many cultural institutions are experiencing difficulties in their functioning, the cultural offer may be compared to almost any European city of the same size and role. The concentration of cultural capacities is reflected in employment rates in the new digital technologies, both in cultural creation and in communication and distribution of cultural contents. Distribution is ever-more dependent on the media and the subsequent spread of new technologies to all parts of the country. Although Zagreb is rather well connected globally, communication with smaller cities within Croatia and the provinces may not be good and intensive enough. Within the city, differences are also discernible and clearly linked to the economic position of some city groups

153. Croatian Economic Chamber and the State Financial Agency, *Intelektualni kapital: Uspješnost na nacionalnoj, upanijskoj i poduzetni koj razini 2004* (The Intellectual Capital: Successfulness on the National, Regional and Entrepreneurial Levels), Zagreb, 2005.

154. *Cultural Policy in Croatia. National Report, Strasbourg 1999; Hrvatska u 21. stolje u. Strategija kulturnog razvitka (Croatia in the 21st Century. A Strategy of Cultural Development)*, Zagreb, 2003.

(e.g. the Roma). The lack of data prevents, however, any serious conclusions. It could simply be said that the use of new technologies in cultural creativity reflects both the inner differences within the city, as well as the differences between more traditional folk cultural creativity in some regions and rural areas on the one hand, and on the other modern arts and culture creativity mainly concentrated in the metropolis.

Concluding remarks

Expressions of cultural diversity in the Croatian metropolis, Zagreb, have been viewed from three perspectives: concentration of ethnic and national groups and their cultural values, expressed mainly through what we have termed *inner cultural differences*; the *economic dominance of the metropolis*, that makes it the richest part of the country, and the *spread/concentration of new technologies* and increased mediation of cultural values through new technologies and media. Zagreb displays a rather homogeneous ethnic and national cultural image. It is supported by its enhanced economic and political/administrative role, which allows for a high concentration of cultural institutions, artists and cultural creativity. The spread and employment of new technologies also support concentration of cultural creativity within the city itself. It may be concluded that Zagreb is today assuming the classic role of an European metropolis, and exercises this role within the country as well as globally. The city has become a potent symbol of the independent Croatia and a discernible point of international recognition of Croatia and its culture.

INFORMATION ABOUT CIRCLE

Cultural Information and Research Centres Liaison in Europe (Réseau des centres de recherche et d'information sur la culture en Europe)

CIRCLE is an independent think-tank dedicated to developing cultural policy models for Europe.

CIRCLE is a network of people concerned with cultural policy including researchers from many disciplines, scholars, documentalists, cultural practitioners, policy-makers and politicians. CIRCLE is also a forum for institutions such as university departments, arts institutions, research organizations, national ministries, arts councils, documentation centres and networks. In bringing together these different entities CIRCLE acts as an intermediary, putting particular emphasis on ensuring that conclusions from its debates are disseminated to those in a position to benefit from them. CIRCLE identifies new issues and maps out what currently exists in terms of research and information and is able to make this information available through on-line resources and databases.

CIRCLE's unique work crosses the whole of Europe (more than 35 countries), a variety of disciplines and a myriad of interested parties. For more than two decades, CIRCLE has maintained its reputation for being at the forefront of cultural policy debate and influencing current and future policy actions.

CIRCLE is a European network, established formally in 1984 and, registered as a Dutch association since 1997. The network has a board that directs the activities of the network and a co-ordinator who facilitates the work and builds links between the members.

CIRCLE evolved with help provided principally by the Culture Committee of the Council of Europe and this agency presently continues to be a prime mover in the work of CIRCLE.

Additional co-operation and/or co-funding for CIRCLE's activities has been provided by numerous institutions, for example:

Arts Council (Dublin), Arts Council of Finland, Arts Council of England, Associazione Economia della Cultura, Boekmanstichting, Budapest Observatory, Cini Foundation, Culturelink, Department of Canadian Heritage, EFAH - European Forum for Arts and Heritage, EricArts, European Cultural Foundation, Fundaciò Interarts, German Federal Ministry of Education, Information and Publications Office of the Italian Government, International Intelligence on Culture, Ministère de la culture et de la communication (France), Norwegian Council for Cultural Affairs, Österreichische Kulturdocumentation, Polish Ministry of Culture and Art, Pro Cultura, Zentrum für Kulturforschung...

INFORMATION ABOUT PRO CULTURA FOUNDATION

The Pro Cultura Foundation was founded in 2003. The idea to create the Foundation originated from the need to call into being an independent Polish research institution in the field of culture.

The main aim of the foundation is to join in international research dealing with culture, cultural industries and new information technologies. All this to propose and promote the best solutions from the field of organising and financing culture and so, to influence its development.

The Foundation gathers together exceptional representatives of science and culture. Its aim is also to build a common ground for dialogue between political, artistic and business societies. And this is, as it is known, not a simple task...

Chosen projects realised by the Pro Cultura Foundation are: „Common project of the reform of organising and financing of culture in Poland”, „Metropolis of Europe – Urban Cultural Life and Inter-city Cultural Interactions – For “Cultural Diversity” In Europe”, „Cultural Offer – needs and expectations of Bielany inhabitants” and others.

As an institution with established international status, the Foundation co-operates on a daily basis with: the Bonn-based European Research Institute on Arts (EricArts), Kulturkontakt (Austria), Budapest Observatory, Observatorio Interarts (Spain), Finnish Foundation for Research on Cultural Policy, Euclid (Great Britain), Intelligence on Culture (Great Britain), Association on Cultural Economics (Italy), Cultural Policy Institute (Russia) and with The Culture & Business Group affiliated at the Polish Confederation of Private Employees. The Foundation also co-operates with cultural networks (i.e. CIRCLE, CULTURELINK, EFAH, ENCATC, etc).

The Foundation is a non-governmental institution with the special status of a public benefit organisation. It does not run any business activities.

The Foundation Board:

Prof. Emil Orzechowski, Alicja Jeleniewska, PhD, Teresa Starzec

Board of Directors:

President, Prof. Dorota Ilczuk, Vice- president, Prof. Kazimierz Krzysztofek

The Foundation is co-ordinated by Magdalena Kulikowska. There are also many volunteers, mainly students of the Warsaw School of Social Psychology and the Jagiellonian University, who are involved in our activity.

